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NEGOTIATIONS OF NATIONAL AND 
TRANSNATIONAL BELONGING AMONG AMERICAN MUSLIMS: 
COMMUNITY, IDENTITY AND POLITY  
AHMET SELIM TEKELIOGLU 
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Major Professor: Sofia Perez, Associate Professor of Political Science 
ABSTRACT 
             This dissertation explores two inter-related questions: a) how US born Muslim 
Americans (converts, second generation and African American individuals) negotiate 
national and transnational belonging in the post- 9/11 context and b) how competing 
discursive practices around the concept of umma (transnational Muslim community) 
influence the way in which American Muslims negotiate an American-Muslim identity. 
The research presented in the dissertation is based on in-depth interviews and 
ethnographic fieldwork conducted in six ethno-racially and socio-economically diverse 
American Muslim communities in Boston and San Francisco Bay Area, including 
mosque communities, educational institutions and third-space organizations. By contrast 
to work focused on organized political movements, the interviews in this research 
focused on the way in which ordinary American Muslims give meaning to their identity 
as Muslims through everyday discursive practices and quotidian understandings of 
community, belonging, and identity. 
          The 22 months-long data collection reveals that rather than primarily through 
saliently foreign policy related or “ideological” considerations, American Muslims 
 viii 
negotiate transnational and national belonging through i) simultaneous considerations of 
inclusion and exclusion in the wider American religious landscape, ii) citizenship 
practices that respond to voices that seek to marginalize American Muslims, and iii) 
through the medium of cultural belonging and identity. The discourse analysis and 
ethnographic fieldwork suggests that American Muslims primarily utilize cultural notions 
of belonging an identity rather than political considerations relating to national or 
international developments in giving meaning to their dual identity. The dissertation also 
notes some differences across and within research sites in Boston, San Francisco Bay 
Area and Los Angeles. American Muslims imagine themselves a particular micro-
community with particular needs, priorities, and cultural outlook that is different from 
other Muslim populations, in both Muslim majority and minority contexts.  On the other 
hand a hybrid set of factors, not simple political considerations, shape American 
Muslims’ understanding of transnational Muslim identity. This is also reflected in their 
internal debates about questions of inclusion and exclusion (gender- based or racial), and 
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CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION 
 
“The man who is travelling and does not yet know the city 
awaiting him along his route wonders what the palace will 
be like, the barracks, the mill, the theater, the bazaar. In 
every city of the empire every building is different and set in 
a different order: but as soon as the stranger arrives at the 
unknown city and his eye penetrates the pine code of 
pagodas and garrets and haymows, following the scrawl of 
canals, gardens, rubbish heaps, he immediately 
distinguishes which are the princes’ palaces, the high 
priests’ temples, the tavern, the prison, the slum. This -some 
say- confirms the hypothesis that each man bears in his 
mind a city made only of differences, a city without figures 
and without form, and the individual cities fill it up.”1  
Italo Calvino, Invisible Cities, p.34. 
 
In March 2015, San Francisco Human Relations Commission unveiled a photovoice 
project capturing Arab, Muslim and Sikh Americans’ experiences with discrimination in 
the American public sphere since the 9/11. Among other stories in the project, a gay 
Muslim Palestinian American voices the trouble he had in the public to voice his 
Palestinian identity and the alternative spaces opened for his Muslim identity in San 
Francisco’s gay spaces, a Sikh man underlines he never runs in the airports and protest 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) agents’ suspicious looks, a Pakistani 
American woman recounts how his brother who was a commercial airline pilot during 
9/11 came under FBI surveillance. Similar stories are widely shared by most religious 
and ethnic minorities in America. In the post-Ferguson, post 9/11 America, neither color-
                                                          
1
 Italo Calvino, Invisible Cities, transl. William Weaver (Orlando: Harvest, 1978). 
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blindness, nor the peaceful melting pot perfectly represent how we imagine America. 
This is why San Francisco Human Rights Commission’s project was aptly titled: “Living 
in an Unfinished America.”2 If America is an unfinished project, an unfinished 
imagination, however, it would mean that the American story has an utopian end. 
However skeptical one may be of such an utopian end, marching progressively toward 
that end will depend on Americans, including those who were born in this country to 
different backgrounds and the multiple immigrant communities of religion, race, and 
ethnicity. In this study I endeavor to present and analyze how an increasingly diverse 
community, the American Muslims, engage with America and its futures.  
I present multiple vignettes from my fieldwork, narrate and analyze the personal stories 
and reflections of numerous generous individuals who shared their life stories and 
insights with me, and focus on a striking set of focal incidents that serve to highlight 
some of the distinctive features of how Muslim Americans imagine themselves in relation 
to their co-religionists across the world on the one hand, and how they interact with 
America, in all its multiplicity. Among many other themes that arise from this study, one 
stands out: As Islam and American Muslims are placed at the center of a national debate, 
however shallow and poisonous it may seem at times, the American Muslim narrative is 
increasingly claiming an equal ownership and stake in writing the unfinished chapters of 
the American experience. As the following pages seek to explain, this process is complex 
                                                          
2
 See, City and County of San Francisco Human Rights Commission, “Living in an Unfinished 
America: Shared Experiences of Discrimination and Resilience by Arab, Muslim, and Sikh 
Americans,” n.d. Available at https://sfgov.org/hrc/sites/sf-




and not neat, often divisive rather than unifying, and highlights the internal diversity of 
American Muslim imaginations shaped by racial, religious, and economic divisions. 
   
Research Questions and Organization of Chapters 
 
My focus in this dissertation will be on the contemporary debates on what it means to be 
American and Muslim, as they are conceptualized within the religious communities in 
which I conducted my fieldwork. The debates that seek to answer the question of Muslim 
American-ness often assume a tension inherent to the juxtaposition of the two terms. In 
other words, it is often assumed – on the one hand in intra-Muslim debates and on the 
other hand in anti-Muslim rhetoric – that being American and being Muslim are 
necessarily at odds with other, hence; require a constant negotiation of Muslimness vs. 
Americanness. This assumption then becomes the pivot on which debates within Muslim 
communities on striking the right balance between the needs of American born Muslims 
and preserving the integrity of religion hinge. The research presented here unpacks some 
of these assumptions through an extensive fieldwork across six American Muslim 
communities and highlights the complex processes of negotiation and discursive 
engagement that is involved in what I call cultural negotiations of belonging.  
Hence in this study I seek to examine one broadly conceptualized focal theme: How do 
religiously observant American Muslims
3
 negotiate what it means to be American and 
                                                          
3
 My investigation is focused on self-identifying American Muslims who are members of mosque 
4 
 
Muslim and how this negotiation influence their relationship with transnational Muslim 
imaginations? The broadness of this theme, however, warrants further elaboration. What 
are the religious and social imaginations that factor into this negotiation? How do 
transnational developments as well as debates about Islam in the American public sphere 
in the post 9/11 era influence national and transnational modes of belonging? The broad 
category, American Muslims, captures multi-layered and often complex sub-categories 
and hyphenated identities including ethnic, racial, generational, and socio-economic ones. 
Additionally, negotiating what it means to be an American Muslim is equally multi-
faceted; political and socio-economic notions often interact in complex fashion with a 
wide array of interpretative meta-narratives about Islam, lived expressions of religion and 
complex processes of citizenship practices and discourses.  
In order to overcome some, if not all, of these complications this dissertation examines 
six American Muslim communities that reflect the ethno-racial, generational and socio-
economic diversity of American Muslim landscape as well as the historical trajectories of 
Islam’s presence and development in the United States. Therefore, the research presented 
here examines three inter-related questions: a) how US born Muslim Americans 
(converts, second generation and African American individuals) negotiate national and 
transnational belonging in the post- 9/11 context, b) how competing discursive practices 
around the concept of umma (-transnational Muslim- community) influence the way in 
which American Muslims negotiate an American-Muslim identity and c) How do US 
                                                                                                                                                                             
communities and other Muslim organizations. Therefore, when I talk about American Muslims  
and American Muslim landscape in the remainder of the dissertation I am referring to  self-
identifying observant Muslims however varying their degree of religiosity may be. 
5 
 
born Muslims situate their experiences and sensibilities vis-à-vis Muslim populations in 
the Muslim majority world? 
Against this background, my dissertation a) unpacks how native-born American Muslims 
construct and negotiate an American Muslim identity and b) seeks to identify the 
discernible discursive elements that influence American born Muslims’ imaginations of 
religious identity in light of national and transnational conceptualizations of belonging. 
Unpacking the concept of umma (community) beyond its most immediate meaning-
framework as “transnational Muslim community” and the multiple discursive contexts 
within which it is utilized, I map debates about the distinctiveness of an American 
Muslim outlook and identity with regards to political and cultural negotiations of 
belonging among American Muslims. Importantly, I bring in indigenous lay Muslims’ 
engagements into this investigation in order to contribute to the literature that relies 
almost exclusively on the discourses of communal leadership, scholarly elites, or over-
represents politicized forms of expression. Embedding the broad conceptual contributions 
of the thesis within the study of transnational religious identities in international relations 
and the study of Muslim minorities in Western settings, with this investigation I offer a 
cross-sectional case study that portrays the role of cultural notions in political 
negotiations of belonging and identity-making. This investigation helps to: 
 a) situate the discursive practices among six American Muslim communities within the 
wider debate on politics of religious identity in Western secular democratic settings and 
Americanization of Islam,  
6 
 
 b) provide an empirical case study that informs the debate negotiations of national and 
transnational modes of thinking among American Muslims,  
c) examine the viability of politicized conceptualizations of Muslim transnationalism(s) 
as a site of negotiation for national and transnational forms of political identity. 
d) unpack discursive practices around a number of religious categories such as Shariʻa4 
(divine Islamic law) and fiqh al-aqalliyat (jurisprudence of minorities) as discursive sites 
of religio-geographic imaginations that contributes to debates on the relationship between 
liberal democratic citizenship and Muslim minorities in the West.  
My aim is to go beyond the over-determinism that characterizes some political Islamist 
views of Muslim transnationalism by revealing the links between quotidian meaning 
frameworks that accompany the concept of umma and its relationship to multiple 
meaning-frameworks and discursive sites with which the notion of a particular Muslim 
American identity that warrants a specific set of concerns, shared moral codes, and 
vocabulary is debated. In doing so, I do not presume a zero-sum trade-off between a 
national and transnational mode of thinking and political engagement. While earlier 
research has assumed a negative relationship between interest in homeland politics and 
engagement in politics in the U.S., recent scholarly work and survey results point to an 
increasingly politically active Muslim American population, much in line with other 
immigrant communities in the U.S.
5
 In addition, building on the role of religious 
                                                          
4
 In this work I do not use diacritics in transliterating Arabic works. The ʻ is used to signify 
Arabic letter ayn as in “Shariʻa” and the ‘ to signify hamza as in “Qur’an.”  
5
 See, Matt Barreto and Karam Dana, “Muslim and American: Transnational Ties and 
Participation in American Politics,” paper presented at the 2008 MPSA Conference, Chicago, IL. 
7 
 
institutions in political mobilization of American religious constituencies, recent work in 
political science has started to examine the role of mosques in political mobilization and 
civic engagement of American Muslim communities.
6
  
The thesis explores the complex sociological mechanism of identity construction through 
unpacking the processes and discourses with which American converts to Islam, second 
generation Muslim Americans and indigenous African American Muslims negotiate their 
multiple identities in relation to domestic and world politics on the one hand, and cultural 
referents on the other. Building on earlier research on Muslim political imagination in 
trans-local political settings
7
, my aim is to also discuss whether or not indigeneity in a 
translocal space – both as a universal and particular geographic realities and as social 
spaces
8
 – alters conditions of religio-political negotiations and religio-sociological 
imaginations of the self and community. 
Therefore, in Chapters 2 and 3, I provide an in-depth historical account of the experiences 
of the six institutions I examined during my fieldwork with an emphasis on their 
institutional leadership and historical development. In the following thematic chapters, I 
unsettle discourses that understand the Muslim community as a community of 
immigrants and emphasize discursive components of the ongoing processes of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Available at: http://www.muslimamericansurvey.org/papers/mpsa2008.pdf [last accessed 
February 26, 2012]. 
6
 Amaney Jamal, “The Political Participation and Engagement of Muslim Americans: Mosque 
Involvement and Group Consciousness,” American Politics Research, Vol. 33, No.4, (July 
2005),pp. 521-544. 
7
 See Peter Mandaville, Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma (New York: 
Routledge, 2001). 
8
 Rhys H. Williams “Creating an American Islam: Thoughts on Religion, Identity, and Place,” 
Sociology of Religion, Vol.: 72, No: 2 (2011), pp. 127- 153. 
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mainstreaming and indigenization of American Muslims. In this regard Chapter 4 focuses 
on diverging, quotidian understandings of the concept of umma, as well as arguments for 
the specificity of American Muslim experience in relation to developments in the wider 
Muslim world. Chapter 5 provides an in-depth study of citizenship discourses and 
practices in the context of engagements with law enforcement agencies drawing much of 
its data from Los Angeles and Boston. Chapter 6 focuses on intra-Muslim debates around 
culture and authority, with a specific focus on the discursive dynamics around immigrant-
indigenous divide. Finally, Chapter 7 details heightened discursive engagement with 
Shariʻah and jurisprudence of minorities in the American context, once again paying 
special attention to contours of a particular American Muslim outlook and discussions of 
cultural referents as the primary source of this imagination. 
 
Case Selection and Data Collection 
 
Primary data collection for this dissertation took place between May 2012 and December 
2014 in Boston and the San Francisco Bay Area where I indexed the major institutions, 
mapped the discursive framework, and conducted a total of 42 in-depth interviews 
including lay-members of my six institutions, and twelve in-depth interviews with clergy 
and institutional leaders. In addition, I utilize a total of 15 interviews conducted in Los 
Angeles and Washington, D.C. in this study. 28 of the respondents were males, and 15 
females. 9 of my respondents were African-Americans and a total of 17 were converts to 
Islam, in addition to two individuals born into convert-families. I interviewed 16 second-
9 
 
generation American-born Muslims among the lay members. In addition to the 
interviews, a number of primary resources such as talks, online and published material 
produced by my institutions, as well as ethnographic fieldwork through participant 
observation  is utilized. The majority of respondents were approached directly, through 
the course of ethnographic immersion and interviews took place in diverse settings. In the 
following chapters I employ pseudonyms to refer to my respondents except in the case of 
institutional leaders who all agreed to be identified with their names. Accordingly, I 
anonymize the details of my respondents’ life stories in order to protect their privacy. 
Importantly, I also utilize online platforms such as Facebook and Twitter for data 
collection and discourse analysis and discuss the dynamics around this phenomenon in 
Chapter 4. 
In Chapters 2 and 3 I will introduce the six institutions that formed the central focus of 
my research, namely Masjid Alhamdulillah, Masjid Al Qur’an and Islamic Society of 
Boston Cultural Center (ISBCC) in Boston and Zaytuna College, Muslim Community 
Association (MCA) and Ta’leef Collective in the San Francisco Bay Area. In choosing 
these institutions I employed a dual criterion: the extent to which they represent specific 
samples of the wider American Muslim demographics and their saliency as leading 
examples of specific subsets of emerging cases of national importance. A third criterion, 
the role of American Muslim converts on the institutional identity, is a common feature 
in five of these institutions. Within this context, converts represent a particularly 
interesting group for the exploration of how individuals construct their identities and how 
this contributes to notions of political community as they undergo a process of change in 
10 
 
their plural, and often contradictory,
9
 group of reference.  The ideas of American converts 
to Islam allow us to explore how individuals conceptualize their political identity when 
this involves negotiating a change of religious reference group and joining a religion that 
postulates affiliation with a trans-national group – the umma. On the other hand, the 
parallels between the present-day experience of Muslims living as minorities and the 
central place of peripheral lands in carrying Muslim thought and experience forward
10
 
poses a crucial challenge for our modern interpretations of the convert and minority 
experience. 
Why do these six institutions serve as laboratories for the examination of how American 
Muslims deliberate and negotiate on what it means to be an American Muslim? My 
primary research questions focus on discursive practices on the boundaries of 
Americanness and normative Islam on the one hand as well as how these boundaries 
affect engagements with the transnational Muslim communities on the other. In doing so, 
I closely examine negotiations of minority politics, role of religious law and cultural 
negotiations of the future of American Muslim communities and American pluralist 
society alike. Against this background, I look at a host of other, often contentious and 
multi-faceted, universe of ideas and debates that influence the post 9/11 politico-cultural 
negotiations that surround American Muslim communities. In doing so, my purpose is to 
walk the reader through not only along the corridors of the making of a religious minority 
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in America but also along the story of the wider American religious landscape. This 
story, I claim, also has implications for the global Muslim population. This position may 
seem surprising not least because the following chapters will include an examination of 
what Zareena Grewal calls “territorializing claims about the American future of Islam”11 
in the context of American exceptionalism – the idea that all things American, including 
religious identities, have innately virtuous and panaceaic qualities that serve for the good 
of the U.S. and global population – which influences American Muslim viewpoints on 
the future of their communities and the global manifestation of Islam, in political, 
cultural, and religious realms. Despite their defensive posture against what they define as 
colonization of American Islam by immigrant Islam, many American Muslim leaders, 
willingly or not, seem to tailor a special role for American Islam in a fashion that is 
reminiscent of the very critique they develop against “imported Islam.” And yet, I argue 
that this is a function not of American exceptionalism or a faulty self-perception, but 
rather rests on the observation that it is related to the very make-up of American Muslim 
demographics: deeply plural, diverse, relatively affluent, and young. Not least because 
the American Muslim demographic is made up of plural backgrounds, including a 
majority who are first generation immigrants, interests on the rest of the world comes 
naturally to American Muslims.  And yet, one question that seems to trouble many 
leaders is whether the second and third generations continue to care not only about what 
happens in country x or y, and whether they will be able to strike a balance between that 
concern and cultivation of a lasting Muslim presence in the U.S. I examine these 
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questions in detail in the following chapters, utilizing in-depth interviews with 
community leaders, religious clergy, and lay members, along with observations from a 
number of American Muslim platforms, including annual conventions organized by 
national umbrella organizations as well as in locally organized events. A number of focal 
incidents that took place throughout my research have also helped highlight several 
important dynamics, from the relationship between foreign policy and domestic identity 
construction to the role of extremism and how the American Muslim community is 
viewed by the policy makers, from the role of racial tensions across and within American 
Muslim publics to the limits and effects of interfaith engagement.  
While negotiations around what an American Muslim identity entails is the focal point of 
my research, a related and equally challenging concern underlies many of the viewpoints 
examined in this study: Will future generations of Muslim Americans care about their 
religion? What does it take to lead a Muslim life in 21
st
 century United States as 
American citizens? In other words, whether hyphenated or not, will second and third 
generation American Muslims really care about the latter identifier in this equation? 
What is notably problematic about the most salient method to answer these questions – 
especially in the form of the mushrooming interest in polling American Muslims after 
9/11 – is poor contextualization and in-depth examination that continues to produce 
superficial results at best. Comparative studies of various faith communities have recently 
been on the rise to gauge the appeal of non-religion,
12
 in part to seek answers to the very 
                                                          
12
 See, Pew Research, “Nones on the Rise,” October 9, 2012. Available at  
http://www.pewforum.org/2012/10/09/nones-on-the-rise/  Note, however, that after a sharp spike 
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same question from an ecumenical point of view. As I will highlight in the reminder of 
this study, a number of American Muslim scholars examined here argue that “American 
Islam” will have to develop a distinct vocabulary and orientation that is tailored for the 
younger generations and in doing so it will have to compete against a varied spectrum of 
alternatives that are available in the ethico-religious marketplace of ideas. This is drawn 
from the observation of American Jewish and Catholic communities in particular, as well 
as a result of conversations with the clergy from within these two preceding faith 
communities. Whether or not American Muslims can overcome the secularizing effects 
of American public religion and if an indigenized American Islam will be able to produce 
the answer to this challenge will remain to be seen as American Muslims respond to 
developments in the U.S. and across the world while continuing to develop their own 
voice and institutions. 
The process of representation and articulation of an emergent American Muslim outlook 
is shaped by a variety of actors other than the plural American Muslim communal voices, 
including, however different in nature than how its European counterparts
13
 shaped 
Muslim life, the American state. In February 2014 U.S. Department of State's Bureau of 
International Information Programs (IIP) released a series of videos that sought to 
introduce American Muslims to global populations. The four-series videos released 
online featured chaplains, community activists, sportsman, and musicians among others. 
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The series were entitled “Who are American Muslims?”14 The videos were circulated 
thereafter by American embassies in the Muslim majority world, including for example, 
by the US Embassy in Pakistan through the Embassy’s Facebook account. IIP also 
organizes hip-hop and jazz music tours in Southeast Asia, West Africa and the Middle 
East featuring American Muslim artists in what Hisham Aidi calls, “sound diplomacy”15 
alongside online video-chat forums to bring American Muslim public figures together 
with Muslim populations from the Muslim-majority world. One such example took place 
during Ramadan in 2014. Cambridge City Councilor Nadeem Mazen, who was portrayed 
in the “Who Are American Muslims” video, engaged in a discussion on being Muslim in 
America, American foreign policy, and his legislative goals as an elected Muslim public 
figure. The live audience he engaged was Ugandan Muslims who were gathered in the 
American Embassy in Kampala. As I tuned in to the conversation from Brighton, 
Massachusetts, several other American Embassies across Africa also hosted locals to 
follow the web-chat, such as in Mauritania’s capital Nouakchott. 
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Figure 1: Mauritanian Muslims Follow a State Department Sponsored Online Web Chat 





Another event with a similar title was held earlier the same month, first on July 1, 2014, 
with NYU Chaplain Khalid Latif and Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC)’s Edina 
Lekovic, targeting South Asian Muslims, and another on July 17
th
 with Linda Sarsour, a 
Palestinian American community organizer from New York City, in Arabic, targeting 
audiences in the Arab Middle East.
17
 IIP’s impressive book on American Muslims is 
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 For the July 1, 2014 event see, IIP State, “American Muslims Speak: Imam Khalid Latif and 
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subtitled with the same question; “Who are American Muslims?”18 Unlike the public 
diplomacy concerns of American government, American Muslims are preoccupied with 
the same question, albeit, with different, more pressing concerns in their minds.
19
 Despite 
the fact that American Muslim’s engagement has been presented as a model to be 
followed in Europe as far back as 2005, when among other initiatives, a program initiated 
directly by the State Department sought to export the American Muslim experience to 
Belgium
20
, the American Muslim sensibilities I have come across in my fieldwork 
suggest that a superficial perspective that is based on the success of the tradition of 
integration and assimilation in the United States vis-à-vis the European failure to 
integrate its Muslim minorities – a view most recently posited by President Obama in the 
wake of January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks
21
 – underestimate the challenges facing not 
only American Muslims but the wider American public whose relationship with religion 
and its role in modern life faces real, often difficult, obstacles as portrayed more recently 
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in the case of post-Paris attacks backlash. In the reminder of this dissertation I frequently 
refer back to these views that point out to the uniqueness of American Muslim experience 
in the context of the current state and future trajectories of American civil religion.  
While I will examine these viewpoints in detail within the American context in Chapters 
4 and 6, it is important in justifying my case selections to point out that the epicenter of 
the debate around American Muslim identity, including whether there could be one 
American Muslim identity, however loosely defined, seems to suggest that the 
boundaries of this identity would have implications beyond its very subjects, the Muslim 
Americans.
22
 As we will see below, some community leaders have started to criticize a 
certain inclination in the American Muslim communities that seek to self-identify as a 
“chosen umma,” a community of Muslims that are inherently better placed to answer the 
crisis of Islam in the modern world. Some of my respondents would similarly point out to 
the peculiarity of American Muslims, sometimes on basis of its diversity, and sometimes 
for its tolerance and experiences in public religion. Proponents of this view argue that 
American Muslims are enabled to do away with the politico-cultural baggage that 
cripples a true manifestation of Islam in the Muslim majority world. Additionally, in 
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comparison to Muslim minorities in the remainder of the West, American Muslims 
benefit from the void of colonial legacies, present an upwardly mobile and affluent 
demographics, and enjoy the blessings of American experience with freedom of religion 
and a hospitable environment in which religion can survive in the public sphere.  
The institutional frameworks I examine speak individually to these questions and yet 
come together as a whole in providing the universe of alternative voices that account for 
ethno-racial as well as religio-ethical fault lines that develop in the wider, national 
American Muslim scene. Notwithstanding the fact that they collectively make up the 
ecology of Muslim presence in their respective settings, they have important differences 
in their programming, scriptural and hadith-based interpretations, and the type of 
religious scholarship they prefer, their organizational and financial footing, and their 
historical evolution. In this context, ISBCC and MCA represent immigrant-driven 
institutionalization; Masjid Al Qur’an, Masjid Alhamdulillah and Ta’leef Collective 
portray the dual evolution of African-American communities, and finally Zaytuna 
College exhibits the pedagogical networks and scholarly orientations. In this section I 
also provide a discussion about the newly imagined Muslim communal and devotional 
spaces,
23
 namely the mushrooming of Third Spaces. “Third space” organizations emerged 
in the last half decade as a new category that corresponded to discourses about the 
shortcomings of mosques; more inclusive, relevant open, and appealing to younger 
generation American Muslims and those who are learning about Islam. With Ta’leef 
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collective being the most prominent example of the mushrooming ‘third spaces’ across 
American Muslim terrain my discussion also ties in with the mosqued/unmosqued debate 
that has emerged as a central theme in the discussion of culture, religion and politics 
among American Muslims. I explain each institution in relation to the local and national 
context and provide information on their historical evolution and leadership. The primary 
research in the two locales, Boston and the San Francisco Bay Area, is then 
complemented with additional findings and insight from my fieldwork in Los Angeles, 
especially in the context of Chapter 5. 
My work for this research started with the awareness that any number of organizations 
and institutions would not reflect the totality of viewpoints and perspectives that exist 
among Muslims in any given locality. Next to institution a you would find institution b 
that could depart from the perspectives I indexed in the previous institution. Individuals x 
and y would differ significantly from sister and brother w and z in the next building. To 
account for these differences I choose to first chronicle the overall trajectory of Muslim 
presence in each landscape, and present an overall depiction of alternative perspectives. 
And yet, it would be a misrepresentation to treat any of my institutions as insular from 
the wider environment they inhabit. In each case, the level of awareness and 
responsiveness to the alternative views and positions was high. Additionally, not only 
institutional representatives and officials but also lay members were aware of those 
outside their institutions – in fact, so much so that majority of my interviewees chose to 
answer my questions in a way that responded to not only myself but those that differed 
with them. Finally, and in part due to the small scale of the community and the relatively 
20 
 
short trajectory of their histories, many of these institutions are related in many ways. In 
the case of Zaytuna College and Ta’leef Collective, the former gave birth to the latter and 
while they exist as independent organizations today, the close relationship continues. The 
same goes for the congregants that I interviewed. Ta’leef would attract MCA members, 
Masjid Al Qur’an’s Imam would deliver sermons at ISBCC and Masjid Alhamdulillah’s 
financial troubles would be offset by these former institutions.  
Despite this level of collaboration and co-existence, however, each institutional 
framework offers distinct qualities. These are reflected in their histories, their 
organizational principles and culture, and their discursive engagement with the idea of 
American Muslim identity and how to position themselves in relation to a host of issues, 
including socio-political and ethico-religious ones. They differ from one another in terms 
of the educational lineage of their religious clergy, the socio-economic make up of their 
members and boards, and how they engage with the idea of umma and American Islam. It 
is also reflected in the place they occupy in the historical transformation of Muslim 
terrain in their respective locations. Once early centers of Islam’s presence in Boston, 
today, Masjid Al Qur’an and Masjid Alhamdulillah remain on the margins of Boston’s 
Muslim landscape. Ta’leef started off as a small organization out of a one bedroom house 
and today occupies an increasingly recognized national role. Zaytuna College started off 
as a loosely institutionalized institute very much dependent on its charismatic founder 
Shaykh Hamza Yusuf’s persona. After a transformative period in the 2000s, today it has 
established itself as the first accredited Muslim liberal arts college in North America.  
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On Research Methods and Ethnographic Account 
 
I am aware that my own situatedness as a self-identified Muslim has affected my own 
fieldwork I first came to the US in 2003 and stayed for two months. That was the very 
first time I left my native Turkey, the very first time I even took a flight. As with many 
students, when I embarked on my graduate studies in Boston in 2007, I had a completely 
different research focus than the current project. Now poised to spend a considerable 
amount of time in the U.S. – although I should confess I never imagined it would be this 
long – my perspective as a Muslim was different than in the summer of 2003. Over the 
following years, as I travelled across the country and through institutions, I always 
remembered my own trajectory and kept in perspective my own pre-conceived ideas 
about the very reality of living as a modern Muslim in America as well as about 
American Muslim histories. The only American Muslim that I could identify prior to 
2003 was two African Americans. Malcolm X was the revolutionary poster-man akin to 
Che Guevara, and I remember reading his autobiography as a kid. Muhammad Ali, the 
heavyweight champion, was the one paragon of Muslim victory when much of the global 
Muslim world was suffering from a sense of defeat and fatigue. The elderly would tell 
stories of tuning to the state radio to listen to his matches, and cheers that followed when 
he won. Ignorant not only of the trajectory of both of these names in Nation of Islam, but 
also their interwoven life stories that resulted in NOI embracing Muhammad Ali as their 
chief face at a time when Malcolm had decided to leave the organization I, along with 
million others in Turkey, related to almost imaginative narratives about American 
Muslims, personified in the images of these two remarkable historical figures. In my 
22 
 
college years, it would be a source of disappointment for me to listen to Turkish expats 
returning to Turkey and telling their disappointment with, and sometimes racially 
pejorative stories about, African Americans. I lived in College Park and frequently 
travelled to Greenbelt, which was at the time a predominantly African American suburb 
that had its own share of reminiscent of those stereotypes. These experiences would allow 
me to better appreciate the critique of “later-comers” that had developed in the African 
American communities. 
While I had not realized it then, one of the more memorable observations in my fieldwork 
took shape before I had even left Ankara for Boston. In the summer of 2007, I was 
preparing to leave for Boston and had started looking online to figure out if there were 
Muslim communities around Boston University. In addition to the university’s Islamic 
Society the search had pointed out to Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center, ISBCC. 
The first picture that was on the website was the minaret capping event that took place on 
June 9, 2007. It would be another year and a half, before the Center was officially opened 
at an inaugural ceremony attended by the then Boston Mayor Thomas Menino
24
, while 
the interim period saw many events organized at the new urban center of Muslim life in 
Boston. The striking part of the pictures for me was the American flag that was attached 
to the top part of the minaret, as it was placed on a crane. At the time, it seemed rather 
strange to me that a mosque would attach an American flag on its minaret – perhaps it 
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reminded me of the post 9/11 bumper sticker craze that had hit the U.S. and was one of 
the more disturbing aspects of my perceptions about America during that 2003 visit 
which had come rather soon after the launch of war on terror and subsequent military 
campaigns and invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
 
 
Figure 2: Minaret capping event in Roxbury, June 9, 2007.
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In several interviews some five years after, American Muslims from different 
backgrounds offered alternative opinions about the presence of an American flag in a 
mosque setting. According to a second generation Bengali-American, it was the only flag 
he knew, that he was the American kid in Bangladesh, the quintessential Long Island 
boy, so it was only natural that the American flag would find a place in the mosque 
space.
26
 An American-born, Azhari Imam in Southern California begged to differ: He 
supported the normalization of being an American and a Muslim, but the presence of flag 
was unnecessary, too reminiscent of a problematic type of nationalism. His reference 
point was not some foreign policy decision, however. Instead, he was referencing the 
Native Americans who also had a problem with the star spangled flag, and that American 
flag perhaps should not find a home in religious congregations.
27
  
Before delving into closer examination of the case studies, however, I need to emphasize 
that my approach is a non-linear examination in the sense that I am not going to be 
treating the institutions, and the trajectory of the wider American Muslim community, 
along the context of the story of a set of binaries – integration vs. assimilation, American 
vs. non-American, moderate vs. conservative, etc. While I will be employing these 
adjectives to the extent they are discursively used by my subjects, I will constantly 
remind the reader that chronicling Muslim American histories along a linear narrative of 
how a predominantly immigrant religious minority gains recognition in the American 
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public space would conceal other, often crucial and insightful, discussions that precede 
and continue to affect key aspects of the underlying purpose of my inquiry – shedding 
comparative light to contesting and continually challenged tone and outlook of religious 
life and discourses in modern plural societies. In this sense, the study of American 
Muslims is a subset of a wider field of inquiry.  
 
Sociopolitical Context and a Growing Literature on Islam in the United States 
Not least because of the impact of 9/11 attacks, the settlement and indigenization 
processes of American Muslim communities have been explored more carefully since the 
9/11. Shedding light on five phases of Islam’s engagement with America, the emerging 





 century slave trade b) post 1965 flow of immigrant Muslims and the Black 
American Islam c) the institutionalization of Muslims in the 1970s and 1980s d) the 
emergent debates about the need to develop an increasingly American Muslim outlook in 
the 1990s and e) post 9/11 dynamics that further exacerbated the indigenizaton processes 
on the one hand and brought Islam and Muslims into the center of public scrutiny 
debates.
28
 Each of these five episodes includes a number of crucial distinct features. 
Importantly, the transition of the proto-Islamic African American movements, mainly 
Nation of Islam, into mainstream Sunni Islam in the late 1970s onwards as well as early 
founding fathers’ interactions with and perception of Islam has attracted separate 
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attention. The increasing number and prominence of second and third generation 
American Muslims alongside convert-Americans and their leadership roles on the one 
hand and the steady flow of immigrant Muslims on the other have also gave way to a 
heightened tension and conversation about frequently divergent priorities and sensibilities 
of immigrant and indigenous Muslim Americans. This divide exhibits itself not only in 
conversations about inter-generational differences but also in conversations about race 
and ethnicity and the role and function of mosques. Because the U.S. Census Bureau does 
not include questions about religious affiliation, estimates on the size and profile of 
Muslim Americans have been a source of debate in the literature. Different studies 
estimate numbers ranging from as low as 2.1 million Muslim Americans to around 10 
million in terms of overall numbers. Most studies use data approximated from 
immigration statistics, where a similar problem exists. Similar to census forms, 
immigration papers do not ask about an individual’s religious affiliation. As a result, 
although various estimates on the size and profile of American Muslims all rely on 
number of immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries, higher birth rates among 
immigrants, as well as reported conversion numbers, they arrive at conflicting numbers. 
While independent organizations such as Pew use otherwise robust statistical methods, 
their sampling and interview methods have been questioned by some analysts.
29
 To some 
their numbers seem more reliable than estimates made by Muslim grassroots 
                                                          
29
 See, Zahid Bukhari, “Blind Men and the Elephant: Media Outlets, Political pundits and the Pew 
Study on Muslim Americans,” available at http://blogs.georgetown.edu/?id=25221 [last accessed 




30, but one should note Pew’s estimates are questioned by most Muslim 
American leaders.  Pew Report cites that, “based on data from the survey, in combination 
with U.S. Census data, Pew Research Center demographers estimate that there are about 
1.8 million Muslim adults and 2.75 million Muslims of all ages (including children under 
18) living in the United States in 2011. This represents an increase of roughly 300,000 
adults and 100,000 Muslim children since 2007, when Pew Research demographers used 
similar methods to calculate that there were about 1.5 million Muslim adults (and 2.35 
million Muslims of all ages) in the U.S.”31 According to the same study, 63% of Muslim 
Americans are first generation immigrants to the U.S., with 45% having arrived in the 
U.S. since 1990. More than a third of Muslim Americans (37%) were born in the U.S., 
including 15% who had at least one immigrant parent, which means another 22% were 
born in the US to US-born parents. According to Pew, among native-born Muslims 
whose parents also were born in the U.S., 69% say they are converts to Islam, and among 
African American Muslims who were born in the U.S., 63% are converts to the faith. 
According to Pew Research Center, Sunni and Shia Muslims have similar numbers of 
converts within their ranks (17% among Sunnis and 13% among Shi’a). Among Muslims 
with no specific affiliation, 36% say they are converts to Islam. 
Since September 11, there has been increased scholarly attention to mapping the 
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American Muslim landscape. Islam and in particular American Muslims keep the lion’s 
share of concerns at the center of a national debate, ranging from debates around civic 
enculturation of American Muslims to their presumed proclivity to radical Islam that 
became subject of congressional hearings and that continues to factor importantly in the 
national and local electoral campaigns. Particularly in the post-9/11 era, Muslim life in 
the United States has been considerably securitized and fundamentally metamorphosed at 
sociological, anthropological, and theological levels. Thoroughly altering perceptions at a 
societal level, thus, public debates on Islam inaugurated an orientation towards creating a 
hostile environment which, in turn, transformed the public sphere: Muslims in America, 
to say the least, started to face further difficulties, challenges and problems in 
experiencing, practicing, and positing a Muslim identity. According to a Gallup survey in 
2011, an overwhelming 60% of American Muslims think they face prejudice in the 
American society.
32
 A Pew survey from the same year notes that 55% of Muslim 
Americans think it has been more difficult to be a Muslim in the U.S. since 9/11.
33
 From 
increased law enforcement scrutiny to the debates around imposing bans on Shariʻa in 
several states, Islam today is at the heart of a national debate.  
On the other hand, and despite setbacks in the past ten years, when compared to the 
experience of Muslims in other Western democratic settings, Muslims in America find a 
relatively more hospitable environment in terms of living their lives as Muslims, and 
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exercising their Muslim identity in the public sphere
34
, thanks in part to the distinct role 
deprivitized forms of religious identity and “passive secularism” plays in American 
public life.
35
 At the same time, American Muslims have experienced increased 
maturation of their institutions, invested in media representation, and have been engaged 
in a lively debate about religious, cultural and political aspects of being Muslim in 
America in light of other minority religions’ experiences.  
Simultaneously, structural conditions in the world, such as the recent emergence of the 
“Islamic State” or ISIS, provide real and symbolic ammunition to those who think Islam 
does not have a place in a pluralist modern polity. In response, Muslim American 
communities increasingly contribute to longstanding efforts to develop a new 
understanding of Muslim presence in non-Muslim majority countries on the one hand, 
and Islam’s relationship with modern notions of citizenship, democracy, and managing 
difference on the other. As a result, and especially since the tremendous impact of 
September 11 attacks, American Muslims are increasingly staking their future to a truly 
pluralist imagination of citizenship in the U.S. All of this resulted in a population that is 
more actively interested in representing Islam as an organic part of American religious 
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life, although, as I highlight in my thematic chapters, sub-sets of this conversation remain 
contentious.36  
As Bilici highlights, the evolving nature of Muslim American’s interaction with the 
American society and political conditions is indicative of the simultaneous processes of 
boundary shifting; the transformative influence of newcomers and religious and cultural 
minorities on their host environments.
37
 Additionally, as Stefano Allievi mentions with 
regard to European contexts, modern society is increasingly becoming a “society of 
minorities,” and racial, as well as religious majorities are progressively being imagined as 
“contextual majorities.”38 These frameworks also help minorities overcome one of the 
primary criticisms that is directed to certain strands of liberal multiculturalism: That the 
discourse of pluralism in these versions implicitly allows for different cultural identities 
to be exhibited only in certain sanctioned settings such as special holidays, parades, and 
social events whereas outside these realms it requires them to be put aside in favor of a 
culturally neutral space to allow for interacting as “Americans.”39 In other words, 
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increasing diversity and the public visibility of minority religions reminds American 
society of its decreasing homogeneity. In this period, the Muslim community has 
witnessed a rise in the interfaith dialogue efforts, in participation in political processes, 
and in the desire to build broad societal coalitions.  
At the same time as the increasing diversity and the public visibility of minority religions 
reminds American society of its decreasing homogeneity, virulent trends such as 
Islamophobia remains a real concern. However, the mere fact that other ethno-cultural 
minorities have also been treated with suspicion and alarmism
40
 throughout American 
history is frequently brought up by my respondents as a somber consolation. This process 
of mainstreaming of religious minorities also means that moral claims to shape American 
socio-political ecology are becoming more democratic. In other words, as Kathleen 
Moore discusses in the context of “diasporic jurisprudence,” and legal plurality that has 
developed among American and British Muslims, Muslim Americans are narrated and 
“narrate themselves into the multicultural nation and state.”41 At the same time, as Turner 
and Richardson points out, anti-Muslim and xenophobic sentiments signal a problem 
wider than mere hostility toward Muslims and other religious and ethno-racial “others,” – 
the problem of general erosion of trust in modern multicultural societies.
42
 
It is in this very sensitive context that in the past decade and a half Islam in America has 
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attracted increased attention from academic scholars and policy experts. Building on 
relatively limited number of empirical work
43
 on the otherwise long history of Islam in 
the United States
44
, national surveys, and academic scholarly works have addressed 
questions ranging from ethnic and racial influences on Muslim life in the U.S. to civic 
integration of Muslim immigrant communities. The pre-9/11 focus on the experiences of 
immigrant communities mostly juxtaposed ethnic background and questions of religiosity 
in light of historical experiences of these sub-groups.
45
 Major hubs of immigrant Muslim 
communities also attracted attention where racial, ethnic and religious identities often co-
existed as analytical frameworks.
46
 Likewise, renewed attention on Islam alongside the 
wider debate on citizenship and multiculturalism further developed the already 
comparably more mature scholarship on Islam in Europe
47
 with in-depth examinations of 
Muslim communities and their imaginations about Islam and their adopted homelands in 
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In post-9/11 United States, the academic curiosity as well as public anxiety about Islam 
resulted in a burgeoning literature at the same time as some studies pointed out that 
American Muslims came to increasingly discover and represent their religious identity vis 
a vis their ethno-racial identities.
49
 An increasing number of studies explored the social, 
political and psychological aspects of Muslims’ integration to the American society. 
These studies not only juxtaposed the experiences of other immigrant religious 
communities with Muslim communities in the United States
50
 but also examined 
simultaneous processes of boundary shifting; the transformative influence of newcomers 
and religious and cultural minorities on their host environments.
51
 Similarly, the post-
9/11 realities in America generated another genre from various disciplines that focused 
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Especially focusing on the history and development of the spread of Islam among African 
Americans and Arab and South Asian immigrant Muslims’ navigation between different 
socio-political and cultural frameworks
53
, this genre of scholarship has only in the recent 
years started to include American converts to Islam and indigenous Muslim Americans as 
another coherent focus area. And yet, most of this attention has been limited to a series of 
studies dealing with conversion either as a subject matter of psychology of religion or as 
a process speaking to crucial issues such as gender and conversion.
54
 The indigenous 
African American communities and their theological transformation and outlook which is 
integral to the historical evolution of Islam in America, shared the very same fate – that 
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is, increased and crucial scholarly attention but insufficient content for a deeper 




At the same time, an increased number of anthologies and memoirs about American 
Muslims contributed to efforts on self-representation in the post-9/11 era to counter 
stereotyped images of Islam.
56
 Phenomenon such as the emergence of Muslim female 
super-heroes in popular comic book series as in the case of “Ms. Marvel” series of 
Marvel Comics
57
 as well as the increased visibility and access of Muslim ethnic 
comedy
58
 to wider audiences with themes including the self-representations of 
Muslimness, the effects of Islamophobia and securitization of Islam, and intra-Muslim 
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racism are frequently cited as examples of mainstreaming of Islam and its positive 
portrayals in public imagination. On the other hand, studies on media representations of 
Muslim minorities in popular television drama series have also emerged, questioning the 
linkages between post 9/11 government policies and “seemingly” positive portrayals of 
Muslims in security-oriented TV shows.
59
 Utilizing the post-structuralist perspective of 
Islam as a discursive tradition
60
 and post 9/11 discursive frameworks about a “good 
Muslim/bad Muslim” dichotomy61 an increasing number of scholarly work by critical 
social scientists continue to examine historical and contemporary imaginations of 
America among American Muslims and the politics of representation.
62
 As some political 
scientists continue to reformulate much of the inquiry around Islam’s assumed 
incompatibility with Western values and instead question if the West is going through its 
own soul-searching through its encounters with Islam and Western Muslims,
63
 Islam and 
Muslims as categories that pose a complex dilemma in the modern world continue to be 
examined through the lenses of transnational developments and the appeal of Islam for 
those seeking a “de-territorialized” political expression.64 Similarly signs of what Peter 
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Berger names resurgent religion
65
 sparked a breadth of new scholarship that provided 
crucial insights into comparative understanding of how and in what ways religiously 
inspired political parties, civil society organizations, as well as Islamic ideas and ideals 
were interacting with the secular environment around them.
66
 
Against this background I seek to unpack two distinct but related dynamics at play in 
some of the assumed inherent tensions that often goes unexamined. First is the 
construction of the Muslim community as a diasporic community, namely, non-organic 
and non-indigenous to American religious life. The actual Muslim community in the 
U.S., to the extent that one can speak of one Muslim Community, is much more complex 
as second and third generation US born Muslims, indigenous African American Muslims 
as well as converts to Islam from other religions, constitute a large part of this 
community. Furthermore, as several scholars noted the experiences of immigrant Muslim 
Americans are shifting away from being defined in the context of “interstitial spaces” 
whereby Muslims is “’in’ a society but not ‘of’ it”67 or as an “anomic periphery.”68 My 
research points out that the American Muslim discourses are increasingly moving away 
from seeing their presence in the United States as a “necessity” born out of exceptional 
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 and are in the process of overcoming what Bilici calls “homeland 
insecurity.”70 The emergence of second and third generation Muslims as well as converts 
shape this discourse in conjunction with changing sensibilities of older generation 
immigrant Muslims, thereby helping new immigrants arrive at a normalized landscape, 
notwithstanding continuing internal debates and influences of external factors such as 
securitization of Islam in America and rising Islamophobia. 
Second dynamic at work in the assumption of the inherent contradiction of the Muslim 
American identity is the uncontested belief that Muslim identity is formed through a 
constant negotiation between the necessities of a modern secular life versus the 
necessities of a religious/pious life. A closer examination of discourses on the 
experiences of other religious minority groups in the U.S., however, reveals that this 
second dynamic is not particular to the debates on Islam vs. Americanness. In fact, most 
discussions on the formation of religious identities in the U.S. tend to conceptualize these 
identities as negotiations of tensions between the perceived characteristics of American 
culture and necessities of a religious life. For instance, Robert J. Wuthnow argued that 
discussions on religion and/or conceptualization of religious life in America were shaped 
by four such polarities – individual vs. community, diversity and uniformity, liberal and 
conservative notions of doctrine, and finally public and private role of religion.
71
 David 
O’Brien, who understands these polarities as tensions between Americanness and 
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religiousness, examined Catholic and Jewish communities through these four 
dichotomies.
72
 As Wuthnow warned, however, “these assumptions take shape within a 
kind of space that is available to us by virtue of the language we use and the categories in 
which we think.”73 Hence, my examination is more directed toward an exploration of 
everyday discourses and narratives that circulate in the American Muslim public sphere. 
The polarized pairs, in which individualism, diversity, liberalism and private expression 
of religion come to represent Western/secular/modern values depending on context, have 
been used in discussions of Muslim communities in Europe and the United States. In 
these examinations the negotiations between such tensions are perceived as leading to 
crisis of pluralization of religious authority and alienation of the younger generation from 
their first generation Muslim parents. Given these two overlooked dynamics, I will argue 
the debates that surround the question of what it means to be Muslim American in the 
U.S. today need to pay closer attention to local, contextual dynamics and account for the 
historical influences that resonate with the process of becoming Muslim in America.  
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Citizenship, Religious Pluralism and National and Transnational Belonging  
 
An exploration of American Muslim debates on national and transnational imaginations, 
or in Zareena Grewal’s adopted conceptualization of moral geographies74, require being 
attentive to the linkages between citizenship, religious pluralism, the problem of 
differentiating between the nation and the polity, as well as questions around inclusion 
and exclusion.
75
 In their 2000 study Kymlicka and Norman observed that citizenship 
literature has started to do away with its theoretical standing in favor of more practical 
suggestions as modern societies came to be defined with increasing diversity and nation-
states faced the impact of transnational flows of people at an increasing pace.
76
 Therefore 
the challenges of ethno-racial and religious minorities have been felt in not only deeply 
diverse but also relatively homogenous societies. On the other hand religious difference 
and management of religious diversity, as well as the otherization of religious minorities 
– especially Muslim minorities in the West as ”unassimilable”77 or “suspect 
communities”78 – have become one of the key sub-sets of the wider question of 
democratic citizenship. At the same time, the question of religious difference and regimes 
of managing religious diversity are not mere recent processes but rather evolve through 
particular historical and institutional experiences. The management of religious pluralism 
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in the United States has gone through various phases since the colonial era. European 
immigrants that arrived to America before the declaration of independence had carried 
with them not only the burdens of their experiences of religious persecution, but also the 
dynamics of state-religion relations from their various European homelands. The 
evolution of state-church relationship through various phases would significantly shape 
majority and minority religious communities’ experiences in America. Similarly, the 
history of slavery in the country and the abolitionist struggle of the African-American 
slaves changed the ways in which immigrants’ ethnic or racial origins were perceived. 
The reception of Muslim communities in the United States and what it means to be 
Muslim today has been greatly shaped by the arrival of European settlers fleeing from 
religious persecution, the experiences of religious minorities such as the Mormon, 
Catholic and Jewish communities, and the arrival of Muslim slaves to Americas and the 
consequent abolitionist struggle. If First Amendment would easily serve to overcome the 
numerous ethical, theological, and sociological challenges that define daily lives of 
believing and non-believing Americans, much of our debates would disappear. And yet, 
social realities are inherently complex and modern life is often defined by difficult 
dilemmas. According to Ahmet Kuru, the overlap between Jeffersonian Enlightenment 
lens and Isaac Bacus’ Great Awakening lens created a workable consensus for 
disestablishment.
79
 In this regard, several theoretical models have been offered to name 
and explain American experience with religion. Kuru’s typological study suggests that 
unlike France and Turkey, the lack of an ancient regime in the United States allowed for 
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the development of a tradition of passive secularism in America. With some difference 
Stepan utilized twin tolerations
80
 Casanova’s framework drew attention to public 
religion, and Rajeev Bhergava’s typology talks about value based secular states that are 
either based on mutual exclusion, one-sided exclusion or a principled distance. While he 
does not specifically name it as such, American experience stands close to Bhergava’s 
normative model, contextual secularism
81
 that is based on principled distance. According 
to him, this type of state-religion relationship is a viable model to manage contemporary 
pluralism that characterizes both Western and non-Western societies. The question, then, 
is as much whether we can expand the title of Will Herberg’s famous 1955 work, 
Protestant-Catholic-Jew
82
, to include Buddhist, Hindu, Sikh, Muslim, Secular, Atheist, 
and the Nones
83
, but also whether multi-religious America can envision a legal, ethical, 
and sociopolitical imagination that can manage difference without requiring from it a 
total agnosticism in the public sphere. As Bhergava reminds us we need to be aware of 
power relations across and within religious traditions: 
“every form of diversity, including religious diversity, is enmeshed in 
power relations….endemic to every religiously diverse society is an 
illegitimate use of power whereby the basic interests of one group are 
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threatened by the actions of another. It further follows that inherent in 
religiously diverse societies is the possibility of both interreligious and 
intrareligious domination – a broad term that encompasses discrimination, 
marginalization, oppression, exclusions, and the reproduction of 
hierarchy…These are in addition to the domination by the religious of the 
nonreligious and the domination of the religious by the nonreligious.”84 
According to the most recent Pew data on a national scale, Muslims are the second most 
ethno-racially diverse religious group in the United States after Seventh-day Adventists. 
Catholics trail Muslims as the fifth most diverse group, owing much of this to the 34 
percent Latino Catholics.
85
 In terms of their religious make up along Christian, Non-
Christian and “nones” axis we see an interesting dynamic in our three geographic areas 
from which primary data was drawn in this study: Los Angeles has the least percentage 
of nones (25 percent) and the highest percentage of Christians (65 percent, out of which 
32 percent identify as Catholics). Boston’s nones constitute 33 percent and Catholics 
occupy 29 percent out of 57 percent who identify as Christians. In San Francisco nones 
constitute second highest population in the nation after Seattle (37 percent) with 35 
percent. San Francisco’s Catholics are 25 percent out of 48 percent total self-identifying 
Christians, which is the lowest share of Christian among America’s 17 major 
metropolitan areas.
86
 These numbers tell us a profound story in terms of the landscape 
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within which moral plurality, multiple claims to authority and authenticity, as well as 
diverse readings of the wider politico-ethical currents take place. What flows naturally 
out of this plural public ethical reasoning is a dynamic ethico-religious landscape. But the 
fact is to the protest of many Catholics who draw attention to the increasing power of a 
secular ethics and Jews who are self-conscious to be living in a Christian ethico-legal 
framework
87
, and to disagreements between Evangelical and mainstream strands of 
Protestantism over how to manage the existence and the height of “the wall of 
separation” between church and the state, Herberg’s prognosis of the American religious 
landscape in the 1950s continue to be challenged by increasing difference. In other 
words, on the one hand we debate whether there should be an impenetrable wall of 
separation between church and the state. On the other hand, however, modern 
sensibilities that understand the state to be coterminous with the public realm pose 
difficulties for a meaningful discussion of the parameters of any separation. If First 
Amendment protects free exercise and encourages a “no discrimination, no favoritism” 
principle, could not religion still influence society without claiming to interfere with state 
institutions? These questions have been addressed by social scientists, legal experts, 
statesman and lay commentators. Rarely agreeing on their prognosis, these actors shaped 
future debates by their actions and reactions to historical context. In addition, efforts to 
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understand American legal, political and social interaction with religion in comparison to 
other pluralistic democracies have shed important light to our perceptions. In the recent 
years, the debate has received renewed attention, especially after the recent publication of 
some major works on the theory and practical aspects of secularism and multicultural 
societies.
88
 These publications are not only important for their assessments of these two 
theses, but also for showing the limitations of terms such as “religion,” “secularism,” and 
“secularity” in the academic terminology, and the ambiguities they create in our historical 
analysis as well as in our understanding of current developments such as the question of 
free speech and freedom of religion.
89
 The debates about the role of religion in the U.S. 
vary in light of alternative readings of history, and evolving views of the notion of “civil 
religion”90 also highlight the intricacies of Islam’s evolution toward becoming an 
American religion. In this context, religio-juristic discourses and everyday practices often 
interact and inform one-another. On the other hand, the increasingly informative 
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literature on Islam in America still has much room for exploration of this interaction. In 
this study, my main focus is on the dynamics of the relationship between everyday 
settings and self-narratives of my respondents on the one hand, and the religio-juristic 
discourses and conceptualizations on the other.  
Territoriality, Islamic Studies and International Relations 
 
In a recent examination on the Islamic Studies programs in the United States Charles 
Kurzman and Carl Ernst draw attention to the skyrocketing of publications on Islam and 
Muslims in leading journals in the post 9/11 period.
91
 They recognize that, paradoxically, 
the very threat perception around and securitization of Islam has been responsible for the 
spike in publications, adding additional layers of challenges to the field of Islamic Studies 
that seeks to move beyond regional and disciplinary boundaries amid a plethora 
challenges around funding, language instruction, lack of faculty positions, and 
geographic boundedness of most programs. Reflecting on the development of Islamic 
studies programs in the U.S., John Voll notes that American academia treated Islam from 
an area studies perspective
92
, mostly limiting its explanations of Islam as a Middle 
Eastern phenomenon to the neglect of other geographic areas
93
 and to the neglect of Islam 
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as a religion. Voll argues that Islamic studies evolved from an Orientalist legacy to area 
studies expertise, and from area studies approach to disciplinary approaches that were 
deeply affected by post-Cold War attention to global Islam, only to rediscover its focus 
on “Islamic fundamentalism,” that started with Iranian revolution, resurgence of 
Islamism, and the early 1990s’ debates on clash of civilizations and end of history in the 
post 9/11 era, albeit in novel, often similarly problematic, manners. 
It is in this context that Muslim minorities in the West has also developed as a subfield of 
study in the disciplines of religion, sociology, anthropology, and political science among 
others. Not only a renewed attention to the durability of religion in the face of 
secularizing and modernizing forces of Western modernity, but also phenomenon such as 
post 9/11 anxiety with “Islamic terrorism,” and “homegrown extremism,” resulted in a 
fast incorporation of research grants, survey programs, and policy frameworks into 
academic study of Islam. As mentioned before, while there existed earlier studies on 
Muslim populations in the non-Muslim majority contexts, those studies were more 
focused on ethno-racial backgrounds rather than looking at religion in particular. As we 
will see below, the transformation of the imaginations of the world from a network of 
empires to functionally similar nation-states posed a challenge to religious thought and 
exercise about belonging, loyalty, and citizenship in the nation-states. These 
developments in turn influenced organization of academia and the types of question that 
the academic enterprise sought to address. These complex, often asymmetric 
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developments, significantly influenced the study of Islam among other phenomenon. In 
turn, Western Muslims’ contending responses in charting religious meaning of their new 
abodes and their engagement with tradition also meant to give meaning to the nation-state 
centric world order. It is crucial that this takes place against the backdrop of an 
increasingly rich literature on jurisprudence of Muslim minorities (fiqh al-aqalliyat
94
), 
diasporic jurisprudence, and legal plurality that has influenced how Muslim Americans 
“narrate themselves into the multicultural nation and state.”95 This process of narrating 
Muslim presence into the American narrative, as well as debating the meanings of 
migration and whether the international states system provides for necessary grounds to 
think of state-citizen relationship in conjunction with classical Islamic law makes it 
imperative to analyze the relationship between area studies, disciplinary approaches, and 
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academic study of Muslim presence in the West. Rather than being a debate that is 
confined to organization of academia, area studies- disciplines debate concerns 
knowledge production processes that are intrinsically related to power relations, spatio-
historical situatedness and contested objectives of social scientific inquiry. 
In a 2003 article Sherman Jackson argued that if Islamic law was viewed from the 
perspective of law and legal science, its appearance of “statis and the privileging of 
provenance over substance” would be seen in-line with all other legal traditions, 
including Western law, which tended to be backward looking and privilege provenance 
over content.
96
 For Jackson, this view would explain the faulty equation built around a 
new, modern school of ijtihad (interpretive legal reasoning) that could resolve the 
perceived dissonance between Shariʻah and modern realities. According to the article, it 
was this lack of legal expertise that led many classical and modern jurists, as well as 
scholars of Islam, miss the crucial distinction between law and fact. For Jackson, this 
widely shared failure to distinguish law from fact influenced classical and modern 
approaches to the question of taqlid (imitation, following) and the “scope of jurists’ 
interpretive authority.” Jackson argued that one reason why many failed to distinguish 
between law and fact, and why Islamic law was viewed as static and backward looking 
could be explained through an analysis of area studies- disciplines debate. Jackson argued 
not only that Islamic law was studied through the prisms of disciplines other than law, 
such as anthropology, philosophy, or scientific inquiry, but also that  
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“One of the limitations built into the study of Islamic law in the West is 
that the majority of scholars of Islamic law are products of Area Studies 
programs and have little to no training in law as a discipline. Their training 
prompts them to explain Islamic law as a Middle Eastern phenomenon as 
opposed to a legal one, while their status as members of the ascending 
civilization (in which philosophy and science dominate, neither of which 
values precedent or authority [unlike legal disciplines]) prompts them to 
see their subject in anthropological or philosophical terms. This invariably 
privileges innovation and change (usually construed as progress) over 
statis and stability.”97 
Bringing area studies-disciplines debate into her examination of perceptions on Islam, 
Anne Norton also points out to the Eurocentric biases of disciplinary approaches. She 
argues that Muslim contributions to philosophy was subject to a scholastic exile and were 
confined “to the provinces of area studies, religious studies, and anthropology,”98 thereby 
placing the writings of Muslim classical philosophers such as al Farabi, Ibn Rushd, Ibn 
Sina, Ibn Tufayl, and Ibn Khaldun among others outside the Western canon. In his 
classical text, Provincializing Europe, Dipesh Chakrabarty drew attention to how area-
studies based “colonial translations” shaped post-colonial scholarship – a scholarship he 
argued should not be concerned merely with sociological transitions but with the question 
of translations as well.
99
 Likewise, Timothy Mitchell argued that whereas in earlier 
decades what distinguished the disciplines were the different kinds of social questions 
they addressed, “in a process beginning in the 1930s and completed by the 1950s, the 
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social sciences transformed themselves into, as it were, a kind of area studies. Each 
created an object that marked the exclusive territory of the discipline and defined its 
boundary with others.”100 For Mitchell, it was the territorial and methodologically 
hegemonic disciplines that have reproduced a particular social science tradition that is 
prone to creating clear and unquestioned distinctions between the local and the global, 
between the particular and the universal that marginalizes the importance of the local and 
reinforces a hegemonic structure of knowledge. We could argue that the demarcations 
developed in the orthodox strands of the discipline of international relations between 
inside (the nation-state as a realm of stability and security), and outside (as a Hobbesian 
anarchic realm)
101
 has been a function of these disciplinary processes of knowledge 
production. In the past ten years, scholars of international relations have started to pay 
increased attention to the role of religion in international relations and examined 
epistemological and disciplinary process that led not only to a ‘secularist bias’ in 
approaches toward religion in international relations, but also to reification of the modern 
nation state as the primary level of analysis in the discipline.
102
 Furthermore, scholars 
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have pointed out to the need to bring international theory in conversation with various 
constellations of secular public spheres and politics of liberal nation state
103
. In Michael 
Barnett’s words, with this wave of scholarship international relations theorists started to 
“awake from their long, secular slumber.”104 Both policy-oriented and theoretically 
informed studies have looked at the issue of religion as a category and complex relations 
between local and international politics in tandem with the religious identity of the 
individual. Furthermore, both scholars of Islam and studies on foreign policy analysis of 
Muslim nations have tried to understand how Muslim-majority states conform to a world-
order based on nation-states.
105
 Policy-scholars on the other hand have tried to understand 
the appeal of militant variants of Islamic identity to craft policies for the policy-makers.  
What is noteworthy in this literature, however, is that religion is approached either as a 
broad conceptual framework that informs and reifies modern secular nation state, or as a 
variable that affects inter-state relations and religious decision makers. While in-depth 
case studies that examine transnational religious phenomena have been lacking in these 
studies, the question have been adapted by cross-national surveys that measure 
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identification with a religious as opposed to national identity, which, in turn, help reify 
the dichotomy between national and religious identities.
106
 Despite the fact that Muslim 
transnationalism is closely related to these questions, a coherent framework that assesses 
its implications for the study of religion in International Relations (IR) has been lacking. I 
identify two primary reasons for this gap in the literature: a) The explanatory framework 
for studies on Muslim transnationalism start with the premise that national identity is 
posited against the transnational identity, most of the time creating a binary opposition 
between the two and b) the case of Muslim transnationalism is investigated primarily in 
the context of political Islamism and diaspora politics, with an emphasis on their radical/ 
militant and isolationist variants on the one hand, and immigrant experiences on the 
other. 
A review of the disciplinary approaches to religion from within IR serves to show that 
this approach results in first, a reification of the conception of national identity and 
national interest, and second in a focus on the “religious other” that does not seek to 
understand but explain away its challenge to established norms of political life. This is 
not surprising, given that IR has developed as a positivistic social science that result in an 
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under-theorized understanding of the nation-state as its primary unit of analysis,
107
 and 
this development further led to the separation of the domestic and international in the 
discipline thereby resulting in an inchoate understanding of the political and its 
manifestations in modern analytical categories.
108
 In relation to these epistemological 
developments in the discipline, transnational and constitutive aspects of religion were 
marginalized due to orthodox ontological and epistemological standpoints that were the 
outcome of the two factors mentioned above. As a result, apart from a few notable 
exceptions, IR scholars have remained largely confined within the disciplinary 
boundaries, being hesitant to employ methods and insights from other disciplines such as 
anthropology, sociology, and psychology in empirical settings.
109
 My purpose below, is 
to highlight how a number of discussions about American Muslim communities we will 
come across in the reminder of the dissertation are intricately related to the literature 
reviewed above. In this sense, not only political arrangements with regards to the nation-
state but also the nature and features of international states system frequently becomes a 
crucial factor for the Islamic jurisprudential views about Muslim presence in the West.  
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Muslim Minorities in the West and Islamic Jurisprudence 
 
As “global dispersal and subsequent modes of global connections”110 precipitated by 
transnational flows of individuals and ideas continue to challenge the nation states and 
posit new modes of transnational imaginations, the legal status of Muslim minorities 
living in non-Muslim territories and jurisdictional settings have also been subject of an 
increasingly rich, multi-disciplinary literature that slowly overcomes the limitations of 
area-studies-disciplines divide. Arjun Appadurai’s observation about the neglect of 
transnational process in 1996 (“the area studies tradition has probably grown too 
comfortable with its own maps of the world, too secure in its own expert practices, and 
too insensitive to transnational processes both today and in the past”111) is slowly 
becoming less pertinent.  
The process of mass-scale Muslim settlement in non-Muslim contexts following 1950s, 
and in the American context especially after the passage of 1965 Immigration Act, have 
created a process whereby transnational networks of Muslim scholars and jurists have 
been sought out to respond to new legal questions and concerns facing nascent 
communities of Muslims living in Europe and North America. For example, Larry 
Poston’s 1992 report about Islamic missionary activity in the United States depicts an 
overview of early responses to the question of Muslim settlement in non-Muslim majority 
contexts, including references to current proponents of indigenization of American 
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Muslim communities, who are reported to have had misgivings about permanent 
residence in a non-Muslim context.
112
 
Not only do contemporary Muslim scholarship addresses this issue but also an increasing 
number of specialists about Islam and Western Muslim minorities have explored how 
questions of authority, citizenship imaginations and novel socio-political conditions 
influence modern political imaginations on the one hand and Muslim minorities on the 
other.
113
 As Muslim migrants in Europe and other Western settings increased in number 
and they settled in their new, adopted lands, a number of transnationally influential 
Muslim scholars have also addressed questions of citizenship and loyalty as it pertains to 
Western Muslim minorities. Could Muslim minorities extend their allegiance to a 
constitution that was not based on Shariʻa? Could they declare their patriotism and serve 
in the military? What does it mean to follow Islamic law in a non-Muslim legal setting? 
As I highlight in Chapters 6 and 7, an increasing number of contemporary Muslim jurists 
and scholars continue to address these questions and argue for the specificity of Islamic 
micro-communities, thereby giving rise to an emergent discourse and scholarship about 
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jurisprudence of Muslim minorities (fiqh al-aqalliyat).
114
 For example, the Qatar-based 
Egyptian scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi developed an “inclusive definition of national 
community based on the concept of muwatana (national belonging)” in lieu of the 
classical jurisprudential dhimma system that connotes differential rights and protections 
for minority citizens with crucial implications for the organization of minority citizenship 
in both Muslim majority and minority contexts.
115
 Other scholars, such as the late Syrian 
jurist Ramadan al-Buti
116
, rejected the permissibility of settling in non-Muslim lands on a 
permanent basis and gaining citizenship of a non-Muslim country. Buti argued that 
citizenship was not merely a legal or geographical identification but also involved aspects 
of creed since the individuals would extend their loyalty to secular man-made laws, 
thereby expressing their conviction of the truthfulness of these laws which he considered 
a grave sin.
117
 Thereby, he also opposed the development of a special jurisprudence for 
Muslim minorities in the West, calling this a “plot aiming at dividing Islam,” but still 
allowing for easing hardship for Muslims independent of where they lived.
118
 Other 
scholars, such as Salah Asawy, the Secretary General of the US-based Assembly of 
Muslim Jurists of America, argued that in cases where citizenship does not require full 
submission to laws that violate creedal aspects and when it facilitates Muslim settlement 
                                                          
114
 For a coherent review see, Said Farres Hassan, Fiqh al-Aqalliyat: History, Development, and 
Progress (New York: PalgraveMcMillan, 2013). 
115
 For a review of al-Qaradawi’s evolving views about citizenship and multiple religious 
communities see, David H. Warren and Christine Gilmore, “Rethinking neo-Salafism through an 
Emerging Fiqh of Citizenship: The Changing Status of Minorities in the Discourse of Yusuf al-
Qaradawi and the ‘School of the Middle Way,’ New Middle Eastern Studies, 2 (2012). 
116
 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the assassination of Buti in Syria in 2014 and its 
reverberations among American Muslims. 
117
 Said Farres Hassan, Fiqh al-Aqalliyat: History, Development, and Progress, op. cit., p.146. 
118
 Bowen, Can Islam be French? op. cit. pp.146-147. 
58 
 
and propagation of Islam, it could be obtained.
119
 In this regard, the concept of loyalty 
(towards Muslims) and enmity (not associating or praising non-Muslims) (al-wala wa l-
bara) also becomes another key concepts that is subject to different interpretations. 
It is crucial to note that these competing perspectives overlap with and mirror 
jurisprudential positions held by pre-modern Muslim jurists. Rather than being a 
contemporary curiosity, the inquiry about Muslim minorities living in non-Muslim 
majority political environments has been an important subject in the writings of pre-
modern juristic discourses. Especially in the 12
th
 century, Muslim jurisprudential 
schools
120
 have developed elaborate, evolving, as well as significantly different positions 
about the legal status of Muslims living outside the fold of the lands/abode of Islam (dar 
al-Islam), in the lands/abode of non-Muslims/disbelief (dar al-harb or dar al-kufr). The 
question of territoriality and legal status therefore, is not a novel phenomenon.
121
 In 
relation to these geographic divisions of the world, terms such as hijrah (migration) and 
jihad (war/struggle) also attained alternative meanings over time and the descriptive uses 
of these terms during early formative years of Islam, unlike its later legal connotations, 
have also been subject of contestation in the current debates about Islamic legal rulings as 
they apply to Muslim minorities living in the West.
122
 Furthermore, these terms have 
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been adopted in multiple contemporary contexts, sometimes carrying their original 
juristic meanings, other times through cultural appropriation in the contemporary 
American landscape.
123
 For example, Zain Abdullah shows how some African migrants 
in Harlem, sought to define certain sections of Harlem as dar al-islam and other sections 
as dar al-harb to connote exclusive realms that Muslims inhabit or not.
124
 Likewise, in 
the internal history of Five Percenters, an unorthodox offshoot of Nation of Islam (NOI) 
that continues to be influential among the popular rap and hip-hop scene, the 1964 hijra 
from Harlem to Brooklyn is seen as central to the livelihood of the movement as the 




In his examination of what liberal citizenship models demand from Muslim minorities 
residing in Western liberal states, Andrew March identifies three major issues: residence, 
loyalty and recognition/solidarity.
126
 As March’s exploration points out early Muslim 
jurists, as well as their contemporary counterparts have responded to these concerns, 
albeit in different temporal and legal-juridical contexts and in distinct spatio-political 
arrangements. Khaled Abou El Fadl’s survey of pre-modern Muslim juristic discourses 
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highlights the contextual and widely divergent positions adopted by Sunni jurisprudential 
schools (Shafi’i, Maliki, Hanafi, Hanbali) alongside Shi’a schools. In the early legal 
codification of Islamic juristic positions on residency in and loyalty to non-Muslim states, 
most Maliki jurists adopted an uncompromising position on the question of residency in 
non-Muslim lands, arguing that these Muslims had an obligation to migrate to a Muslim 
territory. The Shafiʻi and Hanafi schools argued that if these Muslims were able to 
practice Islam even if the law of the land was not based on Shariʻa (Divine Law), they 
could legitimately reside in these territories. The scholars of these schools argued that 
Muslim presence in non-Muslim lands could potentially contribute to the spread of Islam 
through propagation and conversions and therefore assigned varying degrees of 
endorsement to it, such as beneficiary, recommended or obligatory.
127
 This brief 
summary however, does not do justice to the dynamic, elaborate legal, social and political 
considerations that influenced the positions. For example, the Maliki position was 
informed by the loss of Muslim lands in Iberia, especially beginning with the fall of 
Toledo in 1085.
128
 Hanafi and Shafiʻi schools felt more confident because the cases they 
dealt with were closer to the heartland of Muslim majority-contexts. Khaled Abou El 
Fadl’s extensive survey of the pre-modern juristic discourses about the relationship 
between Muslim presence in non-Muslim lands and Islamic law points out that rather 
than a static discourse, the legal discourse on territoriality and Muslim life was much 
more nuanced than some of the contemporary presentations of the geographic division of 
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the world between dual abodes of dar al-Islam and dar al-harb. In some cases, legal 
rulings (fatwa, pl. fatawa) about the question of Muslim residency in non-Muslim lands 
addressed the sentiment that Islam is better lived in non-Muslim lands than in Muslim 
majority countries that suffer from political, social, and economic ills despite the 
presence of Islamic legal structures.
129
 Similarly, emerging questions throughout time 
continued to play an important role in the pre-modern legal discourses. What would be 
the status of converts to Islam in non-Muslim lands, should Muslims in these territories 
participate in wars waged by the non-Muslim rulers? Would Islam be conceptualized as a 
universal moral imperative or a territorially based political identity?  
Although the development of consistent legal doctrines across jurisprudential schools 
stabilized gradually only after 12
th
 century, alternative positions about some of these 
questions and their practical implications continue to influence contemporary Muslim 
scholars. For example, the prominent names of Wahhabi Islam, Saudi scholars Shaykh 
Abdul Azeez ibn Baaz and Shaykh Muhammad ibn Saalih al-ʻUthaymeen offered advice 
on a number of questions that face Muslim minorities in a compilation published in 
1998.
130
 In their talks and their answers to questions from Muslim minorities, both 
scholars do not questions legal validity of Muslim residence in non-Muslim lands. On the 
other hand, from questions such as whether these Muslim minorities could follow the 
divorce laws of their countries of residence
131
 to whether they can “imitate” the dresses of 
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, they take squarely conservative interpretative positions about the 
doctrine of loyalty and enmity. 
On the other hand, during a visit to San Francisco Bay Area in 1999, the contemporary 
Mauritian scholar Shaykh Abdullah bin Bayyah who is an influential and respected 
scholar across neo-traditional, conservative and Sufi American Muslim circuits
133
, 
addressed the question of Muslims living in non-Muslim lands. “In contrast to Muslims 
living in the dominant Muslim world at large, you are, in many ways, strangers in a 
strange land,” said the prominent jurist. According to Bin Bayyah, “given our state of 
weakness and our minority status here, the governmental aspects of the shariʻa do not 
apply to us. We are not legally responsible for the governmental aspects because of our 
condition here.”134 Bin Bayyah, in support of the idea of jurisprudence of minorities 
argued that the division of the world between abode of Islam where peace dominates and 
abode of disbelief where war and hostility defines Muslims’ relationship to these lands is 
wrong. He told the audience that: 
 
“This idea is wrong. There are three abodes: there is the abode of peace, 
the abode of war, and then there is the abode of treaty where there is a 
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contractual agreement between two abodes. For instance, when I came 
into this country, they issued me a visa, and I signed something. In the 
issuance of the visa and my signing of it, a legally binding contract 
occurred which was a sulih. It was an agreement that when I came into 
this country, I would obey the laws and would follow the restrictions that 
this visa demanded that I follow. This was a contractual agreement that is 
legally binding according even to the divine laws. In looking at this, we 
have to understand that the relationship between the Muslims living in this 
land and the dominant authorities in this land is a relationship of peace and 
contractual agreement-of a treaty. This is a relationship of dialogue and a 
relationship of giving and taking.”135 
 
Almost a decade after this speech in March 27-28 2010, Bin Bayyah spearheaded a 
conference in the Southeastern Turkish city of Mardin that culminated in what is 
famously known as “the New Mardin Declaration.”136 The conference sought to 
contextualize the eminent Mamluk era Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyya’s (d.1328) famous 
Mardin Fatwa. Ibn Taymiyya was born near the city of Mardin, which was conquered by 
non-Muslim Mongol armies. Ibn Taymiyya was asked about the legal status of Mardin 
and whether the Muslims there had a duty to either emigrate to Muslim control lands or 
fight the non-Muslim rulers. In response, Ibn Taymiyya, whose legacy
137
 has been 
subject to much controversy since a diverse set of Salafi and militant currents claimed to 
uphold his views to the protest of different strands of Muslim spectrum ranging from Sufi 
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to Wahhabi and traditionalist circles
138
, argued that the categories of dar al-Islam and dar 
al-harb did not apply to people of Mardin and that Mardin should be considered as a 
hybrid case where Muslims should be treated according to their rights as Muslims and the 
non-Muslims should be treated according to their own laws.
139
 The declaration argued 
that the fatwa was critical: 
“Ibn Taymiyya, in his classification of the city of Mardin –  through his 
deep understanding of the Shari‘ah and keen insight and awareness of the 
context in which he lived – went beyond the classification that was 
common amongst past Muslim jurists: Dividing territories into an Abode 
of Islam (in which the primary state is peace), an Abode of Kufr 
(Unbelief) (in which the primary state is war), and an Abode of ‘Ahd 
(Covenant) (in which the primary state is truce), amongst other divisions 
(that they had stipulated). Instead of the classification common in his age, 
Ibn Taymiyya came up with a compound/composite classification by 
virtue of which civil strife amongst Muslims was averted, and their lives, 
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wealth, and honor safeguarded, and justice amongst them and others 
established. His fatwa is one that is exceptional in its formulation and that, 
to a large degree, addresses a similar context to our time, a political state 
of the world that is different from the one encountered by past jurists, and 
which had formed the basis for the particular way in which they had 
classified territories.”140 
According to Saudi Arabian scholar Abdelwahhab al Turayri, who participated in the 
conference, the last sentence of Ibn Taymiyya’s Mardin fatwa also became the subject of 
controversy when Bin Bayyah argued that many prints and translations of the last 
sentence erroneously read “…while the non-Muslims living there outside of the authority 
of Islamic Law should be fought as is their due,” as a result of misreading the Arabic 
word yu’amal (should be treated) and using yuqatal (should be fought).141 Consequently 
Bin Bayyah argued that this mistake was a fundamental one as many militant 
organizations utilized it in justifying killing non-Muslims and several American Muslim 
scholars, including Shaykh Hamza Yusuf, frequently invoked the mistake in their talks.
142
 
In addition to global media exposure the Mardin Conference received, the once 
prominent American cleric turned Al Qaida ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki published a 
rebuttal of the Mardin Declaration in Al Qaida’s online magazine Inspire in its Fall 2010 
edition, about a year before he became the first American citizen deliberately targeted 
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and killed in an extrajudicial airstrike in the war on terror.
143
 The article, which was 
highlighted on the cover of the magazine, was titled “The New Mardin Declaration: An 
Attempt at Justifying the New World Order.”144 
 
Figure 3: Anwar al-Awlaki’s refutation of Mardin Declaration highlighted on the cover of 
Al-Qaida’s magazine, Inspire.145 
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Al-Awlaki argued that the conference was an attempt at justifying the West’s unjust 
policies and to defeat those who were engaged in a war against the West. According to 
al-Awlaki, the Declaration’s following passage underscored that the Conference and the 
jurists who convened together were ignorant to the sufferings of the Muslim ummah. 
It is such a changed context that Ibn Taymiyya took into consideration 
when passing his fatwa, and that now makes it imperative that 
contemporary jurists review the classical classification, because of the 
changed contemporary situation: Muslims are now bound by international 
treaties through which security and peace have been achieved for the 
entire humanity, and in which they enjoy safety and security, with respect 
to their property, integrity and homelands.  Consequently, Muslims are 
interacting with others in unprecedented ways: politically, socially and 
economically. 
Combining the Al Qaeda rhetoric on the plight of Muslim populations in Palestine, 
Kashmir, Chechnya and other locales, as well as the corruptness of the West, Al-Awlaki 
argued that the Conference sought to justify the oppression of Muslims at the hands of 
Western international system. While the article invokes a political discourse more than a 
religious/textual one, Al-Awlaki argued in his conclusion that the New Mardin 
Declaration was part of what he called a “New World fiqh.” 
Just as the khilāfah and the shari'ah rule were dismantled, we now see 
such dangerous attempts at dismantling the body of fiqh of our early 
scholars. This call to discard the fatwa of Ibn Taymiyyah should not be 
seen as merely a disagreement with ibn Taymiyyah on a particular point of 
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legislation but as part of an orchestrated effort, under the sponsorship of 
the West, to discard the body of work done by centuries of scholarly work 
by the Imams of the ummah. But to put it that way is to put it mildly. It is 
in its essence a covert attempt at abrogating all the verses of Qur’an and 
hadith that call for the establishment of Islamic rule, fighting aggression, 
and fighting for the spread of the call of Islam. According to these 
scholars, these rules simply have no place in the modern world. According 
to them there is a New World Order that necessitates a New World fiqh. A 
fiqh of submission, a fiqh of rendering what is unto Caesar to Caesar, a 
fiqh that would allow the cowards to live in peace. It doesn’t matter what 
quality of life they live as long as they are living.
146
 
Modern Muslim reformers such as Tariq Ramadan also engaged in a renegotiation of 
these geographic designations. Ramadan examines the concepts of Dar Al–Islam (abode 
of peace) Dar-Al-Harb (abode of war), Dar al-Ahd (abode of treaty), as well as the more 
recent proposition, Dar-al-Dawa (abode of invitation-to God) in the context of Muslim 
minorities in Western democracies. For Ramadan, these concepts which were not defined 
either the Qur’an or in the Prophetic sayings (hadith) but were developed by early 
Muslim jurists as the need to think about how flourishing Muslim communities would 
organize their relations with their neighbors emerged fall short of meeting the realities of 
the modern day experiences of Muslims living Western societies. Thus, he proposes the 
term Dar-al-Shahada (abode of testimony) a term that suggests a self-confident Muslim 
identity in a society that provides the minimal safeguards for continuation of Muslim 
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identity in its constitution.
147
 
Likewise, one of the earliest proponents of a jurisprudence of Muslim minorities (fiqh al-
aqalliyat), Taha Jabir al-Alwani, the Virginia based former chairman of Islamic Society 
of North America’s Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA), argued that pre-modern and 
post-colonial realities of the world did not provide enough guidance for contemporary 
Muslims. “Our predecessors did not experience the closely-connected world we live in 
today and its interacting cultures and global-village atmosphere. Their world was made 
up of separate ‘islands’ with limited cohabitation and understanding of one another. The 
‘fiqh of conflict’ was then prevalent, dictated by the times, but what is needed today is a 
fiqh of ‘coexistence’ which suits our world in spirit as well as in form.”148 Al-Alwani 
cites the conservative jurist Ibn Taymiyyah’s views on Muslims’ need to differentiate 
themselves from non-Muslim groups and the colonial Algerian scholars’ views that 
prohibited Muslims from taking up French citizenship to emphasize that historical-social 
contexts were influential in these views. “These and other similar opinion stem from a 
‘culture of conflict’ which Muslim minorities today can do better without,” according to 
al-Alwani. For him, the emergent jurisprudence of minorities would build on the “rich 
legacy” of the science of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) and “exercised within the 
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established rules of ijtihad, or those of interpretive analysis.”149 For al-Alwani, it is 
crucial that unlike the development of a science of higher objectives of Divine Law 
(maqasid al-shariʻah) “almost independent of usul al-fiqh,” jurisprudence of minorities 
would retain its connection to the wider science of jurisprudence.  
In these accounts, the concept of umma also takes alternative meanings, not only in terms 
of its diverse Qur’anic uses but also and especially with reference to its uses in the 
Constitution of Medina
150
, a document that organized the relationship of Muslims with 
other religious communities living in the new adopted center of the nascent Muslim 
community following his hijrah (migration) from suppression in Mecca. Frederick Denny 
highlights that several historians and linguists disagreed whether the Jewish community 
living in Medina was included in the umma of Medina, or whether they constituted a 
separate umma alongside the Muslim community.
151
 Despite divergent interpretations, as 
a political/religious document the Medina Constitution is frequently invoked today as a 
form of political settlement that sought to organize relations between overlapping 
communities. Similarly, as several studies have noted, the concept of umma is constantly 
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renegotiated and redefined. Peter Mandaville showed how new information technologies 
and online communications allowed for new ways of connection and imagination in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s
152
 – a phenomenon that has been further exacerbated through 
new forms of communication and social media – and several scholars examined whether 
transnational notions of umma corresponds to a vision or is embedded rather in everyday 
practices.
153
 In this context, the intricate relationship between different levels of analysis 
and approaches to national and transnational developments have been crucial in the 
scholarship on citizenship regimes, managing religious diversity, as well as developing 
jurisprudential positions from religious vintage points. The indigenization process and the 
American Muslim identity under investigation in this study point toward the framework 
of multiple modernities, and contested secularisms. In Jose Casanova’s words, I 
contextualize American Muslim experience not as a dichotomy between a Eurocentric 
contradistinction constructed around traditional religion vs. modern secularity, nor 
around tensions between religion and world or between cosmological transcendence and 
worldly immanence. With Casanova, I understand this experience and the understandings 
of Muslim transnationalism to be a unique one, in that “… in the same way as Western 
secular modernity is fundamentally and inevitably post-Christian, the merging multiple 
modernities in the different postaxial civilizational areas are likely to be post-Hindu, or 
post- Confucian, or post-Muslim; that is, they will also be particular and contingent 
refashionings and transformations of existing civilizational patterns and social 
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imaginaries mixed with modern secular ones.”154 What Casanova refers to here with post-
Muslim, on the other hand, should not be confused with Olivier Roy’s discussion of post-
Islamism. Roy uses the term to refer to the process of privatization of religion among 
Islamists as they transition from lower-middle class to upper-middle class in the social 
hierarchy. According to him, while they continue to hold strong religious beliefs, 
Islamists are increasingly less interested in systemic manifestation of these beliefs in 
politics and in the public sphere.
155
 In the course of this thesis, however, I take 
Casanova’s emphasis on post-Islamism as a social phenomenon that is not limited to the 
account Roy provides – seeking the political necessarily in the context of movements and 
individuals participating in organized politics.
156
 As Cemil Aydin emphasizes, pan-
Islamic thought has emerged in the Muslim lands in late 19
th
 century, as a response to and 
critique of perceived Eurocentric world order, in engagement with the enlightenment 
thought. In this regard, it is a modern discursive practice; and not a historically 
congruous, primordial thought-exercise. While attempts at historicizing transnational 
Muslim identity have started in the Muslim world since the late 19
th
 century, it should be 
noted that anti-Western discourse was not confined to Muslim thought and practice. In 
intellectual centers in Asia, such as in Japan, a strong and parallel critique of the West in 
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the form of Pan-Asian though has also emerged.
157
 In addition, some scholars argue that 
not only umma, but also similar concepts from other religious traditions such as Khalsa 
Panth, transnational community of Sikh believers, offer conceptual and theoretical room 
for challenging the dominance of Eurocentric
158
 accounts of international relations.
159
 
These accounts, however, paradoxically grant the concept of umma an ideational agency 
in the search for post-national forms of political and social imaginations. Furthermore, 
this view tends to over-represent what Bilici calls a “Westernized umma” or “Muslim 
nationalism,” often locating the questions around umma at the center of post-colonial 
Islamist experience.
160
 As globalization continues to provide an impetus for non-
territorial imaginations and as the failure of nation-state as a static form of political 
organization fails to provide the panacea for complex contours of citizenship 
imaginations, the search for de-territorialized, post-national, transnational imaginations 
gains ground- thereby also challenging International Relations scholarship and its 
engagement with religion. 
It is because last half of the century has witnessed tectonic changes in a number of 
aspects of American public life, from race relations to the legal and discursive challenges 
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of 9/11, from the overwhelming rise of secular ethics to the mediums through which 
public life is organized, that the trajectories of American Muslims reflect the overall 
milieu in America and American Muslims’ self histories and thought processes are multi-
faceted. Notwithstanding radical transformations in the global Muslim world, the 
multiple lenses with which Muslims in America have mediated and negotiated the 
requirements of their religion and their lives in North America have also been subject to 
fundamental challenges and transformations. This is true not only for the post-1965 
immigrant Muslims who frequently negotiated whether their stay in America would be 
temporary or for the long-haul especially as their American-born children came of age, 
and whether the Islamic norms and foundational texts they were accustomed to in their 
native lands spoke meaningfully to their new exigencies but also for the indigenous 
African American Muslims who had to chart through the simultaneous dynamics of being 
a double minority and, unlike their immigrant coreligionists, native to the only land that 
was available to them.   
Below, I first contextualize the wider religious and socio-political environment within 
which my institutions and key figures responded to these challenges. Next, I examine 
each institution in detail and highlight their distinctive qualities, which will be 
instrumental to provide the readers with the sufficient background to assess where the 
members and leaders of these institutions come from as they come across their voices in 
the reminder of this study. Finally, I identify a set of fundamental issues that emerge from 
these institutions that establish the central motif of the thematic chapters. The research 
presented here underlines that the settlement and indigenization processes of Muslims in 
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America portrays a number of distinctive features. Chapters 2 and 3 present six 
institutions that span convert, African American and US-born second and third generation 
immigrant Muslims in highlighting the pedagogical and normative networks through 
which these institutions represent the indigenization process in the United States. At the 
same time, the particular experiences of African American and convert leadership and 
their influence on communal discussions on the one hand and on internal debates about 
politics of representation and power relations on the other serves to underline the 
complex dynamics influenced by the legacy of Muslim and non-Muslim African 
American experience. Mapping the historical processes of settlement and indigenization, 
I also highlight how American Muslim experience, especially in comparison to European 
Muslim communities, have been relatively far freer of the central role played by 
European states which sought to create what Jonathan Laurence calls Muslim Councils to 
manage Islam in accordance with state’s role in management of religion in general on the 
one hand, and of the role of foreign countries in vetting and shaping normative 
pedagogical and clerical networks and mechanisms on the other. Although the state 
continues to be a crucial actor in the American case as well, the particular experiences 
with religious freedom and constitutional mechanisms on religious plurality provide 
American Muslims with enough room to navigate the complex contours of securitization 
of Islam in the post 9/11 period. In this regard, in chapters 4, 5 and 6 I bring in 
contentious focal incidents and argue that both normative engagements with Islamic 
learning and the wider debate about the particular identity of American Muslims create a 
community that is heterogeneous in particulars yet largely unified in contemplating a 
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particularly different American Muslim outlook. This process, as I argue in Chapter 7, 
also influences engagements with questions of jurisprudence from an American Muslim 
perspective. Yet another finding of the dissertation, the prevalence of cultural expressions 
as a focal distinctive feature in socio-political and religious imaginations about 
community, identity and polity, is common thread across multiple chapters. In this 
regard, although I draw widely on the work of critical social scientists, I highlight that as 
much as critical meta-narratives and discursive deconstructions are helpful in uncovering 
crucial aspects in self-representations and politics of the state involvement, they need to 
be augmented with and measured against local, often more complex, lived experiences. 
Accordingly, in presenting my respondents’ views as well as public debates I attempt to 
contextualize how public discourses are intricately related to historical processes and map 




CHAPTER 2- INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IN URBAN BOSTON 
  
Islam as a Minority Religion in Boston: Historical Perspective 
 
The religious landscape of Boston has always been of interest to historians of the United 
States. The dynamics between the early Puritans and later immigrants, both Catholic and 
Jewish, Episcopalian and Southern Baptist, were the focus of these early studies. The 
transformation in the religious make-up of Greater Boston reflects a host of key changes 
that affected the wider American religious landscape.  While Boston is considered a 
paragon of secular liberalism today, it is crucial to remember that Massachusetts was one 
of the latest states to disestablish its official church. It would not be until 1833 that the 
state would severe tax-granting ties with the Congregational Church.
161
 The Catholics 
that started to arrive to the city in the early 19
th
 century faced problems that were already 
being experienced by the Baptists. The Jewish immigrants similarly did not find a 
tolerant, welcoming milieu. When the Catholic numbers started to peak in the next 
century, the city would experience significant transformations in its economy and elite.  
Henry James’s acclaimed novel The Bostonians depicts a fictional yet realistic account of 
the changing character of the city in the mid 1800s, with an increasing awareness on 
women’s issues and social critique.162 Similarly, Cleveland Amory’s The Proper 
Bostonian presents a semi-satirical sketch and an amusing transformation of the city. 
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Amory, a member of the “first families” himself, does not spare anecdotes that describe 
how the Protestant establishment reacted against the increasing influence of the city’s 
Catholic inhabitants in the administrative, economic and financial spheres in the 1900s. 
Describing the story of how Bishop Lawrence of Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts 
was furious that the mailbox in front of his house was removed but his neighbor’s, who 
happened to be the Catholic Cardinal William O’Connell, was untouched, Amory notes: 
“The Bishop returned and called the department once more. Boston might be three-
quarters Catholic, its city government even more so, and Cardinal O’Connell might be 
the most august member of America’s Catholic hierarchy, but the next morning the mail-
box of Episcopal Bishop Lawrence was back in its place.” The remainder of the century 
witnesses the extension of a similar aversion to other, more recent, ethno-religious 
minorities including the Jews and the Greeks.
163
  
When Cardinal O’Connell was born in late 1859 in Lowell, Massachusetts there were 
only a couple hundred of Jewish families in Boston.
164
 Jewish immigration to Boston had 
not matched immigration to other port cities and to central and southern states, along with 
southern tip of New England, because Boston was deemed too unwelcoming, too 
homogenous. Following the civil war the picture changed and Boston received many 
more Jewish immigrants. As Boston’s mounting Jewish community was slowly 
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establishing itself amid a not too welcoming environment, however, O’Connell was 
getting ready to become the new Archbishop of Bostonian Catholics. One year before he 
became the Archbishop of Boston in August 30, 1907, another American born Catholic 
assumed a “civil” throne. John F. Fitzgerald would become the first Boston-born Irish 
Catholic to be elected mayor of what was once referred to as “the Yankee Boston.” He 
had previously held a seat at the State Senate and in the House of Representatives and his 
grandson, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, would become the nation’s first Catholic President 
in 1961. In 1913, Massachusetts would elect its first Catholic Governor, David I 
Walsh.
165
 Three years after that Jewish Americans would see the imagined unimaginable, 
a Jewish Supreme Court Justice, Boston’s Louis D. Brandeis. None of these would come 
easy. Kennedy would be questioned on whether he felt loyal to the Pope or to America 
and earlier generations of Bostonian Catholics, including Cardinal O’Connor, while 
active in local politics, acted cautiously to disprove fears of a “Catholic conspiracy” 
against American liberties.
166
 Already considered a paragon of Americanization and 
exemplar of Jewish integration by the American Jewish community
167
, Brandeis would 
have to overcome anti-Semitic stereotypes.  
Almost a century later, in 2013, Cambridge voters would elect the first Muslim City 
Councilor, Nadeem Mazen. On the race-end, things progressed much slower; first 
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African American City Councilor of Boston, would be elected in 1946. Without doubt, 
occupying political office is not the only criteria with which we can assess and compare 
how integrated, accepted, or tolerated – note that lies rarely with the minorities in these 
terms – a minority group is. Catholics, even when they had representation, had to 
overcome the Yankee Boston’s lingering pride and answer to their critics. Following late 
19
th
 century exponential increase in their numbers Jewish Bostonians had to fight back 
against anti-Jewish bigotry. African American neighborhoods of Boston produce city 
councilors today and yet continue to feel the vices of urban politics and gentrification. 
Muslims’ presence in Boston would start much later, around the time when Catholics had 
established themselves and Jews were starting to feel more comfortable as Bostonians. 
Boston’s Muslim history follows the footsteps of Muslim presence in the United States: 
early 20
th
 century immigrants from the Levant arrive in port cities, pursue job 
opportunities and settle across the country; some lose their religious identity, many 
struggle to maintain them even in their closely-knit ethno-religious environments and 
ultimately become more attuned to their cultural and religious heritage as children are 
born and out-of-faith marriages increase; early efforts to institutionalize take place at a 
time when proto-Islamic movements spread across the African American urban 
populations; the post-1965 immigrants and Muslim students at select universities seek to 
push back against unorthodox practices they find at the handful of mosques and slowly 
take over some of these institutions or establish new ones; in the meantime African 
American mainstreaming sweeps urban centers starting in 1975; 1980s and 1990s bring 
further waves of immigration and mushrooming of mosques, Islamic schools and cultural 
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associations; 9/11 shakes the stature of Muslim Americans; post 9/11 era witnesses an 
increasingly hostile Islamophobic movement along with negotiations along the 
settlement-indigenization axis.  
When applied to the Boston landscape, this national narrative produces the following 
chronology: In the early 1930s eight Muslim families who had arrived in the new 
continent at the turn of the century come together in Quincy to establish an association to 
serve their cultural and religious needs. As a result Arab American Banner Society is 
chartered in 1934. This community transforms into Islamic Center of New England in 
1964. A few years back, Malcolm X had founded the then Temple 11 of the Nation of 
Islam in Dorchester, and around the same time, another African American movement 
composed of a few individuals, who had departed from the unorthodox NOI, had come 
up with yet another loosely institutionalized organization called The Society of the 
Islamic Brotherhood (SIB) in 1958. In 1973, SIB would establish the second formal 
mosque in the area, Masjid Alhamdulillah, also known as Mosque for the Praising of 
Allah, in Roxbury. Back to suburbs, Wayland and Worcester’s largely immigrant 
communities establish new Muslim organizations in 1979; Wayland community charters 
Islamic Center of Boston and Worcester community the Islamic Center of Worcester. 
Both would establish a mosque in the next decade. The formerly established Muslim 
Student Associations in the colleges dotting the city would serve the handful of Muslim 
students in the 60s and 70s but would become influential as the numbers continue to 
increase in the next decade. Realizing the need for further collaboration and consultation 
Islamic Council of New England (ICNE) is established in 1984 including communities in 
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Western Massachusetts Springfield and Southern New England. Islamic Society of 
Boston, Cambridge (ISB) emerges in the early 1980s and establishes a mosque in 1993 
on Prospect Street. The same year, Quincy Mosque extends into another southern suburb, 
to Sharon, to serve the communities that had settled there. Starting with late 1990s, an 
influx of Somali immigrants fleeing the unstable scene in their homeland start to arrive in 
Boston in increasing numbers. Representing earlier Middle Eastern and South Asian 
immigrants with political Islamist backgrounds, Muslim American Society (MAS) that 
was established nationally in 1993 opens its Boston Chapter in 1999. Smaller mosque 
communities serve the faithful in neighborhoods across Jamaica Plain, Cambridge, 
Malden, and Allston from store front or basement units only to realize their numbers 
grow exponentially faster than their physical locations would ever contain. In the late 
1980s the first idea for an urban Islamic Center in Roxbury starts to crystallize among 
African American Muslim leaders in Roxbury and Dorchester and negotiations with the 
city results in the allocation of an empty lot in Roxbury for development. When finances 
and organizational problems fall short, the Arab and South Asian immigrants of the 
Cambridge mosque fill the gap and the long-stalled idea for an urban Islamic Center in 
Roxbury starts to pick up steam in the late 1990s. But its funding structure becomes 
increasingly more controversial in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks. Simultaneously, the 
early proponents of the idea, the inner-city African American communities, feel side-
lined. Following the horror of 9/11, at a time when most Muslims are precarious about 
what would follow, a local alliance of anti-Muslim group poses a serious challenge to the 
project. After a series of mutual lawsuits between those who label the mosque as being 
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funded by Muslim extremists and the project’s leaders, MAS Boston is called to task. In 
2006 the long judicial process is settled amid calls for greater integration and 
indigenization and doing away with “back-home-practices.” Arrival of Suhaib Webb, a 
rising national star-preacher in the American Muslim scene, to Boston in 2011 brings 
ISBCC to national attention. Bostonian Muslims face yet another challenge in April 15, 
2013 when two bombs go off at the finish line of Boston Marathon. The Muslim 
perpetrators behind the bombings would put the ISB and ISBCC on the spot-light.  
While the extent of overlap between the national and local stories is noteworthy, both 
accounts conceal as much as they reveal. Not least because the many institutional 
contexts raise crucial sub-sets of issues that are buried under the national histories and 
more divergent, rarely linear, trajectories, issues that help differentiate these histories 
along multiple dimensions. These include alternative inclinations toward selective 
cultural absorption and cultural retention, negotiations around religious norms and their 
adaptability to new settings, the socio-economic dynamics of economic mobilization, the 
influence of racial constructs and the wider socio-political and economic changes that 
affected not only local but also national – and global – perceptions about religion. Below, 
I attempt to introduce my institutions in the context of an alternative narrative that is 
attuned to a bottom-up approach with particular attention to self-histories narrated by my 
interviewees and as chronicled by first hand resources produced by these institutions. 





I am once again on the 66 Bus. Running late to my appointment with Masjid 
Alhamdulillah’s Imam Abdullah Faaruq, I become increasingly impatient as the driver 
makes the right turn to Tremont Street on Brigham Circle. I have taken this route and 
indeed walked it many times but this time it looks more gray than usual. The Irish bar on 
the left seems empty and once again I am struck by Basilica of Our Lady of Perpetual 
Help, an iconic signifier of the area’s Catholic past. Redemptorist Catholics have 
managed this structure and the adjacent school for over a century and yet, once again it 
seems rather deserted, even sad, overlooking to the city from this rather lonely part of 
historic Boston. Past the Basilica , another witness to what was once a vibrant Catholic 
neighborhood emerges. KoC of Roxbury Council 123 is equally deserted and the paint it 
received from a neighborhood council several years back
168
 is almost gone now. I don’t 
take my usual stop at Roxbury Crossing and continue onto Malcolm X Boulevard, with 
occasional stops to pick up students from the nearby Madison Park High School. The last 
stop is at Dudley Square, called “the other downtown” of Boston. The mural right at the 
corner of the square looks like a scene from Spike Lee’s 1992 movie, Malcolm X and 
depicts a vibrant square- and yes, perhaps a downtown for “the others.” The past 20 
years, however, has been tough. Changing demographics and economic challenges had 
brought the area down and the city had been struggling to revitalize it ever since. The 
long time BRA renovation and redevelopment project at the legendary landmark, The 
Ferdinand Building, was recently completed
169
 and there are several housing and office 
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projects coming up in the area. I take the stop before the last, and cross Malcolm X 
Boulevard to Shawmut Avenue. 
 
Figure 4: The renovated Ferdinand Building in Dudley Square, January 17, 2015. 
When Masjid Alhamdulillah opened its doors in 1973, the only alternative for the area’s 
Muslims was the Quincy Mosque, which was established in 1963
170
 by Lebanese 




 Mary Lahaj, “The Islamic Center of New England,” in Muslim Communities in North 
America, eds. Yvonne Yazback Haddad and Jane Idleman Smith, (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1994), p. 299. 
86 
 
immigrants and their second-generation children. The handful of Muslim students 
studying in the surrounding universities across the sprawling colleges in the city were 
drawn to the Quincy Mosque, first in search of a mosque community, then as potential 
religious advisors. One of these students, Dr. Muzammil Siddiqi, whose engagement with 
the center started in 1962 while he was a doctoral student at Harvard Divinity School 
following his studies in India and the UK served as its assistant Imam from 1973 to 1976. 
He would later become a central figure in the development of Islamic institutions in 
America as the President of ISNA and as the chairman of the Fiqh Council of North 
America, a position he continues to occupy today. 
Masjid Alhamdulillah, or Mosque for the Praise of Allah, opened its doors right behind 
Dudley Square on October 1, 1973. The founders were a group of African-American 
Muslims who had previously organized under Society for the Islamic Brotherhood (SIB) 
which was founded in the 1950s. Located in the historic Dudley Square and surrounded 
by housing projects, the mosque carries the characteristics of the quintessential inner-city 
African American mosque. Similar to many urban centers, however, it has changed 
considerably over the years. Today, a Somali restaurant, Dayib Café, is located under the 




Figure 5: Masjid Alhamdulillah- Mosque for the Praising of Allah’s first logo.171 
Along with Boston’s landscape the profile of Masjid Alhamdulillah’s has changed as 
well. So did Imam Faaruq. The mosque served for many years as a hub for the inner-city 
area’s Muslims, including for Muslim students and professionals who lived in the inner-
city, not in suburbs. The Shawmut mosque, another name for the historic red brick 
building, was once a local power house. Before the Quincy Mosque opened its doors in 
1964, three African American Muslims, Kareem Jamal, Ahmed Attaa, and Abdul Zahir 
Dawud Ahmad, who had become Orthodox Muslims unlike the convention at the time, 
had founded the SIB. In 1970, they managed to rent half of the building at the historic 
red-brick building on 724 Shawmut Avenue. In October 1973 they get a lease on the 
building and chartered the Mosque. Imam Faaruq, born Jack Borrows, converted to Islam 
in 1980 in New York City and thereafter relocated to his native Boston in 1981. It is very 
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orthodox, in both its attendants’ outlooks and worldviews. Ahl-i Sunna wa’l Jamaah is 
often cited to explain the orientation of the Mosque. At any given time you can find a 
number of predominantly African American worshippers at the mosque, engaged in a 
heated debate on how many other mosques have become more accommodating and how 
easy it is to stray away from the “straight path.” To a first time visitor and an alien eye, 
Masjid Alhamdulillah may seem to fit into that stereotype that has developed around the 
inner-city African American communities: the salafi, strict, rough community which has 
failed to Americanize in its ideational sense. And yet, Masjid Alhamdulillah developed 
an alternative form of engagement with the identity question. Imam Faaruq explains: 
“We are first and foremost Muslims. American Muslim? It is problematic because it 
starts with American. By virtue of being born here we have specific ability and 
responsibility to speak to our immediate environment. And that entails speaking out 
against the haraam in this society and promulgating the beauty of Islam.” 
 
Figure 6: Masjid Alhamdulillah  
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A former singer and songwriter, and occasional actor, he adds, Imam Faaruq has a 
melodious voice. I asked him once if he continued to sing after he converted to Islam. He 
laughed, and said he initially did, but “oh baby come here,” he chanted in the most 
melodic form, did not go with “Allahu Akbar,” so he stopped after the second year of his 
conversion. Still, during our conversations he would sometimes start singing. He loves Al 
Green’s famous song, “Let’s Stay Together.” “It’s lyrics are deep, nothing like the trash 
you find in today’s songs,” he emphasizes. “It is that element of love in the African 
Americans that made them resist hating the white man despite all the injustices” he 
continues. 
Last time I saw Imam Faaruq was before I had left for California, at Brigham and 
Women’s Hospital. He looked weak, and could hardly walk. A few minutes after me 
Chaplain Taymullah, a young, local African American scholar, came into the room and 
we chatted for a few minutes. Imam had an undiagnosed problem on his left leg. It had 
first appeared a few years back and had put him to bed, and this was the second time he 
had to take time off of his duties at Masjid Alhamdulillah. He was in pain but seemed 
much better than the first time this strange problem had hit him. When I visited him at his 
home in late 2012 he could hardly move and had excruciating pain. He had become the 
Imam of Masjid Alhamdulillah in 1996, after serving as an Assistant Imam to Imam 
Dawud Ahmad since 1983.  
Imam Faaruq remembers attending Martin Luther King’s 1963 March on Washington for 
Jobs and Freedom as an impressionable 16 year-old high school student. In retrospect, he 
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recounts, this event had inspired a revolutionary, rebellious outlook for him. I ask him if 
he had been exposed to NOI or Malcolm X’s discourses. He argued he was not, but states 
that despite the effect of the March, it was the non-violent, Christian nature of Dr. King’s 
discourse that had not allowed many more to follow in his footsteps. Although he was not 
exposed to them, he could see how the “do for yourself,” ideology and the anti-
Trinitarian beliefs of NOI, Black Panthers and H Rap Brown (who would later become 
Jamil al Amiin, an Atlanta based leader who became center of much controversy) that 
provided the break-out that the African Americans like himself become more attractive to 
Blacks. Noting that he preaches change today, and not revolution, back in the late 1970s 
he was influenced by these movements, and had become more receptive to a 
revolutionary discourse.  
It would be through his exposure to the Ansarullah Community in Brooklyn that would 
spark his conversion to Islam. Ansarullah, literally meaning “Helpers of God,” was 
founded in the 1960s in New York by Dwight York, or Isa Muhammad. Originally 
named the Nubiian Islamic Hebrews, and today known as the Holy Tabernacle 
Ministries, Ansarullah is one of the more interesting Black communities that have 
developed since the early 20
th
 century that made connections to Jewish scripture and 
Afro-Middle Eastern roots.
172
 “It was the strict, exotic dresses they imposed, the many 
row houses they controlled in Brooklyn that attracted me,” says Imam Faaruq. And yet, 
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he was not completely at home there. Ansarullah’s founder, the eccentric Imam Isa who 
would later pronounce himself the Mahdi and add a line to the Muslim pronouncement of 
faith that pushed Imam Faaruq away from the movement. Still in Brooklyn, he starts 
attending the mostly Egyptian immigrant mosque on 72
nd
 Street in Brooklyn. He studies 
Arabic and Qur’an with them; in his words, “it was learning through enculturation. That 
is how I received my middle name, Taalib-student.” What shapes his future trajectory is a 
call he made from Brooklyn to his mother in Boston. When he asks her if there was any 
Muslims she knew, his mother talks to her Nigerian neighbor and that person refers them 
to Mosque for the Praise of Allah. Today, most first time visitors find the mosque online, 
on Google, according to Imam Faaruq.  
In the early 1980s, Imam Abdul Zahid Dawud Ahmad was the full-time Imam at Masjid 
Alhamdulillah. Imam Dawud was originally from Kentucky – “he had seen the worse” 
adds Imam Faaruuq – and he was a Korean War veteran, influenced by the humane 
treatment he received from Muslim soldiers he met in Korea. Previously a Catholic altar 
boy, he would convert to Islam in 1956.
173
 They had established an Islamic school, called 
Al Azhar. Imam Faaruuq counts organizational and financial problems and lack of 
capacity among the reasons why they had to close the school. Due to his eagerness to 
study and serve, Imam Dawud made him Assistant Imam in 1983 and he commuted 
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between Dudley Square and Allston where he was the maintenance superintendent for a 
large housing complex. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s the mosque attracted 
African Americans along with the Sudanese immigrants who had started to settle nearby 
and the many Muslim professionals and students who had settled in the city and for 
whom Shawmut Avenue was the closest mosque they could find. Masjid Al Qur’an – still 
called Muhammed’s Mosque No. 11 until 1985 – was not as centrally located and the 
community was slowly moving away from the NOI teachings into mainstream Islam. 
Dudley Square was in close proximity to the area’s medical centers, as well as to 
Northeastern University. Imam Faaruq counts many “Indo-Pakistani doctors” who 
attended the mosque. While some of them continued their affiliation with the mosque, 
many would establish or join suburban mosques in the coming years. Imam Faaruq 
becomes the full-time Imam of the mosque in early 1996 when Imam Dawud has a stroke 
in late 1995 while delivering the Friday sermon at the mosque.  
Masjid Alhamdulillah operates on a modest budget. The mega-mosques across Boston 
and in California can raise upwards of a couple hundred thousand dollars in one 
fundraiser, but for Masjid Alhamdulillah 2014’s goal was a minuscule thirty thousand 
dollars. Most attendees of the Mosque are formerly incarcerated or lower-income 
individuals. And yet, the mosque is content with their operations. They run a monthly 
food bank out of the Mosque, every Thursday evening dinner is provided to those who 
fast in emulation of Prophet Muhammad’s custom, and during Ramadan collective 
donations provide for the daily evening breaking of the fast. After the Al Azhar was 
closed the community reverts back to the weekend school model, which is another 
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income source for the mosque. Because most members cannot afford to send their 
children to the private Islamic schools that started to increase in numbers since the early 
1990s, weekend school is deemed critical. The influx of Somali immigrants
174
 following 
the 1991 civil war, especially as situation in Somali gets direr in the late 1990s, creates 
another change for the pedagogy at Masjid Alhamdulillah. While Imam Faaruq and his 
wife, who is a public school teacher, had planned to open a charter school, lack of funds 
pushes them to postpone the plan. Although Imam Faaruq starts working as a prison 
chaplain in the early 1990s, his financial situation does not allow for the realization of the 
plans, which eventually falter in the early 2000s. In 2005 the Somali community at the 
mosque opens a dugsi – a type of madrasa that is common in Somalia, which focuses 
much more on rote memorization than anything else. In late 2008 Imam Faaruq decides 
that model would not work. I ask him what made him to make this decision. Here is his 
answer: 
“Well, we are not Somalis. We are Americans. Memorization is good but 
it does not solve much by itself, if the characteristics is not there. It simply 
does not work. And we saw that. I realized it would be better if the kids 
memorized only the last juz [the last 20 chapters of the Qur’an that are 
shorter in length and easier to memorize] rather than rote memorization 
and too much attention to tajwid [the Arabic pronunciation in Qur’anic 
recitation].”  
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This is how the current MECCA Weekend School war born in late 2009. MECCA stands 
for “Motivating Excellence in Character, Community and Academics.” Imam Faruuq 
explains each element in detail. Kids need motivation. Without character and 
commitment to community one cannot fulfill their Islam. And Islamic curriculum alone is 
not enough, it needs to be accompanied by good academics, including in secular 
disciplines. The school currently has around 60 students from different ethno-racial 
groups and age brackets. Many are African American with some Somali and West 
African students, including about 30 teenage boys and girls, and younger kids, even some 
toddlers – Imam Faaruq is especially fond of these little kids and can frequently be seen 
playing with them. What happens to the other Somali members once the dugsi closes? 
Some stick around, but some rent a small place nearby on Green Street.  
Imam Faaruq has recently been at the center of several controversies. Aaifa Siddiqui had 
once led social relief operations out of the Masjid and her association with the Mosque 
and Imam Faaruq came to be questioned even more in the aftermath of Boston Marathon 
bombings. A year earlier, and while he was seriously ill, he was fired from his position as 
the Muslim Chaplain of Northeastern University, following his remarks at Brighton’s 
Yusuf Mosque where he had spoken strongly against the case against Siddiqi and how 
she was striped from the right to see her family for years while being kept in Bagram 
Prison in Afghanistan without a charge. [REFS] 
He was instrumental in establishing the Eid Committee of Boston, which was in place 
from 1991 to 2010. The committee would go for moon sighting, to observe the new 
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crescent moon, the sunnah, according to Imam Faaruuq. His account follows that it was 
when the then imam of the ISBCC, Imam Basyouny Nehla, unilaterally decided to follow 
the astronomic calculations that allowed for determining the Eid day, that the “unity was 
abandoned.” “But why do they rule against the Prophet, peace be upon him, it was not 
me. We follow the sunnah today, sometimes we join other mosques who also follow the 
sunnah. They choose to follow the loudest voice, not the correct way.”175 This year, 
Masjid Alhamdulillah was absent from the Eid al Adha prayers organized by ISBBC, ISB 
and Masjid Al Qur’an. The announcement from the Mosque read: “For the sake of unity 
and due to an overwhelming appeal from the community to follow global sighting for this 
eidul adha, we will pray on October 4, 2014. Prayers will be held at the Salvation Army 
Kroc Center.” In 2012 the funds that were collected during the Eid prayers collectively 
held by these three mosques were used for Imam Faaruq’s hospital expenses. Imam 
Suhaib Webb, the Imam of ISBCC, told the community that he could not reveal where 
the funds would go, but if they knew the sacrifices of this giant server, they would double 
their donations. As early as 1980s Imam Faaruuq was assisting Imam Dawud to establish 
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 Among my other institutions, Zaytuna College and Ta’leef Collective also adhere to the moon 
sighting method. An e-mail from Zaytuna College on July 28, 2014, marking the end of Ramadan 
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YouTube channel that portrays moon sighting in the Bay Area for the Islamic lunar month 
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on three M’s; music, moon, and meat, are hotly debated, often divisive, issues across the 
American Muslim landscape. It is important to note that this issue is rarely reflective of the 
conservative- moderate bifurcation that is common in the literature; it may be considered more 
reflective of the traditionalist- modernist debate. 
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the ISBCC. Nearly 20 years after those first efforts ISBCC would open its doors. From 
the three-story small community of Masjid Alhamdulillah it takes about 20 minutes to 
walk to the ISBCC. But the distance has grown deeper in Imam Faaruq’s heart, especially 
since 2012. He gets emotional explaining how they were pushed aside simply because 
they did not have the “same fundraising capability as the Arabs who overtook the 
project.” Although he is not at the center of Boston’s Muslim landscape today, Imam 
Faaruq continues to emphasize his own take on global developments, while remaining 
critical of America. As we will see below, over time one of his attendants would be killed 
in a “counterterrorism operation,” which he argues was merely a function of the young 
member’s skin tone. Speaking on ISIS, Imam Faaruq says, “I am not downing my 
country, America.. My family coming from West Indies, our blood and tears are in the 
soil of America. I have more than a right, a responsibility to talk about my country and 
we need to listen and obey to make that change happen, learn, read, and reflect, and come 
with the willingness of submission and commit yourselves.”  
 
ISBCC: The Urban Paragon of American Muslim Identity? 
 
ISBCC has become a landmark of Boston’s plural urban landscape. When you walk out 
of the nearby Orange Line T Station Roxbury Crossing, a mural meets you. The mural 
depicts ISBCC, with its dome and minaret, alongside other landmarks in the historic 
Mission Hill neighborhood. Local artist Roberto Chao was commissioned to work on the 









As you step out of the station, this time it is the Asian door that greets you, with ISBCC 
located under Chinatown’s famed gate. The mural creates a matched illusion with the 
actual dome and mosque clearly visible behind the mural. The second, which greets 
commuters as they walk toward the station from Columbus Avenue/Malcolm X 
Boulevard intersection, is called the Middle Eastern Gate with “salaam- peace” written 
above the door in Arabic script. Other figures depicted in the series of mural include 
Melnea Cass, depicted the “Mother of Roxbury,” Reggie Lewis Track Center and 
Roxbury Community College. The nearby Columbus Avenue seems to stand in a 
misnamed contradiction to these marginal heroes of the America’s underprivileged.  
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When you cross the busy Columbus Avenue over to Malcolm X Boulevard – with his 
adopted Muslim name, El Hajj Malik al-Shabazz written in small letters, below his NOI 
name – toward Roxbury Community College, ISBCC stands at the corner of Elmwood 
Street and the Boulevard, behind the electronic announcement board of Roxbury 
Community College. The intersection was renamed the Muhammad Ali Salaam Square 
on August 8, 2013 at a ceremony attended by the then Boston Mayor Thomas Menino 
and Boston’s Muslim community members, along with a long list of city officials. 
Considering the long, controversial story of how ISBCC was built, there could be no 
other name better suited than Muhammad Ali Salaam’s for this location – a Catholic who 
was born in Panama and influenced by NOI in his early years in America
177
, his 
conversion to orthodox Islam would come as the result of a conversation he had with 
Muzammil Siddiqi, the current FCNA Chairman, at the Quincy Mosque on the concept of 
trinity.
178
  He has been the Boston Muslim community’s primary face and advocate in the 
halls of city and federal government. He was the conceptual father of the mosque, and 
represents its many faces today. 
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A+DREAM [last accessed January 17, 2015.]  
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Figure 8: Opening ceremony of Muhammad Ali Salaam Square in front of ISBCC, 
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 Retrieved from, http://isbcc.org/defining_moments/ [last accessed January 19, 2015]. See, 
Patrick D. Rosso, “Community advocate Muhammad Ali Salaam honored in Roxbury,” 
boston.com, August 9, 2013; available at 
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ISBCC is an urban mosque, run by Muslim American Society (MAS)’s Boston chapter. 
In stark contradiction to my other Boston area case studies, ISBCC- MAS Boston has 15 
full-time staff, regular programming spanning youth programs, food pantries, religious 
programming delivered by national and international speakers, houses a full time Islamic 
school on its premises along with a weekend school, and until recently it employed one of 
the most popular preachers in the country, Imam Suhaib William Webb. It is a mix 
between a mosque and a community center and when challenged on holding certain 
events on its premises, such as a Super Bowl viewing party at the Café on its first floor or 
a spoken word performance by Muslim and non-Muslim artists, ISBCC officials point 
out that the Center was envisioned as a mixed space exactly for the reason to be able to 
hold different events, and to enable different audiences come to the Center without 
strictly adhering to the requirements of Muslim attire – especially for women –, and not 
only prayers. This aspect of ISBCC would highlight shifting imaginations on Muslim 
sacred spaces and debates in the community on several occasions, especially in the 
context of the dispute surrounding a documentary called Unmosqued. Unmosqued aimed 
to answer a critical question: Why were some Muslims leaving the mosque, and what 
were their grievances? In early 2013 several teasers for the documentary film appeared 
online featuring some of the leading Imams and community leaders, including Imam 
Suhaib Webb, Nouman Ali Khan and Khalid Latif. Originally conceived, the 
documentary sought to give voice to those Muslims in America who were alienated from 
mosques due to gender discrimination and ethno-cultural practices, highlighted 
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problematic hiring and firing practices through featuring several Imams who talked about 
their problems with mosque administrators and showcased examples from Third Space 
organizations such as Make Space and Ta’leef Collective. Ta’leef would refuse to be 
featured for the documentary as I will explain below and the controversy around the 
documentary film would continue unabated after its official release in April 2014.  
 ISBCC’s vision statement is short: “To build a community of leaders rooted in Islamic 
tradition, committed to the best of American ideals and empowered to serve the common 
good.” Today, ISBCC hosts over 1300 worshippers coming from 64 different ethnic 
backgrounds on any Friday, operates on a 1.5 million dollar budget, and aspires to 




The Center’s history is weaved with African American Muslims’ efforts to expand their 
presence in Boston’s inner-city, an interest on the part of Boston City Hall in the late 
1980s to revitalize Roxbury, and the influx of immigrant Muslims. The divergent income 
levels and the ability to access to financial resources between the indigenous and 
immigrant Muslims would be the first hurdle that emerged in the ISBCC history. The 
next phase of the center’s history is marked by anti-Muslim sentiments after 9/11, which 
would play an important role in the long, thorny road to build the center and pose a 
fundamental challenge to the civic co-existence and interfaith dialogue in Boston for a 
long time. Since the first temporary prayers were held at the mosque in November 2007, 
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and especially with its formal opening, ISBCC’s experience with local and national 
opposition has informed its institutional identity, how it approaches inter-faith dialogue, 
and the dominant role of community-organizing methods in its internal organization and 
outreach efforts. While I will highlight several dynamics that shape the mosque’s identity 
today – including intrafaith disagreements along the immigrant-indigenous divide and 
competing interpretations of Islamic law and its applicability in the Western context – I 
pay special attention to contextualize the legacy of the period from 2002 to 2007 – a 
period when the ISBCC project was under heavy fire from a small but effective alliance 
of forces – especially because this period would be invoked in the wake of Boston 
Marathon bombings
181
 and shape how Boston’s Muslim community reacted to the 
unfolding debate and was, in turn, received by the Boston’s wider civic leadership. 
Origins and Early Problems 
When the lot behind Roxbury Community College was given to Muslim Council of 
Boston (MCB), a local alliance of Muslim groups primarily led by Masjid 
Alhamdulillah’s Imam Dawud Ahmad, financing became the first problem. Starting in 
1989 local newspapers were inquiring whether it was viable for Boston Redevelopment 
Authority (BRA) to designate, for no charge, the potential housing development site to be 
used toward religious use. Muhammad Ali Salaam, then BRA’s deputy director, was an 
early advocate for the project. He argued that the new site would be a landmark and 
“visitors to Boston will not feel they have seen the city unless they see this.” BRA’s 
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Director in 1989 pointed to an earlier example, Chinese Evangelical Church in South 
Cove area, to underline that the mosque project was not getting special treatment from 
the city.
182
 Imam Dawud envisioned the new center to reflect the wider Muslim 
community’s diversity. He did not give up until he had the stroke in 1995. They worked 
hard, trying to mobilize the community and raise funds. Imam Faaruuq remembers they 
were seeking every venue, but in the early 1990s, Boston’s Muslim population was only 
slowly starting to settle and climb the economic ladders. Roxbury and Dorchester’s 
African-American Muslims did not have the cash, nor could they tap into the networks of 
wealthy Muslim individuals abroad. In the pre-9/11 era it was normal for wealthy 
Muslims and governments to channel funds into America for mosque construction. The 
post-9/11 surveillance and securitization of mosque financing and charitable donations 
were not in place.
183
 
In the mid-1990s, the development of the proposed center was making so little progress 
that many wondered if the project would ever come to fruition. Muhammad Ali Salaam 
was also under pressure to make strides in the project – after all, the lot was still empty 
and the neighborhood had slowly started to show signs of revitalization, which made it 
eligible for a housing project. During this time, several other groups volunteered to make 
the project a reality but these mostly immigrant groups and the project’s initial thought-
fathers had to agree on certain basic guidelines. The pioneer African Americans, 
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primarily Masjid Alhamdulillah community but also the leadership at Masjid Al Qur’an 
who had agreed to be part of the MCB, had concerns: Would the new groups, one of 
which was called Jami’ Masjid of Boston (JMB) founded by a local Muslim scholar of 
Zimbabwean-Indian origin specializing in Islamic law, be inclusive of African American 
community once the new center was built? Would their socio-economic status result in 
their marginalization? Would those who put in the money simply pull the strings? The 
letter from Jami’ Masjid to Imam Faaruuq in April 3, 1997 stated that they had 
committed to address all the reservations of African American community but, “sadly, 
very little progress has been made in this regard.”184  
Today, after some eight years since the ISBCC opened its doors, leaders at Masjid 
Alhamdulillah and Masjid al Qur’an continue to be deeply unsatisfied with where things 
stand. Imam Faaruuq and Imam Taleeb Mehdi separately claim that those with money 
pull the strings, that they are excluded from the decision-making process, and report that 
they were even not invited to some of the key ceremonies held at the commencement of 
construction at the mosque site. As I will highlight below, these sentiments are not 
perfectly shared at the ISBCC and MAS Boston, which runs the center. Their account 
holds that they respect and do their best to include a diverse array of wider community 
leaders but a center as big as ISBCC cannot be meaningfully administered on the basis of 
communal consultation, that these Imams would give khutbas or take part in several 
committees established at the ISBCC – such as Imam Taleeb Mehdi’s role at the current 
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  Imam Suhaib’s constant emphasis on the problem of racism 
among Muslims, with his affinity with and calls toward learning from African American 
experience, the naming of his educational institute after Ella Collins, the sister of 
Malcolm X do not help wither divergent outlooks. As I will examine in Chapters IV and 
V, there exists a deep-seated perceptive gap between how indigenous and immigrant 
Muslims frame their respective relationship. On the other hand, it is crucial to note that 
most of ISBCC’s staff is American-born, with a distinctive preference for an American 
Muslim identity and the label, “immigrant mosque” is a rather misleading 
characterization. MAS Boston’s board includes American born Muslims, including a 
female convert, along with a number of immigrant Muslims. How, then, do these 
communities continue to contextualize their disagreements in the context of an 
immigrant-indigenous duality? Answers lie, in part, in the communal make-up and in-
part in the mixed perceptions that take hold across discursive and historiographic lines 
developed over time in the context of respective historical experiences, in turn 
influencing the negative transnational belonging discourses – that umma corresponds to 
an ideal with little to none practical application, especially at the face of intra-Muslim 
community racism – that are explained in Chapter IV.  
“Immigrant Muslims” Take over the Project: Post 9/11 Realities 
Following the failure of JMB effort in 1997, by 1998 the community around ISB 
Cambridge emerges as the most viable group that was deemed able to shoulder the 
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financial burden and meet BRA requirements, eventually becoming the official designee 
for the project slightly one year before the September 11 attacks. In this period ISB 
leaders, majority of whom were once immigrant students who had decided to settle in 
Boston upon completion of their studies and established the mosque, spearhead efforts to 
raise interest-free loans from individuals and banks in the Middle East. MAS Boston, 
established in 1999 by members who were active in the Cambridge mosque, starts to 
develop programming at the mosque, especially geared towards the Harvard and MIT 
students. On November 8, 2002, amid increased scrutiny for the project and some 
opposition, a groundbreaking ceremony takes place attended by community leaders and 
Mayor Menino. The following two years would prove one of the hardest periods in the 
already troublesome trajectory of the Center. Sparked by allegations put forward by a 
trustee at the Center’s neighbor Roxbury Community College, William Sapers186 who 
was also active in several Boston-area Jewish organizations, and the self acclaimed anti-
terrorism experts of post 9/11 era who claimed they were concerned about ISB’s 
affiliation with Muslim extremists, the episode turned poisonous to quickly include 
Boston’s Jewish establishment, including Jewish Community Relations Council of 
Greater Boston (JCRC), Combined Jewish Philanthropies (CJP),  as well as the Boston 
Chapter of Anti-Defamation League (ADL). The controversy around some of ISB’s 
board members’ statements about Israel, and simultaneously prominent and controversial 
Islamic scholar Yusuf Al-Qaradawi’s affiliation with the center in the late 1990s, drew 
                                                          
186
 For Saper’s 2003 role, see, Dean Barnett, “The Islamists Are Coming: And they’ve got 
lawyers with them,” The Weekly Standard, June 11, 2007. Retrieved from 




attention following a series of articles published by the Boston Herald in the fall of 
2013
187
, and continued to attract national attention in the years to come.
188
  
In its first front-page news story about the project, Boston Herald pushed forward the 
double-claim that Qaradawi, who was listed as a trustee of the mosque from 1998 to 
2001, was a Wahhabi cleric who had ties to Egyptian Islamic Brotherhood with hostile 
views toward Israel and had published religious edicts justifying suicide bombings in 
Israel. The article also highlighted another trustee, Abdurahman Alamoudi, who had been 
charged by American government with receiving funding from foreign entities. The 
Virginia based Alamoudi was among the founders of ISB back in 1982 and had since 
moved to Virginia. He would be counted among Muslim activists who advocated for 
Muslim Americans to vote for George W. Bush Jr. in the 2000 elections, and even 
actively campaign for him, only to be jailed on charges of extremism by the same 
administration after 9/11.
189
 The series of articles at the Herald, coupled with anti-
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Muslim experts such as Steven Emerson and his Investigative Project’s190 online 
coverage of ISB continue for months and in time a local Boston Jewish organization 
David Project joins the voices that continue to question BRA’s Muhammad Ali Salaam 
along with Mayor Menino’s administration. In response, in a press statement on March 
19, 2004, ISB refused the claims forwarded by the Herald and the David Project, and 
argued that they were being attacked for their religious beliefs.
191
 While ISB disowns the 
seemingly anti-Jewish statements by any individuals connected to the project in the 
summer of 2014 and publishes a values statement in September 2004 denouncing anti-
Semitism, in September 2004 a Mission Hill resident who was affiliated with the anti-ISB 
campaign files a law suit against ISB and BRA claiming the land deal between the two 
involved wrongdoings- which would be denied in 2007. Following another series of press 
releases and publications against the Project, ISB and two members of its board file 
separate lawsuits against Boston Herald, David Project and several individuals claiming 
defamation and civil rights breach in October of the following year. In response David 
Project and CPL- one of the groups addressed in ISB’s lawsuit – file their own lawsuit to 
dismiss charges forwarded in the ISB lawsuit, which would be denied in 2006
192
. The 
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following year and a half from the end of 2004 to mid-2006 would be marked not only by 
a harsh legal battle between ISB and its adversaries, only to further surround Boston’s 
wider Muslim and Jewish communities
193
, but also marked additional challenges for 
BRA when a city councilor, Jerry McDermott, calls for a public hearing to inquire into 
Muhammad Ali Salaam’s role in the deal between BRA and ISB.194  
Talking about this episode, which resulted in deep-seated misgivings across Boston’s 
Muslim and Jewish communities, former ISB officers and current ISBCC leaders 
mention a double-edged responsibility. They report that they had only minimal, 
inadequate outreach into other faith communities at the time – they would appreciate the 
value of alliance building in the aftermath of this episode, especially in a post 9/11 
context. On the other hand, they argue, this failure allowed “extremist voices in the 
Jewish community” to capitalize on the post-9/11 securitization hysteria in presenting 
ISB and the proposed ISBCC project as affiliated with terrorism and extremism.
195
 On 
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the other hand, reflecting back, in my interviews with Imam Taleeb Mehdi of Masjid al 
Qur’an and Imam Faaruuq Abdallah of Masjid Alhamdulillah both separately argued that 
their exclusion from the project meant that the Project was seen as an immigrant effort. 
They argued that had indigenous Muslims – African Americans – were not excluded 
from the project since 1998 it would not have been as easy for the anti-Muslim groups to 
stigmatize the Project and that they could bring in their credibility across the inner-city 
political circles as a source of support. While both threw their support behind ISB at the 
time – Imam Faaruq was serving as the President of Islamic Council of New England at 
the height of controversy – both argue that their previous marginalization did not serve 
the wider community well.
196
 I will return to this issue when I discuss further examples of 
discursive debates on indigenization of American Muslims especially because many 
African American Muslims also complain from a type of tokenization that takes place in 
the national scene – that they are invited to American Muslim events only when it serves 
a particular purpose, whether by other organizations or by the Federal government. 
Indeed, Imam Taleeb Mehdi would point out that in the post- 2007 period, they were 
included in many events not as “real” stakeholders, but just for the cosmetics of putting 
on an inclusive, more American face.  
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The Interfaith Intervention: Towards Reconciliation and Community Organizing under 
MAS Boston 
On July 13, 2014, ISBCC held its annual Civic Leaders iftar. Nearly 100 people, from 
different faith groups filled the Center’s third floor meeting room. As I continued to 
follow the program which included a presentation on ISBCC by its Executive Director 
Yusufi Vali, followed by recognition of dignitaries in the room, including rival 
candidates for Attorney General in the November 4, 2014 elections — which was a 
seemingly unimaginable scenario in the mid 2000s — an old, serene priest drew my 
attention. This was the legendary Reverend from Boston College, Father Raymond 
Helmick. I was seated next to Jerome Maryon, Father Helmick’s close associate and a 
leading Catholic figure, perhaps much more colorful than the ailing Father Ray, as he 
would call him. Some eight years ago, at the helm of the breakdown of civic peace in 
Boston, Father Ray, along with his colleagues at the Interreligious Center for Public Life 
(ICPL) – a joint initiative by the Andover-Newton Theological School and Hebrew 
College – would play a fundamental role in paving the way for peaceful resolution of the 
legal battle between ISB and its adversaries.  
Throughout 2006, as JCRC and CJP, while not openly opposing the mosque project, 
acknowledged the David Project’s right to inquire about the ISB and its affiliates, ISB 
members and MAS Boston were building relations with a handful of Jewish 
organizations and congregations, as well as with members of Christian clergy and local 
politicians, to mend the broken relationship and discredit allegations of the David Project 
112 
 
and its affiliate Citizens for Peace and Tolerance (CPT), including sending an open letter 
to David Project’s President Charles Jacob which was also disseminated widely among 
interfaith leaders in the area.
197
 The numerous interfaith events organized with Jewish 
congregations
198
 were spearheaded by a number of young, mostly American born MAS 
Boston volunteers, many of whom had become increasingly more aware of their role as 
community voices in the past three years. Bilal Kaleem, a fresh MIT graduate, had been 
attending ISB since his arrival to Boston in the early 2000s and was shocked by the 
vilification of its members in the media. He recognized the need to reach out and became 
more active with MAS Boston. In a short time he would become the MAS Boston’s 
Executive Director and walk the community through the establishment of the ISBCC and 
its first four years. Still, the outcome had been costly: Potential donors, both in the U.S. 
and abroad had become increasingly wary of the controversy around the project and the 
construction had all but stopped.
199
  
At this juncture, ICPL intensifies its involvement in the dispute and taps into some its 
board members who had previous experience in conflict resolution and mediation, such 
as Father Ray and Rabbi Harold Kushner both of whom urged parties to avoid being sunk 
in a protracted court battle and aim to settle out of court, through mutual understanding. 
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A Boston Globe article in July 4, 2006 reveals that a 40 -member panel of rabbis, priests, 
and civic leaders had been meeting with both ISB, on May 11, and the David Project, on 
June 12, to hear their positions. The initiative, which included smaller mediation sub-
committees, received full support of Andover Newton’s President Rev. Nick Carter and 
the Hebrew College’s President David M. Gordis and was welcomed by both parties’ 
lawyers.
200
 Notwithstanding the fact that the efforts would not bear fruit immediately, and 
the pursuant months witnessed renewed public posturing, a December 22, 2006 letter 
from Rv. Carter and Rabbi Gordis to ISB and the David Project which read:  
“Gentlemen, we are writing to you with concern, but also with hope. We 
are concerned because we know you are engaged in a seemingly 
intractable dispute and that this painful reality weighs heavily upon 
everyone involved. Then too, we are anxiously aware of the burden these 
festering circumstances may place upon the future of interreligious 
relationships in greater Boston….Sobered by the hard realities of the 
situation and yet buoyed by your genuine interest in finding a resolution, 
we have decided to take the bold step of proposing a new course of action 
for you to consider.” 
The presidents of two religious schools, armed by the propositions of ICPL 
subcommittee’s recommendations, proposed a five step resolution that sought to finally 
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cut the Gordian’s knot that the dispute has become. They asked both parties to drop their 
mutual lawsuits, issue a joint statement condemning and disavowing all forms of 
terrorism, mutually affirm the right and benefit for all faith communities to build and 
maintain houses of worship, join forces under support and sponsorship of ICPL to build a 
Center for Interfaith Understanding, and finally, upon successful completion of these 




The proposal would not be immediately adopted, nor would it be put in effect in full. Yet, 
it would pave the way for what was to come in May 29, 2007. The period from January to 
April 2007 witnessed a series of legal maneuvers and disputes, as was the norm since 
2003, but also a last minute effort to end the deadlock. In February a 2004 lawsuit against 
the ISB and BRA is dismissed, a group of Jewish organizations- Jewish Voice for Peace, 
Tekiah and the Boston Tikkun Community throw their support behind ISB’s lawsuit 
against the David Project, only to be labeled by the JCRC as marginal groups
202
, and 
David Project appeals a 2006 decision that denied its lawsuit that sought to dismiss ISB’s 
lawsuit.  
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Despite these setbacks after the ICPL proposal was sent to parties, ISB, the more willing 
party in Father Ray’s words, takes an initiative to bring one of his former trustees, Dr. 
Walid Fitaihi, back to Boston in April 2007. Dr. Fitaihi had made statements in the wake 
of second intifada that were shown as proof of anti-Semitic views held by ISB circles. 
Fitaihi and ISB leaders joined a closed meeting held by one of the Jewish groups that 
advocated for mediation, Boston Workmen’s Circle (BWC) — a secular Jewish group 
that had a long working relationship with the ISB leadership — where Father Ray was 
also present, and Fitaihi apologized for his remarks.
203
 Dr. Fitaihi would eventually return 
to Boston and deliver the Friday sermon on July 6, 2012.
204
 Imam Suhaib Webb would 
welcome him as a major advocate for the mosque who was ostracized in the past for his 
sacrifices toward the construction of the Mosque.   
Following Fitaihi’s remarks, both sides’ lawyers get together and start working 
toward an agreement by which lawsuits would be dropped. In the meantime, already 
holding the upper hand in the legal battle, ISB produces documents pointing out to a 
concerted effort by the David Project and CPT to defame the ISB. By May 29
th
, however, 
the long-awaited settlement is announced in a press statement by ISB, entitled, “ISB 
Litigation Settlement Announced – Peace at Last.” The press release read:  
 
“The ISB filed its lawsuit to defend an important principle: the basic 
constitutional and civil right of all faith communities to build places of 
worship.  We have achieved what we set out to do – to stand up for an 
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important principle….The Muslim community will now focus on 
completing a dream that has been in the works for almost two decades, the 
completion of the Islamic Society of Boston’s new mosque and cultural 
center.  We are confident that the new facility will be a wonderful 
gathering place for area Muslims, as well as a beacon of hope and 
understanding between communities, as it has always been intended….We 
embrace a Greater Boston that is multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-
religious, in which diversity is respected and valued and we will always 
oppose efforts to create divisions between communities.”205 
 
The event that marked my first, albeit virtual, encounter with the ISBCC, the minaret 
capping event, would be announced in this press release and would take place on June 9
th
, 
2007. Now formally under management of MAS Boston, ISBCC would hold an 
Intercommunity Solidarity Event on June 27
th
 attended by hundreds, including local 
clergy from Christian communities, as well as Jewish representatives, not only from the 
Workmen’s Circle and representatives of supportthemosque.org website group – which 
presented the mosque with a $2000 check – but also the Rabbi at Temple Beth Zion of 
Brookline, Moshe Waldoks, a JCRC Committee Chair who argued that David Project 
was more conservative than the Jewish mainstream and not representative of the wider 
Jewish community and revealed that he had been in contact with ISB members 
throughout the legal battle.
206
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ISBCC in the aftermath of 2007- Community Organizing and Imam Suhaib Webb 
On September 28, 2007 I broke my fast on campus and took the T with a group of friends 
from Islamic Society of Boston University (ISBU) to Roxbury Crossing T Station. There 
were tens of Muslims on the train and everyone looked jubilant. This was the day of first 
ever prayers at the ISBCC. Weeks earlier, Friday prayer khateebs were announcing the 
event. Everyone was urged to attend at his auspicious event. For three weeks in a row the 
speakers at Boston University’s Friday prayer services – many of whom were leaders at 
ISB – underlined that these first prayers at ISBCC would be historic, that it was a 
victorious occasion that came after a long battle with anti-Muslim groups, and that the 
taraweeh prayers would be led by the legendary qari – someone who specializes in 
Qur’anic recitation – Shaykh Muhammed Jibreel who was travelling from Egypt 
exclusively for this special occasion. This was my third week in Boston and I had 
forgotten about the minaret capping event I had seen online a few months ago. Ilir, a 
fellow graduate student from Montenegro who was rooming with Muhammad, the 
Sharon native who was the President – at the time called Ameer – of ISBU207, was 
looking forward to this day as well. He had arrived in Boston a year earlier and while his 
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first contact was with Masjid Alhamdulillah, he considered ISBCC a place for all 
Muslims, an institution that needed to be preserved by the collective Muslim voice in 
light of the anti-mosque.  
The mosque was packed with Muslims of all ages, and no one seemed to care too much 
about the ongoing construction and the thick semi-concrete floors covered with 
cardboards that did not help much during prayers. The recitation was indeed moving and 
the worshippers seemed humbled to be finally praying in this space. When Shaykh Jibreel 
finished the first half of prayers, Loay Assaf, a MAS Boston official, and Bilal Kaleem 
came to the microphone and started an on the spot fundraiser. To my amusement – I had 
never witnessed a public fundraiser in Turkey where charitable giving, religious or 
otherwise, is expected to be done in private, far from the gaze of others – this process 
went on for a good forty minutes. MAS Boston would announce later that 200.000 dollars 
were raised that night in Roxbury, in addition to the 300.000 dollars they were able to 
collect the day before at a fundraiser at the Cambridge Marriott.
208
 In 2007 and 2008 and 
I would see Assaf several times at ISBU prayers and at Yusuf Mosque in Brighton calling 
Boston’s Muslims to donate for the ISBCC, which he identified as an institution that 
belonged to all Muslims, not to one particular group.  
From 2007 onwards ISBCC has become the face of Boston’s wider Muslim community. 
As I have discussed before, African American Muslims felt excluded, but continued to be 
part of the Project, the center became an attraction point for the Somali immigrant 
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community who live predominantly in Roxbury, and Boston’s Muslim student population 
became increasingly more attracted to this new, large center. The period since 2007 was 
one of expansion and institutionalization. In 2007 and 2008 the Mosque still needed 
funds to pay for their current debts and to finalize construction that was required to get 
occupancy permits from the City of Boston. MAS Boston, which started to run the 
Mosque in June 2007, was also investing in relationship building. While the lawsuit was 
settled, problems persisted and required immediate attention. 
Shortly before he left his position at MAS Boston in 2012, Bilal Kaleem explained to me 
that they did not even have time to celebrate the end of the legal battle; if balance sheets 
were one major source of concern, the continued negative press coverage – despite 
improved relations with the Jewish community and the interfaith leaders – would 
continue to keep the small team of volunteers at MAS Boston busy. The 2009 formal 
inauguration of the ISBCC would become another source of controversy due to 
approaching 2010 gubernatorial elections. However, unlike in the mid 2000s, ISBCC 
would find Boston’s interfaith leaders squarely on its side. Bilal’s relations with the 
Greater Boston Interfaith Organization (GBIO) would be the critical factor in garnering 
this much-needed support. Today, ISBCC’s institutional identity is influenced heavily by 
its relationship with the GBIO and the trajectory of events after Boston Marathon 
bombing of April 2013 is a testament to the legacy and influence of this relationship. 
Below, I first thread across a set of events and individuals that have been critical factors 
in this relationship and then examine the arrival of Imam Suhaib Webb to the ISBCC – 
another significant development that brought the ISBCC increasingly into national light 
120 
 
and influenced the current identity of the institution.   
ISBCC would finally acquire an occupancy permit in 2008 and daily prayers would 
commence in August.
209
 In November 2008, however, ISBCC project faces another set of 





, The Boston Phoenix publishes a set of articles that repeat the earlier 
Herald coverage on ISB’s links to terrorism and further question Mayor Menino and 
Muhammad Ali Salaam’s role in the construction of the mosque. Based on the findings of 
an academic study focusing on ISB, the paper also questions if ISB has espoused 
homophobia, and pointing out to interviews with Imam Abdullah Faaruuq and Imam 
Taleeb Mehdi, argues that African American Muslims were pushed aside.
210
 Unlike in the 
period from 2003 to 2006, however, a long list of interfaith and civic leaders, including 
several of Boston’s Jewish community, publicly defend MAS Boston and ISBCC with an 
open letter published at the Boston Phoenix on December 4, 2008 where they underline 
that MAS Boston had been an active partner in the city’s interfaith circles and had shown 
genuine interest in furthering Roxbury’s civic life. 211 GBIO was one of those interfaith 
circles. The relationship between ISBCC and GBIO goes back to 2006, when Bilal 
Kaleem sought allies in the interfaith community upon becoming MAS Boston’s 
Executive Director. GBIO had become an active player in the Boston’s civic and political 
life since its inception in 1996. As a major advocate for universal healthcare reform in 
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Massachusetts the organization had proved instrumental in organizing religious 
congregations behind the legislation through an aggressive campaign in 2005 and 2006 
and had proved their ability to deliver change.
212
 While ISBCC needed an interfaith ally 
that was on the progressive spectrum of political life, GBIO wanted to extend into 
Boston’s inner city, and toward faith communities beyond its core Christian and Jewish 
membership. MAS Boston- ISBCC’s membership in GBIO would provide the young 
organization with fresh new legitimacy and much needed support to overcome any efforts 
that sought to marginalize it. Furthermore, GBIO’s community organizing know-how that 
put special emphasis on relational organizing and storytelling would become instrumental 
in establishing relations within the community. Whereas initial fruits of this relationship 
would emerge when leading GBIO figures sign the open letter in The Phoenix in 2008, its 
relationship with GBIO would become critical for ISBCC when it found itself in the 
crossfire during the 2010 Gubernatorial campaign.  
Having raised enough money to complete most of construction and acquire city permits, 
ISBCC announces an inaugural celebration and grand opening for June 26
th
, 2009. A few 
weeks before the center would host an ICPL-sponsored dialogue and interfaith relations 
conference.
213
 The program features an interfaith and civic leadership breakfast with 
Governor Deval Patrick, who was elected into office in November 2006, closer to the end 
of ISB’s legal battle. The long time advocate for the ISBCC, Mayor Thomas Menino, 
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would headline a ribbon cutting ceremony in front of the Mosque, and the next day 
ISBCC would hold an Inaugural Dinner at Marriott Copley with African American 
Minnesota Democrat, Keith Ellison – the first American Muslim congressman elected to 
Congress in 2006, representing an electoral region heavily populated by Somali 
immigrants.  
 
Figure 9: Flyer for ISBCC’s Inaugural Opening, June 26, 2009.214 
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Reflective of its history, the inaugural opening of the ISBCC, takes place amid competing 
shows of solidarity and protest. Deval Patrick cancels his appearance at the last minute, 
saying he had to attend the funeral of a Massachusetts soldier who died in Afghanistan
215
 
– alternatively attributed to Patrick’s fear of political attacks during a heated run-up to the 
gubernatorial election scheduled for November 2010 by Yusufi Vali, the then GBIO 
organizer and current Executive Director of the ISBCC
216
 – but sends a warm video 
message to greet the gathering and describes the event a milestone, a large group of 
interfaith leaders, civic and political leaders attend the breakfast amid protest by 
Mosque’s opponents. While, a number of Jewish faith leaders attend the event and the 
subsequent ribbon cutting ceremony with Mayor Menino, most mainstream Rabbis do not 
attend the inaugural events, pointing to their unease due to ongoing allegations published 
by The Boston Phoenix.
217
 During the breakfast and at the ribbon cutting ceremony 
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Menino would declare himself to be proud to stand together with Muslim community, 
and not with the protestors. When Menino passed away in November 2014, Muslim 
community leaders would pay tributes to ISBCC’s most powerful supporter, and recite 
his words on that day as a testament to Menino’s support for the ISBCC. Friday prayers 
would be preceded by a call to prayer from the minaret, audible from nearby, and the 
sermon would be delivered by a close friend of Imam Abdullah Faaruuq, another African 




Figure 10: Mayor Menino at the ISBCC Ribbon Cutting Ceremony on June 26, 2009 with 
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Patrick, on the other hand, would return to ISBCC the next spring, on May 22, 2010. 
Troubled by his poll numbers, Menino’s political team decides to focus on inner-city 
communities of color to tap into a voter base that proved instrumental in 2006. Yusufi 
Vali states that it was Patrick who called Bilal Kaleem, whom he had met during GBIO 
events, and requested a tour and visit with the ISBCC community. Kaleem agrees, yet 
proposes an alternative format; the event would be organized as an action with the wider 
Massachusetts Muslim community whereby Patrick would listen to specific issues of 
concern to the community and respond to “asks,” a list of requests to which Patrick had 
to respond on-the-spot. With Patrick’s agreement, Bilal Kaleem organizes a listening 
campaign to identify the wider Boston Muslim community’s concerns and 
simultaneously starts a turn-out campaign. The event would become a success – 
collaborations from Islamic Council of New England and around 25 mosques across the 
state turns out 1200 Muslims and Patrick responds affirmatively to the four asks: to visit 
two more mosques in his first year in office, to urge cultural sensitivity training for law 
enforcement officials and stop profiling, to develop a program with Muslim leaders to 
better train public school teachers on Muslim youth’s encounter with discrimination, and 
finally to support GBIO’s ongoing anti-usury campaign that sought to cap interest rates. 
Furthermore he drew parallels with his experience of discrimination as an African 
American and the anti-Muslim discrimination, which was a major win for the Bay State 
Muslims.
220
 In addition, Patrick announced he was appointing a liaison, Ron Bell, to the 
Muslim community. 
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Figure 11: Governor Patrick shakes hand with Imam Abdullah Faaruuq of Masjid 
Alhamdulillah at the ISBCC on May 22, 2010. Yusufi Vali and Bilal Kaleem (second and 




The event would prove a success and becomes one of the milestones and often cited 
episodes in ISBCC’s history of community organizing work – together with what would 
follow in a span of five days when Governor Patrick’s contender, independent candidate 
and State Treasurer Timothy Cahill publicly criticized Patrick’s engagement with the 
ISBCC, arguing his rival “was playing politics with terrorism” by meeting with over 
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1000 Muslims, which was labeled as “fear-mongering” by the Patrick campaign.222 Then 
an organizer with the GBIO following his education at Princeton and LSE and his Arabic 
studies in Syria, as well as his work in the Obama presidential campaign, current 
Executive Director of ISBCC Yusufi Vali narrates that Bilal Kaleem turned to his GBIO 
allies to devise a response to Cahill’s statements. Especially because GBIO had 
previously worked closely with and had positive responses from Cahill on several of its 
actions, including in its anti-interest rate campaign and in raising state funds in over 20 
years for a Boston public school, Dearborn School, this was a sensitive issue for the 
GBIO as well. And yet, GBIO would stand squarely with the ISBCC and against Cahill, 
organizing a meeting with Cahill at the then GBIO President Reverend Hurmon 
Hamilton’s congregation, in Roxbury Presbyterian Church, on May 28th, 2010. In the 
meeting, Cahill faced criticism from over 20 faith leaders, but declined to retract his 
statement. In response, GBIO and ISBCC would organize a press meeting in front of 
ISBCC the next morning, attended by leading faith leaders, including many Rabbis, 
publicly blasting Cahill for his statement.
223
 When Charles Jacobs of APT publish a 
criticism
224
 of the past President of Massachusetts Board of Rabbis, Rabbi Eric Gurvis of 
the reform congregation, Temple Shalom of Newton in the Jewish Advocate, for 
                                                          
222
 Vali, ibid. Also see, Glen Johnson, “Cahill: Patrick ‘pandering’ with Muslim meeting,” The 
Associated Press, May 27, 2010. Available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/05/27/cahill_patrick_pandering_
with_muslim_meeting/ [last accessed June 22, 2015.]  
223




aders+unite+to+blast+Cahill [last accessed January 22, 2015.] 
224
 Charles Jacobs, “What’s up with Patrick?” The Jewish Advocate, June 4, 2010. Available at 
http://peaceandtolerance.org/docs/rabbis/060410whatpatrick.pdf [last accessed January 22, 2015.] 
128 
 
appearing in the GBIO-led press conference, over 70 Rabbis publish an “Open Letter to 
the Jewish Community” in the same paper, where they not only oppose Jacobs’ attack to 
Rabbi Gurvis, but also criticize Cahill’s statement and call on Jacobs to “discontinue his 
destructive campaign against Boston’s Muslim community which is based on innuendo, 
half-truths, and unproven conspiracy theories.”225  
 




Crucially, this long and painful episode in Boston’s religious landscape took place not in 
isolation from but rather against the backdrop of a national conversation on Islam, 
radicalization and terrorism. The media attention around American Muslims’ association 
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with terrorist organizations as well as congressional hearings
227
 had been fueling the 
national conversation on Islam and American Muslims in a negative fashion. Park 51 or 
Ground Zero Mosque controversy was at its height; Fort Hood shooting took place some 
five month ago, Aaifa Siddiqi, a former MIT scholar, had been captured in 2008 in 
Afghanistan on charges of aiding Al Qaida and Tarek Mehanna, a Boston area Muslim, 
was charged with providing material assistance to terrorism in 2009. Much of the anti-
ISB/ISBCC coverage found new material in these trials to incriminate Boston’s Muslims. 
In out interview, one Masjid Alhamdulillah member would describe life in the post 9/11 
America as “living like a mouse in a house of cats.” Suhaib Webb would not avoid 
allegations; he would be the new “radical Imam” in the eyes of APT and its allies. I will 
return to the national conversation on Islam and how post-9/11 environment 
securitization of Islam in America affected the tone, nature, and discourses of Muslim 
American worldviews in Chapter V. 
It is important to note, however, that ISB and ISBCC had developed close relationships 
with Boston’s law enforcement circles, especially with the FBI agents in the post 2002 
period. Muhammad Ali Salaam, still at BRA at the time, would be the community liaison 
with the FBI and local mosques, and as early as 2006, ISB and MAS Boston would 
initiate a “know your donor program” with the help of FBI, thereby informing the 
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government of any donations over 5000 dollars. Additionally, along with other MAS 
chapters nationwide, MAS Boston had adapted an anti-radicalization program that was 
called “the Straight Path” in 2009. This initiative was part of a wider program that sought 
to instill values of moderation and the perception of the “ummatan wasata- the moderate, 
middle umma [2:143]. Current ISBCC / MAS Boston Board member Hossam AlJabri, 
who was the Executive Director of MAS National in 2010, explained that MAS observed 
a trend of radicalization among young American Muslim and initiated the project in 2009 
after a year of preparation.
228
  
These relationships would be instrumental in the aftermath of April 15, 2013 and despite 
being buried under a cloud of suspicion and under renewed attack from their long-time 
critics such as APT, Boston’s Muslim leaders would establish close contact with and 
offer their help to the FBI.
229
 Another crucial factor to help ISBCC wither the storm in 
the aftermath Marathon Bombing would be Imam Suhaib William Webb, a five foot six 
Oklahoma native turned Al-Azhar graduate who would radically alter the discursive 
landscape at ISBCC. 
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“We are Bostonians”: Boston Marathon Bombing and Suhaib Webb Years at ISBCC, 
2011- 2014 
Suzan El-Rayess remembers the morning of April 15
th
, 2013 vividly. It looked like any 
other Monday for her. By nightfall, she would be receiving calls from local, national and 
international media and would soon be one of ISBCC’s faces on these platforms. She was 
in her office at the ISBCC that morning and she had a one-on-one, a relational meeting 
method used in community organizing circles, with a potential donor. She was scheduled 
to have a late lunch with a family friend on Newbury Street and was eager to finish her 
weekly meeting with Yusufi Vali, the former GBIO organizer who had become the 
Executive Director of ISBCC in mid- 2012. She was presenting her fundraising strategy 
to Yusufi that she had been working on for the past several weeks. As the Center’s 
Director of Development she was tasked with community outreach and fund-raising and 
had prepared hard for her presentation. Suzan had recently finished her public policy 
masters program at Columbia and returned back to her native Boston. At the time she was 
the only native Bostonian on the staff and after working at the Harvard Kennedy School’s 
Women in Public Policy Program she was recruited to ISBCC – she was not a foreigner 
on the premises since she had already worked there as a volunteer during the Deval 
Patrick visit. They had asked not to be disturbed but the potential donor from the morning 
meeting was on the phone. She told her that something strange was going on in the city. 
Puzzled, Suzan remembers asking herself, “so why is she telling me this?” Minutes later 
an incessant flow of police cars and sirens start to buzz in front of the ISBCC. Boston 
Police Headquarters is within three minutes walking distance to the ISBCC, on Columbus 
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Street. Even on an uneventful day, the corner of Columbus Avenue, Tremont Street and 
Malcolm X Boulevard has its own heavy traffic of police cars, and by virtue of nearby 
Longwood Medical Area, ambulances.  
That day, however, was nothing like before, recalls Suzan, that incessant sound of sirens 
still buzzes in her head. So they tuned in to the news. Two bombs had rocked finish line 
on Boylston Street, minutes away from Old South Church, one of ISBCC’s major 
partners at the GBIO. As they follow the flowing chaos of information on TV and try to 
reach out anyone they knew who were in proximity of the finish line, with fresh 
memories from a few years back, they realize this can turn ugly for Bostonian Muslims. 
That “let it not be Muslims,” thought crossed their minds she told me. So they put away 
the fundraising strategy and start drafting a press release. 
I received this press release at 5:01 pm in my room some 3000 miles and two time-zones 
away in Fremont, California. I had moved to Fremont from Boston only ten days ago and 
was only starting to get acquainted with the Bay Area. The night before I had paid my 
second visit to Ta’leef’s Sunday night program the night before and was getting ready for 
my meeting with Dr. Mahan Mirza from Zaytuna College later in the week. Marco, my 
landlord, had just come home and was busy feeding his two kids. He came knocking on 
my door to check what I thought about the bombings. Much like Suzan and Yusufi, I was 
following the news and had checked-in with my roommate from Boston to make sure he 
was not anywhere near the finish line; my Twitter feed did not provide any clarity as to 
who was responsible for the attack, it was full of speculation and yet insinuations of 
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“Islamic terrorism” was high on the list. The press release also reflected the speculation 
about an attack to the JFK library, which would later become clear, was not attacked. 
Signed by Yusufi Vali on behalf of MAS Boston/ISBCC, the press release read: 
“Condolences, Prayers and Support After Boston Marathon and JFK 
Library Explosions  
The Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center and the Boston-Muslim 
community is deeply saddened by the tragic occurrence at the Boston 
Marathon and JFK Library, both icons of our great City. We are concerned 
for the loss of life and injuries to the victims. Our prayers and thoughts go 
out to the victims and their families, to the marathon organizers, runners 
and fans, and to our Boston community at large. 
As Bostonians, and inspired by the values of mercy and justice central to 
our faith, the American-Muslim community stands ready to help. We have 
close to 40 ISBCC volunteers on site who are committed to assist in relief 
efforts and also donate blood. Should the City call upon us, we are also 
ready to transform the ISBCC into a disaster relief center. Additionally, 
we extend our spiritual counseling services to any of the victims and their 
family members. 
We hold to the highest standard the human safety and security of our City, 
its people and its guests. We encourage any Bostonian who sees any 
suspicious activity or package to report it to the number provided by the 
Boston Police Chief:  800-494-TIPS (800-494-8477).” 
 
The course of events would prove their worries right. Before the suspects’ identities 
emerge and the manhunt begins, however, they start getting calls from the media that 
night, following the press release. I repeated a question that a New York Times reporter 
asked her that night: why they felt the urge to put out a press release? Wouldn’t that help 
draw blame and seem apologetic even before any details became clear? Suzan, visibly 
puzzled and rather angry, responded back: “Why not, we wanted to underline we were 
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standing with our city!” The flow of calls kept them in the office all night and the volume 
of inquiries was so high that they had to do a division of labor. Suzan would get 
international media, Yusufi, in addition to covering contact with law enforcement, would 
respond to inquiries and interview requests from major local media, and finally Imam 
Suhaib Webb would handle national media outlets. The number of media requests would 
exponentially increase once Tsarnaev brothers were identified towards the end of the 
week, only after they killed an MIT Police officer who happened to be from the same 
town as Suzan, and it became clear that they were occasional visitors to ISB, ISBCC’s 
sister mosque which really did not have a major staff at the time. Therefore, Yusufi 
would become the spokesperson for ISB during the crises and yet ISBCC would 
underline that it was at Cambridge mosque, not at ISBCC, where Tamerlan Tsarnaev was 
kicked out of after getting angry at what he thought was a watering down of Islam in 
Friday sermons on two separate instances.
230
 And yet, despite their previous outreach and 
media experience from 2008 onwards, ISBCC was not equipped to handle the intense 
media attention. “How would one go on air, defend the community, make clear we were 
not to be blamed for this and also not sound defensive?” Suzan tells me they had only a 
few members who could do this. So they gathered any volunteers, to log in calls, to make 
Google background searches on whatever news agency or reporter was calling from 
Japan to China to any paper in the United States. When I asked Suzan if they were 
surprised to be getting that many inquiries, she shared how frustrated she was on the 
nature of questions: “Look, we were putting out many press releases, underlining we 
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condemned the attacks, that we were Bostonians, and shared the disaster that was going 
on the city. Many questions were asking about foreign policy, any misgivings we could 
have about this or that going on the world…At some point I wanted to shout: ‘We are an 
American institution. We care about gentrification, homelessness, medical bills, not 
whatever foreign policy debate you guys want to have!’”  
That week proved to be one of the hardest for ISBCC’s post-2008 trajectory. Imam 
Suhaib would later tell a Friday night halaqa gathering that the aftermath of Marathon 
Bombing was one of the most difficult challenges he had to face in his almost 20 years 
career as a religious leader. His history, that spanned a life which started in the Oklahoma 
suburb of Edmond as the grandson of a Church of Christ preacher to the hip-hop and 
gang scene of Oklahoma in the early 1990s would change in 1992 when he takes his 
shahadah with another convert, Shaykh Abd al-Rahman al-Baseer, who had converted to 
Islam in 1962 at Masjid al Faruuq in Brooklyn. In 2002, after studying privately with a 
Senegalese sheikh in Oklahoma for ten years during college years which also made this 
six foot four blonde, blue eyed young rising star a hafiz of Qur’an, and a rising star in the 
national American Muslim scene; he briefly serves as local Imam at the Greater 
Oklahoma Mosque before he was recruited by the MAS Chapter in San Francisco Bay 
Area and MCA.
231
 In 2003, sponsored by MAS and MCA, he sets off to Cairo, Egypt to 
study at Al-Azhar. The deal was that he would go to Azhar, and come back to MCA 
equipped with his degree that would further embolden his credentials. In addition, 
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developing an institution of learning that would bring Azhari credentials and be credited 
by Azhar was also in the plans.
232
 This model, American mosques sponsoring individuals 
to study in the traditional centers of learning in the Muslim world, had been adopted 
increasingly in the 2000s. During my fieldwork I would come across several other clergy 
who had done so, including Jamaal Diwan. Busy with his studies in Cairo and his 
growing family – he had married a Malaysian immigrant student while at university of 
Central Oklahoma and they had two kids – he would come back to California in summers 
to lead religious programming and attend ISNA and MSA Conventions. By 2008, he had 
become one of the rising stars of American Muslim scene, sharing the stage with the likes 
of Hamza Yusuf and Zaid Shakir. After finishing his studies at Al Azhar and working at 
Dar al Ifta and the Fulbright commission in Cairo, he returns back to MCA as the full-
time Imam in 2010. Because MCA had an amazing plurality, as I will highlight below, 
Webb’s emphasis on American Islam, including some of his positions regarding mixing 
of genders and the needs of youth, had become increasingly more contentious at MCA, 
despite the fact that Webb had enjoyed support of the Mosque’s leadership. In dire need 
of an Imam for the ISBCC, and privy to insider’s knowledge on his problems at MCA, 
Bilal Kaleem and the then board member of ISBCC, Nancy Khalil approach Suhaib 
Webb and convince him to move to Boston. Imam Suhaib starts at ISBCC in December 
2011 and launches Ella Collins Institute, his educational institute shortly after. 
In a flattering, largely positive news profile on Imam Suhaib Webb three weeks after the 
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attacks, Boston Globe would point out to the crossfire near 40 year old Oklahoma native 
was facing: On the one hand, Charles Jacobs and APT had renewed their allegations of 
ISB/MAS Boston/ ISBCC’s ties to terrorism and radicalization233, on the other hand, 
Governor Patrick’s office had dropped him as from the program of interfaith prayer 
service on April 18
th
, that was attended by President Obama at the last minute, and he 
was being attack by some Muslims on Facebook and Twitter for having refused to pray 
over Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s body234 and for calling Obama “the drone President” “our 
President.” He calls this latter group of Muslims some of whom publish websites 
dedicated to boycott of Suhaib Webb
235, the “Google Shaykhs, mostly from the UK.” I 
will return to the episode when Webb was replaced by Nasser Weddady, a Mauritanian 
American online activist at the Boston chapter of American Islamic Congress (AIC), for 
the prayer service, the subsequent apology from the Governor’s office for having done 
so, and the content and context of Suhaib Webb’s discourses on American Islam, the 
need for an “American Islamic theology,” and his move from ISBCC to Make Space, a 
new Third Space organization based in Washington, D.C., in Chapter V.  
When a shoot-out with the Tsarnaev brothers lead to a dramatic two-day man-hunt and a 
virtual quarantine of the city on the night of the interfaith prayer service, on Friday, April 




islam-wake-up-america [last accessed January 25, 2015.]  
234
 Lisa Wangness, “In life and words, Muslim leader bridges cultures,” The Boston Globe, May 
12, 2013. Available at: http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/05/11/imam-william-suhaib-
webb-emerges-face-boston-muslim-community-time-
crisis/Kd8v0O48vkHSZAnOpYCqOI/story.html [last accessed May 13, 2013.]  
235





 Yusufi Vali announces that the Center would be closed until further notice.
236
 ISBCC 
would cancel Friday prayer services for the first time since its inception. In an e-mail 
titled, “A Letter of Love to Boston Community,” on the same day, Suhaib Webb seeks to 
assure Muslim Bostonians: 
“Dear friends, 
I greet you, invoking God’s peace and blessings upon you: 
Friday’s are special for me because at the ISBCC I get to see the fabric of 
our community. 
…. 
Friday’s at the ISBCC bring about the best in our community. From law 
enforcement, educators, medical professionals, weight loss coaches, 
students and the youth; all of you bring smiles and warm stories about the 
unique relationship between faith and life. One of the many things I 
learned from you is balance and patience. I hear your stories and I feel the 
book education I’ve received pales in the face of your rich experiences. 
.... 
This Friday is not a normal Friday. I am deeply saddened and shocked by 
the recent events. Our city's peace was taken away in a blink of an eye. 
Our faith is once again being called to suspicion.  Innocent people are 
being hurt. What is needed now is meeting hate with love, trials with 
patience and fear with increased worship. Each and every one of us needs 
to be a shelter in this storm.  
… 
God has chosen the Boston community to be the focus, because our 
community is an excellent one. Our track record speaks volumes to the 
dedication we have to our city, our heart, Boston. Do not fear and do not 
waiver, for God stands with this community! Face the coming days with a 
sense of pride and altruism, that will grant you the dignity to swallow the 
pills of the shallow minded, the heart to continue to give and support our 
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city. I remind you as our Prophet (sa) reminded Abu Bakr when things 
looked dire, “Do not fear, God is with us.”237 
 
Suzan tell me “it was a blessing to have Imam Suhaib here. He pulled the community 
together, assured us.” “What was the most difficult aspect of that week?” I ask Suzan. 
“you know what…it was a difficult time and looking back, when everyone was in shock 
and were grieving for all that calamity the city experienced we were not afforded that 
grieving period. We just did not have the time to…We were responding to everything 
that was going on. Developing talking points, getting the support from MPAC, 
CAIR…all was good. But we were not granted that period to grieve.”  
Despite a deep level of disappointment with Deval Patrick’s office, ISBCC reaps the 
fruits of its government and interfaith relationships in the coming weeks. Especially the 
once severely tested interfaith relations would provide much needed support. After the 
cancellation of the Friday prayers the week before, the next week, on Friday, April 26
th
, 
media turns its attention to both ISBCC and ISB. In both mosques, ISBCC’s GBIO 
partners turn the Friday prayers into a show of interfaith solidarity.
238
 In about six 
months, on October 27, 2013, ISBCC would host the joint GBIO/Massachusetts Minority 
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Contractors’ Association action with the mayoral candidates just nine days before the 
November 2013 mayoral elections – without experiencing any of the former drama.239  
Next year, ISBCC decides to turn the anniversary of Marathon Bombings into a set of 
events to solidify its place in the city’s civic ecology. Three community members run the 
Marathon. Hamza Syed, one of the ISBC runners would declare: “This is our home. And 
we will not allow anyone call us otherwise.” Several inter-faith events were organized; 
Imam Suhaib would speak at a remembrance service at the Old South Church. Suzan 
would represent ISBCC at an interfaith vigil at the Trinity Church.
240
 Now a media 
consultant, Cheri Agnes, the former director of GBIO, helped the ISBCC to gain media 
access that week and managed to enlist the help of Rethink Media, a non-profit media 
advisory firm. Speaking to a crowded group on the night of the events, Yusufi called 
Cheri the “Abdullah al-Arqat of our community, Abdullah who was not a Muslim was 
the Prophet’s guide on his journey from Mecca to Medinah, the hijrah. She is one our 
own now, let’s embrace her.”  
As part of the ISBCC’s Marathon week campaigns, the Friday before the first anniversary 
of Boston Marathon bombings, on April 11, 2014, a female non-Muslim preacher, 
Reverend Nancy Taylor of Old South Church addresses the whole Friday prayer 
gathering. Surrounded by congregants following her speech, she is rushed into a small 
classroom to the right of the prayer area by Suzan. She invites me in too. Here, Reverend 
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Nancy confides us that “it was intimidating to speak before such a masculine crowd, to be 
the only woman up front, bare foot, with having taken your shoes off at the door.” The 
conversation steers toward the challenges that face both congregations, and their 
respective capacities. Reverend Nancy would soon go on a sabbatical, to focus on writing 
in a secluded cabin. Yusufi quickly points out that it was unimaginable for any imam in 
any American Muslim mosque to afford that. “It took us over 350 years to get to this 
point. You guys are just starting from scratch.” This sense of pride is common to clergy 
of the Church; in a GBIO meeting with mayoral candidates later in the year another Old 
South clergy would mention with pride that last time the Church had a 100 people 
gathering, “a revolution happened!” Halfway into our conversation over snacks at the 
classroom, Reverend Nancy mentions, “…these problems you are having now are 
normal, with more assimilation it will go away.” Do these remarks, which at the time 
seemed a bit snarky to me, correspond to what American Muslim communities are going 
through? Is assimilation a function of time, generational shifts and economic mobility? 
Will it come at the expense of lost Muslim values like many fears?  
 My thematic chapters will try to reflect a number of diverse views my respondents 
expressed about assimilation, integration, calculated integration, and complete isolation. 
The case of ISBCC and Imam Suhaib Webb will serve as important reference points 
during that discussion. Not far away from ISBCC, at Masjid al Qur’an these questions are 




Masjid al Qur’an: From Temple No. 11 in Nation of Islam to Sunni Islam 
 
On November 30, 2013 I am listening to Dr. Muzammil Siddiqi at the Islamic Society of 
Orange County’s (ISOC) Friday Umma Night. He tells the mostly young crowd that 
when he arrived at Harvard Divinity School as a doctoral student in September 1969 after 
spending four years in Europe, first as an imam in Geneva at Dr. Said Ramadan’s Islamic 
Center of Geneva, then as a Masters student at Birmingham University, he was not 
allowed to visit what was then Muhammed’s Temple No. 11 in Dorchester, today’s 
Masjid Al Qur’an. Unlike in the reputable Indian madrasa at Nadwatul Ulama and in 
Madina University where he had studied Islam for seven years before embarking on a 
journey to Geneva in 1965, the only Muslim communities in Boston were Harvard’s own 
Islamic Society, composed of a few international Muslim students, and the Quincy 
Mosque, again with a small community. 
 In 1969, only four years after Malcolm X was assassinated in Harlem, the Temple that he 
had established was still following Elijah Muhammad. Malcolm would frequently visit 35 
Intervale Street before 1963 and confer with the then Minister of the Temple, Louis X in 
addition to visiting his older sister, Ella Collins. Louis X would replace Malcolm in 
Harlem when he broke off from Elijah Muhammad’s Nation of Islam. In 1975, along 
with tens of other Temples, Temple 11 would accept Warith Deen Muhammed’s 
leadership and embark on a journey into an orthodox, Sunni interpretation of Islam 





Figure 13: The February 7, 1975 issue of Muhammad Speaks ran a five-page section on 




Figure 14: Masjid Al-Qur’an 
On September 29, 2012 I walked into the Annie M. Cole Community Center near 
Jackson Square. The jazz band was full in swing, two women were singing what I 
gathered was an old blues song, with the three old, bearded men in bow-ties and striped 
suits were playing the instruments. Soon, the jazz band would finish their songs, and 
Qur’an recitation would start. Imam Taleeb Mehdi greeted me; he was energetic and had 
his usual smile on his face. I was there to join Masjid al Qur’an’s annual Ramadan 
fundraiser. Imam Benjamin Bilal, who was hosted by Imam Suhaib Webb at the Friday 
night halaqa at the ISBCC the night before, was the keynote speaker for this event. The 
menu included fried chicken and bean pies. Mosque members were calling on “Brother 
Imam,” this was how Imam Taleeb is referred to at Masjid Al Qur’an. I think it is fair to 
say that each and every symbolic reference to African American Muslims, or Nation of 
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Islam, you could find on TV shows and Hollywood movies had come alive that night. For 
over fifty-five years, Masjid Al Qur’an community has been a witness to and an agent of 
multiple transformations: in the way they relate to America, in their views on black 
nationalism, in the demographics of their neighborhood, and in the type of theology they 
follow. When the red building on 35 Intervale Street and the adjacent living quarters on 
37 Intervale Street was purchased from the nearby Jewish community in 1957, there were 
a sizeable number of “Black Muslims,” who had formed in small numbers in the 1940s 
and mushroomed into a larger community in the mid-1950s, following Elijah Muhammad 
in Boston. Malcolm X had rushed up to Boston amid his busy schedule on November 3, 
1957 for the dedication on the new Temple.
241
 Soon, the Jewish community would leave 
Roxbury and Dorchester, the once vibrant centers of Boston’s Jewish life, for Boston’s 
suburbs. In 1967 Congregation Adat Jesherun would sell the impressive, 1906 landmark 
Blue Hill Avenue Synagogue.
242
 Today, architecturally intact as a synagogue, this 
building is owned by First Haitian Baptist Church. 
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Figure 15: Old Blue Hill Avenue Synagogue 
Amid shifting demographic dynamics, racial politics in the nation, and the influx of 
immigrants from Muslim majority world, Temple #11 would become a major factor in 
the Black Muslim life of Roxbury-Dorchester neighborhoods. Two transformative 
moments would be experienced in the roughly two decades after formal establishment of 
the Temple. The Temple’s honorary founder Malcolm X’s assassination in 1965 would 
continue to affect Masjid Al Qur’an’s trajectory in the years to come. 10 years after this 
tragic event, on the Saviors’ Day of 1975, February 26th, and a new leader would emerge 
with a dramatically different outlook than his predecessor, his very father, and set out to 
transform the belief-system that had come to define this community for many years. The 
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trickle effects would be felt throughout the country, across Nation of Islam’s over 100 
Temples. In 1978, a former resident of 37 Intervale Street and Temple #11’s first 
minister, Louis Wolcott – later Louis X and Louis Farrakhan – would split from Warith 
Deen Muhammad, and manage to re-establish the Nation of Islam – a name abandoned 
by Imam W. D. Muhammad in 1976 in favor of The World Community of al-Islam in the 
West and numerous other names until his passing in 2008
243
.  
Masjid Al Qur’an has been a Boston landmark since the 1950s but it was most likely in 
the aftermath of Marathon Bombing when most Boston residents heard of it. With details 
of the bombers’ life appearing in newspapers, many read that Tamerlan Tsarnaev and 
Katherine Russell’s Islamic marriage ceremony took place on June 21, 2010 at a 
Dorchester mosque, at Masjid Al Qur’an. It was Imam Taalib Mahdee who performed the 
ceremony.
244
 Imam Taalib’s life story is full of references to some of these major 
transformations; but for the most part, until December 8, 1978 he was an outside 
observer. During a Conversations event at the ISBCC, he would tell the audience that 
because he was never in the NOI, he had missed on the experiences of the generation that 
went through the transformative experience of leaving the NOI theology and coming into 
the fold of mainstream Islam. And yet, he was very much part and parcel of that 
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transformation, thanks to Imam Shakir Mahmoud. With Imam Shakir they established 
and ran the Clara Muhammad School for eleven years, from 1980 to 1991. Imam Shakir 
sent him as his representative to educational and fact-finding missions organized by 
Imam W. D., to Al Azhar and to Saudi Arabia. In 1992, when Imam Shakir left for 
Indianapolis to take a chaplaincy position there, he took over full-time as the Imam and 
continues the legacy he had inherited from his teachers; Imam W.D. and Imam Shakir.  
While the core of Masjid Al Qur’an’s congregation remains largely African-American 
Muslims, it had drawn a much more diverse community since the mid-90s. Somali 
community nearby attends the mosque and runs a weekend school for Somali kids on 
Saturdays, a number of West African families have adopted Masjid Al Qur’an as their 
congregation, and drawn to the mosque’s ties to Malcolm X, Boston’s Muslim students, 
both international and American, make occasional stops in Dorchester, especially on 
Fridays. Between his chaplaincy at the Bridgewater Correctional Complex, about 25 
miles south of Boston, and leading the community Imam Taalib has a busy life. In 
addition to the Somali weekend school, the mosque organizes a Sunday youth group that 
meets every week. Along with several others in the community Imam Taalib follows the 
Muslim American Logic Institute’s (MALI) Arabic classes – on Wednesday evenings a 
group from this class comes together at the Mosque and reiterates the previous week’s 
curriculum. Imam Muhammad’s emphasis on discourse, language and the etymology of 
words is felt in these classes. In one session Imam Taalib points out that “Soon after he 
became the Supreme Minister of Nation of Islam [he would drop the title in 1980 in favor 
of the title, Imam,] Imam Muhammad told his followers the correct translation of the 
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basmala is not ‘In the name of Allah.’ He asked us to say, ‘With the name of Allah,’ 
because he knew the previous translation would reverberate in minds along ‘In the name 
Jesus.’ He wanted to use language to strip us off of the deity of Jesus. This is important 
for us; may be others cannot relate but in our context it is important for us.” Brother 
Aamir, a long-time community member who teaches at Berklee College of Music,” 
interjects, “it’s important not only for us, for others too!” “Others,” sometimes refers to 
“late-comers” or “newcomers,” the immigrants.245 This is why they could not make peace 
with their American identity- something that Imam W.D. has made many years ago; 
before “American Islam” was the next big thing in American mosques, conventions, and 
educational institutions. Starting in 1976, he asked his community to consider themselves 
as American citizens; not as a minority that was discriminated against. He did not deny 
that the same country once sought to subjugate their voices; and yet this was their own 
country, and if there was any hope of helping the country, it would be through Al-Islam. 
Still, it was a deep rupture from both his father’s position and Malcolm X’s early legacy. 
To symbolize the new-found peace with the country, in 1976, on the Savior’s Day, Imam 
Wallace Muhammad marched on the stage with the American flag and instructed his 
followers to be engaged in American politics.
246
 In 1958, Malcolm X had organized an 
event in Los Angeles, where he had founded Temple 27 and pointing to an American flag 
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that was in the rented facility, he would say: “This represents our enemy.” For Malcolm, 
all that America ever gave to the Black Americans was epitomized by the photo of a 
lynched black man that was brought to the room.
247
  
Like Imam Taalib, Imam Shakir, who passed away in 2004, was a native of Boston. He 
knew Malcolm from the streets – they had met in 1953 near Dudley Square. His pre-NOI 
journey spanned the street life and racial strife of the 1950s and 1960s. After a brief stint 
in gangs and “in the system,” he would convert to Islam in 1964, but he would step out 
following Malcolm X’s assassination in 1965. In 1973 he would start attending the 
Quincy Mosque and embrace orthodox Islam. Mary Lahaj, a member and historian of the 
Quincy Mosque, reports that his engagement with the Mosque continued after Imam 
Shakir became the Imam of Temple #11 in 1976.
248
 Imam W.D. Muhammad, still 
Wallace until 1980, needed individuals who could bring the community onto the fold of 
Orthodox Islam. From the onset since 1975 he himself had initiated a program that 
sought to dispel the Nation of Islam mythology, starting with the Prophethood of his 
father and the divines of Fard Muhammad. When asked if he was divinely ordained for 
the mission, Imam Muhammad would refer to himself as a mere “mujaddid,” a renewer 
of religion.
249
 Imam Shakir’s exposure to and study of orthodox Sunni Islam made him 
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an ideal candidate to run Temple #11. In the meantime, Don Muhammad, who had 
emerged as the leader of the Temple after Minister Louis Farrakhan was dispatched to 
Temple #7 in Harlem, to Malcolm’s Mosque, would protest over Wallace’s renunciation 
of Elijah Muhammad’s prophethood and leave the movement.250 He would only return 
back to Farrakhan’s NOI, and only in 1980, not immediately in 1978 when Farrakhan 
announced he was leaving Wallace Muhammad and re-establishing the NOI. Today 
Minister Don leads Temple 11 of the contemporary NOI which is located not far from 
Masjid Al Qur’an, at the Grove Hall where the unified Temple #11 community once ran 
many businesses. Shakir would then adopt W.D. Muhammad as his mentor; become a 
follower of his madhab.
251
 At the local level he would serve as the President of ICNE in 
1987, and nationally he would become a convener of the Imam W.D. Muhammad’s 
Council of Imams. His biography notes that he established relationships across the faith 
spectrum in Boston and was a participant to the initiative of the then Catholic Archbishop 
of Boston Cardinal Medeiros’s 1979 ecumenical initiative to alleviate racial tension that 
was called “The Covenant of Justice, Equity and Harmony.”252 While at Masjid Al 
                                                          
250
 PBS, This Far by Faith, June 2003; “Minister Don Muhammad: Temple No.11,” available at 
http://www-tc.pbs.org/thisfarbyfaith/transcript/minister_don_muhammad.pdf [last accessed 
December 29, 2014.]  
251
 Muhammad Mendes, a contemporary African American Muslim scholar of neo-traditionalist 
orientation and a collaborator of Zaytuna’s Ustadh Abdullah bin Hamid Ali, explains that the 
question of whether or not Imam Muhammad established amadhab can only be understood in the 
context of the profound reform process he led. He agrees that the madhab is a more colloquial 
than legalistic term in the history of Imam Muhammad. See, 
http://www.lamppostproductions.com/?p=4356 [last accessed December 28, 2014.]  
252
 Associated Press, “Cardinal Medeiros of Boston Dies After Coronary Bypass Operation,” The 
New York Times, September 18, 1983; available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1983/09/18/obituaries/cardinal-medeiros-of-boston-dies-after-coronary-
bypass-operation.html [last accessed January 30, 2015.] 
152 
 
Qur’an he would establish The American Bilalian Institute, and would in time change this 
name to American Ijtihaad Institute.
253
 
Imam Taalib’s story has numerous similarities with Imam Shakir’s story and he tells me 
that it has had a profound effect on his work as a religious leader. Under his leadership 
The Masjid Al Qur’an community had to brave many storms. By the early 1990s, the 
community faced economic challenges and had to close the Clara Muhammad School. 
Mosque members kept “being caught up in the system,” and the younger generations did 
not necessarily stay close to the community. In 2008, after Imam W.D. Muhammad’s 
death, the community would lose their national leader who had already decentralized his 
own community to a great extent. Imam Shakir was approached by Masjid 
Alhamdulillah’s Imam Dawud Ahmad at the end of 1980s to come together under MCB 
for the Roxbury mosque project. When Imam Taalib and Imam Faaruq took over the 
leadership of their respective communities, they continued to collaborate on this project, 
but beyond that the communities did not have much to share. Today, despite the fact that 
Imam Taalib is more integrated with the ISBCC community and both mosques 
collaborate on Eid prayers, both leaders share similar grievances with regard to the 
treatment they got from the “immigrant community” in the later stages of the ISBCC 
project.  
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Figure 16: Imam Taalib Mahdee delivering the second sermon at the joint ISBCC, ISB 
and Masjid Al Qur’an Eid Prayers, October 4, 2014. 
 
Imam Taalib’s story started in Cambridge as Ronald James, spanned street life after high 
school, and the military – which was a way out of street life. And yet, his career in the 
military that took him from Cambridge to Korea and then to Fort Lewis in Washington 
would last, “4 years, 5 months, and 8 days,” between 1972 and 1976, would be defined 
by racial discrimination, a sense of injustice, and his dislike for authority. Imam Taleeb 
ties his conversion to Islam to a series of events that took place, while he was in the 
military, after his return to Cambridge in December 1976. Once back in Boston he would 
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come in touch with NOI once again, he remembers a NOI member wearing a bow-tie 
from his childhood who was distributing Muhammad Speaks. After three visits to Temple 
#11, with different feelings and experiences each time – his first visit was just to 
accompany a friend of his who was seeing a girl from the community, and the second 
was to listen to a sermon by a visiting imam when he felt the message reverberated with 
him but when asked if anyone was willing to convert to Islam he had not. He takes his 
shahadah with Imam Shakir in his third visit, a week after his second stop there. Soon 
after, he would start spending more time at the Temple, cleaning the carpets and helping 
Imam Shakir. “Imam had so much on his plate. He was tending to the community, 
leading prayers, teaching but he was also driving to the Airport to pick up the newspaper 
[by this time the old Muhammad Speaks was renamed Bilalian News by Imam W.D.]…I 
got my driver’s license and started picking up the newspaper and help distribute it.” This 
would be the beginning of his assistantship to Imam Shakir. 
Imam Taaleb has been in Dorchester since then. He thinks the neighbors love the 
community; “because we are Americans, we are an organic part of the neighborhood.” 
And yet, his main complaint is with the African American Christian ministers in the 
neighborhood, whom, he says, frequently preach against Black Muslim “heathens.” In 
one of my meetings with Imam Taaleb, we had to postpone because he was ill. He 
insisted to give me a ride to Roxbury Crossing T Station. He also wanted to stop-by at 
Ashur, the Somali restaurant behind ISBCC, so that he could get some Somali tea to fight 
the pneumonia he had contracted. Soon after we left Masjid Al Qur’an that Monday 
morning, we pass by Emmanuel Temple Pentecostal Church on Warren Street. Imam 
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Taleeb recounts a story when a Muslim community member who had recently got out of 
the system and was slowly getting back on his feet decided to marry a non-Muslim lady. 
When asked if he would perform the marriage ceremony along with Imam Taleeb, the 
Pentecostal minister rejected the request, saying “they are non-believers, I will not do it.” 
Imam Taleeb says, “Look, I have issues with it too…but hey, it is their day, and just 
being there is important.” During the same car ride, I also bring up Masjid Al Qur’an’s 
relationship with the new NOI Temple 11 in Grove Hall. Imam Taaleb is disappointed 
that the current NOI community did not follow up on a reform process to come into 
mainstream Islam despite Imam W.D.’s outreach to Minister Farrakhan – especially 
when he joined the NOI’s Saviors Day celebration on February 7, 2000. “Farrakhan 
always said he is taking a gradual approach to it. And we understand that. But it has been 
so long now that I wonder if it is ever going to happen.” Imam Taaleb also tried to reach 
out to the NOI members at Bridgewater but they have their own chaplain and they do 
observe the Friday prayer services held for the more than 150 Muslim inmates. He 
actually tried to reach out to Minister Don Muhammad after taking over the leadership of 
Masjid Al Qur’an from Imam Shakir in 1992. “I wrote him a letter when I became the 
Imam. I knew we would have our differences but I wanted to work towards a common 
cause; we could lobby together to name one of the streets after Honorable Elijah 
Muhammad.” He never heard back. “I was disappointed when I did not hear back. Then, 
we ran into each other at an interfaith event in 2004. I had given a radio interview about 
the African muslim experience and talked about the history of NOI. He came flying to me 
at this event, in front of all the other clergy and shouted, ‘how could you say those things 
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about NOI?’ I was thinking to myself, ‘this man is in my face, but he is my elder, I 
should stay calm…’ So I told him, ‘I would like to think what I said was true.’ The thing 
is… he made this scene in front of all those other people, all the Christian Ministers in the 
room. I knew he had better relations with them, and wanted to have better relations with 
them than with us…So I sat across from him at that gathering. I wanted to see if it was 
just a front or if he was just genuinely angry. It was a front…”  
During our conversations, Imam Taaleb always underlines the uniqueness of African 
American Muslim experience, with an emphasis on the post 1975 period. The multiple 
stages of this experience, defined by notions of continuity and change in the ethos of 
NOI, inclusion and exclusion as it relates to immigrant and indigenous non-African 
American Muslim experience on the hand, and to American society at large on the other, 
as well as by ownership of the American religious experience, carry signs of multiple 
challenges faced by the Masjid Al Qur’an community. Imam Taaleb argues that other 
Muslims cannot always relate to the exigencies posed by the very fact that African 
American Muslims came out of a particular set of historical experiences and a distinct set 
of values. “Imam W.D. always asked us to think for ourselves. African Americans were 
not used to do this. We had to adapt, and walk the whole nine-yards to claim ownership 
of our own Islam.” Notwithstanding the peculiarity of this experience, Imam W.D. 
community would also look to the “old world” Islam in an effort to cultivate religious 
knowledge and carve out an interpretative framework for their lives in the United States 
as Muslims. When I asked Imam Taaleb if he is concerned about the continuity of the 
historical African American, post-NOI Muslim experience in his own community he 
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points out to several experiences he had in the Muslim world. In 1980, when he was still 
a new member in the Masjid Al Qur’an community, he travelled to Saudi Arabia, joining 
ten other members of Imam W.D. community. “It was an eye opener. We wanted to gain 
religious literacy but also to see how we could adapt what we learned in our own 
communities.” He would then take a trip to attend a six-week course at Al-Azhar in 1989. 
This trip was organized for teachers in the numerous Clara Muhammad Schools teachers 
across the nation and the goal was similar: to see Islam in a different context, to draw 
lessons from the curriculum and apply it back in the U.S. “A Big challenge for African 
Americans is to see the value of Islam in their real lives and apply it to different areas of 
daily life. This trip would help us in this regard. But it became not as beneficial as it 
could have been. Many who attended from our communities were more interested in 
visiting a foreign land than learning from the curriculum. One person got into an 
argument with a teacher over whether Adam or Eve was created first and this became a 
distraction throughout the course; it became a clash of cultures rather than education. Our 
people did not follow instructions. We were staying in these guest houses and despite 
clear instructions not to throw toilet papers in the toilets our people simply did not follow, 
the pipes got clogged and this became another burden.”  
With these experiences in mind, Imam Taaleb’s main concern remains to emphasize the 
value of Islam in the uplifting of his community. “Our Islam needs to come out of these 
walls. We are trying to apply Qur’an and Sunna in our daily lives to impact change both 
for ourselves and for our neighbors. Look, we are concerned about both domestic policy 
and foreign policy. But we cannot be consumed by foreign policy alone. Imam W.D. 
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wanted us to see that what is most important to us is our relationship with our Creator. 
Many Muslims who come here are sometimes too hang-up on political issues. And that 
can become toxic.” At Masjid al Qur’an this critique of the wider American Muslim 
scene is widely shared: an over-emphasis on foreign policy issues, a failure to appreciate 
the immediate challenges faced by African American Muslims, and a treatment that 
sometimes translates to treating them as a niche group that still clings to old habits from 
NOI. “You are never going to be able to take away the music from these people. 
Whatever fiqh opinion you bring, it will simply not happen. These women here, they will 
never agree to a curtain or to a partition. It is our culture.” In Imam Taalib’s discourse, 
they are the ansar, the native “helpers” in Madina, who hosted the muhajirun, those who 
were emigrating from Mecca and created a community of Muslims under Prophet 
Muhammad’s leadership. “The Prophet told the ansar and the muhajirun to take care of 
one-another. Now the immigrants who are here, they bring a baggage here, without 
understanding who is here and what our issues are. The question is, how do we move 
forward, how do we get together to solve these issues?” As I mentioned above, the 
ISBCC phase did not really help in answering these questions. But Imam Taalib sees 
progress, however small it may be. “The Somalis here…Even attending the Friday 
sermons here, listening to us help them understand this country and where we are coming 
from better.”  
It is perhaps these simultaneous and shared and yet distinct and disparate negotiations of 
identity, belonging and responding to the challenges of life in America that help construct 
varying forms of discourse, policy and institutional development that define Boston’s 
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Muslim milieu. My thematic chapters will highlight that alternative perceptions of what it 
means to be a Muslim American and how that identity relates to the transnational forms 
of belonging, developing in conversation with but not always in sync with historical 




CHAPTER 3- THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA INSTITUTIONS 
 
A Diverse, Concentrated Hub of Muslim Settlement and Indigenization Patterns 
 
The San Francisco Bay Area (“the Bay Area” hereinafter) portrays several crucial 
differences in comparison to Boston’s Muslim population. The dearth of concrete studies 
on the respective size of Muslim population on both coasts, and the urban vs. suburban 
settings make it difficult to delineate the exact nature of these differences. On the other 
hand, unlike Greater Boston Area’s relatively small Muslim population, the Bay Area 
hosts one of the more sizeable and concentrated Muslim populations across the United 
States. In a 2013 study commissioned and sponsored by a number of Bay Area civic 
foundations such as One Nation Foundation, Silicon Valley Community Foundation, The 
San Francisco Foundation, Marin Community Foundation and Asian American/Pacific 
Islanders in Philanthropy (AAPIP) along with the nation’s only American Muslim think 
tank, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, the Bay Area Muslim population was 
estimated to number at 250,000, making up roughly 3.5 percent of the total Bay 
population.
254
 In the American Muslim parlance, and especially for the Bay Area natives, 
the region is known as “the Blessed Bay,” for its hospitable climate by virtue of being 
located on the “best Coast,” for its ethno-religious diversity and for its high concentration 
of leading Muslim scholars and institutions. The younger generation, such as Zaytuna 
graduate Chris Cusano, also talk of, “Khalifornia,” a word play on chaliphate. In addition 
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to nationally recognized religious leaders, Bay Area has been instrumental in the birth of 
numerous Muslim civic organizations who work at the national level such as United 
Muslims of America (UMA), Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), Islamic 
Networks Group (ING), and Muslim Advocates.  
The historical development of Bay Area’s Muslim population closely traces Muslim 
settlement processes across the United States. Starting with late 19
th
 century, small 
pockets of Muslim population are found across California, especially near Sacramento 
where Punjabi immigrants settled as farm workers.
255
 With the increasing importance of 
San Francisco as a point of entry for immigrants, and the post 1906 earthquake economic 
opportunities, new immigrant waves enter the region. These small pockets of Muslim 
immigrants mostly settle in and around San Francisco and its close-by suburbs. The 
University of California system in the region attracts students from all over the world, 
especially in the wake of sexual revolution, and opposition to Vietnam War highlight the 
importance of Berkeley. At the same time period, new waves of economic immigrants 
arrive in San Francisco, and the Bay Area’s first immigrant mosque is established in 1965 
at Crescent Street in Mission District by South Asian and Arab immigrants. This mosque, 
called the Islamic Center of San Francisco or the Crescent Street Mosque, would continue 
to serve as a major hub for religious services for the mainstream Sunni Muslims across 
East and South Bay for nearly two decades until new mosques appear across the Bay 
Area in the early 1980s. Similar to Shia settlement in Boston’s suburbs such as in 
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Billerica, with the 1970s and especially after Iranian revolution, several Shia mosques 
and cultural centers become operational across the Bay Area. Starting in the 1980s, and 
especially with the .com boom of the 1990s, the need for skilled high tech professionals 
creates a shift in immigration policy in favor of H1B visas. This period sees increased 
settlement in and near Silicon Valley, spanning South Bay and parts of East Bay, thereby 
creating a sizeable middle to high class Muslim professionals who arrive in the Bay Area 
both from abroad and from across the United States. The emergence of two communities 
in the South Bay, the South Bay Islamic Association (SBIA) in San Jose, and Muslim 
Community Association (MCA) in Santa Clara take place in the early 1980s, followed by 
mushrooming of mosques in Fremont and Hayward axis along the East Bay in the early 
1990s. MCA would purchase the old headquarters of Hewlett Packard in 1994 and move 
in to its current gigantic location at the heart of Silicon Valley. While it would keep its 
older location, which is today called Masjid Al-Noor, the new facility would house its 
Islamic school established in 1988 along with conference halls and prayer rooms. This 
expansion would make it a major hub for the Bay Area Muslim community. In 2013 both 
SBIA and MCA experience another expansion with additional buildings purchased to 
accommodate exponential growth of their communities. The flow of high-tech 
professionals to the Bay Area continues today and has understandably led to the 
misconception that Bay Area Muslims are primarily made up of overwhelmingly upper-
class, prosperous, highly educated Muslim professionals. While this is certainly true for 
parts of the Bay Area, such as in Santa Clara and Marin counties, where average income 
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levels for Muslims number at low to mid six figures,
256
 both within the Silicon Valley 
and in its suburbs, just like across the whole Bay Area, there are sizeable blue-collar 
refugee and immigrant communities from Fiji, Tartar Turks, Yemeni, Somalia, West 
African, and Afghanistan that belong low-income brackets. Similarly, Oakland and San 
Francisco’s sizeable African American Muslim communities belong to low-economic 
classes. As I will explain below many of the communities I examine suffer from 
grievances created by this intra-regional income gap. There are, at the same time, a 
sizeable number of culturally Muslim professionals especially in the Silicon Valley area 
who do not immediately identify with the mosque/Islamic Center scene but seek to 
experience their religiosity through philanthropic contributions and other support to 
Muslim civic associations and third spaces, such as Ta’leef Collective. The Bay Area 
Muslims try to create a regional council of Muslim institutions in mid 1970s and in the 
early 1990s, but these efforts bear little fruit. Although Northern California Islamic 
Council (NCIC) is formally established in 2003
257
, and despite efforts to model it after 
Southern California’s Islamic Shura Council and strong support from leading scholars for 
increased participation, according to its current president, Dr. Hatem Bazian of Berkeley 
and Zaytuna College, NCIC has not been able to fulfill a crucial role in the region. 
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Figure 17: Masjidul Waritheen, Oakland 
Bay Area also is home to a vibrant, historically active and important African American 
Muslim community. Nation of Islam had built two temples, Temple 26 and Temple 26B, 
in San Francisco and across the Bay Bridge in Oakland, respectively, both in the late 
1950s.  Today, the former Temple 26B, moved to a new location in 1976 under the name 
Muhammad’s Mosque #77 and later renamed Masjidul Waritheen, serves as one of the 
major representatives of African American Muslim presence in the Bay Area. 
Strengthened with a Sister Clara Muhammad School in a historic church building, the 
Mosque’s Imam, Faheem Shuaibe, is known to be one of the close associates of Imam 
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W.D. Muhammad and has been a national African American Muslim leader. Across from 
Masjidul Waritheen, the community also runs Elijah Muhammad Cultural Center. 
Historically speaking, another importance of the Bay Area for the post-Elijah Muhammad 
trajectory of NOI was that a Lahori Ahmadiyya Muslim member of the Crescent Street 
Mosque who had arrived in the Bay Area by way of Fiji, Imam Muhammad Abdullah, 
had been instrumental in the life of Imam W.D. Muhammad. He had played an important 
role in bringing and guiding Wallace Muhammad to orthodox Islam. Muhammad would 
make his teacher and mentor the Imam of Temple 26B, which is described to have 
created some friction in the community since the San Francisco Temple was lead by an 
African American imam, named Ousman Mekki and some Oakland residents chose to 
travel across the Bay Bridge to Temple 26 for wedding ceremonies to have the ceremony 
performed by one of their own. Imam Abdullah, who was speculated to be Fard 
Muhammad but himself rejected that attribution, is buried today in a Muslim cemetery in 
Hayward, on the East Bay,
258
 the same city that would become the first home of Zaytuna 
Institute in 1997 before the institution moved to Berkeley and transitioned into a Muslim 
liberal arts college. Oakland-Berkeley axis would also serve as important centers of 
African American political activism throughout the 1960s, with Malcolm X’s talk at 
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Figure 18: Elijah Mohammad Cultural Center adjacent to Masjidul Warithdeen, Oakland 
I first visited the Bay Area in 2008, and had stopped by several small, storefront and 
basement mosques scattered across the Mission district in San Francisco. Bay Area 
residents are quick to make fun of Muslim tourists visiting San Francisco and choosing to 
stay in Mission District, parts of which can get rough after dark just because they spot 
many mosques and halal restaurants on zabihah.com, a Muslim website and app that 
helps locate Muslim places of worship and businesses, and especially restaurants. The 
website/app’s founder, Shahed Amanullah, was based in the Bay Area before serving in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Panther Party in Oakland, California, (Chapel Hill: the University of North Carolina Press, 
2010), pp. 71-83.  
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the State Department’s Office of the Special Representative for the Muslim Communities 
between 2011 and 2014. It would be during a pre-fieldwork visit in January 2013 that I 
first visited MCA, Zaytuna College, and Ta’leef Collective. During the course of my 
fieldwork, these three institutions experienced significant changes; MCA had been 
expanding and struggling to find a new Imam to replace Imam Suhaib Webb, Zaytuna 
was adopting to changes in its faculty and seeking to balance the school’s educational 
curriculum and logistical expansion with warranted and unwarranted attention it was 
receiving, and Ta’leef was similarly expanding into Chicago and to national scene while 
also seeking to respond and shape the conversation on converts and third spaces across 
the American Muslim landscape. My short visits in early 2013 had allowed me to get a 
sense of the wider landscape but I would realize soon after in the field that the networks 
across the three institutions and their congregations were more complex than it seemed 
on the outside. Likewise, my work over the next year would also expose me to a new set 
of institutions and individuals that were instrumental in making the Bay Area Muslim 
population an exciting sub-set of American Muslim experience. Below, I will discuss the 
institutional development of each of the three institutions and highlight the overall outline 
of high they discuss and negotiate national and transnational belonging. At MCA my 
focus will be on the challenges and factors that shape and face suburban mega-mosques, 
at Zaytuna College I will focus on the relationship between pedagogical networks, 
academic approach and negotiations on American Muslim identity, and at Ta’leef I will 
focus on the third space discussion, African American and convert perspectives in a 
conspicuously sufi, traditional setting.  
168 
 
It is my hope that this discussion on Boston and Bay Area institutions will serve as a 
meaningful entry point to my thematic chapters where I will be giving voice to 
individuals from each community about their perspectives on being a Muslim American, 
living a Muslim life in America, and how these two relate to their discursive 
engagement(s) with the multiple discursive frameworks built around the concept of 
umma. These discussions are framed within a landscape where alternative ethical 
considerations, contending approaches to religious and communal authority, negotiations 
about forms and content of inter and intra faith engagement, as well as frequently 
clashing views about America’s past, current, and future engagement with Islam, 
Muslims, and Muslim world are increasingly become more pronounced. American 
Muslims are debating their identity as citizens, as followers of a faith, and as stakeholders 
in the future shape of religious diversity in a very public fashion and under dynamic, 
often hostile, watchful eyes of a global audience.  
 
Muslim Community Association: Immigrant Roots, Second Generation Futures in a 
Suburban Mega-Mosque 
 
“Oh, MCA? Yes, I have been there. Impressive building but it was so difficult to find a 
parking spot on Fridays!” This was the response I got from a former Bay Area resident in 
a conversation before I moved to Fremont in April 2013. My previous trip in January was 
too short and I did not have a chance to spend a Friday in the Bay Area but it just did not 
register with me how the huge parking lot on every side of MCA’s 92,500 square-foot 
building would not accommodate worshippers. Once in the Bay Area I would frequently 
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have to drive down on 880 highway from Fremont to Santa Clara ahead of time for the 
second Friday prayers that start at 1:30pm, wait for the first group’s (12:15pm prayers) 
cars to leave, and still not manage to find parking in time for the second prayer only to be 
grateful that MCA had adopted a three-Friday prayer (2:30pm) services policy a while 
back to accommodate over 4000 worshippers that flock there on any Friday. In May 2013 
the community would finalize the purchase of a neighboring building, following a 
campaign named “MCA 2.0: Building for the Next Generation,” that is slowly being 
remodeled but is going to host Granada Islamic School, separate gyms for men and 
women, a youth lounge, additional classrooms to house the new high school branch of 
Granada and prayer halls.
260
 Fouad Khatib, MCA’s President, told me that when they 
moved to 3003 Scott Boulevard in 1994, they thought it would take another 15 years for 
the community to outgrow this current location - the influx of new Muslim population in 
mid-1990s and the comparatively low number of mosques back then would make parking 
a major hassle only in two years, by 1996. MCA had completed a remodeling in 2011, 
adding a new wing to the building that included a new foyer to hold some events – such 
as the weekend post-dawn prayer breakfasts –, a renovated washroom area for ritual 
ablutions, and a bookstore. A minaret, which had received initial opposition from some 
business owners in the area
261
, and Islamic ornaments were also part of the 3 million 
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dollar expansion in 2011.
262
 When the opportunity to purchase the neighboring building 
presented itself, the community decided to run another fundraising campaign. Throughout 
my stay in the Bay Area, MCA kept asking the community to donate in order to make the 
down payment for the 30,000 square foot building. After the Friday prayers volunteers 
would man several desks in the Khadijah Banquet Hall, MCA’s largest hall that hosts 
numerous events from lectures to wedding receptions, with mobile credit card machines 
and the area’s faithful would form lines to donate. Eventually, by the end of May, it was 
announced to a jubilant reaction that the community had managed to collect close to 2.6 
million dollars for the new building’s down payment. Already the Bay Area’s largest, 
even with the more recent expansion of SBIA into a huge building complex, with the 
additional building MCA is argued to have become one of the largest Islamic centers 
across the United States.  
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Figure 19: April 15, 2013 e-mail from MCA shows the progress in the fundraising efforts 
MCA is located in the middle of office parks and warehouses and although there are 
some residential complexes nearby, it feels a bit out of place to drive to a mosque that is 
located past Oracle’s shiny building and behind Intel’s Bay Area headquarters and 
another technology giant that manufactures your wireless modem. The purchase in 1994 
came after the community had become so sizeable that Masjid Al-Noor on Catherine 
Street, which was converted out of a church, was overflowing with worshippers. The dire 
parking situation around the mosque had also strained the community’s relationship with 
their neighbors. At that point, and in testament to pre-9/11 dynamics of mosque 
construction patterns in the United States, MCA partnered with ISNA’s North American 
Islamic Trust, NAIT, to purchase the old Hewlett Packard building. The ownership 
therefore was jointly held by NAIT, only to be decentralized following 9/11 when 
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increasing cases of lawsuits to leading Muslim non-profits and individuals on the grounds 





Figure 20: MCA’s new location at 3033 Scott Boulevard, adjacent to its headquarters 
MCA’s two locations – Catherine Street and Scott Boulevard branches – stand in contrast 
to one-another. Masjid Al-Noor on Catherine Street is located in an old, residential 
section of Santa Clara and is circled by family homes. At Masjid Al-Noor prayers are the 
                                                          
263
 Interview with former MSA President and General Secretary of ISNA, current Director of  
ISNA’s Office of Interfaith and Community Alliances, Dr. Sayyid Syeed, Washington, D.C., 
February 11, 2014. 
173 
 
main focus of activity, in addition to a funeral facility that serves the local Muslim 
community.
264
 Congregation is visibly more immigrant-based, with lower income 
individuals forming the majority. The gigantic MCA headquarters on the other hand is 
much more diverse in every possible of the makeup of its congregation: mosque officials 
report there are over 40 nationalities represented at MCA, with the majority made up of 
South Asian and Arab background congregants, followed by smaller pockets of 
ethnicities spanning Somali, Nigerian, Central Asian and Pacific Islander backgrounds 
among others. In addition to the ethnic backgrounds, MCA is anything but homogenous 
in terms of the religio-ethical orientations of its membership. MCA has been around for a 
long time and the community’s concern has shifted toward the needs of second and third 
generation and whether or not they will take ownership of not only MCA but more 
fundamentally of their Islam. A number of individuals that I interviewed were literally 
born into MCA and grew up all their lives in around the community, drawing numerous 
lessons from what they experienced. Active in the administration of the mosque, and yet 
not oblivious to gender-specific problems associated in the mosques, women form 
another major component of the community. While prayer halls at MCA are divided by 
semi-transparent glass, women and men do mix in the lecture halls, and at Crescent 
Cuisine, the halal restaurant located inside the MCA building. A sizeable number of 
converts attend MCA for it is not only a mosque but also a meeting spot, where most big 
events take place, and where there is a bookstore that caters to their needs for Islamic 
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literature and clothing. 
This deep diversity is indeed one of the most striking characteristics of MCA and Fouad 
Khatib admits that “as much as it is a blessing, it is also a challenge.”  To an outsider a 
cursory look at the flyers of events dotting MCA’s numerous announcements boards 
might seem rather oxymoronic. One weekend after another you can find an event 
organized by Islamic Organization of North America (IONA), the US Branch of 
Tanzeem-e Islami,
265
 an off-shoot of Pakistan’s Jamaat-e Islami which is more reclusive 
and conservative in its religious interpretations: IONA’s Ameer, Mustapha Elturk, a 
Lebanese student of Dr. Israr Ahmed who split off of Jamaat-e Islami because they were 
involved in electoral politics, adopted a different set of rules than those operational at 
MCA in their Michigan-based mosque: IONA Masjid in Warren, MI argues that “sharia 
disallows mixing of genders,” and considers practices such as mawlid un-Islamic.266 The 
same weekend CAIR would organize a “Know Your Rights Workshop,” another time 
Zaytuna would have a big conference/benefit dinner, or Imam Suhaib Webb would come 
back to his old community and preach why connecting with rap music is important to 
understand evolution of a conspicuously American take on Islam.  Similarly, Friday 
sermons also portray a range of views and positions.  It is common to find one Friday 
khutba delivered by a neo-traditionalist sufi scholar at Zaytuna College, the next one by 
an Arab or South Asian scholar activist of political-Islam bent, yet another by a visiting 
Al-Maghrib instructor preaching a much more conservative outlook and interpretation of 
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the exigencies of Muslim life in the United States. In all these cases, discursive 
frameworks overlap, clash, and ultimately contribute to the kind of complex collective 
imagination of Islam that has become a pivotal aspect of post 9/11 America.  
Fouad Khatib admits that this diversity has proven difficult to manage and despite 
MCA’s pivotal role in the Bay Area he notes that a big congregation and square footage 
does not translate into a healthy community. Early on, MCA had faced difficulty 
managing internal diversity that translated into the difficult task of cultivating an 
environment hospitable to co-existence of different ethnic backgrounds and different 
ways of living Islam – which sometimes resulted in various groups trying to correct 
others on how they dressed, how they prayed, and what programs would be allowed in 
the mosque. Generational shifts and increasing population of MCA’s youth, both native 
born and immigrant, presented additional, often thorny, challenges alongside more 
technical, logistical challenges in this mega-mosque.  
While technical in nature, logistical challenges frequently translate into jurisprudential 
arguments and pose a difficulty in finding solutions in an environment where congregants 
belong to different schools of jurisprudence: It was a debate whether Friday prayers could 
be offered before the time of noon-time prayers, zuhr, enters. Because the first of the 
three Friday prayers had to be offered before zuhr especially during summer time, 
scholars at MCA had to make the point that Friday prayers which are obligatory for men 
replace the requirements of zuhr prayer and can be prayed ahead of zuhr time in 
situations where needs — from parking logistics to accommodating people whose work 
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schedule require them to be at work at a certain time — dictate so.267  As we have seen 
previously in Boston, another logistical challenge that made it imperative to point out to 
differences of opinion across legal schools and the need to accommodate modern legal 
reasoning, or ijtihad, was one of the three-Ms; moon-sighting vs. astronomic calculations. 
Planning for accommodating thousands of congregants for the two Eid prayers, along 
with community’s needs to ask schools to allow their kids to take a day-off, pushed MCA 
to follow Fiqh Council of North America’s fatwa on the permissibility to adopt 
astronomic calculations for the designation of Eid days. MCA started adopting 
astronomical calculations in 2006.
268
 While this was a fiqhi issue that continues to 
dominate Muslim spheres today, it is, at the same time, a sign of adapting to the logistical 
needs that comes with quick expansion in the size of the community. In South Bay, some 
MCA regulars therefore attend other mosques that choose to follow moon-sighting to 
designate the beginning of the Ramadan fast and Eid days, particularly the nearby SBIA 
which is led by a Zaytuna faculty member, Imam Tahir Anwar who was Granada’s 
Islamic Studies director for a long time and has since started his own Islamic school next 
to Ta’leef called Averroes Institute. While mosque leaders are keen to urge the 
community to not be divided along justified differences of interpretative disagreements, I 
would follow many of my contacts engage in heated debated on social media, voicing the 
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opinion of one scholar over another, or just point out to “how the community is divided 
and cannot be unified.” Another aspect of this issue would involve those individuals who 
choose to follow Saudi Arabia in deciding the day of Eid, especially during Eid al Adha 
when the Muslim pilgrims climb Mount Arafat the night before the Eid. For some, it 
would be “tragic” to observe Eid on a day different than the pilgrims in Mecca and “the 
rest of the umma,” whereas for others, verified eye-sighting would take precedence, 
regardless of on what day Eid is being observed “back home.” 269 
Khatib posits that despite the problems, MCA was largely able to overcome these 
challenges and create a relatively “low-stress community” due to three factors: That the 
MCA community was relatively well educated, both in terms of Islamic and conventional 
literacy, that a critical mass of sensible members realized it was important to overcome 
differences, and because affluence of members signaled to them the possibility of 
creating something bigger than the differences. Still, he admits, problems around internal 
politics exist but that “the middle path overcame the persuanists.” MCA’s Khutba and 
Dawah committees manages to strike a balance between “Sufi and ‘movement oriented’ 
preachers, we hold programs representing different schools of thought, invite scholars 
that belong to many backgrounds, and try to manage this diversity; it is a good 
challenge.” Despite this diversity, for some MCA has been too much inclined toward 
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political Islam, and organizations associated with different colors of Islamist thinking. 
Many leaders of MCA, including Khatib, were instrumental in the establishment of 
CAIR’s first branch in the country. Today, CAIR’s Bay Area offices are located in the 
business park across from the MCA. Others label MCA a “Salafi mosque,” or one that is 
associated with “Muslim Brotherhood.” A website, with the banner “Inside the Muslim 
Brotherhood at MCA,” frequently carries material purporting to reveal how MCA’s 
leadership has been “infiltrated by Muslim Brotherhood networks.”270 For some locals, 
MCA has become just too political. During a fundraiser for a local Muslim aid 
organization in the spring of 2013, one individual told me he was looking for a more 
traditional approach at MCA, but “rather than having mawlid and spiritual programs, they 
always talk about political issues, in Palestine, Kashmir, etc…” As in my other 
institutions, these labels are used by those both within and outside of the communities. 
Khatib and others that I talk to at MCA are aware of these challenges. They cannot 
overcome these labels that can be construed as unfair given current and historical 
interconnections between MCA, Zaytuna, and Ta’leef. Many of my subjects in the Bay 
Area were regular attendees and volunteers at both Ta’leef and MCA, and like everyone 
else were closely following Zaytuna and its scholars. MCA is one of the milestones in 
Zaytuna and Ta’leef’s histories. As I will explain below, Shaykh Hamza had served as a 
part-time Imam at MCA from 1990 to 1995 before he co-founded Zaytuna Institute in 
1996. The co-founders of Ta’leef, Mustafa Davis and Usama Canon, had taken their 
shahadahs inside the MCA community, back in 1996 and 1997 respectively. Today, 
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Zaytuna College’s three co-founders, especially Zaid Shakir and Hatem Bazian and on 
rare occasion Hamza Yusuf, and Ta’leef’s Usama Canon occasionally deliver Friday 
sermons at MCA. 
 For converts who were drawn to Ta’leef, it meant sometimes negotiating a line between 
their close friends at MCA. One of my subject who converted at MCA said, “they [some 
of my mentors and close friends at MCA] would not attend Ta’leef because of mawlid, 
etc.…but you know what they never discouraged me from going. They told me it was OK 
for me to go if I am benefiting from it.” When I spoke on a separate occasion to one of 
these mentors, a young software engineer who is also studying hifz, he told me he found 
Ta’leef and Zaytuna to be “too dependent on Greek philosophy.” “Look, Shaykh Jamal 
Zarabazoo who gives classes here every weekend is also a convert and he is also 
American but he is more orthodox. I appreciate the service Shaykh Hamza is doing but I 
am more comfortable with a different approach.” On the night of this interview, I joined 
my convert subject and the young engineer hafiz who were joined by several other 
Ta’leef regulars at the MCA talking on the events of the day after night-time prayers. 
Next day, some of them were going to wake up early to prepare food for the local needy 
at ICNA’s local relief arm. ICNA, like CAIR, had its long list of pioneers in the MCA 
community.  
The problematic aspects of these challenges associated with navigating across ethnic, 
interpretative, and discursive lines were portrayed most significantly in 2011 when Imam 
Suhaib Webb left MCA after a contentious period in the community. Khatib, just like 
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many others – including Imam Suhaib –, do not like going into details of that process; he 
notes he admires Imam Suhaib and that his son is Webb’s best friend. One member of 
MCA who said he was “literally born and raised in MCA,” and was, at the time of our 
interview, a teacher at the Granada Islamic School at MCA – where he was once a 
student – told me it was difficult to see Imam Suhaib go because Webb had shown him 
that “it was possible to be a hafiz, an American, like and reference NBA in the Friday 
sermons.”  Since Webb’s departure to Boston, MCA operates without a designated Imam. 
Two local Imams who have been in the community for a long time Shaykh Ibrahim 
Othman, originally from Egypt, and Shaykh Abdelrahman Saafan, who also runs his own 
organization, Rahman Islamic Services
271
, lead the prayers and mentor students. There 
are students studying hifz with them, they are sought out for marriage ceremonies, and 
mentoring new Muslims. Shaykh Othman, who is also affiliated with the Bay Area 
Chapter of MAS, answers jurisprudential questions through MCA’s “Ask the Shaykh” 
program.
272
 But neither of them delivers Friday sermons.  
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Figure 21: “Imam Wanted” ad273  
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In the post- Suhaib Webb period MCA has experienced the difficulty to find an Imam 
that could speak to its diverse congregation and represent it. Fouad Khatib admits to the 
challenge. It is not easy to find an imam for this mega-mosque where alternative readings 
on citizenship discourses and what it means to be Muslim in 21
st
 century America 
manifest itself in multiple ways. At a time when having a popular, preferably American-
born Imam at the national level has become the norm and competition amongst 
America’s mega-mosques, it is proving to be a daunting task to find an Imam that has the 
credibility that comes with the classical education, can appeal to the youth who are 
increasingly approaching attending mosques as a matter of choice rather than an organic 
part of being a practicing Muslim, stay relevant to the increasing calls for female equity 
in the mosque space, and can represent the community at times of crises.
274
 I will further 
examine these challenges, as well as the national discussion on the role of Imams in my 
thematic chapters and provide comparisons with the ISBCC and other urban and 
suburban mega-mosques in both Bay Area and Los Angeles. MCA, with its multiple 
challenges continues to serve as a regional hub, where post 9/11 dynamics have also been 
experienced. In this regard, many of the subjects I have interviewed at MCA demonstrate 
the diversity of Bay Area’s Muslim imaginations. While Zaytuna and Ta’leef are also 
more diverse than they are frequently presented in the media accounts, they are 
institutions with specific goals and audiences. Including MCA among my other field sites 
provided me to tap into a distinct sub-segment of American Muslim landscape where 
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intra-faith diversity and challenges of institutionalization has been dramatically 
important.  
 
Figure 22: Islamic Center of Nashville new ad- the Center posted a more colorful ad on 
their Facebook page that drew local and national attention.
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Zaytuna: Defining and Re-Introducing Islamic Tradition in the American Milieu   
 
“The Muslim minority in this country [the US] is the most significant 
Muslim minority in the history of Islam. And we are going to be 
recognized by those who come after us as either fulfilling a great 





“Are we meeting at Le Conte or Hillegas?” Most of my meetings at Zaytuna College 
were preceded by this question – I was trying to make certain I would go to the correct 
Zaytuna campus. Was I supposed to drive up to Holly Hill for Zaytuna’s Le Conte 
building and park at the UC Berkeley parking lot near the Graduate Theological Union 
(GTU) Library, or drive through Berkeley and struggle to find parking along People’s 
Park or on Hillegas Avenue where Zaytuna’s 2009 building housed most classes until 
June 2015 when Zaytuna combined its two campuses into their two buildings on the Holy 
Hill. A Bay Area landmark since 1996, today’s Zaytuna College was known as Zaytuna 
Institute until 2008 and was located in Hayward, about 20 miles south of Berkeley in the 
East Bay. The move to Berkeley was still new and my first visit to Zaytuna during the 
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January 2013 trip was to its Le Conte building in Berkeley. This gothic building was only 
recently purchased in 2012 after a long, 2.5 million dollar fundraising effort and meant 
that Zaytuna would have a physical presence on the Holy Hill, where GTU and its 
affiliate religious schools had their campuses. This was only the third year of instruction 
at “America’s first Muslim liberal arts college,” frequently dubbed at Zaytuna’s 
promotional material as “an idea whose time has come.”277 That idea was sparked by a 
Catholic Sister, Dr. Marianne Farina from Dominican School of Philosophy and 
Theology, who had urged Zaytuna Institute’s leaders to think of ways to have a presence 
on the Holy Hill, which required a more systematic approach to education than the series 
of lectures and classes offered at the Institute in Hayward. The first step in that direction 
would be the addition of a pilot seminary program from 2004 to 2008 that produced five 
graduates trained in classical Islamic sciences. In 2009, Zaytuna Institute would be 
transformed into Zaytuna College. Below I introduce the meaning of this transformation 
for the American Muslim story with references to educational philosophy and pedagogy 
and with historical references that examine the wide network of Zaytuna-affiliated 
leaders that continue to shape American Muslim sensibilities and imaginations. 
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Figure 23: Zaytuna College, Le Conte Campus 
I had accepted the higher new years’ eve airfare to California to be able to make it to an 
event at Zaytuna that was scheduled to take place on the evening of January 1, 2013. 
Zaytuna had titled this event, “New Year’s Resolution: Planting Seeds for a Greener 
Tomorrow;” it was part of a workshop co-organized with GTU’s Center for Islamic 
Studies and University of Vermont’s Institute for Environmental Diplomacy and 
Security
278
 on Experiential Environmental Education in Islamic Schools. Although I was 
excited that Zaytuna was having a program during the holiday intercession and I would 
be able to attend, I remember feeling rather disappointed – I would have preferred a 
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program that would give me earlier signs and research material on the two primary 
reasons for my choice to include Zaytuna in my research: whereas traditional Muslim 
seminaries existed and continues to flourish today across the United States since the late 
1980s in New York, Chicago, and Texas, Zaytuna was arguably the most prominent 
American Muslim institution of learning — and not only because it was aspiring to be the 
first Muslim liberal arts college. Its two convert co-founders, Shaykh Hamza Yusuf and 
Imam Zaid Shakir, had been instrumental in shaping both pre and post 9/11 American 
Muslim imagination from citizenship discourses — their views on this subject had seen a 
fair amount of transformation over the years,
279
 — to how to comprehend the role of 
classical orthodox Sunni scholarship in a modern context. Of course, the story of Zaytuna 
is also located in the wider development of American Islam. As the introductory chapter 
highlights, the development of American Muslim institutions has been influenced by 
Muslim majority countries but several crucial distinctive elements stand out. Unlike the 
deep influence of what Jonathan Laurence calls, the “Embassy Islam,” in Europe, 
American Muslim communities’ maturation and development have been widely a process 
that is independent of the influence of state management of religion and the Islam 
Councils that served as the main conduit for recruitment and education of religious clergy 
for Muslim ethnic populations.
280
 Additionally, as Martin Van Bruinessen highlights, 
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although the idea of creating indigenous institutions for imam training and religious 
education has been on the rise among European Muslim minorities, the prevalence of 
home-country led efforts continues.
281
 
 Zaytuna’s dual role in crafting new forms of American Muslim education and 
simultaneously contributing to development of a distinctly American Muslim identity and 
socio-political imagination made it an exciting case to explore. After all, Zaytuna was 
arguing that “Islam has never become rooted in a land until that land began producing its 
own Muslim scholars,”282 and had decided to define its mission as follows: “Zaytuna 
College aims to educate and prepare morally committed professional, intellectual, and 
spiritual leaders who are grounded in the Islamic scholarly tradition and conversant with 
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Figure 24: Zaytuna promotional brochure from October 2013 picturing Le Conte building 
In the post-9/11 era Zaytuna had received increasing media attention, both positive and 
negative, thanks to its founder’s, Hamza Yusuf, increasing global popularity. While 
Yusuf was already a trademark name in the American Muslim community since the early 
1990s — he had started to draw thousands to ISNA annual conventions since his first 
appearance there in 1993 — he gained increased visibility when he was the only Muslim 
leader to have a close-circuit meeting with President George W. Bush just one week after 
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9/11, successfully urging the President to reconsider the original name of the post 9/11 
military campaign, Operation Infinite Justice. Following the meeting with Bush, the 
name was changed on September 25, 2011 to Operation Enduring Justice.
284
 Explaining 
his decision to attend the White House meeting and later serve as an adviser to White 
House for two years which drew fire from many
285
 in light of the invasion of Afghanistan 
in Hayward, California on September 30, 2011, Yusuf would point out that he had 
conferred with Shaykh Abdullah bin Bayyah on the invitation he received. Shaykh bin 
Bayyah who would address Zaytuna College’s first commencement ceremony in 2014, 
told him that it was fard, obligatory, on him to attend this meeting.
286
 Years later, during 
the 2012 ISNA Conference Hamza Yusuf would tell thousands of Muslims, “that was the 
only advice he ever took from me.”287 The fact that on the day of the meeting Hamza 
                                                          
284
 “Infinite Justice, out- Enduring Freedom, in,” BBC News, September 25, 2001. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1563722.stm [last accessed February 15, 2015.] 
285
 Grewal, op. cit., pp.307- 313. 
286Hamza Yusuf, “America’s tragedy: an Islamic Perspective,” (Hayward: Alhambra Productions, 
2001).  I was not able to acquire a copy of the cassette of this talk that was distributed by 
Alhambra Productions, an organization that distributed much of Hamza Yusuf’s earlier talks. A 
transcript of the talk is available here: 
http://www.muslimsforjesus.org/Current%20Affairs/America%27s%20Tragedy-
An%20Islamic%20Perspective%20by%20Shayk%20Hamza%20Yusuf%20at%20the%20Zaytuna
%20Institute.htm  . Yusuf, who also attended Bush’s address to the Congress on September 20 as 
an invitee of Laura Bush, would also witness his statement “you are either with us, or against us.” 
See, “Address to a Joint Session of the Congress and American People,” September 20, 2001. 
Available at  http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-
8.html  -last accessed February 15, 2015.] In the talk cited above Yusuf would say he had no idea 
Bush would make such a statement.  
287
 Accompanied by American Muslim leaders who were in D.C. to attend the same meeting, 
Bush would also visit the Islamic Center of Washington, D.C., on September 17, 2001 and 
declare that “The face of terror is not the true faith of Islam.  That's not what Islam is all 
about.  Islam is peace.  These terrorists don't represent peace.  They represent evil and war.” See, 
“‘Islam is Peace’ Says President,” September 17, 2001. Available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010917-11.html [last accessed February 15, 
2015.] This effort would be seen by many as an early effort to project tolerance at home and 
avoid the backlash experienced by Japanese Americans after Pearl Harbor. See, David E. Sanger, 
191 
 
Yusuf’s Bay Area house would be visited by FBI agents who were surprised when they 
were told by Yusuf’s Hispanic-American wife, Liliana Hanson, that her husband was in 
the White House
288
 established another important chapter of this episode that I will return 
later.  Since then, Zaytuna has been frequently examined in the Western press in 
publications as diverse as Wall Street Journal, The New Yorker, and The New York 
Times. In academia too, the College had started to receive attention especially in the post 
9-11 era. Some focused on how Hamza Yusuf was revitalizing a centuries-old tradition of 
marrying Islamic spirituality and legal expertise,
289
 others focused on citizenship 
discourses developed by Yusuf.
290
 Coupled with the star-like status of Yusuf and Shakir 
in the global Muslim audiences, views of Zaytuna’s scholars were dissected, 
deconstructed and scrutinized by its sympathizers and dissenters alike.  
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Figure 25: Bill Gates, Shaykh Abdallah bin Bayyah and Hamza Yusuf, at Gates 
Foundation’s Global Vaccine Summit, Abu Dhabi, April 24, 2013.291 
 
Contrary to my expectations, the program provided a perfect initial window into 
Zaytuna’s educational philosophy and enabled me to see some of its pedagogical 
networks at the local, national, and the international level. While Hamza Yusuf, and the 
College’s third co-founder, Dr. Hatem Bazian, was absent from the event, I was able to 
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6527bb34%26oe%3D5591205C&size=960%2C720&fbid=10151536698191544 [last accessed 
December 27, 2014.]  
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listen to Imam Zaid Shakir, the famous co-founder of the College who had led Zaytuna’s 
pilot seminary program for four years before the decision to transform what was Zaytuna 
Institute from 1996 to 2008 into Zaytuna College was made in 2009. Before explaining 
the maqasid al Shariah, the five higher objectives of Islamic law, Imam Zaid mentioned 
that it was imperative to be merciful to the earth and that problems in East Oakland’s 
segregated, violent neighborhoods, global warming and recycling crises were all inter-
connected. This was the reason why Zaytuna was co-sponsoring this event; the College 
was an effort to revive the traditions that helped Muslims thrive in the past. It was 
through translating the vision of Zaytuna into reality that Muslims could restore sanity to 
everyday life, to the workspace and achieve the sustainable, holistic reality of traditional 
societies; the student club Green Khalifa at Zaytuna was a testament to these efforts. 
Other speakers included a fashion-model turned Muslim, Imam Dawood Yasin, who was 
the Muslim Chaplain at Dartmouth College at the time of this event – in late 2013, 
recognizing that Zaytuna’s growing student body was not oblivious to problems found 
among college students Imam Zaid would ask his long-time student, someone he had 
trusted with the leadership of the second mosque he had established in Connecticut,
292
 to 
join Zaytuna as its Dean of Student Life and Experiential Learning.  Another speaker, Dr. 
Mahan Mirza, current Dean of Faculty at Zaytuna, had joined Zaytuna in 2010. A native 
of Pakistan, his journey to Zaytuna included an engineering education in Texas which 
had become unsatisfactory and led him to pursue a path towards political Islam in 
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Pakistan with a focus on intense study of the Qur’an, with IONA’s Pakistani mother 
organization Tahreek-e Islami, but that he would come to an understanding that making 
Islam work in the modern world required much more than what Tanzeem was offering
293
: 
he would end up at Yale, finishing his PhD in Islamic studies before joining Zaytuna – an 
institution that is accused by some as being nothing more than a sufi group promoting an 
apolitical Islam. Among other participants to the event and the three day workshop were 
representatives from academic institutions, community organizations and Islamic schools, 
people who were studying Islam and environment.  
One of these names, Imam Afroz Ali, came all the way from Australia. Pointing out to 
Zaytuna’s global network of sufi-oriented institutions, Imam Afroz belonged to Seekers’ 
Guidance an institution that was founded in Canada and had stretched to Australia. 
Seekers’ Guidance and its founder Imam Faraz Rabbani represented a segment of 
Western-born Muslims who had traveled to Muslim countries to seek knowledge. Faraz 
Rabbani had studied intensely in Jordan with an American convert sufi leader, Shaykh 
Nuh Ha Mim Keller; Imam Afroz had studied in Madina, Yemen, and Mauritania with 
traditional scholars. As I will discuss further below, through its intensive summer study 
camps called Rihla in locations as diverse as Albuquerque, Madinah, Granada, Fez, 
Hayward, Nottingham, Istanbul and Konya over the years, along with and the North 
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American Islamic convention Reviving Islamic Spirit (RIS), both organized in 
partnership with Zaytuna’s associate Deen Intensive Foundation294 Zaytuna had produced 
its own global network of American born and international students of knowledge – some 
of these American students would spend numerous years abroad in pursuit of sacred 
sciences and would come back to the United States to establish different organizations, 
including Ta’leef Collective. One of these students, Faraz Khan had attended a Rihla in 
2000 while a medical school student and had then decided to leave medical school, 
pursued classical education in Jordan and joined Zaytuna’s faculty to teach Hanafi fiqh 
and hadith in 2013. I would listen to him talking about theodicy in Islam at a Zaytuna 
Conference and fundraiser in May of 2013 in Los Angeles, before actually moving to Los 
Angeles for a longer period.  
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Figure 26: Zaytuna College’s invitation for its first Commencement ceremony 
 
Zaytuna had started small. Its seminary program graduated three men and two women in 
2008. Of those five, I was able to trace two; one, an ethnic Bengali from New York City, 
since finished his undergraduate education at NYU and started a PhD program in 
religious studies at Columbia; another, an African American convert from Atlanta, served 
as an Imam at Lighthouse Mosque in Oakland and gained his masters in Philosophy at 
GTU’s Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology. On May 18, 2014, Zaytuna 
College’s first graduates, five women and four men, received BA degrees in Islamic Law 
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and Theology. The incoming class in 2010 was a total of 15 students, and five had 
dropped at different times; during the commencement ceremony, noting that UC 
Berkeley had 12 first graduates, Hamza Yusuf thanked all graduates; with an additional 
thanks to James Ford, one of the four African American graduates who already had a law 
degree, for “not suing” the College. Dr. Bazian acknowledged the families for “trusting 
us when we were an idea, we were not accredited, we did not have tables.”  In 2010, at 
the end of Zaytuna’s first semester Shaykh Hamza would acknowledge that it was Imam 
Zaid who had pushed for beginning the instruction sooner rather than later, Yusuf thought 
they were not ready.  
In a 2008 video, shortly before the seminary program led by Imam Ziad was concluded 
Imam Zaid had announced the move to an academic venture
295
 as well as the first 
Summer Arabic Intensive Program, the first program of the new College
296
, described as 
not perpetuating “a classical vs. modern dichotomy but the continuity between classical 
and modern Arabic.” The program would also contest its contemporary rivals offered at 
Middlebury College or at Georgetown University.
297
 Additionally, the Arabic Intensive 
Program would serve as a steppingstone for future Zaytuna students who were required to 
come to Zaytuna with at least elementary knowledge of Arabic that would be further 
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strengthened while in the College. The video would describe an ambitious goal for the 
new College: 
“With this program Zaytuna aspires to do more than just teach Arabic. 
Ultimately Zaytuna wants to contextualize the learning of Islam and its 
sciences in a setting and perspective that is authentically rooted in the 
West but in the manner that remains true to the core tradition of Islam. It’s 
a tall order and to achieve it Zaytuna’s educational programs like the 
Summer Arabic Intensive must be at the highest caliber.”298 
During their commencement ceremony, students would listen to Seyyed Hussein Nasr, 
who had also given the first guest lecture at Zaytuna in 2010, and Sheikh Abdallah bin 
Bayyah, a Mauritanian scholar and long-time teacher of Shaykh Hamza. For Zaytuna, the 
choice seemed obvious. While they belonged to distinct backgrounds, these two names 
had mastered Islamic traditions, had engaged with the Western academia at a deep level, 
and were advocates of reviving a Western Muslim generation that rooted in authenticity 
of Islamic knowledge and could speak to ailments of Western civilization. This is why, 
Zaytuna’s academic catalog explains, Zaytuna’s curriculum was designed to continue the 
liberal arts education that was offered in religious and secular institutions of higher 
education in the West such as “Thomas Aquinas College, St. John’s College, Columbia 
University, Shimer College, Williams College, and Bard College.”  
“Zaytuna is the first Muslim college to join the movement. The decline of 
traditional Islamic education has resulted in a similar erosion of 
understanding of grammar, rhetoric, and logic, as well as fundamental 
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skills of reading, writing, speaking, and listening, among Muslims. A 
Muslim liberal arts college with a well-designed curriculum can help 
integrate the study of Arabic and Islam into the Western canon. Such an 
effort by Zaytuna and others may go a long way toward infusing faith into 
civil society, thereby enhancing the commonweal.”299   
 
For this reasons, Zaytuna argues to have developed a holistic epistemology through a 
combination of Islamic studies, trivium, and quadrivium. Modeled after the famous 
hadith of Gabriel, Islamic studies are offered under three broad categories, iman 
(theology), Islam (jurisprudence), and ihsan (spirituality). Study of grammar, logic, and 
rhetoric make up the trivium and scientific literacy, mathematics, and astronomy 
establish the quadrivium leg of Zaytuna’s curriculum. The regalia worn by Zaytuna’s two 
guest speakers, as well as its Muslim faculty during the commencement ceremony 
reflected a symbolic marriage of these two worlds. There were Dr. Bazian and Dr. Mirza 
in their Berkeley and Yale gowns, those who had obtained traditional ijazahs, including 
Hamza Yusuf and Zaid Shakir, wore a custom made gown, with their choices of head-
garbs. The initial plans of Zaytuna’s first graduates signal that Zaytuna may have instilled 
in its students this vision of marrying the two traditions and increasing their knowledge 
— the verse inscribed in Zaytuna’s new seal orders them to do so: “Say, O Lord increase 
me in knowledge.
300” Forthcoming chapters will provide examples from Zaytuna students 
on how they see their role as carriers of these traditions and how they understand 
tradition in the contemporary world.  
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Five students out of Zaytuna’s first graduating class went ahead to graduate school 
including at Graduate Theological Union and Chicago Theological Seminary, one 
traveled to China to do research on Chinese Muslims, and three decided to pursue further 
Islamic studies in the traditional centers of learning, including in Morocco and Yemen. 
Several of the Zaytuna students I spoke to during my research already have plans to go 
abroad and study in the traditional seminary settings; some have already spent their 
summers in such locations and for many Dar al- Mustafa in Tarim, Yemen appear to be 
the most appealing choice for reasons I will explain below.  
 
Figure 27: Shaykh Abdallah bin Bayyah speaking at first Zaytuna Commencement, 
Shaykh Hamza Yusuf translates. 
This trajectory, seeking traditional, authentic Islamic education abroad and applying it in 
an American context is deeply embedded in Zaytuna’s institutional identity. If the 
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seminary program sought to incorporate what was found in Mauritania, Syria, and 
Yemen’s centers of learning in Hayward, California from the pedagogical approaches to 
the content of the study, from the use of wooden slates commonly found in Mauritania to 
reliance on rote memorization, the move to a college setting was a step that had become 
imperative in the minds of Zaytuna’s three founders. To achieve, “higher education for a 
higher purpose,” the move from Hayward to Berkeley, from Zaytuna Institute to Zaytuna 
College had to be made.
301
 Zaytuna’s self-narrative defines this move as a “seismic 
transition,”302 but this was not a radical departure from the emphasis on authentic chains 
of transmission or the simultaneous primacy of perennial traditions of Islamic legal 
authority and spirituality. These aspects remain constant at Zaytuna College and 
memorization is part of College’s Honors program, along with the requirement to defend 
a senior thesis. “This project is about restoring the centrality of knowledge to our 
tradition and religion. The basis of Western commitment to knowledge was Christian 
theology. But they lost theology, knowledge was stripped off of spirituality and now 
technology threatens us with virtual wars,” said Hamza Yusuf during the commencement 
event.  
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Figure 28: Professor Seyyed Hussein Nasr addressing first Zaytuna Commencement 
Ceremony 
 
Two of the co-founders, Hamza Yusuf and Zaid Shakir, converted to Islam on the same 
year, in 1977. But the next fifteen years of their life-trajectories would follow paths as 
distinct as their lives pre-conversion, until starting to intersect in the mid-1990s, and 
finally these two men would start their formal collaboration in 2003. Both of them are 
listed among the top 500 Muslims and are incredibly popular across the United States and 
beyond. Below, I examine their life trajectories to shed light on some of the formative 
experiences and travels that has prepared grounds for them to establish a liberal arts 
college where they aim to marry Islamic and Western intellectual traditions and prepare a 
new generation that seeks to create a vibrant, quintessentially American Muslim 
generation that can articulate a new vision for Western Muslim communities. 
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Hamza Yusuf was born Mark Hanson in Walla Walla, Washington in 1958 and had 
moved to Marin County with his academic parents. The family had Irish Catholic and 
Indian American background, along with Greek roots- and he was raised in Greek 
Orthodox tradition in a liberal, privileged environment. His formative experiences with 
the Great Books education at home and his mother’s activism in the 60s’ civil rights and 
environmentalist movement would define his approach to Islamic education and political 
philosophy. In stark contradiction, Zaid Shakir, born Ricky Mitchell in Berkeley in 1956, 
grew up in a broken family, and in housing projects first in Southwest Atlanta and then in 
New Britain, Connecticut. Raised largely by his single mother, Ricky would experience 
life in the projects, and struggle through odd jobs, a failed first college experience, and 
the leftist political rebellion of the 1970s. He would join the military in 1977 out of 
desperation and meet Islam the same year.  The rest of their respective stories are 
reflective of the alternative colors of global political, social, and pedagogical shifts in the 
Muslim world and of serendipity – post-colonial experiences, the rise of political Islam, 
Salafism, migration and emigration, the spread of Sufi orders in the West, and political 
upheaval. For a group of Westerners who had engaged with these factors from a different 
experiential perspective, the thirst to know Islam which could not have been achieved at 
home meant they would engage with these factors directly in the heartlands of Muslim 
world. Zaytuna is an effort to not reverse but perhaps make this process of knowledge 
acquisition easier. Zaytuna’s contemporary, 56 American born students experience 
another set of challenges today. Their engagement with traditional study of Islam takes 
place not in the madrasas of Mauritania or Syria but in Berkeley. But many of them long 
204 
 
for the day they will be able to undertake similar travels, not for purposes of having an 
exotic experience. These perspectives will be the subject of Chapter 3 and 4. 
 




Hamza Yusuf, whose first Muslim given name was Salman Abdulwahid, would convert 
into Islam in 1977 after a near-death traffic accident with a convert Sufi who had lived 
for a period in Madina, named Michael Haroon Sugich in Santa Barbara, California.
304
 
                                                          
303
 Retrieved from www.finalbrick.blogspot.com  
304
 Sugich reports an anectode that took place in 1977 when the then Shaykh Al-Azhar Dr. Abdul 
Halim Mahmoud was sent by Anwar Sadat to reach out to American Muslims shortly after Camp 
David and was visiting Los Angeles. Sugich, a convert to Islam and a shadhili sufi follows 
Shaykh al Azhar’s group to Islamic Center of  Southern California in Los Angeles. today pictures 
of that visit are hang on the walls of this Mosque which credits itself with having first pioneered 
the idea and necessity of “an American Muslim identity.” I will return to this in later Chapters. 
Sugich tells the Shaykh whom he had met in 1975 in Cairo, that three Americans had converted 
to Islam with him. The Egyptian Shaykh responds, “why not 300?”  In his book Sugich writes 
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Today he almost resembles a global envoy for and representative of the Western Muslims 
with appearances at leading think tanks in Washington, D.C., annual visits to World 
Economic Forum in Davos, and with his capturing sermons that reach millions over 
YouTube. He explained in a Zaytuna event organized on September 17, 2012 entitled, 
“Between Militarism and Extremism: The Excluded Middle,”305 before delving into an 
analysis of the depiction of Prophet Muhammad in Dante’s Inferno, and how he was 
castigated by many for his remarks on Danish TV. In the wake of Danish cartoon crises 
he had travelled to Denmark, and besides media interviews, he also met with the Prime 
Minister’s Office in Copenhagen. The Zaytuna event was organized in response to the 
then recent online movie that sought to denigrate the Prophet and had sparked the still 
dubious series of events that led to the siege of American consulate in Benghazi, Libya. 
Yusuf asked a critical question while criticizing the loss of nuance in the wake of such 
events. Quoting an American politician, who had said that “We should never apologize 
for American values,” Yusuf first pointed out that what lied behind the politician’s 
remarks was not a support for the movie per se, but a defense of freedom of speech. He 
argued that Middle Eastern audiences would misinterpret such statements. “But the point 
is,” he continued, “as Americans do we really want to say it is an American value to 
denigrate other people’s faiths, other people’s beliefs?” The journey that transformed 
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Yusuf into this global personality and an advocate for a spiritually oriented, rigorous 
study of Islamic sciences involved pit stops in the Middle East, North Africa, and West 
Africa. 
Shortly after his conversion, the young Californian would travel to England to study with 
the community of Scottish convert Sufi Shaykh Abd AlQadir as-Sufi, born Ian Dallas, 
whose group Murabitun, had been instrumental in transferring Shadhili Sufi teachings 
into different parts of the world. In England, Hamza Yusuf would attend many events and 
be amazed with Arabic language.
 306
 He would then start a journey into Middle East and 
Africa in 1979 that would last until his return to Southern California in 1987. Yusuf’s 
move to Abu Dhabi to study Arabic and Islamic sciences would be facilitated by his 
contacts in London, and he enrolls in Dar-Al Ain Institute. For the next four years 
Yusuf’s studies with local scholars would lead him to first become a muezzin and then an 
imam at a local mosque, attended by largely Afghan immigrant workers. 
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Figure 30: Murabit al Hajj’s home in Tuwamarat, Mauritania, by Mustafa Davis in 1997 




When Yusuf meets a local Mauritanian scholar named Shyakh Abdallah Ould Siddiq, his 
ties to the West African scholarship starts. Yusuf’s account holds that he enrolls in a deep 
study of Maliqi fiqh with Siddiq and several other Mauritanian scholars but that a 
Mauritanian electrician he met in 1983 encourages him to seek out another scholar in 
Mauritania, Murabit al-Hajj Ould Fahfu, whom he describes to Yusuf as much more 
learned than any of the other West African scholars. Meeting Murabit Al-Hajj’s son, 
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Shaykh Abdar Rahman, himself a scholar who was visiting in Abu Dhabi at the time – he 
would serve as an imam and mufti there before establishing residence in Granada, Spain 
in the later years – leads Yusuf to embark on a deeper study with a friend of Abdar 
Rahman who emphasizes rote memorization and the study from and write on wooden 
slates called lawh, as traditional in Mauritania. This period of study creates an urge in 
Yusuf to study directly with Murabit al-Hajj and he leave his relatively comfortable life 
and studies in the Emirates and sets out for the mahdhara, the name given to madrasas in 
Mauritania, of Murabit al-Hajj, deep in Mauritania, far away from civilization. Arriving 
in Mauritania after a brief period in Algeria where he get arrested on suspicion of being a 
spy, he arrives in the mahdhara and studies with Murabit al-Hajj for the next three years 
until his return to California in 1987.
308
 Hamza Yusuf has been travelling back and forth 
between the mahdhara of Murabit al-Hajj, ever since.  
At Zaytuna, his example in pursuit of sacred knowledge is replicated in new, novel ways.  
When Yusuf established Zaytuna Institute in the Bay Area with a local Iraq physician 
Hesham Alalusi, he requested Murabital-Hajj to send someone for the local community 
and his teacher dispatches his son-in-law, Shaykh Khatri bin Bayba, to Hayward in 
September 1996. As I will discuss further below and in Chapter 4, a number of Zaytuna 
students, including many converts, would study with Shaykh Khatri and other 
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Mauritanian scholars in the Bay Area
309
 and travel to Murabit al-Hajj’s mahdhara for 
further studies starting in 1997.
310
 Zaytuna would serve as a local liaison office between 
Western students and the mahdhara. In response to increasing inquiries at one point one 
of the earlier students of Zaytuna, Rami Nsour, who embarked on the journey in 1998 
and has came back to the Bay Area in the mid-2000s to establish a prison outreach 
program
311
 would write a tutorial for those interested in taking the journey that Shaykh 
Hamza had made almost two decades ago. In April 2014, shortly before my return to 
Boston, at Zaytuna’s library I would listen to two siblings, both Zaytuna students, 
describe their journey to Murabit Al Hajj’s mahdhara that they took with Shaykh Rami in 
their spring break. These Afghani-American brother and sisters from Virginia look up to 
Shaykh Hamza’s example. And yet they are also informed by experiences of a number of 
other student-traveler Zaytuna faculty; the first African-American graduate of Al-
Qarawiyyin University in Morocco who, in addition to teaching at Zaytuna, brought 
together a prominent group of African American Muslims in an educational initiative 
called Lamppost Education Initiative; an expert on the Old and New Testament fluent in 
Latin and Hebrew who studied in Tarim’s Ba’alawi madrasa Dar al Mustafa; and a 
lawyer with degrees from UC Berkeley law school who teaches American Constitution at 
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Zaytuna after studying Islamic law in Murabit Al Hajj’s mahdhara in the late 1990s to 
name a few. These faculty members who were armed with classical ijazahs from 
traditional teachers have since engaged Western academia and many of them are 
currently completing their graduate degrees at GTU.  
 Among these scholars, Imam Zaid Shakir stands out as the most beloved teacher at 
Zaytuna. His journey was different than the one Hamza Yusuf took. When Hamza Yusuf 
was deep into his studies in the Middle East and West Africa, Zaid Shakir was “holding it 
down” in the small inner-city African American communities influenced by Salafi 
teachings on the American East Coast.  
Imam Zaid’s conversion to Islam was preceded by a search. He had been a communist for 
many years, he had tried “mucusless diet,” and transcendental meditation- at a Ta’leef 
event he would confess to having paid 400 dollars for the mantra! Following his 
conversion Imam Zaid continues in the military and gets stationed to Incirlik Air Base, in 
Adana, Turkey in 1979. One of his favorite stories from his time in Adana is the instance 
when he confront a fierce atheist Turkish man and tells him, “you are kafir- an infidel,” 
and in response, the man, who associates being called a kafir with not being a Turk – a 
function of Turkish nationalism and labels attached to non-Muslim minorities – shouts 
back, “I am not a kafir, Alhamdulillah we are Muslims.” On the other hand, Imam Zaid 
and his wife, formerly a Catholic, whom he met in the army would organize prayers 
services in the base until they were asked by the Turkish commander of the base to stop 
doing so. In one of his talks at Lighthouse Mosque of Oakland which he founded in 2007, 
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Zaid cites this event too, “he was silent to the Christians’ services but thought our make 
shift mosque space was against secularism!” Zaid would get in touch with local Muslims 
in Turkey, learning mostly Hanafi Islam. Imam Zaid’s formal relationship with political 
Islamism starts in Washington, D.C. after his return to the United States while studying at 
American University. Here he would come in touch with a group that was supportive of 
Iranian revolution, and was attracted to the rebellious, anti-American nature of the 
revolution. After graduating from American University with high honors in international 
relations, he proceeds to New Brunswick, New Jersey to complete a master’s degree in 
the same field at Rutgers University. Here, he co-founds a small mosque and becomes 
engaged in an anti-drug campaign, similar to the ones that became popular among 
African American mosque communities. At this stage, still influenced by political 
activism, he meets Salafi teachings. Initially straddling between his former Iranian-
influenced radical political activism and the Saudi variant of non-political Salafism, 
Imam Zaid chooses Salafism but that he would continue his political activism to the 
protest of his mentors. In 1982 he travels to Cairo for a one year Arabic study program. 
He would write in his memoirs that he had also applied to Islamic University of Medina, 
but that his acceptance letter arrived after he left for Cairo. When he was notified of the 
letter and despite his friends’ urging he refused to leave Cairo and move to Saudi Arabia. 
“My decision not to leave was fateful. Had I gone, I would have likely become a very 
influential caller to the Salafi way in America, although God knows best. A good friend 
of mine was also accepted and went on to become one of the few African American 
graduates of that influential institution and a leading caller to the Salafi path. As for 
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myself, I would remain on the fringes of the movement.”312 Imam Zaid would settle in 
New Haven after Cairo and establish Masjid al-Islam there. He would gain prominence 
for the study programs, the anti-drug campaign they lead against drug dealers in New 
Haven’s housing projects and for his marriage of conservative Islamic teachings and 
revolutionary political activism. This community would become his home from 1983 
until 1993, when he decides to leave the mosque and his teaching position at the Southern 
Connecticut State University. Imam Zaid holds that it was in the Syrian context where 
lineage and attachment to a land was important that he realized that the only place he 
could call home was, despite all its problems, America – after all, his name was recorded 
with the addition of the epithet Al-Amriki in his school applications – and that he had to 
work more purposefully to make it a better place. Here, having looked at Syrian history 
and how Syrian regime had massacred a protest of Syrian Muslims in Hama, he would 
also realize the downsides of revolutionary politics. During 2013 and 2014, Imam Zaid 
would frequently speak against the repression of Syrian and Egyptian popular protests. 
While critical of the brutality of these regimes, in his opinion articles Imam Zaid would 
advocate for a spiritually-rooted political activism, service oriented politics, a pluralistic 
Muslim constitutionalism and Muslim participation in the political struggles of the global 
South
313
; during a global qiyam for Syria at MCA in May 17, 2013 he would urge 
attendees to not be embroiled in false notions of jihad and strive to change themselves 
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and affect change in America before purporting to change the world. For many who 
remember Imam Zaid’s views in the early 1990s that advocated for political non-
participation and grassroots based radical change in America these views can be 
construed as the end-result of him being incorporated into an apolitical, false Sufi sense 
of spirituality-based change. In an article co-authored with Hamza Yusuf, Imam Zaid 
advocates for enhanced civic-involvement and challenges that notion.
314
 I will return to 
this point when I discuss the views from within Zaytuna in the context of American 
Muslim debates on political participation, cultural relevancy and discourses on Arab 
Spring and its roll-over in the 2013-2014 period in relation to development of an 
American Muslim identity.  
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Figure 31: Imam Zaid Shakir talking during Global Qiyam for Syria event at MCA. 
Imam Zaid’s return to Masjid al-Islam in 2001 after graduating from Abu-Nour 
University in Damascus
315
 would be short-lived and within a year and a half, he would 
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ask Dawood Yasin to lead the community and he would move to California to join 
Zaytuna Institute. The exact timing of when Shayh Hamza and Imam Zaid met is not 
known, but as early as 1998 and 1999, while he was still living in Syria, Imam Zaid was a 
regular visitor at Zaytuna Institute’s programs. His move to the spiritually based Islamic 
scholarship had been taken shape in Syria and during his brief residency in Morocco. 
Many American Muslim student travelers, prominently African American converts, 
report Imam Zaid’s central role in helping those American students that travelled to 
Damascus for linguistic and religious studies to settle, manage school applications and 
registration, and get used to the life of a seeker of knowledge.
316
 Soon after his arrival in 
Hayward, Imam Zaid would spearhead its seminary program, initiate a more structured 
outreach program, write articles in the Institute’s bi-annual journal Seasons in addition to 
the ones on his website and publishing house New Islamic Directions, continue to travel 
across the country in support of environmental, political and anti-poverty activism, and 
eventually push for the transformation of the Institute into a liberal arts college.   
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Figure 32: Imam Zaid Shakir addressing People’s Climate March, New York City, 
September 21, 2014. 
 
Both the faculty and administrators at Zaytuna are under high pressure. As the College 
expands, increased costs and logistical challenges have become a taxing process to 
manage. The school is on a continuous fundraising mode. Its three founders are buried 
under multiple tasks: they are expected to teach, to fundraise, and speak to American and 
global Muslim debates and developments. The continuous attention and scrutiny has also 
created new dynamics that would in turn alter the dynamics of my own fieldwork. Many 
Muslims who travel to the Bay Area take trips to Berkeley to visit Zaytuna in hopes of 
seeing Shaykh Hamza or Imam Zaid. At one point during my stay at Zaytuna, the College 
had to introduce stricter rules regarding guests and visitors and put in place a card-reader 
for access to the main buildings. Media interest has been both a blessing and a challenge. 
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One Zaytuna faculty has told me that they were not able to successfully operate and build 
their identity while being continuously examined and “defined by others.” This concern 
became more visible when NYU based journalist-academic Scott Korb published a book 
on Zaytuna.
317
 Korb had first come to know Zaytuna through a student of his who was 
one of the graduates of Imam Zaid’s seminary program and had decided to take travels to 
the Bay Area and write on the College. Korb had enjoyed extensive access to Zaytuna’s 
students, its administrators, and much of his faculty throughout its first two years. While 
the outcome was a popular book and a large network of American Muslim scholars had 
helped promote the book as a sign of pride in the college’s success, Zaytuna’s 
administrators were not happy with some of the content. Students’ names were published 
in their entirety and some private conversations were included in the book that did not 
quite fit in with the expected etiquette of the College. In other words I would be the 
victim of the access that was granted to Korb. I should emphasize that I found Korb’s 
book helpful. It provides a detailed sketch of Zaytuna’s historical development. I, on the 
other hand, had to proceed carefully in order to respect the administration’s wish that I 
was not disruptive to the educational atmosphere. I detail some of these dynamics in the 
forthcoming chapters. 
The elevated profile of the College brings more visibility, but Zaytuna’s administrative 
team and its three co-founders have to travel to major American Muslim conventions to 
attract students. While the school’s accreditation process has been on track, for many 
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American Muslim families the standards of good education still corresponds to getting 
engineering and medical degrees, ideally from Ivy League institutions – for some, this is 
yet another “immigrant Muslim problem.” The conventions serve as opportunities to 
fundraise for the College, and to organize “meet the faculty’ programs on the sidelines of 
the Convention. During the 2014 ISNA Conference in Detroit, Imam Zaid and Dr. 
Bazian, along with Dr. Mahan Mirza, held three separate such meetings. These on-site 
meetings were meant to complement the College’s quarterly online open-house meetings. 
Shaykh Hamza was absent from this year’s ISNA because he was in Malaysia, visiting a 
prominent scholar of Islam, Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, whom he credited in his 
commencement address as one of his teachers, delivering another talk at a Muslim 
convention there and fundraising for Zaytuna at a benefit dinner held at the Malaysian 
International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) entitled “Higher Education for 
a Higher Purpose.” While the college has managed to fundraise close to 7 million dollars 
to date, just like MCA and ISBCC, they have to rely on monthly donations. Furthermore, 
an in testament to the success of the College to brand itself as a project that is critical for 
all American and global Muslims, Zaytuna’s administrative vice president Waheed 
Rashid, a former Silicon Valley engineer now working full-time at Zaytuna, underlined 
that only 20 percent of Zaytuna’s fundraising originates in the Bay Area. Therefore, 
Zaytuna’s monthly donor campaign calls for 12000 Strong, 12000 monthly donors. In a 
public appeal Hamza Yusuf said “Our Prophet has promised that God will never abandon 
12,000 Muslims united for a cause,
318
 we need you to ensure Zaytuna College reaches 
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that number – and has the care of Providence.”319 In support of the campaign Imam Zaid 
would embark on a tour across the United States during the month of Ramadan in 2014 
visiting small and large mosques, holding iftar-dinners and talking at conferences.  
 
Figure 33: Zaytuna’s full faculty and staff pose for a picture in 2015. 
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This is why Zaytuna organizes Conferences with appealing titles such as “Reclaiming 
Our Faith: Modern Theological Faultlines,
320” and “What’s Left That’s Right: Ethical 
Clarity in a Polarized World,”321 in locations as diverse as Los Angeles, Washington, 
D.C., Detroit, Chicago, Gainesville, and Manhattan. Followed by benefit dinners, these 
events help Zaytuna meet its financial needs. On the other hand, these Conferences are 
also opportunities for Zaytuna to attract students and engage with different audiences, 
including other educational initiatives, such as Bayan Claremont in Southern California. 
These interactions, along with a closer examination of alternative, sometimes 
contradictory, citizenship and transnational belonging discourses I found at Zaytuna will 
figure importantly in my thematic chapters. Now, I turn my attention to another Bay Area 
organization that has its root in Zaytuna’s Hayward years. Many of its leading names 
credit Zaytuna for who they are and what they do today.  
 
Ta’leef Collective: American Islam, Spirituality, Tradition and Community- “Come 
as you are, to Islam as it is” 
 
Whitney Canon, Brian Davis, Diego Arancibia and Micah Anderson had distinct life 
experiences and followed dissimilar paths in different parts of the United States for much 
of their lives until the mid-1990s. Canon and Davis were born as mulattos in California 
                                                          
320
May 25, 2013 in Los Angeles, California. This conference and benefit dinner headlined not 
only Shaykh Hamza, Hatem Bazian. Mahan Mirza and Faraz Khan from Zaytuna faculty but also 
prominent scholars such as Sherman Jackson, Jonathan Brown, and Ansa Tamara Gray along 
with Jerry Campbell, President of Claremont School of Theology which houses Bayan 
Claremont, an Islamic graduate school, that has a different orientation than Zaytuna.  
321
 March 1, 2014, Santa Clara, California. 
221 
 
into mixed race families. Arancibia’s family had immigrated to San Diego from Chile, 
and Anderson was born to a European American family in Connecticut.  Their identities 
and life trajectories have been significantly altered starting in 1996. Born into Christian 
families, they converted to Islam early in their lives, pursued alternative educational 
paths, travelled the world, and developed alternative passions. Today, they all live in the 
Bay Area and work at Ta’leef Collective. Whitney became Usama, Brian was given the 
name, Mustafa, and Diego was complimented by Sulaiman. Micah, despite having had 
experiences through Turkish darvishes in New York and had lived like one, stayed 
Micah. Ta’leef is an Arabic word, used in the Qur’an with multiple variations322 and in 
plural interpretive frameworks. It can mean authorship, bringing hearts together, 
reconciling opposites, and a manifestation of good will. Before it became Ta’leef 
Collective, it was known as Zawiya and operated out of Zaytuna Institute’s Hayward 
grounds. It had a humble, two room space at Hayward. In 2005 Ta’leef was born as an 
independent organization, in 2009 as Zaytuna was moving north along the East Bay, to 
Berkeley, Ta’leef moved to south, to a much larger space in “Kabulistan of America”, 
Fremont, home to largest Afghani-American population in the United States. 
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Figure 34: Ta’leef Collective’s first home in Hayward, California; 2005–2009 
When I first visited Ta’leef Collective in early 2013 it had already started to gain national 
prominence. For the next two years, its profile would be further elevated and this leading 
example of a “third space,” would become one of the most renowned American Muslim 
institutions. On February 4, 2015 Diego Sulaiman Arancibia represented Ta’leef 
Collective in the White House, in the first direct meeting between President Obama and 
American Muslim representatives.
323
 Since 2013, Taleef has become a sought out 
organization at ISNA Convention; and the organization opened a branch run by 
volunteers in Chicago. Over 100 American Muslim community leaders and professionals 
from different backgrounds have travelled to Fremont to learn Ta’leef’s model of 
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community work with the intention of applying what Ta’leef has done since the late 
2000s into their contexts. Ta’leef Collective’s founding president Usama Canon travels to 
Europe, Canada, and Southeast Asia to address large crowds, mostly, but not always, 
through a network of Ba’Alawi sufi organizations.  
 
Figure 35: Main hall at Ta’leef Collective, January 18, 2015 in Fremont, California324 
An examination of Ta’leef’s history325 and its founders’ conversion stories provide a 
fascinating look into Bay Area’s socio-economic transformation since the early 1990s, 
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the evolution of Bay Area Muslim community, and importantly into some of the key 
debates that have gained increased attention among American Muslims on a national 
scale. When I first arrived at the rectangular warehouse that houses Ta’leef Collective at 
a business park on Osgood Road in the city of Fremont, I did not expect to walk into a 
space that Ta’leef describes as an alternative, semi-sacred space: “Reflecting the beautiful 
culmination of our Muslim cultures in America, our headquarters is an alternative space 
that is sacred enough to be meaningful, while inclusive enough for all to find common 
ground. By means of such a space, we are able to meet our beneficiaries hallway and 
assist them toward positive spiritual growth.”326  For Ta’leef, this semi-sacred space 
provides the 
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provides the flexibility to develop programs that would not be bound by limits that 
explicit prayer spaces are subject to in Islamic law. After all, Usama Canon argues, third 
spaces have always been central to Muslim life and modern American exigencies have 
only exacerbated the need for a Muslim variant of these vibrant places. Epitomized in 
their motto, which was coined by Imam Zaid Shakir, “Come as you are, to Islam as it is,” 
Ta’leef Collective is aiming to walk a line that can be seen as porous by its main target 
audience – is Ta’leef’s inclusiveness flexible enough to allow those who seem to define 
boundaries of religiosity in an eclectic fashion that seems to privilege not the traditional 
and the sacred but the more secular, less formulized understandings of religiosity? Below, 
I try to answer this question through focusing on the pedagogical, intellectual, and 
institutional history of the organization and its founders. 
My first visit to Ta’leef was on a Sunday night, and I made sure to arrive at Ta’leef’s 
weekly “Living Right” class with Usama Canon on time. Over the next couple of months, 
I would visit Ta’leef on Sunday nights, but make sure to arrive earlier than usual to attend 
the weekly celebration of Prophet Muhammad’s birth, the mawlid which combines a 
reading of Shimmering Light written by Tarimi scholar Habib Umar bin Hafiz and world-
famous poems and liturgies that honor Prophet Muhammad. Usama Canon would oversee 
the reading of the mawlid as the spiritual leader of the room, combined with the rituals of 
burning aloes wood and serving Moroccan tea. Perhaps the most continuous and visible, 
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yet slightly less publicly announced, sign of Ta’leef’s sufi orientation lies in the mawlid 
program which attracts a slightly different audience. Some of Usama Canon and Mustafa 
Davis’s early teachers in Islam, such as Tarif Arabi, attend the mawlid but rarely stay 
over for the lecture that follows the program. Over the next few months I would also 
attend the Monday night “cultivating mindfulness” meditation class with Micah 
Anderson, attend Ta’leef’s “introduction to Islam” workshops, follow a special series of 
lectures by Dr. Umar Faruq Abd-Allah on his influential essays ‘Living Islam with 
Purpose” and “Islam and the Cultural Imperative” that has driven much of the 
traditionalist discourse on American Muslim identity, follow Ta’leef’s Mu’allif 
Mentorship Program, and help organize their “Breaking Bread” community barbeque 
only to realize that this spiritual aspect is closely embedded in much of Ta’leef’s 
programs which takes place in a continuously expanding institutional and financial 
framework that operates on an annual budget of over one million dollars in 2014.
329
 
Below, I will provide a background history on how this seemingly disparate range of 
programs comes together as a coherent model of community building and propagation of 
Islam and why this model attracts national attention. Before that, however, it is important 
to emphasize that despite the increased attention Ta’leef have received since early 2013 
when the discursive environment on mosques, third spaces, and the unmosqued 
phenomenon have taken American Muslim public with a storm and led to a discussion on 
why the role of cultural identity and alternative perspectives for the present and future 
articulations of an American Muslim identity are crucial, Ta’leef has developed its own 
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distinctive character and response to these debates through a jurisprudence-based 
approach that emphasizes the need for an indigenous American Muslim identity, 
informed by Islamic spirituality. As I further elaborate in the following chapters, Usama 
Canon would refuse the Unmosqued producers’ demand to feature Ta’leef in their 
documentary. Noting that the conversation around the documentary had evolved to 
include an “anti-mosque” sentiment, he would explain, “as students of sacred knowledge 
we did not want to contribute to that false understanding.” Within this framework Ta’leef 
seeks to serve three groups of audiences: disenfranchised Muslim youth that make up 
80% of its beneficiaries, individuals who are either interested in learning about Islam, 
what Ta’leef calls “seekers,” and those who have converted, including formerly 
incarcerated Muslims. Ta’leef’s Convert Continuum of Care program and the youth 
program called “Inheritors’ Circle,” are complemented with weekly and monthly events, 
workshops and community gatherings. As we will see in Chapters III and IV, the African 
American ethos is strong at Ta’leef, discursively and aesthetically, it is carefully 
navigating the strongly embedded Sufi teachings its staff has relied on, and has developed 
an elaborate media messaging, through films, documentaries, social media presence and 
educational initiatives. Through ethnographic immersion and participant observation I 
became part of Ta’leef for about four months in 2013 and have made three additional 
trips to the Bay Area from Los Angeles and Boston during 2014.  
For all the attention Ta’leef gets due to its pioneering role in establishing one of the first 
institutionalized examples of Muslim third spaces, due to its emphasis on dispelling the 
notion of a perceived dichotomy between being Muslim and being American, and due to 
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its attention to the African American experience, my research in Ta’leef points out that 
these crucial aspects of Ta’leef’s role and space in the contemporary American Muslim 
publics and discourses eventually can be explained with a concern for what Usama 
Canon refers to as “inter-generational survivability of Islam,” a concept developed by Dr. 
Sulayman Nyang. This is why, he explained to me, Ta’leef invests in developing 
culturally relevant, meaningful, healthy communities; physically in Fremont and 
Chicago, and on a larger context through its programming and elevation of a discourse 
that travels across the country and continents by way of Ta’leef’s media productions and 
Usama Canon’s personal travels. 
Ta’leef’s history is closely intertwined with Zaytuna College and MCA; with the Afghani 
community in Fremont, and the professionals of Silicon Valley. I was thinking of these 
interconnections sitting at Ta’leef’s main hall and waiting for Usama Canon to 
commence his Arabic lesson. In June 2013 he had announced that he would be starting 
weekly Arabic lessons. Although I would soon leave for Los Angeles, I decided to sit 
through these classes where attendees included a few of Ta’leef’s staff members, several 
university students driving down to Fremont from near Sacramento, a Palestinian 
American community elder who wanted to improve on her vernacular Arabic, and 
Muhammed Canon, Usama Canon’s first born child whom his father was teasing with 
additional questions. Muhammad was born on September 6, 2001; only a five days before 
9/11. His birth had also taken place five years to the date of his father’s conversion to 
Islam in 1996. Usama Canon started the class pointing out to a paper he had brought with 
him. It was the Arabic alphabet written in a notebook. The class was designed for people 
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who already new basic Arabic, we would not be going over the alphabet; so this was 
rather strange. He explained: The alphabet he showed us was written for him on his 
notebook by Shaykh Hamza Yusuf, in 1996. He keeps it on his desk and told us that after 
spending many years studying Arabic he was giving this class in order to not forget 
where he came from and in order to payback the sacrifices his teachers did for him. Later, 
he would say how his work is informed by this experience, “Shaykh Hamza was slowly 
recognized on the national Muslim scene then; in 1996 he was on the podium at ISNA 
convention but there he was not shying away from teaching this kid from Campbell, San 
Jose alif, ba, ta…”330  
The underlying message was also that if the students worked hard, they could talk Arabic 
as fluently as he did, and walk seamlessly between Arabic and English. In a previous 
interview with him, for which I had to wait several months due to his busy travel 
schedule, my eyes were fixated on the sand clock that Usama Canon had set off and 
placed on the desk when we started the interview at his office. My time was slowly 
coming to an end and I still had a few more follow-up questions. He had mentioned that 
planets so aligned that after the conversion to Islam of scholars like Hamza Yusuf, Zaid 
Shakir, Dr. Sherman Jackson, Dr. Umar Faruq Abd-Allah and Timothy Winter in the 
early to late 1970s, himself, Mustafa Davis, and Yahya Rhodus, all from the Bay Area, 
converted to Islam in 1996. This second generation of Western converts to Islam, 
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however, was the product of a different age. The older convert-scholars cited above, 
whom Usama Canon cites as his teachers in his talks, along with a number of Ba’Alawi 
scholars from Yemen, Morocco, and Indonesia, have been instrumental in his own 
understanding of Islam, in his pedagogical travels, and in his understanding of the links 
between spirituality, Islamic law, and community care, all of which come together to 
form the core of Ta’leef’s mission: dawah, or as Usama Canon translates it, healthy 
propagation of Islam, especially catering to disenfranchised Muslims and those who have 
or are in the process of converting to Islam.  
 
Figure 37: “Passing the Baton: The Life and Legacy of Malcolm X” event at Ta’leef 
Collective May 19, 2013. From left are Mustafa Davis, Usama Canon, Dr. Umar Faruq 
Abd-Allah and Imam Zaid Shakir.  
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Among the three, it was Brian Davis who converted first, at MCA’s then two year old 
new building, in February 1996. The reason for his conversion was Whitney, his friend at 
De Anza College, who urged him to look into Islam. Whitney was not Muslim then but 
he knew of Nation of Islam and orthodox Islam – his older brother Anas Canon, who is 
now a music producer/DJ based in LA and featured in Ta’leef documentary Deen Tight, 
had experienced both. Whitney’s conversion would take place 6 months later, in 
September, again at MCA. A week after him, John Rhodus, his long-time friend would 
become Muslim and take the name Yahya, at MCA with Shaykh Khatri who had just 
arrived in the Bay Area and Yahya’s conversion was the first time he was witnessing 
conversion in his life. All three would start to study with Hamza Yusuf at his house near 
MCA and with Shaykh Khatri. 
 
In May of 1997, Mustafa Davis would leave with Shaykh Khatri to Mauritania, to be 
joined by Yahya in September. In the meantime, Shaykh Hamza would arrange for 
Usama to fly to Morocco for his studies. Mustafa Davis, today a filmmaker and 
photographer, would then study Arabic and Islamic sciences “overseas,” in Mauritania, 
Syria, Sudan, Morocco, and Yemen, and would work in Abu Dhabi at Tayba Foundation, 
founded by one of his teachers from Dar al-Mustafa, Habib Ali al-Jifri, for four years. 
Yahya would also travel later to Syria, return back to Mauritania to study with Murabit al 
–Hajj and then move to Tarim, to further his studies at Dar al-Mustafa and keep close 
company to Dar al-Mustafa’s founder Habib Umar bin-Hafidh. When Habib Umar came 
on a tour of the United States, it was Yahya who translated for him at Ta’leef Collective. 
Today, Yahya Rhodus has come back to the United States after many years of travelling 
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between Tarim and the Bay Area. He would teach at Zaytuna Institute and Zaytuna 
College in the interim while also finishing his undergraduate education, receiving a 
master’s degree from GTU, and finally enrolling in a doctoral program at University of 
Cambridge. Since 2013 he has been back in the United States full-time, and is working 
towards establishing a community in rural Pennsylvania under a new institution he has 
established, Al Maqasid.
331
 I will be examining these histories and the relevant segments 
of specific experiences throughout my following chapters. 
 
Figure 38: Usama Canon (L) and Mustafa Davis (R) in Fez, Morocco, 1999.  
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Usama Canon would return from overseas first, having married his Moroccan teacher 
Shaykh Moulay Hashim al Balghiti’s daughter, and having lived in Cairo and in Madina. 
He would start working with Shaykh Hamza and later with Imam Zaid at Zaytuna 
Institute and witness its expansion into a vibrant center of learning and teaching. He 
would become both a student and a community leader, eventually rising to the status of a 
teacher and would conduct Introduction to Islam classes. As Zaytuna Institute attracted 
more number of students both from within Bay Area and abroad, the number of converts 
would increase and by 2002 Zawiya would come into effect. Usama Canon would be 
responsible for providing services and eventually education to the new Muslims, to 
families attending Zaytuna events, and to incarcerated Muslims who sought out Islamic 
literature from Zaytuna. By 2005, he would also start serving as a Chaplain for the State 
of California Department of Corrections. It is these experiences, he explains, that formed 
the basis for Ta’leef Collective and when Zaytuna College decided to move onto the 
college experiences, Ta’leef branched out as a fully independent organization but kept its 
ties with Zaytuna College. Usama Canon would serve as an instructor at Zaytuna’s 
Summer Arabic intensives in its inception, Zaid Shakir would assume the chairmanship 
of Ta’leef’s board, and Zaytuna’s first graduating class would be awarded seats at 
Ta’leef’s 2014 Muallif Mentorship Program. 
 On Sunday nights, Usama Canon can be seen effectively threading across these 
experiences in his lectures. Building on his experiences with prison chaplaincy and on his 
role as the spiritual advisor to Inner-City Muslim Action Network (IMAN) in Chicago he 
can utilize an explicitly African-American vernacular at one point, referring to the OGs in 
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the room, the original gangsters, talking about the experiences of African American 
inner-city communities and the obliviousness of the larger Muslim community to these 
experiences. Just a minute after this he would tell a story of his travels with his teachers 
and how they cultivated an authentic marriage of Islamic law, spirituality and the spirit of 
the law. In his lectures Usama Canon draws on Imam W.D. Muhammad’s pioneering role 
in developing early articulations of an American Muslim identity, Malcolm X’s legacy on 
social struggle, how his teacher Habib Umar’s father Habib Salim bin Hafiz struggled 
with the Yemeni socialists regime and sacrificed his life for the longevity of Tarimi 
centers of learning, a critique of the prison industrial complex, and on contemporary 
challenges facing American Muslims in the context of Arab Spring and Islamophobia. 
Usama Canon’s discursive engagements with these themes simultaneously remain 
dynamic and engaging, but they also point out to challenges he shares with the leaders in 
my other field-sites; the utter complexity of contemporary American Muslim life and 
identity. 
If Ta’leef is about understanding, embracing and realizing, Usama Canon puts 
understanding first and emphasizes why “serious study of the sacred tradition with 
qualified scholars who teach unbroken chains of transmission and are licensed from 
referancable scholars” is crucial. When he teaches traditional texts in his classes – such as 
the 18
th
 century Tarimi Ba’Alawi gnostic Imam Abdallah Ibn-Alawi Al-Haddad’s The 
Book of Assistance and Counsels on Religion
332
 - he would mention that he received 
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permission, ijazah, to teach these texts from his teachers. But it is not always traditional 
texts that are covered in these classes. For a few weeks in May 2013, Usama Canon 
structured his talks around Time magazine’s series on the millennial generation entitled 
“The Me Me Me Generation.”333 
 
Figure 39: Time magazine Millennials issue that was covered at Ta’leef’s Living Right 
classes in May 2013. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Counsels on Religion (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2010.)  Mostafa Badawi is also the author of 
most detailed account of the historical evolution of Tarimi Ba’Alawi tradition. See Mostafa al-
Badawi, A Blessed Valley: Wadi Hadramawt & The Alawi Tradition-Volume One (Guidance 
Media: 2013).  
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In these sessions Usama Canon would walk across some of the major themes that are 
debated among American Muslims: Can the divide between the American born 
generation and the immigrant generation be bridged? What are some of the problems in 
the Muslims communities that make mosques unwelcoming? Why are increasing 
numbers of Muslim youth leading double lives? Is it because their parents stigmatize 
being American to such an extent, and use the word “American” in a pejorative sense that 
the youth are developing reactionary identities? The visibly spiritual answers to these 
questions can range from an emphasis on a Prophetic narration that emphasizes the 
simultaneous respect and love that needs to be fostered among the elderly and the youth 
to a critique of the materialism of the 21
st
 century. In the question and answer session 
after Usama Canon’s lecture, the discussion can take the form of a further expansion of 
these issues. This is how Usama Canon explains the gap between the youth and their 
parents based on a recent conversation he had with the youth in Miami, Florida who 
reported their parents’ negative discursive engagement with the adjective American: 
“May be subconsciously, at some level, the kids may 
be proverbially saying [to their parents], ‘why did you bring me here? I 
did not ask to be born here…Yo…I did not ask to be growing up here… 
what do you want me to do?’ Now what am I saying? Am I saying that we 
have to cosign on all of the problematic…foreign policy issues that this 
country is involved in? I am saying that that we have to be flag waving… 
kind of if we don’t agree with everything that the American state does 
then we are somehow not American? Quite the contrary!” 
“I am saying that we have a right and a responsibility as people who live 
in this country to be invested spiritually, intellectually, physically, and 
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psychologically in the affair of this country and if we don't do that…I am 
not saying that is not only not American, I am saying that it is not 
Prophetic! Because the Prophets were invested in the people whom they 
lived amongst. And they cared about the people they lived amongst. And 
even those who denied faith among those they were sent to are referred to 
in the Qur'an as qawmi…oh my people…” 
 
In the following chapters I will provide further examples on how the dynamic between 
cultivating an unapologetically American Muslim identity that is culturally relevant to the 
American context is construed at Ta’leef as a crucial aspect of Islam’s long-term survival 
in the United States. Much like at Zaytuna, Ta’leef’s the traditionalist, jurisprudence 
based approach that lies behind this understanding is constructed as integral to the 
centuries-long history of Islam’s expansion into distinct cultural contexts. Because my 
fieldwork coincided with a number of focal incidents that stimulated a heated debate on 
American Muslim identity Ta’leef’s perspective on what was required to cultivate an 
understanding of communities that develop micro and macro perspectives on the norms 
that regulate Muslim public spheres through Sherman Jackson’s conceptualization of 
“private maximum and public minimum” was further elevated. The following chapters 
will examine Ta’leef’s efforts to develop a coherent religio-cultural framework in its 
work, through highlighting how its understanding of Convert Care differs from some of 
the other models in the country and how its understanding of dawah is informed by 




An Introduction to Thematic Chapters 
 
For all the institutional differences across my six communities this chapter highlighted a 
number of themes, debates, challenges and processes that are commonly shared and 
experienced across community leaders, religious scholars and lay members that make up 
the heterogeneous American Muslim experience. In the following chapters I will 
elaborate on, unpack, and present some of these themes and experiences. Before I move 
onto that stage, I would like to identify the broad boundaries of these distinct and shared 
experiences. 
First, it is crucial to remember that Muslim presence in the United States is relatively 
young. While American Muslim narratives have increasingly – and in relation to the 
attempt to construct the American Muslim identity per se – included an emphasis on the 
importance of transatlantic slave trade in bringing first Muslims to the United States, the 
sizeable immigration and settlement processes that took place since the 1965 Immigration 
Act are relatively new phenomenon. Likewise, while the United States had engagements 
with Muslims since the 18
th
 century through diplomatic and intellectual exchanges, the 
embodiment of what can be named an American Muslim community does not take place 
until after the 1965 act and the mass conversion of African American Muslims into 
mainstream Islam in the post-1975 period. Having cited this factual reality, we are faced 
with two viewpoints: The first interprets this fact to underline and further the need to 
develop an explicitly American Muslim identity and response. An influential African 
American Muslim public intellectual notes that despite all the challenges, Muslims in 
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America have managed to weave the country from one coast to another with mosques, 
community centers, and different organizations within a span of less than 60 years. 
According to him, this process is by divine decree and imposes a critical challenge to 
American Muslims: Are American Muslims going to be able to develop institutions, 
produce knowledge, and internalize the need to fulfill their duty to represent, live, and 
disseminate Islam in America?
334
   The second is less sure that this is a directed, divine 
process and argues that the boundaries of an identity comes secondary to preserving the 
religious identity. As we have seen, the overwhelming majority of my institutions, in line 
with the larger American Muslim community, gravitate towards the first view. Because 
these positions are not polar opposites, and because identity formation is a messy process, 
there are a number of issues such as the norm and limits that guide civic engagement, 
interfaith relations, law enforcement engagement, foreign policy positions that do not fall 
squarely into one or the other category. In fact, most heated debates and differences can 
be found within the first category. Yes, we are American Muslims; but what does that 
denote? Unsurprisingly self-identifying as an American Muslim does not result in 
homogenous responses to theological, ethical, jurisprudential, or political puzzles. On the 
other hand, because of the real and perceived duality between immigrant and indigenous 
experiences, discursive positions on American Muslim identity also show great deal of 
variance across ethno-racial divides. From the alternative definitions of tradition – 
whether it is the tradition and legacy of African American Muslim experience or a more 
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timeless and continuous process of engagement with scholarly tradition as it developed 
through central Asia, Middle East, North and West Africa – to conceptions of communal 
pluralism, these dualities define much of my respondents’ perspectives and cut across 
institutions. The next two chapters introduce my findings across the six institutions. The 
fourth chapter will deal with umma discourses and highlight why and how problems and 
debates within the Muslim publics serve to qualify the ideal of ummatic unity, both with 
respect to American Muslim context and to global developments. The fifth chapter will 
examine closely how American Muslim identity is construed by my subjects and why 
cultural referents, rather than political considerations play the central role in the 
imaginations of American Muslim publics. The final chapter examines the scholarly 
debates on maqasid al-Sharia, higher objectives of Islamic law and fiqh-al-aqalliyat, the 




CHAPTER 4- DEBATING PRIORITIES AND 
CITIZENSHIP PRACTICES FOR AMERICAN MUSLIMS: 
UMMA DISCOURSES AND CONTENTIOUS POLICY AREAS 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the multiple umma discourses and competing visions of fostering 
an American Muslim identity and citizenship that circulate in the larger American 
Muslim landscape and in my research sites. As I have examined before umma has been 
used in multiple contexts throughout the Qur’an. Similarly it takes on multiple meanings 
in the American and global Muslim vernacular. I show below how my respondents 
engage with the concept of umma in its linguistic, theological and practical diversity. My 
interviews point out that the most widespread use of umma, the transnational Muslim 
community to which Muslims have an emotional attachment, continues to be a dominant 
discursive tool. Multiple audiences engage with the idea of umma and its complex 
implications. Is it an alternative to the nation states? What does an attachment to the 
umma mean in terms of America’s foreign policy? If umma is an ideal what are the 
factors and conditions that make it possible or impossible to materialize it? The mapping 
of the discursive landscape below signals, however, that the most immediate discursive 
engagement with umma discourses takes places in the context of American Muslims 
giving meaning to their own presence and challenges in the United States. In other words, 
rather than juxtaposition of an universal umma attachment in contradiction to loyalty to a 
nation state that is informed by emergence of nation states and nationalism
335
, the ideal of 
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ummatic unity is debated in the context of challenges of intra-Muslim diversity across 
ethnic, racial, socio-economic and interpretative lines. As I explain in the next chapter, 
the American institutional-historical context of religious accommodation, the discourse of 
“civil religion” and positive assimilation pave the way for a non-bifurcated engagement 
with the idea of umma even when American Muslims continue to struggle with American 
foreign policy towards Muslim majority contexts and increasing anti-Muslim populist 
sentiments.   
In this context, the powerful presence of the concept of umma and the multiplicity with 
which it is engaged and employed in the particular context of American Muslim 
landscape will establish the pathway to my next chapter that will examine the discourses 
on shariah, maqasid and a host of umma related concepts such as dar al-Islam and dar-al 
Harb in the discursive landscape of Muslim Americans. These discourses, with various 
levels of emphasis, encourage the creation of an American Muslim identity and culture. 
Indeed, most of my respondents chose to debate questions of belonging and 
indigenization with reference to these latter categories, rather than through discussions 
about foreign and domestic political developments. In both chapters I survey the religious 
authorities in my research sites as well as lay members of my research sites. I highlight 
the particular experiences and discourses of both convert and born-Muslims and provide 
personal stories that influence the presence of alternative conceptions about what it 
means to be a Muslim American.  
This chapter starts with several vignettes from the American Muslim landscape to 
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provide a sample of vernacular engagements with the concept of umma. In the second 
section, I examine how my respondents employ and engage with the concept in relation 
to perceived priorities for American Muslims. I highlight three different modes of 
engagement with the concept. In the first mode, umma is employed and negotiated as a 
political ideal and an alternative to nation-states. Second mode points out to umma as a 
religious community at the local and international level that denotes religious and cultural 
unity without pertaining to the modes of political imagination and third refers to umma as 
a social cohesion with particular emphasis on local communal dynamics. In the third 
section I juxtapose how my respondents interpret the concept of umma through practical 
perceptions of difference and discord. These questions require a closer look at dominant 
discursive uses of the concept of umma in relation to the local contexts that illustrate how 
a diverse set of respondents contextualize concepts of difference, unity, and uniformity. 
In the final section of this chapter, I examine four prominent nation-wide debates (White 
House iftar boycotts in 2013 and 2014, Tariq Ramadan’s boycott of ISNA and RIS 
conventions in 2014, Arab Spring and American Muslim pedagogical networks, and law 
enforcement engagement) that illustrate the complex nature of divergent preferences 
regarding best strategies to cultivate an American Muslim identity against the backdrop 
of transnational developments in non-American Muslim contexts. These debates present 
crucial discursive practices about a common question asked in my research sites: whether 
political engagement of American Muslims should focus on foreign policy considerations 
in regards to transnational Muslim issues or local, cross-communal, not always 
specifically Muslim issues. A careful examination of the four episodes point out that most 
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actors deny a clear-cut prioritization of one strategy over another and rather engage in 
complex discursive practices to argue that both local and transnational contexts are 
important.  
These perceptions then inform my following chapter where I contextualize how re-
engagements with shariah and maqasid as well as development of fiqh al-aqalliyat at the 
scholarly level trickle down to communal level on the one hand, and how discourses on 
American Muslim identity and culture influence the discursive landscape of my 
communities on the other hand. In this context I also highlight questions around practical 
religious considerations such as whether American Muslims should channel their 
charitable giving to the local contexts or to conflict driven Muslim lands. While this 
framing may lend itself to a bifurcated analytical framework, my data suggests that 
contextual and discursive realities often straddle the dichotomous constructs built around 
local and transnational contexts and the very actors that seem to prioritize one over 
another point out that such bifurcations are counterproductive. On the other hand, the 
realities of the post-9/11 era and the Americanization of Muslim minority in the United 
States clearly lead my institutions and respondents to frequently emphasize a discourse 
that seem place a greater emphasis on building a specifically American Muslim outlook. 
Through re-engagements with Muslim history, a considerable number of leading figures 
emphasize that that normative Islamic doctrines and histories make it imperative to build 
an American Muslim identity. Rather than thinking of this as erecting a wall between rest 
of the Muslim world and American communities, it is suggested that this process is the 
safeguard of Islam’s visibility and viability in the long run and one that has the potential 
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to shape Islam beyond the confines of North America.   
Especially in regards to the concept of umma and the simultaneous convergence and 
divergence between its Qur’anic uses, the importance of the personal and quotidian 
understanding take paramount importance. While the term has been used in the Qur’an 64 
times, its meaning in the Muslim Holy Book has gone through transformations in the 
verses revealed in Mecca and Medina, as well as within these spatio-theological 
contexts.
336
 These discourses that I have surveyed correspond with Peter Mandaville’s 
typology for assessing Muslim transnational identity.
337
 Mandaville identifies four types 
of Muslim transnationalism: 
a) Muslim transnationalism as Muslim people flows: created by human mobility; 
labor migration, immigration, etc.…not necessarily Islamic but affecting its flavor. b) 
Muslim transnationalism as globalizing Muslim social and political movements; whose 
agendas and organizational structures transcend nation-state boundaries. Examples are 
movements/ organizations such as Jamaat-al-Tabligh, Muslim Brotherhood, and Gulen 
Movement. c) Muslim transnationalism as the global Muslim public sphere as a 
discursive space where contested accounts of Muslim identity and Islamic normativity is 
discussed, in large part thanks to developments in new media and information and 
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communication technologies.  Issues debated span from discussion around issues of fiqh 
to Islam in the global political and social public spheres. d) Muslim transnationalism as 
the discourse and practice of umma-oriented solidarity: While also finding its place in 
the Qur’an with several different uses, modern conceptions of Umma is numerous and 
nebulous, in resemblance to Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’. While it is 
espoused as the global community of Muslims, even for the defenders of the concept it 
poses challenges due to Westphalian nation state system, secular international law, and 
the persistency of ethno-religious nationalisms.  
 
My fieldwork points out to a strong correlation between the last two types of 
transnationalism in Mandaville’s typology. On the other hand, the discursive and 
ritualistic practices often defy strong differentiation across these typologies. Additionally 
the American Muslim debates on the meaning of living in America as Muslims create 
strong interconnections across Mandaville’s categories. Although a host of recent 
literature approach transnationalism as the practice of a particular form of counter-
citizenship
338, my approach here is to allow my subjects’ reflexivity to speak for itself, 
rather than to frame their discourses through critical lenses. In other words, while 
territorialization of Islam in America can be viewed through its “domesticating”339 
features whereby its dissenting voices disappear, my subjects engage with the immediate 
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exigencies of their lives in a fast changing environment. In both the case of local actors 
and national umbrella organizations, a host of factors influence the discursive direction of 
Islam’s presence in the United States. Rather than framing my subjects along the axis of 
whether they do or do not subscribe to a certain interpretation, I let my material speak for 
itself and then explore the reasons for the dominance of certain discursive practices over 
others. The complex personal stories and situatedness of my subjects also mean that they 
adopt often-conflicting discursive practices over-time. In the case of public actors I have 
covered a careful examination of their multiple discourses highlight that their discourses 
adapt to multiple contexts. In the following survey I trace these changes and emphasize 
the contextual engagements.  
One Umma, Many Uses of It? 
 
“…Come my Ummah, wake up  
our jihad is long overdue 
let’s go Ummah, wake up 
‘coz you and I have much to do…”  
 
These are the lyrics of Ani Zonneveld’s song, “ummah wake up!”340 Los-Angeles based 
Zonneveld, originally from Malaysia, founded Muslims for Progressive Values (MPV), 
an LGBTQI friendly Muslim community where orthodox Muslim positions are seen as 
regressive and reflective of an old, misogynistic hierarchy. “…We need to bury old 
traditions; that contradict Qur’anic teachings; let us be just in this unjust world, the 
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 is what we have been told…” reads Zonneveld’s ummah wake up! In an 
interview in Los Angeles she told me that her organization believes in individual ijtihad 
and that umma needs progressive models such as MPV where women can lead the 
prayer
342
, men and women pray as a mixed congregation — “as we do in Mecca,” 
proclaims Zonneveld. Unlike in Mecca, at MPV’s prayer spaces men and women pray 
side by side and the nation’s first openly gay Imam Daayiee Abdullah leads MPV Friday 
services in Washington, D.C. 
In Boston, during one of his final halaqas at the ISBCC ahead of his move to 
Washington, D.C., Imam Suhaib Webb cautioned the mostly young audience gathered at 
the prayer area of Roxbury mosque: 
We need to stop treating ourselves as the chosen umma, the saviors of 
everyone else…At this time when Islamophobia has increased, has 
become this systematic and strange phenomenon, we need to look at 
ourselves. No other community would have allowed the show Homeland, 
the most bigoted show on TV to be aired on TV. 
Webb had deployed umma to refer to the American Muslim community, implying that 
other religious minorities would have lobbied against depictions of Muslims in shows 
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such as Homeland, which featured an American convert to Islam as one of the key figures 
of the show. For Webb, who uses umma to refer to transnational and national Muslim 
communities simultaneously, American Muslims had to stop glorifying themselves in 
opposition to conflict-ridden, chaotic universe of Muslim communities elsewhere. On the 
other hand, Webb, who is one of the most prominent voices calling for indigenizing Islam 
in American Muslim scholarly circles, would simultaneously call for Muslims to be 
involved in their local agendas and not be consumed with struggles abroad, as much as “it 
hurts.” He argued that one reason why Boston Muslims could not fight against the 
decision of the Massachusetts governor’s office to replace him with American Islamic 
Congress’s Nasser Weddady343 was that Muslims lacked institutional power: 
“If we do not develop our own identity, we will continue to be 
defined by developments overseas, and we have no control over 
what happens in overseas. You need to worry about your own 
country and I have to continue to care about my own…it hurts, but 
this is real…Look, this does not mean I am saying we don’t need 
to worry about overseas…but unless we develop institutions, we 
will be voiceless.” 
The Mosque Cares, Inc., one of the two main branches of Imam W.D. Muhammad’s 
community today, organizes an Annual Muslim Convention. Every year, one of the 
highlights of the Convention is the “State of the Ummah” address.344 The keynote 
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speeches are delivered by leading figures of the African American Muslim community 
that has decided to follow Imam W.D. son in the period following W.D.’s death in 2008. 
The event starts with singing of the American national anthem, followed by a Muslim 
prayer.
345
 Over the Labor Day weekend of 2014, while the ISNA convention was 
underway for the first time in Detroit, MI, not far away, in neighboring Illinois, the Imam 
W.D. community was having their 25
th
 annual convention, once again with a state of the 
ummah address. Despite all the talk about unity and difference at ISNA panels in Detroit, 
this simultaneous distance with the African American communities was yet another 
symbolic tension that my African American interlocutors frequently highlighted. 
Anwar al-Awlaki, the once prominent San Diego and Washington area Imam and a 
frequent visitor to White House before he turned into an ideologue of Al Qaida, gave a 
talk in 2009. This was three years before his death in an American drone attack in 
Yemen, which raised eyebrows because it was the first extrajudicial killing of an 
American citizen in the war on terror. In the talk entitled, “the State of the Ummah,” 
Texas-born Awlaki argued that the West was creating an Islam that was silent and docile. 
He argued that despite divisions in the ummah, Muslims could not wait to get rid of the 
nation-state and “withhold fighting.”346 
In late 2014, Dr. Maher Hathout, the long time leader of the liberal Islamic Center of 
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Southern California and a prominent supporter of American Muslim identity, published a 
video entitled “A message from Dr. Maher Hathout on the State of the Umma.”347 Dr. 
Hathout was recently diagnosed with cancer and he wanted to address ongoing 
challenges. He argued that American Muslims represented a good sampling of the 
Muslims from all over the world and explained how recent events in the Muslim world 
related to Muslim Americans.  
At the community level, ISBCC’s health initiative which was initiated by a group of 
medical professionals in the community to provide health screenings for Muslim and 
non-Muslim residents of Roxbury, to provide health and addiction counseling to 
community members is called UMMA Health Initiative.
348
 At university campuses, some 
Muslim student associations create acronyms that include umma, such as De Paul 
University’s “United Muslims Moving Forward,”349 or an early example from Los 
Angeles where Umma Community Clinic, founded in 1992 by Muslim medical students, 
stands for University Muslim Medical Association.
350
 UmmahNow, an Irvine based tech-
initiative distributes community wide events and job postings in California, Texas, and 
Washington, D.C. The website takes pride in creating connections across institutions and 
publics. The weekly newsletters include the following note about their featured events 
lists: “If it is “of interest” to the Muslims in your community, you’ll find it here, whether 
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it is Quran or Hip Hop; organized by Sunnis or Shias; Muslims or Non-Muslims; Nation 
of Islam or Zionist Jews. It is your responsibility, dear reader, to attend events, 
contribute, and “correct” the ummah and the world around you, where necessary.” 
In the cultural arena, Muslim artists and thought leaders have created artists’ collectives 
such as “Creative Ummah,” a “global platform that helps you discover and connect with 
incredible change makers and creatives from right around the Ummah.”351 One of the 
founders of Creative Ummah, Peter Gould is an Australian convert with close ties to 
Ta’leef Collective and Zaytuna circles. The idea of community and links to the umma are 
reflected in his online apps for children that include “ummah Legends,” and “kids of the 
ummah.” Dustin Craun, one of the first students of Zaytuna’s seminary program served 
as a community organizer in the Bay Area before launching “Ummah Wide,” a “digital 
media startup focused on stories and cultures that transcend the global borders and 
boundaries of the Muslim and Human family.”352 A strong critique of American 
exceptionalism and whiteness, the Colorado native had come to learn about Islam 
through left wing activism during college and was drawn to activist-traditionalism. He 
argues that American Muslims should achieve indigenization without buying into 
whiteness and exceptionalism.  
In an article prominent African American Muslim scholar Sherman Jackson highlighted 
that some of the most pronounced Muslim scholars and leaders lived as religious 
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minorities in the early Islamic period. Dr. Jackson also questioned whether American 
Muslims were included in the umma:  
“I have often wondered about the way Muslims use the word ‘ummah.’ In 
a technical sense, it clearly refers to the entire Community, the unqualified 
collective of all who espouse, “There is no god but God and Muhammad is 
His messenger.” And yet, it commonly manages to connote certain parts 
of the world to the marginalization if not mild exclusion of others. The 
Middle East, South Asia and South East Asia clearly make it in, while 
America, Canada and Jamaica are barely brought to mind. Ultimately, of 
course, numbers play a role here. Where Muslims are a majority or even a 
‘significant minority’ (as, e.g., in India or parts of Africa), it is simply 
easier to see their sufferings, obsessions, preferences and even sensibilities 
as reflecting the pulse and interests of the ‘ummah.’ Where they are a 
small, marginal minority, on the other hand, (as, e.g., in America or 
Canada) this is far less likely to be the case. My concern in all of this is 
not so much with the way the rest of the ummah looks upon Muslim 
minorities in the West. This is an issue, of course. But to my mind it pales 
in significance next to the way that these minorities ultimately view 
themselves.”353 
During my fieldwork, I came across a number of instances when Jackson’s juxtaposition 
of the relationship between American Muslim’s self-perceptions and the boundaries of 
ummah in linguistic and perceptive practices were highlighted. Why were most Friday 
prayer sermons concluded with prayers that highlighted the plight of Muslims in conflict 
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zones across the Muslim majority world and not American inner-cities? Why were 
American Muslim charities collecting millions of dollars for relief operations in these 
zones but were not equally invested in raising money for local organizations and policy 
agendas? 
In a recent Ta’leef video marking Usama Canon’s 19th year as a Muslim354, the two co-
founders of Ta’leef Collective, Mustafa Davis and Usama Canon, engaged in a 
conversation about their life stories, and the difference between pre 9/11 discourses in the 
Muslim community when they were recent converts and the post 9/11 realities where 
they emerged as nationally and globally recognized names in the American Muslim 
landscape. Usama Canon reflects on his experiences as an early convert and how he had 
romanticized the Muslim ummah at the time, reverberating similar questions posed by Dr. 
Jackson: 
“For me there were times and hopefully they were short times, exceptional 
times, when I was not there, a dissociative kind of thing, where I had gone 
to like the la la land.…you created a construct in your mind, a time or 
place like that was the right way, the right place, the right kind of living, a 
utopian kind of la la land that you have created in your mind.…that you 
are aspiring to get to…and you realize that this place does not exist. Or 
being psychologically or spiritually invested in "the Muslim world. My 
friend Dr. Suad Abdul Khabeer called me out, Allah bless her, when I 
said, ‘the Muslim world.’ She said, ‘don't say the Muslim world. Because 
when you say that it almost suggests that our world is not Muslim world 
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because we are not in a Muslim majority country. Say, 'Muslim majority 
countries.’ And it is so much more accurate than to say "the Muslim 
world." And the deep point about is that ‘in the Muslim majority world,’ 
are they thinking [about us?] And we have been together overseas…‘ente 
Muslim? Are there Muslims in America…"  
Mustafa Davis interjects, “they almost do not believe you.” Usama Canon continued with 
a sense of bewilderment, “We are kind of like forgotten, if ever recognized. So when 
people talk about the umma, the global community, like are we even part of that 
conversation?  You know what I mean? So what does it even say of us when we are 
invested in other people's struggle, other people's realities, but not of our own...like that's 
a very profound...that's off dude! It was not even political, it was not even politically, but 
in terms of just like literally what I was psychologically invested in.” 
In the same conversation, Mustafa Davis tells how a conversation he had with Imam Zaid 
Shakir in Syria in the late 1990s changed his outlook towards his own identity. It would 
take another five years before he returned to America but Davis reports this as a turning 
point in his life: 
“He is the first person when I got to Damascus; and you know I was like, 
‘I am making hijrah forever. I am never going back to the United States. 
And on the first day he [Zaid Shakir] goes, ‘how long are you gonna be 
here for?’ and I was like ‘I am here, I am Syrian now I live here forever.’ 
And he goes…‘hmm, are your parents Muslim?’ and I was, ‘no,’ and he is 
‘your family, your neighbors?’ ‘No.’ And he goes, ‘you staying here 
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leaves a void that only you can fill.’ And that was it…that was the first 
time that I had thought about that.” 
 The next section examines discursive engagements with the concept of umma among my 
respondents and then focuses on three national debates where these questions were 
highlighted. 
Between Ideals and Realities: Umma Discourses 
 
Figure 40: Louisiana State University MSA’s submission to MSA National’s Design 
Your Donation 2013 t-shirt design contest. This design was a finalist but the prize went to 




The idea of ummatic solidarity is based on a famous hadith, frequently cited in Muslim 
circles in the American Muslim landscape, from Friday sermons to formal and informal 
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An-Nu’man ibn Basheer reported: The Messenger of Allah, peace and 
blessings be upon him, said, “The example of the believers in their 
affection, mercy, and compassion for each other is that of a body. When 
any limb aches, the whole body reacts with sleeplessness and fever.”356 
 
Kareem converted to Islam while in the army in the early 1990s. His parents, both 
Baptists, were not overly religious and they were fine with his conversion. Living in 
Boston for the last nine years, he keeps close ties with his family who live in Baltimore. 
But he says he found a family in Islam: 
When I thought of Islam, I always thought we were one strong block. The 
umma is family, all one big family…this is the beauty of Islam…Man, we 
are the original United Nations. But we need to be aware of all these 
elements. A lot of Muslims are just afraid of being Muslims. 
An avid self-thought student of history, Kareem associates his keen interest in geopolitics 
and especially problems in the Muslim world with his African American background. 
“As an African American I am sensitive about problems in the umma because there is 
injustice. Look at Kashmir…We know about it from sitting in the back of the bus, you 
know what it feels like…” Referring to Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Kareem argues that 
“No one in America can survive check points for two weeks even.” But Kareem is no 
romantic either. He admits to divisions across Muslims: “Sure, we have problems, but 
families have disputes, problems. Now, we have to work on the political aspect.”  
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At Ta’leef, Rabia has a more strongly worded reaction to the idea of umma as one big 
family. She has been influenced by Usama Canon’s description of Morocco and Yemen, 
and has become more appreciative of the diversity at Ta’leef as a formerly rebellious 
Muslim youth. She has a connection with Muslims elsewhere she says, “I feel a 
connection, there’s definitely a connection.” And yet she is angry at the idea of ummatic 
unity: “But when people say umma is like a big happy family…that is bull shit. I don’t 
see that kind of community. The sense of community that I see is the local organizations 
here.”  
Zach has a similar view of umma. When he took his shahadah in Seattle, his mother came 
to the mosque with him and had to sit through a khutbah that Zach describes as anti-
American. “Some make a case based on foreign policy, but even most conflict seem to be 
inter-muslim. Not everything is a direct attack on Islam. Most khutbahs are always about 
struggling Muslim communities abroad. My focus is on the global humanity, not merely 
umma or non umma. For me the umma is the Bay Area, it is also the human connections 
here.” 
For Francesca, umma denotes going beyond boundaries and is something more than the 
local community. She was born into a Bostonian Irish-Catholic family but had mostly 
found peace in yoga, which she still continues today. Her interest in international politics 
was strong; she says she had a strong interest in Iranian society, “although we were 
supposed to hate them.” She finds that an attachment to umma through shared religious 
beliefs is valuable:  
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“This idea of humanity bonding over religion is much more powerful than 
humanity bonding over democracy. Humanity not being bond by 
geography is powerful; it would destroy West’s supremacy. Umma is an 
ideal but also umma is better than the nation-state.” 
But she is not sure, if borders and political demarcations could be done away with. “I 
know EU happened,” she says; at the same time she is not sure if Muslims could replicate 
the same model; she says it would be difficult. In California, Muaz says that umma is 
beyond nation-states but it is still a utopia: “I use umma for anyone that has accepted 
Prophet’s message to a certain degree. Umma crosses nation-state boundaries, it extends 
beyond that. But also one-nation state as umma does not exist, there is no one blueprint or 
constitution that can contain everyone.” He continues though, arguing that “the umma is 
going through all these tests…we need to ‘hold on to the rope of Allah together.’ That’s 
where the umma comes in. I don’t know if there would be a central authority, a khalifa 
and things would be different…” 
Umma as it is (re)imagined through negotiating borders and foreign policy realities, also 
poses problems. Ustadh Abdullah bin Hamid Ali, who identifies himself as a neo-
trationalist
357
 was born to African American Muslim parents and became the first 
American graduate of Morocco’s famous Al-Qarawiyyin University before joining 
Zaytuna’s faculty and enrolling in a doctoral program at Graduate Theological Union 
explained to me, “the concept of Umma is political by nature, it is impossible to think of 
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its development independent of that political aspect.” Abdullah bin Hamid Ali argues that 
“the process of indigenization will make” the transnational conception of umma “less 
relevant; when people accept their American identity.”  
But one of Bin Ali’s students, Hasan explains to me that when he gives a khutba at the 
local mosques in Berkeley, he uses umma and community interchangeably. “Defining 
feature of our umma is the crises of authority in our communities. Worldwide Muslim 
community and umma is the same thing” says the young student originally from San 
Diego, before qualifying it: “But I never had a national/political concept of umma.” In his 
early days, when his family found the mosque communities too modernist and the outside 
world too toxic for Hasan, he would be engaging Islamic scholarship from his home, 
mostly listening to Sufi scholars. He had actually taken a year off of his home schooling, 
transferred to a school in the Bronx and lived and studied with a Qadiri shaykh in his 
masjid for 7 months. “Anybody who says shahadah  (deceleration of faith) is part of the 
umma. I used to be more conservative before. Then, I would say ‘only sufis are true 
Muslims.’” His education at Zaytuna, despite its strong Sufi undertones, says Hasan, 
“changed my perspective.”  
His class-mate, Omar has a more transnationalized conception of the concept: “when I 
say umma in my sermons, I use it to mean transnational Muslim community; the large 
umma means there’s one nation, the umma, and all other nations are part of it.” When 
Omar traveled to Mauritania in the winter break that year he had come across the teachers 
of his teachers, Shaykh Hamza and had told the young members of umma there about his 
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love for Malcolm X and Ahmed Shah Massoud while playing soccer in his to-go Afghan 
hat, pakol– the career he would have chosen if he had not made the decision to come to 
Zaytuna. 
Bilal spent his childhood in the streets of Roxbury and Dorchester. He grew up between 
Masjid Alhamdulillah and Masjid Al Qur’an communities but he would soon find himself 
in gangs and dealing drugs. When he was locked up in juvenile holding for two months 
he tried to put his life back together but music and drugs did not leave him alone. In 
attempt to escape his surroundings he would travel to Trinidad to attend a seminary in a 
short-lived adventure and would later travel to and witness Saudi Arabia through his 
“super rich” friends. He would witness the extravagant lifestyle there and would come 
back disillusioned. Coming back to Boston, he adopted a more conservative lifestyle, 
took music out of his life and started to memorize the Qur’an while finishing college. His 
experiences affected the way he views the umma: “What used to exist with umma is this 
global unity of all the Muslims under one leader. Now it is more a concept, not a reality. 
There are all these cultural differences, different interpretations of the Qur’an and the 
practice.” Bilal’s own interpretations of America and the possibility of living a Muslim 
life changed too. His misgivings are not so much about foreign policy issues. He actually 
thinks American values, “all these things, pride, ego, greed…All these things that 
America lives for” are detrimental to the heart. But after his experiences in Saudi Arabia, 
he is not sure if there is an ideal place to be a Muslim. 
Amina has not been to Muslim Middle East but she longs to travel there. She came to 
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Ta’leef after spending her youth hating her Afghan and Muslim background especially 
after 9/11. She was forced by her sister to attend Usama Canon’s lectures in the East Bay. 
Sitting through his lectures convinced her she found a place where she could co-exist in 
her dual identities. Today she is a member of Ta’leef’s programming team. “Umma has a 
meaning for me now. When Brother Usama talks about his travels to Morocco, to 
Yemen, I want to know about those places…But of course there are difficult issues.” 
Some of these difficult issues manifest themselves in the foreign policy arena. While not 
all of my subjects were willing to talk about American foreign policy, for some of them 
human rights issues and injustices abroad were the reasons why they came to know 
Islam. Others discussed foreign policy as a problem-area but quickly noted that it could 
not determine alone how they discussed their lives as American Muslims. Below, I 
examine these discourses and then highlight how not only American foreign policy but 
also a number of internal differences about a host of issues in the Muslim world 
accentuate different viewpoints across the intellectual and organizational networks in the 
American Muslim landscape. 
The vignettes and responses above from my fieldwork denote that my respondents 
discursively engage with the transnational concept of umma through multiple contexts 
and personal experiences. Rather than merely thinking of umma as a fixed concept that 
competes for their loyalty, their engagements are multi-faceted and reflect an ideational 
attachment that is thorn by their everyday experiences. Furthermore, a diverse set of 
actors from community activists to Muslim academics and intellectuals, from journalists 
to artists shape the public collective reasoning around the concept of umma, thereby 
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diversifying its reimaginations beyond the Qur’an and hadith based references to the 
concept. Below I first highlight how American foreign policy and umma is discussed by 
my respondents. Next, utilizing three nation-wide debates about the future of American 
Muslims in the context of developments in the Muslim world, I highlight alternative 
imaginations for indigenization of Islam in the United States. 
Unlike Bilal, Robert is convinced America provides a good foundation for being Muslim 
and he thinks foreign policy concerns are actually a sound basis to reach out to a diverse 
set of actors. As a restaurant and bakery chef he led a stressful life. “That’s when I got 
into human rights to get my mind off of work. Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Palestine, all 
kinds of human rights issues. I was drawn emotionally to the suffering of people in these 
situations.” He later attended a CAIR function and got interests in Islam. That is when he 
looked up online for mosques and found MCA’s Introduction to Islam classes. He 
converted to Islam within two weeks of his first class. A frequent volunteer at Ta’leef and 
ICNA Bay Area’s charity, Humanitarian Hands, Robert puts his understanding of umma 
in the context of the tenuous balance between foreign policy concerns and local efforts: 
“the umma exists in the bigger picture; and really here we are blessed to have all these 
Muslims, all this cultural spread here. Foreign policy upsets me of course, but I am trying 
to not be defeatist. We have to be realistic, I mean we don’t have a Muslim government 
and you can’t expect the same thing...Actually in a country like this, there are enough 
people who are critical of the foreign policy. And not only religious people, right, people 
who care about justice and human rights. I don’t know for example people like Michael 
Moore. Look there are all these things here, Helping Hands, MCA…go help with them, 
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donate to Palestine but also be realistic.”  
Our interview took place in June 2013 and this was a period when Syria was a hot-button 
issue; before ISIS and Al Qaida branches dominated the headlines in the fight against the 
Assad regime. As I mentioned in Chapter III global qiyams for Syria were being held in 
several American communities and Imam Zaid Shakir had urged the participants of the 
late night qiyam at MCA to be intelligent and work toward constructively building 
solidarity with powerless people.
358
 “Foreign policies of super-powers, including our own 
government,” added Imam Zaid, “creates these problems.” He urged people to not think 
that they could fly off to Syria and fight there. Robert shared the sentiment. “You can’t 
hop on a plane and go there and get killed. I mean mashaallah to those who do, but all I 
see as a solution is educating people; and really taking one sided people and educate 
them. And some will go into local politics and achieve change.” 
The third-generation Chinese-American Zaytuna student Kevin urges a similarly local, 
activist inclination, “one needs to think globally and act locally.” He thinks Imam Zaid 
and Sherman Jackson calls for local activism and that captures what needs to be done: 
“Sherman Jackson, Imam Zaid, Dr. Umar want to build a political and activism oriented 
Islam…But some immigrants are just about ‘back home..’ Dr. Jackson says, ‘if you don’t 
do it here [invest resources to build community] then you are de-capacitating yourself..’  
“You have to fight oil industry and consumer culture.” As I have highlighted before 
Imam Taalib Mehdi of Masjid Al Qur’an has been a strong proponent of communal unity 
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although he mentions that immigrant Muslims usually tokenize African American 
Muslims. He uses umma in multiple contexts, but most commonly to refer to the 
immediate community in Dorchester or in Boston. During the Eid al Adha celebrations at 
Reggie Lewis Athletic Center organized with ISBCC and Islamic Society of Boston in 
Cambridge, Imam Taalib announced that two names would receive appreciation awards 
for their “contributions to our umma in Boston.”  On foreign policy concerns he says this: 
As a citizen here I have primary concerns with the country where I live. 
So my real concern is domestic policy and how to bring tawhid to the 
society… Look foreign policy is important but we have gone through 
slavery here. We don’t like what is projected in terms of foreign policy but 
also we are not consumed by it. So Imam W.D. wanted us to first know 
our creator. What is your relationship with your creator? How you are 
growing to make your identity and citizenship a value and make a positive 
contribution. It can get toxic if some people are hang up on these foreign 
policy issues. As an umma there are so many things we have to do among 
us alone. But focusing on them [foreign policy] issues, they are not 
unimportant…but it can be time-consuming. Prophet said take care of one-
another. How do we move forward? How do we get together to solve 
issues? 
Imam Taalib’s questions find multiple responses in the field. He posed these questions in 
early 2015 but the previous two years witnessed several important disputes that took the 
American Muslim landscape by a storm pertinent to his questions. Were American 
Muslims too domesticated to dissent to their government? Were they silent not only on 
the constant breach of their civil rights by the Obama Administration but also on White 
House’s foreign policy? These questions were highlighted when in 2013 and 2014 calls 
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for boycott of White House’s annual Ramadan iftar — the fast breaking dinner for 
Muslims during the month of Ramadan — created a wide-spread debate in the American 
Muslim publics. Below I examine the 2013 and 2014 White House Iftar debates and 
Tariq Ramadan’s 2014 boycott of ISNA and RIS conventions and the reactions to these 
calls. These episodes highlight not only different preferences about political engagement 
but also illuminates how developments in the Muslim transnational scene reverberate in 
the United States and inform the heated debates on American Muslims’ relationship with 
the transnational umma. 
 
Scholars of the Umma Disagree:  Three Debates on the Future of Islam in America 
 
The 2013 and 2014 White House Iftar Debates 
On July 25, 2013 Dr. Omid Safi, a prominent professor of Islamic studies then at 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill penned a blog post that sparked a heated 
debate among leading voices in the American Muslim community
359
. Writing on the day 
of the State Department iftar, and only days ahead of the upcoming White House iftar Dr. 
Safi urged dozens of invitees like himself to engage in a “principled boycott” of the 
Secretary Kerry and President Obama’s invitation. The reactions to the post juxtapose the 
intersecting political, sociological and theological debates that are prevalent among 
American Muslims and perceptions of the US among Muslims abroad. The post received 
various responses on social media under the hashtag #whitehouseiftar. Some agreed with 
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Safi’s reasoning: that White House was engaging in extra judicial killings by way of 
drone attacks in Muslim countries, that the Administration was hesitant to take necessary 
steps to transfer detainees out of Guantanamo prison, and that discriminatory policies 
around ethno-religious profiling and surveillance didn’t receive the Administration’s 
attention. Cross-cutting oft-used binary categories of conservative vs. moderate vs. 
progressive – Safi is a prominent advocate and researcher on “progressive Islam”– the 
civically-engaged vs. isolationists and indigenous vs. immigrant, the responses illustrate 
diverse interpretations of what an American Muslim identity would entail. Among those 
who disagreed and attended the White House iftar, many argued that they accepted Safi’s 




During my dissertation fieldwork, I came across an interesting set of discursive practices 
on how “White House boycott” issue was discussed. Some argued that it was unfortunate 
to see little indication of the indigenousness of American Muslims in President Obama’s 
address
361
 to the guests, that he treated American Muslims as “another over-achieving 
immigrant community.” A prominent leader of Council on American Islamic Relations 
(CAIR) in Los Angeles argued that dissent has to be normalized among American 
Muslims and shouldn’t be taken as a negative indicator of civic engagement. Ani 
Zonneveld of Muslims for Progressive Values on the other hand valued her presence at 
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the White House iftar and was happy to have the ear of Susan Rice, President Obama’s 
National Security Adviser. “I told her ISNA and others are not the only Muslims they 
should pay attention to. She showed interest in our progressive stance.” A CAIR official 
in San Francisco Bay Area argued it was “the real American thing to do” to boycott the 
iftars and eventually posted on Instagram a modified menu from the dinner that included 
items such as “Drone Strike Stew” and “Guantanamo Bay Soufflé.” A leading Muslim 
civil rights activist criticized the White House for only announcing the names of the 
invitees from foreign missions. At Zaytuna, a prominent public intellectual and educator 
mocked those insisting to attend the event in order to “take a seat on the table:” 
“Congrats, you are the menu.”  
Next year, the same hash tag was still relevant in the run up to White House’s Ramadan 
iftar. The fall out from the previous year was further elevated in the summer of 2014 as 
Israel had started a new air assault on Gaza. Furthermore the Arab Spring had seen 
developments, most prominently in Egypt where the post-revolution government was 
overthrown, that had drawn American Muslim communities’ attention to their 
government’s reaction to the Middle East.  Before the July 14th iftar a collation of 
American Muslim intellectuals, clergy an community organizers circulated a petition 
calling for the boycott of the iftar.
362
 The reasons were similar to the year before, with the 
added concern about ongoing Israeli attacks against Gaza. Keith Ellison, the Muslim 
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congressman from Minnesota, released a statement saying that he “certainly shared the 
group’s concerns” but disagreed with their tactic:  “It will not close Guantanamo Bay, 
guarantee a cease-fire between Israel and Palestine or undo the [National Security 
Agency] NSA’s targeting of Muslims.”363 Ellison argued that historically successful 
boycott leaders did not have the opportunity to engage directly with the White House and 
his arguments were picked up by Bay Area leaders such as Maha Elgenaidi of ING to 
support engagement over boycott. But moral opposition to engagement was also high. On 
the day of the iftar, American Muslim writer Mariam Abu-Ali wrote an article on 
Huffington Post and explained how his brother, an American citizen, was detained in 
Saudi Arabia on the request of American government and was subsequently sentenced to 
life in prison. Abu-Ali held that her brother was tortured in Saudi Arabia and that 
testimony was the only evidence America’s post 9/11 security infrastructure could 
produce against her brother.
364
 Once again online debates were often vitriolic. Those who 
chose to attend were accused of being “#housemuslims” in reference to the “field negro 
vs. house negro” differentiation. The symbolic references to African American struggle 
would frequently come up in the days and months to follow; especially in the context of 
erecting a dual opposition between engagement and boycott. But the iftar also went 
anything but uneventful. To further exacerbate the debate, Israeli Ambassador Ron 
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Dermer was invited to the iftar and in his remarks to the invitees Obama said the 
humanitarian situation in Gaza was heart-breaking but argued that Israel had the right to 
defend itself.
365
 When Dermer tweeted about Obama’s remarks366, in one American 
Muslim journalist’s words, “the Muslim internets went crazy.”  
Obama’s speech and Dermer’s tweet put the participants who chose to attend the iftar and 
defy calls for boycott in a difficult position. They had to bear the accusation that White 
House iftar was merely a ceremonial event where real engagement and discussion could 
not take place. Amani al-Khatathbeh, founder of online Muslim women’s magazine 
muslimgirl.net, argued that: 
“As an American citizen, I believe in government engagement. I value its 
potential and recognize its importance. I look forward to my government 
being more inclusive of me, representing me, and recognizing me as one 
of its own instead of a potential token for a co-opted political opportunity. 
I want to have a seat at the table — one where we can actually have a 
meaningful discussion about the real issues at hand. Not one where dinner 
is served.”367 
The Los Angeles based Muslim Public Affairs Council’s President Salam Al-Marayati 
was among those who advocated that opting out of White House iftar was not a sensible 
path for American Muslims. As a policy-advocacy organization MPAC had long 
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advocated that American Muslims should be engaged with local and federal government 
despite concerns with problematic local and foreign policy agendas pursued by 
government agencies. Actually MPAC had invested a lot in building relationships with 
White House and had announced that they would attend the White House event.
368
 Al-
Marayati was an advocate of attending the iftar even when his wife, Dr. Laila Al-
Marayati had declined invitations from both Secretary Kerry and President Obama to 
attend the State Department and White House iftars. As a Palestinian-American she had 
taken part in the organization of first White house iftar hosted by President Clinton in 
1996 but she could not make peace with the idea of attending an iftar at the White House 
when her family in Gaza was being bombed and her non-profit KinderUSA was forced to 
stop its operations. She wrote to Obama that White House iftar was not a substantive 
forum where real engagement could take place and she could not justify tacitly endorsing 
Washington’s realities under the circumstances.369 MPAC also released a statement 
underlining their disappointment with Obama’s speech. They found it unacceptable that 
Obama would use the iftar to throw his unconditional support for Israel’s assault on Gaza 
especially when civilian casualties were mounting: “MPAC is calling for more 
substantive policy discussions with the administration concerning Gaza, surveillance and 
other issues impacting the American Muslim community.”370 Later in the month Salam 
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Al-Marayati wrote an op-ed on CNN and called on Obama to not shy away from 
engaging with American Muslims and to take practical steps to stop Israeli attacks 
against Gaza.
371
 Several attendees to the iftar, especially Palestinian-Americans, wrote 
articles online, explaining their disappointment with the turn of events. One of these was 
Tarik Takkesh, a Palestinian American who represented Access California, an Orange 
County based organizations serving new immigrants to the United States. A graduate of 
Orange Crescent Islamic School at Islamic Society of Orange County, Tarik had attended 
the iftar wearing a Palestinian scarf and was shocked not only by the Israeli ambassador 
being there but also by Obama’s speech. Tarik wrote that the iftar was not the 
engagement forum that he had envisioned.
372
 These engagements with alternative visions 
for American Muslims’ engagement with their local government point out that American 
Muslims’ citizenship discourses frequently fall back on diaspora politics and events in the 
larger umma. Even when scholars such as Imam Suhaib Webb point out that American 
Muslims do not have the luxury to be defined by what is going on in the Muslim majority 
world, the fall outs from these contexts directly intersect with American Muslims’ 
imaginations about national belonging given American governments’ involvement in 
crises zones in the Muslim world from Palestine to Burma and Syria to Yemen. After all, 
even proponents of a different mode of political activism that is more inward-looking 
such as Imam Suhaib had come out in the wake of White House iftar to criticize 
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President Obama. On July 15
th
, Webb wrote on his Facebook account this criticism: “The 
President's remarks in support of the continued aggression against Palestinians at last 
night's iftar were a shame and disrespectful. Time and time again, Obama shows he lacks 
the backbone needed to make ethical decisions.”373 For its part, ISNA’s leadership had 
participated in the White House iftar and drawn criticism for their silence about Obama’s 
comment. ISNA released a statement next week emphasizing that Imam Muhammad 
Magid, then ISNA’s President, had spoken to Vice President Biden at an interfaith iftar 
about the conflict. In the statement, ISNA urged American Muslims to engage their 
elected officials and bring their concerns to the attention of lawmakers.
374
 In 2015 the 
White House iftar was again a symbolic discursive space for divisions across inclusion 
and exclusion, representation and the right mode of engagement with local law 
enforcement engagement. Zaytuna graduate Faatimah Amatullah Knight sat next to 
President Obama along with Samantha Elauf, who won a Supreme Court case against 
Abercrombie & Fitch, which denied her a job because she wore a headscarf. Knight later 
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Tariq Ramadan’s Boycott of ISNA and RIS Conventions 
 
The month following the White House iftar another boycott dominated American Muslim 
terrain. This time the call came not from a network of activists and community leaders 
but from an individual, the famed Swiss-Egyptian Muslim intellectual and scholar Tariq 
Ramadan. On August 9, 2014 Tariq Ramadan announced that he had decided to withdraw 
from ISNA’s 2014 Convention to be held in Detroit in August and from RIS convention 
in Toronto scheduled for December 2014. A strong proponent and ideologue of the 
indigenization of Western Muslims in their societies, Tariq Ramadan had become a 
constant figure in North American speaking circuits in the second half of 2000s. Only in 
the last two years Ramadan’s sessions at ISNA, ICNA and MAS conventions drew 
thousands of people. Furthermore, in 2012 he was hosted by a number of mosques and 




 to give talks and introduce his 
ideas around his book Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation
378
 where he 
advocated a reintroduction of intellect-based ijtihad to navigate complex moral, ethical, 
and political questions surrounding Muslim communities in Western democracies. In 
2014 he had travelled to Los Angeles to talk at Islamic Shura Council of Southern 
California’s annual conference and in a fundraiser at Orange Crescent School. Dr. 
Muzammil Siddiqi, a former president of ISNA and current Chairman of the ISNA’s Fiqh 
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Council of North America, had spent two years in Geneva as a researcher at Said 
Ramadan’s Islamic Institute of Geneva when Tariq Ramadan was a little kid in the 1970s. 
Ramadan had studied Qur’an with Dr. Siddiqi before the Lucknow-educated Siddiqi who 
came to Geneva from Islamic University of Madina traveled to England to earn his 
master’s degree and later ended up at Harvard for his doctorate. 
 Furthermore, Ramadan had become one of the strongest intellectual names in the West 
to advocate for a healthy integration of Western Muslims in their countries. Of course, 
Ramadan continued to draw accusations for his family ties. His father, Said Ramadan 
was the son-in-law of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hasan el-Benna and Tariq Ramadan 
was even denied a visa to the United States when he was offered a professorship at 
University of Notre Dame due to his alleged support for Hamas.
379
 In other words, 
Ramadan’s political views and scholarship had tied in strongly with a number of 
intellectual and scholarly networks in the American Muslim landscape and his lectures 
were as much critical of foreign policies of Western governments as well as the 
isolationist tendencies of Muslim immigrant populations in the West. 
This is why, when Ramadan wrote a post on social meia and his website entitled, “Why I 
will not Attend ISNA (August 2014) and RIS (December 204) Conventions,”380 the 
American Muslim landscape saw yet another round of public posturing about how 
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American Muslims should approach their own government. In explaining his decision to 
withdraw from ISNA convention, Dr. Ramadan argued that ISNA had become too 
accommodating and was portraying a cowardly stance against White House, thereby 
sending the wrong message to American Muslims. He argued that ISNA’s leadership, in 
a quest for integration, turned a blind eye on American government’s problematic 
domestic policies with regard to surveillance of Muslims by the FBI and intimidation 
tactics used against religious and racial minorities. “However, the ISNA leadership is too 
often silent, as if paralyzed by fear,” wrote Ramadan who was critical of ISNA leadership 
for its stances on foreign policy. “It fares no better with respect to American foreign 
policy. Its silence over American support for the outlaw and inhuman policies of Israel 
cannot be justified, even less so after attending an iftar organized by the White House 
during which President Obama defended Israel while the Israeli ambassador tweeted his 
delight!” Ramadan’s criticisms toward ISNA implied that ISNA’s “silence” toward 
American government’s policies fared negatively for the future of American Muslim 
citizenship: 
“We cannot be forever silent: what kind of active and responsible 
citizenship does the ISNA leadership offer young American Muslims? 
What kind of example? That of silent, fearful sycophants–or of free, 
public-spirited citizens who, while defending the values of human dignity 
and justice, serve their country in the most sincere and critical way? That 
of the unconditional loyalty of the timorous, or the critical loyalty of free 




Before examining Ramadan’s critique toward RIS, it will be helpful to examine the 
reactions to his decision to boycott the ISNA’s 51st Annual Convention in Detroit. ISNA 
had decided to move its annual convention to Detroit in 2014 following a three year 
campaign led by a 30-year old medical student who had witnessed the breakdown of 
Detroit’s socio-economic landscape following the 2008 crisis. In 2009 he envisioned to 
bring the annual ISNA convention to Detroit in order to help the city get back on its feet. 
Upwards of 15 thousand Muslims who attend ISNA conventions each year would help 
the city economically, it would also mean a symbolic gesture on the part of American 
Muslims who would contribute the healing of Detroit. ISNA officials were skeptical of 
the plan- hosting a convention as big as ISNA required collaborations with city officials, 
required a safe environment, a sizeable convention center to host tens of parallel sessions 
all at once and more importantly mandated a strong local organizing and volunteer effort. 
Mohiuddin did not give up. In the next two years he convinced two competing local 
umbrella organizations to merge, which provided for the local organizing effort and 
spearheaded a lobbying campaign with ISNA officials.
381
 The sizeable Shi’a population 
in Detroit was also appealing for ISNA, which had become concerned with the fall-out of 
sectarianism from the Middle East to West Asia. I met Mohiuddin briefly in Los Angeles 
in 2014, a year after ISNA officially decided to move its convention to Detroit. 
Mohiuddin had established relationships with local officials who were convinced hosting 
ISNA would help Detroit, new hotels were opened in the city and the major convention 
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center had undergone a major renovation. A graduate of University of Southern 
California’s American Muslim Civic Leadership Institute (AMCLI), Mohiuddin was in 
Los Angeles to attend an alumni meeting of the AMCLI. He had overseen the evolution 
of the project and was excited at the prospects of ISNA convention in Detroit, especially 
highlighting the theme for the convention: “Generations Rise: Elevating American 
Muslim Culture.” According to Mohiuddin, ISNA was slowly becoming more 




 generation Muslims to 
define the narratives of the Convention, which was becoming more relevant for the 
younger generations.
382
 ISNA was also investing a lot in the Convention. The 
organization had recently hired an American Muslim lawyer as its new new executive 
director and popular American Muslim imams and public figures were heavily 
advertising about the convention on social media.  
Against this background, the criticisms toward ISNA during the White House iftar debate 
and Tariq Ramadan’s announcement had significantly reduced the excitement. Following 
Tariq Ramadan’s announcement Mohiuddin wrote on social media that Ramadan was 
unaware of the limited capacity of ISNA to address domestic and foreign policy 
concerns. In the heated and often vitriolic debates on social media some accused 
Ramadan for trying to be overly righteous and trying to affect American Muslim scene 
from abroad through a parochial “political Islamist” paradigm. Others took issue with 
Tariq Ramadan’s method of “public shaming and critique;” these internal disagreements 
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could have been addressed through private communication and Ramadan had failed to 
offer any practical route forward
383
. Dr. Sherman Jackson also weighed in on the debate 
with an appeal to Tariq Ramadan to reconsider his decision. Jackson, a past President of 
ISNA, did not reveal whether he agreed with Ramadan’s criticisms but argued that there 
was some truth to Tariq Ramadan’s position at least regarding ISNA’s selective political 
positions:  
“…The challenges we face as an Ummah today are simply staggering. 
And even when the matter is clear from a moral standpoint, the road to 
practical decision-making is often cluttered and befogged by so many 
legitimate competing considerations and interests…I agree that ISNA 
cannot have its cake and eat it too: it cannot publicly condemn this 
kidnapping in Nigeria
384
 or that beheading in Iraq and then turn around 
and imply that it is not a political organization when it comes to 
condemning the political wrongs of America, domestically or 
internationally.” 
On the other hand, Jackson wrote that, “But, for better or worse, ISNA is our flagship 
Muslim organization in America; and it serves concerns and interests far beyond the 
purely political…” He thought that Ramadan had sparked a meaningful debate but that it 
would be in the best interests of American Muslims who attend ISNA if he came to the 
convention and directly engaged these issues. Emphasizing that he did not write at the 
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behest or in coordination with ISNA leadership, Jackson noted that he was willing to 
initiate an internal communication between the two sides. ISNA’s official response came 
two days after Ramadan’s post. Imam Muhammad Magid, a nationally recognized 
religious leader and President of ISNA, addressed the debate about ISNA’s model of 
engagement in the context of Ramadan’s criticisms in a “Letter to the American Muslim 
Community.”385 Magid argued that Prophet Muhammad’s life story encouraged Muslims 
to engage their adversaries and take part in forums where views against their own are 
voiced. He was disturbed that public debates often confused unity with uniformity and 
American Muslim leaders often found themselves attacked on the hand by Islamophobes 
and on the other by their own communities. Magid proposed that unity was encouraged 
both by the Qur’an and by the American Constitution whereas uniformity was 
detrimental to advancing American Muslims’ interests. Providing examples where ISNA 
takes part in engagement of government and interfaith community to address a host of 
local policy issues alongside transnational contexts such as Gaza, Syria and Iraq, he 
argued that ISNA was choosing to engage with elected officials to address American 
Muslim’s concerns. Imam Magid also addressed a problem that he identified with 
American and European Muslim communities: he argued that there was a gap between 
how Western Muslims “preached endlessly” about the problems with their governments 
and how little they did in engaging their local officials to voice their unhappiness with 
these policies. He also said: 
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“My Brothers and Sisters, let me be open with you, I often find many 
Muslim communities are more concerned about international issues than 
American domestic issues. We have to connect the international issues of 
concern to the country in which we live so that our fellow Americans can 
see the impact of these international issues on America itself… We cannot 
choose to isolate ourselves; we cannot choose to be silent.  Wherever we 
live in the world, those are the places we call home, the places where our 
children are raised and the places where they will raise their own families. 
Yet I have met many people, even in the US, who follow the political 
situations of their countries of origin, but are oblivious to the politics of 
the country in which they live and work.  Individuals have great concerns 
for the situations “back home” but are not investing themselves in the 
greater community here at home where they are physically present and 
where their children are educated.” 
Imam Marc Manley wrote that making American foreign policy the yardstick to judge the 
effectiveness of ISNA’s leadership was indicative of a larger problem, “emotional 
hostage taking” and he argued that: 
“…I personally find those clamoring for changes in foreign policy (as 
detestable as it is) whilst silent on domestic injustices indicative of a 
broader malady, one which highlights why the Muslim community still 
struggles to find a niche in the American narrative: by and large, we’re not 
concerned with what America does at home, only what it does abroad. Nor 
can foreign-policy be the preferred or prestiged conduit by which 
American Muslims formulate (or attempt to formulate) communal unity… 
With the current levels of injustice in the world, American Muslims need 
not feel they must pick which continent to root for. We can have solidarity 
with our brothers and sisters no matter where they are, though local issues 
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should take priority as they are the ones we are most likely to have the 
ability to affect change in.”386 
In an interview with The Muslim Monthly, Tariq Ramadan had responded to his critics 
online a day before Muhammad Magid and Marc Manley wrote their responses and 
Sherman Jackson’s appeal was published on social media. Noting that his boycott of 
ISNA convention was not absolute and could change in the coming years, he argued that 
his absence would be “the most powerful speech he ever gave at ISNA.” He had also 
countered Magid and Manley’s criticisms that noted that American Muslims could not – 
and should not – be primarily engaged with foreign policy matters: “I do not deal with 
‘international affairs’ only; half of my work has been on Western Muslims. My point is 
straightforward: anyone who tries to separate or divorce domestic politics from 
international politics does not get it, and that might be dangerous for the future of 
Western Muslims.”387 In the following days several American Muslim leaders and 
activists weighed in on the debate. Many, including Imam Suhaib Webb, noted that they 
shared Ramadan’s concerns and criticisms but, noting the concerns raised by Sherman 
Jackson, they would attend the ISNA convention. Similarly, a number of my 
interlocutors, including Zahra Billoo and Dr. Hatem Bazian, who were strong supporters 
of White house iftar boycott in 2013 and 2014 chose to participate at ISNA where they 
spoke in multiple panels. Some of these names would later tell me that ISNA leaders 
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were creating a false dichotomy between local and transnational engagement. They found 
ISNA lacking in embracing African American Muslims or domestic political campaigns 
such as Black Lives Matter, but all the while presenting those who work on these issues 
as isolated individuals when they also asked for stronger positions on American foreign 
policy.  
During the Labor Day weekend a few weeks after the newly renovated Cobo Center in 
Downtown Detroit was hosting thousands of Muslims. I shared my shuttle ride from the 
airport to the Convention Center with three Muslims who had flown in from Houston. 
The program was busy and the Opening Session started with Muslim boy scouts reading 
the Pledge of Allegiance, to be repeated by the thousands of attendees following the 
session in the gigantic ballroom. The keynote speaker of the Convention was former 
President Jimmy Carter who had formed an interfaith relationship with Imam 
Muhammad Magid. The opening session was headlined by a diverse set of speakers, 
including Michigan Governor Rick Snyder. Snyder highlighted the importance of ISNA 
coming to Detroit in an effort to help the city recover from its problems. On the other 
hand, when Snyder emphasized that he was an advocate for peaceful co-existence in 
Palestine as well as a strong supporter of Israel. Critics of ISNA took to online platforms 
to say that the leadership in the room was silent again, as they were during the White 
House iftar. Others mentioned that although Snyder’s remarks were yet another “slap on 
the face of the entire communities” ISNA or MPAC should not be thrown under the bus 
as the only responsible parties because politicians felt that such insults did not carry any 





 Still, reflecting the fallout from the White House iftar and 
Ramadan’s criticisms ISNA released a strong statement on the last day of the Convention 
urging American Muslims to call Snyder’s office and express their unhappiness.389 The 
session continued, however, with a diverse set of speakers: Bishop Elizabeth Eaton of 
Evangelical Lutheran Church told the audience that the Convention Program and its 
theme about next generations spoke to the conversations within her own congregation as 
well and that she would point to her critics from her own church to the reading of pledge 
of allegiance and the singing of the national anthem; “these were the best answers to 
those who accuse you of being un-American.”390 Adam Shakoor, the first Muslim Judge 
in American history who served the 36
th
 District Court, told the audience that they had 
come a long way and they should not hide who they are. Rasheda Talib, a State 
representative for Michigan chronicled how she ran a campaign in a non-Muslim, non 
Arab district on a diverse platform overcoming concerns that she could not overcome 
anti-Muslim prejudice. Syed Mohiuddin thanked the over 350 volunteers who had been 
working for months for the program and congratulated everyone who wanted to take part 
in the revitalization of Detroit. The Program Committee Chair, Princeton University 
Muslim Chaplain Imam Sohaib Sultan highlighted that they strived to create a diverse 
program with an inclusive set of speakers to reflect especially the women and young 
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leaders who would speak to the convention’s Generations Rise theme along six tracks: 
Healthy Culture, Effective Engagement, Social Trends, Education, Masjid Development 
and Healing Divides. However, and Healing Divides.   
As I discuss in the next chapter, however, these themes and several sessions in Detroit 
highlighted an important point about Islam in America and its relationship to 
developments in the global umma: Negotiations about American Muslim identity is 
multifaceted and multiple individuals and organizations interact with a complex and 
diverse discursive terrain of American Muslim landscape that is often influenced by 
internal as well as external contexts. For example, in a session entitled Fiqh of Culture 
that headlines leading American and Canadian Muslim scholars – Dr. Jamal Badawi who 
is an expert on Shari’ah, Dr. Abdulla Idris-Ali, a Sudanese Canadian leader, Imam Tahir 
Anwar of Zaytuna College and the then Imam of the prominent Shi’a mosque in Detroit, 
Islamic Center of America Sayyed Hasan Al-Qazwini – who later had to leave Islamic 
Center of America following an intra-Shi’a Lebanese-Iraqi struggle for the control of the 
Center’s board following a protracted internally divisive process391 – some of these 
problems and the difficulty of “Healing Divides” that are informed by sectarian conflicts 
in the Muslim majority world were illustrated. Dr. Badawi spoke about why fiqh should 
not be construed as a list of “do’s and do not’s”, how maqasid and ‘urf are integral parts 
of envisioning an American Muslim culture. Imam Tahir similarly talked about maqasid 
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as overall guidelines that could help American Muslims navigate complex choices and 
how in an effort to reject “American culture,” some Muslims were simultaneously 
embracing parts of their Indo-Pakistani or Arab culture that may not be Islamic. Syed 
Hasan al-Qazwini started his remarks with citing a hadith of Prophet Muhammad that 
says that “disagreements among my umma is a blessing”392 and argued that there was 
great room for diversity in Islam. This was the reason why different madhahib and sects 
developed in Islam said Qazwini, “Allah could have created all of us in one color, as one 
nation.” But his speech was interrupted when a group of about 25 people, mostly young 
walked out of the room, passing in line formation by the platform where speakers were 
seated. While the group was non-verbal in their protest it was anticipated that a protest 
would take place. These were mostly Syrian-Americans who were protesting Qazwini for 
his “tacit endorsement of Assad regime’s brutality in Syria.” Qazwini mentioned that the 
protest did not bother him. In the question and answer section, a questioner accused him 
of his support and the Iraqi-American cleric mentioned that he had always and equally 
condemned atrocities of both the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition.  
Arab Spring, Sunni Religious Authorities in the Middle East and American Muslim 
Networks 
 
In his post Ramadan argued that RIS convention was apolitical in nature but the presence 
of certain speakers who justified the brutality of repressive Arab regimes pointed out to 
                                                          
392
 The hadith in question  is one of the most popular and yet many hadith scholars and 
commentaries questioned its authenticity. Some debated whether the disagreements or ikhtilaf 
referred to matters of jurisprudence or matters of belief. Also see Muhammad Khalid Massoud, 
“Ikhtilaf al-Fuqaha: Diversity in Fiqh as a Social Construction,” in Zainah Anwar (ed.), Wanted: 




an agenda that sought to validate problematic and political stances of these speakers. 
Ramadan said that he could not justify being on the same program with these names 
because it would mean a tacit approval of their stances. Ramadan did not mention names 
in his post but he was clearly pointing out to Habib-Ali Al-Jifri, the Yemeni Ba’Alawi 
scholar who had been a constant figure at RIS conventions, as well as at Amr Khalid, the 
popular Egyptian preacher/televangelist who had supported the coup against the 
democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt. 
Although Shi’a-Sunni divide informs much of the divisions across the ulama of Islam, 
Sunni authority figures also frequently found themselves on opposing ends of political 
developments during the Arab Spring. Especially in Syria and Egypt competing 
interpretive reasonings with regards to questions of fitna, divisiveness and disrupting 
public order, and the relationship with political authority became pronounced as Sunni 
religious authorities opted for alternative positions. These differences were also in display 
throughout the American Muslim landscape at the communal and scholarly level. 
Although Arab Spring was met with enthusiasm across the board, not only the fate of 
ruling elites but also policies adopted by new ruling governments became hot-button 
issues in American mosques and community centers. During my fieldwork in American 
mosques I frequently came across Egyptian-Americans disagreeing about Muslim 
Brotherhood’s role in the post-Mubarak Egypt and the turbulent trajectory of Arab Spring 
only highlighted these questions. In Syria, although a majority was squarely in the anti-
Assad camp following the regime’s brutality against civilian protestors, sectarian 
divisions as well as concerns with long-term instability were reflected in the debates. A 
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number of American Muslim scholars reflected on their relationship with leading 
religious figures in Egypt and Syria among others and the power rivalry between regional 
actors influenced American Muslim debates.
393394
  
The Egyptian-American expert on Islamic law Khaled Abou El Fadl for example wrote a 
sketching critique of Ali Gomaa, the former mufti of Egypt, and Shaykh Ahmad al-
Tayyeb, the shaykh and rector of Al Azhar University, in the prologue to his latest book 
published in 2014. Both Gomaa and Tayyeb had assisted him with his research during his 
time in Egypt, but Abou El Fadl disagreed with their support to the military regime that 
toppled and replaced Mohammed Morsi and subsequently killed civilian protestors in 
Egypt: “I only wish that this expression of true and heartfelt gratitude were not burdened, 
weighed down, and drowning in so much Egyptian blood.”395 At ISBCC, Imam Suhaib 
Webb was also critical of his former teacher, Ali Gomaa with whom he had worked at 
Dar Al-Ifta at al-Azhar. He frequently referred to Gomaa’s rulings during his tenure at 
the ISBCC but in 2013 he would emphasize that he considered Morsi as the legitimate 
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President of Egypt and not shy away from criticizing “shameless” positions adopted by 
his former teacher. A number of Muslim scholars across the world were also shocked by 
the stances of some of the traditional ulama in Syria.  
One of these scholars, Shaykh Said Ramadan al-Bouti, a renowned scholar of 
jurisprudence, had refused to throw his support behind the protestors, arguing that armed 
rebellion and protests would only worsen the situation in the country and instill discord 
and instability. Although Bouti was near-universally embraced for his erudite scholarship 
and may who disagreed with his position accepted that he was essentially subscribing to a 
traditional Sunni perspective about the unlawfulness of opposing political authority for 
fear of civilian strife
396
, the Syrian crises had evolved in such a way that not only activist 
Islamists but also traditional Sufi scholars of Syria such as Shaykh Mohammad Al-
Yaqoobi were standing against the Assad regime
397
 as calls for the ouster of the regime 
was also high on the agenda of Syrian American community that tried to eschew the 
sectarian politics of the country in bringing Christian, Muslim and Alawite American 
Syrians together to lobby the Obama Administration. In March 21, 2013 Bouti was killed 
in a suicide attack that targeted Al Amin mosque in Damascus where he was giving a 
lecture on Islamic law.
398
 The attack was not immediately claimed by any group but 
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Yaqoobi, who has been a participant at Zaytuna’s annual rihlas for many years and most 
recently gave a talk at Zaytuna about his book refuting ISIS’s claims to Islam, argued that 
Al-Bouti had responded positively to his criticisms toward him and was getting ready to 
denounce Assad regime. He argued that he was possibly assassinated by the Assad 
regime.
399
 Shaykh Muhammad al-Ninowy, another Sufi leader who have a considerable 
following in the United States and frequently travels in the Bay Area to give lectures, 
argued that the neo-Kharijite extremist were responsible for assassinating al-Bouti: 
“Nothing will stop intellectual terrorists from carrying out terrorism, not the Book, nor 
the Sunnah, nor any sound logic, or any human value for that. The Ummah needs to go 
back to the Qur’an and Sunnah and their unconditional compassion, tolerance, and 
freedom. Fighting for freedom does not mean in anyway killing those who peacefully 
speak their view and understanding of the Book and Sunnah.”400 In a Facebook post that 
received over 200 comments in two days ranging from despising Al-Bouti to giving voice 
to alleged role of Assad regime in his killing, the American born scholar and dean of Al 
Maghrib Institute Dr. Yasir Qadhi said: “As Allah is my witness, I was disgusted at his 
pro-Assad stances, I disagreed with his theology, I didn't like his attitudes towards 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Damascus Bombing,” March 21, 2013. Available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/21/sheikh-mohammad-said-ramadan-al-buti-
killed_n_2925898.html?utm_hp_ref=world [last accessed November 23, 2015.]   
399
 “Shaykh Said Ramadan al Bouti Passes Away,” March 21, 2013 available at 
https://seekerofthesacredknowledge.wordpress.com/2013/03/21/shaykh-said-ramadan-al-bouti-
passes-away/ [last accessed November 23, 2015 ]. Also see, http://www.sacredknowledge.co.uk/. 
Yaqoubi’s claim was rejected by Al-Bouti’s daughter, see Basma Atassi, “Daughter of Syria’s 
slain cleric speaks out,” AlJazeera.com, March 24, 2013 available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/2013/03/201332414592444794.html [last accessed November 






Orthodox Sunnis, yet I say that murdering him and other Muslims in this despicable 
manner (suicide bomber inside of a masjid!!) is a major sin that is unacceptable in our 
pure religion.”401 Zaytuna College faculty Abdullah bin Hamid Ali also wrote a reflection 
on Al-Bouti, “one of the contemporary giants of Islamic tradition,” highlighting how 
many American scholars like himself had studied his books during their education 
overseas, holding scholars like Al-Bouti in high-esteem. It was unfortunate, Ali argued, 
that these scholars would suddenly be painted as “traitors.” Preceding his comments 
about the level of debate about questions of authority, authoritarianism and scholarly 
position in lands that were defined by strife, Ali argued that he was actually unwilling to 
enter into a debate for several reasons: 
“The details of the circumstances surrounding his death are still 
forthcoming. I find it hard to resist the temptation to write about him–not 
only because I have benefited from reading most of his books (at least 
those I know of)—but also because I have tried my best to refrain from 
commenting about things happening in the Muslim world, since it seems 
that it’s hard to have a dispassionate conversation with anyone whose 
heart is closely intertwined with what is happening there, especially over 
the past 2 years. Having a dispassionate conversation would necessitate 
trying to exercise some degree of objectivity, even though I don’t believe 
true objectivity really exists. The other reason I gave up speaking about 
international affairs happening in the Muslim world is also because I feel 
that the only way that Muslims living in the “West” will be able to truly 
chart a course towards social and political empowerment is focusing more 
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of their attention on what’s happening here and now as opposed to 
allowing what’s happening over there dictate to us what we need to 
prioritize in our lives here.”402 
Like Imam Taalib Mahdi, Bin Ali was advocating that American Muslims should not be 
over-consumed with “what’s happening over there.” These demarcations between “here” 
and “there” however, did not seem possible in an age of instant global communication. 
Transnational developments in the “umma” continued to influence American Muslim 
landscape. In June 2014, Bin Ali was commenting on yet another debate that surrounded 
American Muslim intellectual and pedagogical networks: “This is a time of great fitna in 
the Muslim world. And how could it not be when you have so many scholars we all once 
considered to be the guides of the Umma at one another's throats.” 
In December 2012 Francesca had traveled with her roommate, another convert to Islam, 
to Toronto to attend RIS and she had found Habib Ali al-Jifri’s talk was one of the most 
inspiring lectures in the Convention. She would possibly disagree with Habib Ali about 
developments in the Middle East. Nearly one year after the assassination of Al-Bouti, on 
June 8, 2014 Abdel Fettah al-Sisi, the leader of Egyptian military coup that toppled the 
Muslim Brotherhood, was sworn-in as the new President of Egypt. On the next day, the 
Yemeni Ba’Alawi leader Habib Ali Al-Jifri posted on his Facebook account a prayer for 
the new ruler of Egypt. He was praying for the unification of the country and for the 
                                                          
402
 Shaykh Abdullah Ali, “Once Upon a Time People Were Proud of Being Rational,” Lamppost 
Education Initiative, March 22, 2013. Available at http://www.lamppostproductions.com/once-
upon-a-time-people-were-proud-of-being-rational-shaykh-abdullah-ali/ [last accessed November 
20, 2015.]   
293 
 
guidance and tawfiq (success) of Sisi.
403
 The New Orleans native Shaykh Omar 
Suleiman, who had become a national star in the wake of Katrina Hurricane when he 
organized local Muslims in Louisiana to help the victims
404
, was among the first to 
protest Habib Ali. Suleiman wrote that he would not take part in any programs with those 
names who supported “tyrants” who had killed hundreds of protestors: “I dont care if you 




" of the Prophet (peace be upon him), or 
the head of an Islamic institution. This is deeper than school of thought or methodology, 
this is about the systematic murder of innocent people. I seek refuge in Allah from the 
wolves in scholars clothing.”407 That same day, Imam Suhaib Webb was equally angry:  
“When I see scholars praying for oppressors and aiding them against the 
people, I feel a tremendous sickness and anger. Some of my former 
teachers have taken positions that are not only cowardly, but soil the pure 
knowledge they claim to uphold. No matter how many ijaazas, your 
family lineage, your clothes or mystic claims, if you can't stand with the 
masses, if you can't oppose the killing of civilians; the spreading of 
corruption, then, by Allah those things will be a witness against you. By 
Allah help the Umma and protect it from those who seek to harm it, 
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Suhaib Webb’s language was addressed clearly at Habib Ali, as much as at Ali Gomaa. 
Gomaa, an Azhari ulama, and Habib Ali, one of the leading names in the Tarimi 
Ba’Alawi networks, had both taken stances against Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, 
arguing that the group was politicizing religion.
409
 Webb’s post received over 300 
comments over a span of a few days. Yasir Qadhi, congratulated Webb for his courage. 
Zareena Grewal, a scholar on Islam, pushed back against those who accused Webb of 
publicly shaming another scholar and argued that Habib Ali had voiced his “shameful” 
position online and Webb was not violating proper adab with his criticism. Some voiced 
that Webb had previously clashed with Sufis accusing them of violating basics of 
tasawwuf and yet others pointed out to accusations about Webb. Sanad Collective, an 
Islamic Center in Canada affiliated with Ba’Alawi networks, argued that Habiba Ali was 
not justifying Sisi, his du’a had many nuances and urged for commentators to not spread 
false claims about Webb. Webb returned their comments with a similarly conciliatory 
one: “Sanad Collective, I'm trying to travel at the moment, but I want to thank you for 
your grace and balance in this discussion. We may differ, but we are still a fraternity and 
one community. My love for the truth and you has not changed, but grown. God bless 
you. I would cautious making this a sufi non sufi thing. Al-Humdulilalh, Sufism is alive 
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and well - there are many great scholars who uphold its true principles. We differ. We 
disagree. But we cannot let this rip us apart.” 
And yet, the divisions and dilemmas would continue to affect American Muslim publics 
and soon enough Habib Ali would offer a justification for his stance. Some of my 
contacts on the field argued that Habib Ali was actually caught up and had become a tool 
in the very geopolitics of the region and its effects on Muslim ulama. Concerned that the 
wave of popular protests was too threatening, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) were pushing against Muslim Brotherhood whereas Qatar was standing behind the 
Islamist wave. Thereby, the petro and gas-dollars from Emirates and Saudi Arabia were 
influencing Habib Ali whose Tabah Foundation is based in United Arab Emirates. 
Similar accusations were directed against Tariq Ramadan and Yusuf al-Qaradawi; their 
critics found them influenced by Qatari positions. Actually the rift between UAE and 
Qatar was so deep that in November 2014 the UAE shocked not only many American 
Muslims but also Obama Administration when it declared two prominent American 
Muslim organizations, CAIR and MAS, which have been engaged with the White House 
in multiple platforms terrorist organizations.
410
 The list included terrorist organizations 
such as Al-Qaida, Islamic State, and Al Shabab but UAE was actually waging its own 
war against Muslim Brotherhood and individuals that it thought was connected to the 
party. Qaradawi’s Qatar based International Union of Muslim Scholars was on the list 
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and CAIR and MAS were perceived to be included because of their alleged links to 
Qaradawi.
411
 Both CAIR and MAS denied
412





released press statements rejecting the UAE’s decision. CAIR and MAS leaders also met 
with the State Department about UAE’s designation and State Department announced 
that they do not consider the organizations to be terrorist organizations and were seeking 
explanation from the UAE authorities.
415
 
For my purposes here, the criticisms against Habib Ali are important not least because his 
ties to Ta’leef Collective. Both co-founders of Ta’eef Collective, Usama Canon and 
Mustafa Davis, count Habib Ali among their teachers and criticisms against him carry 
implications for the global Ba’Alawi networks. Habib Ali is a leading student of Habib 
Omar bin Hafidh, the leader of Ba’Alawi Sufis with strong ties in the convert and born 
scholar communities of United States, England, Canada and Australia in the West as well 
as in Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. Especially in the case of Mustafa Davis, Habib 
Ali was instrumental in pushing him to re-embrace his artistic roots while he was a 
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student at Dar Al-Mustafa in Tarim. He would travel to Abu Dhabi with Habib Ali to 
work at his Tabah Foundation and Habib Ali would finance his film studies in New York 
and Los Angeles. The Ta’leef Collective movie “Deen Tight”416 which chronicles 
Muslim hip hop artists and examines how jurisprudential stances about music and culture 
intersect with convert-musicians lives in the American Muslim landscape. Several 
graduates and close students of Habib Omar and Habib Ali had in the meantime moved 
back to the United States, establishing institutions similar to Ta’leef though many of them 
with less of a popular and national outreach or diversity of programs. Shaykh Abdulkarim 
Yahya, an African American Berkeley native and a convert to Islam, who had spent many 
years at Dar al Mustafa and had served as the translator for Habib Umar in his 
international travels had relocated to Detroit area and established Beacon Foundation. 
Shaykh Yahya Rhodus had established Al Maqasid, a spiritual and community 
engagement foundation, in rural Pennsylvania. In addition to Ta’leef the introduction of 
these scholars in the national speaking circuit at ISNA conventions and weekend 
seminars across the mosques and universities over the past years had increased the profile 
of Tarimi indigenous scholars, as well as their teachers. Habib Ali released a video 
message on YouTube
417
 explaining why he made the du’a. He was not condoning Sisi’s 
actions and his regime, he was merely asking God to give him guidance; tawfeeq did not 
mean control and dominance. Moreover, he argued, leaders could err but complete 
rejection was also problematic: “However complete rejection in the way that I heard 
some say “Down with the next president”. Then what do you want? Do you want to build 
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the country? Or do you want to tear down the country?”418 Later in June Habib Ali 
published a redacted explanation on his English Facebook account and Mustafa Davis 
shared his explanation on his own social media accounts. Habib Ali was mentioning that 
he had also made a du’a for Morsi when he was elected President. The statement said that 
Habib Ali’s involvement in politics was limited to offering religious guidance and his 
criticisms toward Morsi were due to his use of religion for political purposes. “Habib Ali 
does not participate in the political process in any way, shape or form and does not 
comment on government policy. This has been the method of his teachers for centuries 
and continues until today.”419 Habib Ali did not attend RIS in 2014 and 2015. But his 
students were in the ISNA convention that year in ISNA. I would observe some of the 
fiercest critics of Habib Ali’s du’a to warmly embrace his students, engage in debate and 
share the same platforms. In his response to Tariq Ramadan, Imam Zaid Shakir, the 
activist co-founder of Zaytuna, argued that Ramadan’s criticisms were shared by others 
and RIS had started to improve its organization to be more inclusive. He argued, 
however, that RIS was a successful organization, focusing on spirituality and its work 
had to be supported.
420
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The debates reviewed in this chapter illustrate the shifting and non-monolithic discursive 
landscape about questions of belonging among a diverse set of discursive agents. 
American Muslim leaders and organizations simultaneously react to and discursively 
engage withdevelopments in the Muslim world at the same time as they negotiate the 
relationship between American Muslims and the global umma. As we have seen, the idea 
that American Muslims should focus on local context and political developments seem to 
inform perspectives about cultivating a specifically American Muslim outlook. And yet, 
these localized issues are also frequent sites of disagreement rather than accord. 
Moreover, transnational developments continue to inform the American political 
landscape, especially in the context of post 9/11 securitization of Muslim communities. 
Below, I excavate alternative visions about law enforcement engagement to highlight 
competing visions for the future of American Muslim identity and citizenship in the 
context of discourses in my research sites about American religious pluralism. Informed 
by the preceding examination of the disputes about White House iftars and questions of 
dissent, boycott, and engagement, this section also brings in data from my research in Los 
Angeles.   
300 
 
CHAPTER 5- POST 9/11 REALITIES AND DEBATING ENGAGEMENT 




One of the most delicate questions for liberal democracies is to strike the right balance 
between freedoms and security. In a world where asymmetric, hybrid security threats are 
more pervasive than ever, the question of security poses significant dilemmas. If citizens’ 
rights are violated by steps taken to presumably protect them, states transform themselves 
into security threats, rather than providers of security. As any agency serving a multi-
faith, multi cultural, multi race, multilingual citizenry law enforcement agencies had to 
develop sensibilities and policies to be aware of these differences that define the modern 
multicultural society.  Historically, all ethnic and religious minorities have specifically 
addressed potential bias that the law enforcement agencies hold against them in the 
process of their co-imbrication to Americanness. Today, law enforcement agencies 
interact with Catholic and Muslim communities in a number of various venues that 
require enhanced channels of communication and cooperation. These include airports 
where TSA officers interact with a Catholic Bishop who is travelling from Africa to the 
United States and has a problem with his immigration papers or Muslims travelling for 
annual pilgrimage to Makkah and have to wear special attire. At nation’s prisons Catholic 
and Muslim inmates’ demands for religious accommodation require cooperation of prison 
administrators
421
 to provide religious services, literature and specific diets. Vandalism 
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against houses of worship and hate crimes call for the immediate attention of law 
enforcement agencies.
422
 In their rallies and big events religious communities rely on law 
enforcement agencies. In other words Catholic and Muslim Americans and their 
citizenship practices include engagement with law enforcement agencies. As a matter of 
fact in Boston, Bay Area and Los Angeles law enforcement agencies have become 
integral actors in interfaith events, civic meetings and the wider landscape of ethno-
religious and moral diversity. In the post-Watts riots period Police and Sheriff’s 
Departments in Los Angeles created community liaison groups to overcome the tense 
weather of suspicion around law enforcement agencies. These efforts were enhanced in 
the wake of Rodney King riots to reflect the increasing diversity of Los Angeles and 
Asian and Pacific Islanders, Hispanics, LGBT individuals, Sikh community and Muslims 
among others were included in outreach efforts.
423
 At the micro level community policing 
also put security agencies in close contact with an increasingly diverse population, 
although most local police forces continue to be under-stuffed and under-budget to 
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adequately implement proper community policing protocols.
424
 Against this background, 
any observer quickly recognizes that law enforcement officials have become key factors 
in the wider civic landscape of my three research sites. In Los Angeles, interfaith leaders 
come together with Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and Los Angeles County 
Sheriff’s Department (LASD) to declare their opposition to religious extremism, LAPD 
and LASD officers take part in interfaith panels, organize periodic meetings with Muslim 
community,
425
 attend Ramadan dinners, and are given awards at events. In Boston, the 
Police Department and Muslim communities cooperate on a number of initiatives, the 
Police Superintendent joins a swearing ceremony for a newly promoted Muslim Captain 
at the city’s largest mosque426, and community leaders are briefed by the Police following 
major events that involve Muslims.
427
 Bay Area Muslims invite police officers to their 
communities and conduct community awareness programs. These partnerships point out 
to an increased sense of awareness on the part of both Muslim community and law 
enforcement agencies that Islam and American Muslims have come to occupy a special 
place in the religiously diverse landscape of America. 
On the other hand, Muslim community’s relationship with the law enforcement agencies 
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is much more intense and problematic than not only the Catholic community but any 
other religious minority. The fact that the post 9/11 moment in the United States has 
significantly altered American Muslims’ lives is reflected frequently in my research sites. 
Additionally, alternative paths followed by Muslim organizations and civic leaders in 
their relationship with law enforcement agencies has created deep schisms among 
American Muslims, both at the national and local level. For example in Los Angeles, the 
largest Iranian-American religious and cultural center, Iranian Muslim Association of 
North America (IMAN), pulled out of Islamic Shura Council of Southern California in 
2014 in part because they viewed the leadership of the organization to be too hostile 
against the LAPD and LASD. Today a major component of American Muslims’ 
conversations about civic engagement is centered on the very question of what constitutes 
the proper mode of engagement with local and federal agencies. There is little 
disagreement among a wide spectrum of American Muslim stakeholders about the fact 
that the new terrain of suspicion, Islamophobia and national security talk following 9/11 
has created crucial problems for America’s Muslim citizens. Despite pronouncements to 
the contrary from the highest echelons of American government in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11, law enforcement agencies scrambled to make sure they could prevent 
another disaster and armed with laws such as the Patriot Act and under pressure from 
their supervisors they indiscriminately targeted Muslim organizations, charities
428
 and 
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 Exacerbated by the growth of an Islamophobia industry that is active not only 
in anti-Sharia discourses but a range of othering practices directed at Muslim-
Americans,
430
 the ramifications of ongoing surveillance culture and reliance on 
informants from the early 2000s continue to be an important source of rift between 
Muslim communities and law enforcement agencies. For many American Muslims, 
barriers to social citizenship, if not legal citizenship, come as a direct consequence of 
their adversarial relationship with local or federal law enforcement agencies and –
unfortunately – breach of their civil rights in the name of national security. America’s 
foreign policy toward the Muslim majority world adds yet another layer of difficulty in 
the already stereotyped images
431
 of American Muslims and in turn negatively influences 
American Muslims’ perception of American pluralism. A number of transnational events 
in the last decade also contribute to this dual phenomenon of rejection and being rejected. 
Several international and national developments shaped this process. Madrid and London 
bombings of 2004 and 2005 highlighted an anxiety with alienated Muslim youth and 
Boston Marathon bombing in 2013 helped carry the fear of “homegrown Islamic 
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432,” to the center of American debates. The “Muhammad cartoons” in Denmark 
and the anti-Muslim video released in 2011 sparked debates about Islam’s position on 
freedom of speech and apostasy – only to be highlighted after the attack against Charlie 
Hebdo in France in early January 2015 – and a number of high-profile attacks by Muslim 
extremist groups in Kenya, Somalia and Nigeria brought Islam into the limelight of 
American public debates about integration, alienation, an radicalization. The rise of ISIS 
and affiliated groups in the Middle East and Africa only exacerbated the already negative 
perceptions of Islam in the public sphere and put Muslim communities world over in a 
defensive posture.  As some academics and commentators debated intensely, could ISIS, 
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world over, lay a justified claim to Islam?
435
 Additionally about a dozen American 
Muslims from different backgrounds – converts, second generation Muslims, and recent 
immigrants – were arrested on charges of plotting to carry out attacks in America or 
providing material support to extremist Muslim organizations abroad.
436
 These 
developments brought to the fore a number of questions such as whether Muslim 
minorities living in the West were susceptible to the appeal of a dogmatized and violent 
interpretation of Islam and whether the problem of integration lied with adherents of a 
religion that is incompatible with secular democracies or with failed integration 
strategies? 
In response to these questions, American Muslim organizations have been emphasizing 
that reporting suspicious activities and threats is not only a civic duty, but also a religious 
obligation.
437
 In numerous declarations that seek to underline that Muslims should not 
allow their religion to be defined by isolated yet vocal extremist interpretations, the 
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dogmatic and violent readings are refuted by reference to Qur’anic interpretations that 
point out to Muslim’s obligations to adhere to laws of their country of residence.438 In 
addition to youth programs they run in mosque communities that are catered to dispel 
notions of alienation and difference, American Muslim leaders joined other faith leaders 
to condemn attacks against houses of worship in the United States and abroad
439
, they co-
organized press conferences with LAPD and LASD that condemns transnational events 
that involve Muslim extremists, such as those who attacked a mall in Kenya
440
 and joined 
forces with civic leaders to speak against the tension between Muslims and Coptic 
Christians in the Middle East following the release of hateful “innocence of Muslims” 
movie.
441
 Throughout these events, American Muslim leaders emphasize time and again 
their opposition to terrorism, extremist interpretations and acts of violence against 
members of other faith traditions while also underlining their commitment to a 
multicultural and multireligious America and to the nation’s security. But Muslims face 
the question, ‘where are the Muslim leaders condemning these attacks?’ in their daily 
lives, in interfaith gatherings and in the media on a constant basis.  
As Muslim community leaders emphasize time and again, however, there has been a 
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positive side to these problems and pains. As I have highlighted previously, in the post 
9/11 period, the Muslim community has witnessed a rise in the interfaith dialogue efforts, 
in civic and political participation, and in the desire to build broad societal coalitions. All 
of this resulted in a collective response that was more actively interested in representing 
Islam as an organic part of American religious pluralism. My respondents emphasize that 
for all the problems generated by the increased scrutiny from intelligence agencies 
towards mosques, umbrella associations, and charities across the nation, the post 9/11 era 
also triggered the professionalization of the organizations, fostered pro-active rather than 
reactive initiatives, increased internal discipline and wider support from the Muslim 
population—that is to say Muslim associations gained their institutional depth and 
strengthened their foundations in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. These Muslim 
associations, with very different motives, moved towards a more active management of 
relations with federal institutions, the media, local administrations, and members of other 
faith traditions.  
Nonetheless, these moral claims to and representations of an American Muslim identity 
have been met with suspicion from a broad range of actors. Islam’s populist protagonists 
frequently questioned American Muslims’ “loyalty”442 and others argued that Muslim 
Americans were susceptible to radicalization — that “moderate Muslims” were an 
exception to the rule. Mahmoud Mamdani’s conceptual construct, “good Muslim/bad 
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Muslim”443 helps explain the abundance of public views about Islam in the post 9/11 era. 
It also sheds light on how some government and policy circles view Muslims. But at the 
same time the complex nature of American Muslim leaders’ engagement with law 
enforcement agencies requires a more nuanced analysis, exactly because Mamdani’s 
otherwise helpful framework strips the agency of American Muslims and renders them 
captives to a prisoner’s dilemma. As I capture below, post 9/11 period generated a 
discursive battle among Muslim organizations about what constitutes the proper form of 
engagement with law enforcement agencies. This debate is shaped in a real context on the 
ground that involves a wide repertoire of discursive and practical layers that are often 
defined by simultaneous processes of cooperation and contestation. I argue below that 
these new sites of cooperation and contest in regards to religious minorities’ interaction 
with security agencies point out to a remarkable maturation of American Muslims’ 
agency and their crucial role as visible reminders of a pluralistic imagination of America. 
At the same time, and in line with the debates in Chapter 4, these debates also point out 
that the contours of political debates and corresponding paradigms for American Muslim 
identity and outlook take shape in an often chaotic framework rather than through a 
religiously mandated one. 
But some crucial questions linger: Are the country’s law enforcement agencies treating 
American Muslims as a suspect community despite American Muslims’ increased civic 
and political engagement and assertion of an American Muslim identity in the national 
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 Can law enforcement agencies define what constitutes 
“mainstream” Islam?   If so, is this a function of the combined effect of the post- 9/11 
national security culture of America on the one hand and the anxieties created by 
continuous waves of extremist Muslim organizations in the Muslim-majority world and 
their potential appeal among American Muslim communities on the other hand? Has 
America allowed its “religiously rooted sense of nationalism”445 to forsake its Muslim 
citizens in the war on terror? And if so, what would this imply for the future of religious 
pluralism in the United States? Would law enforcement agencies adopt problematic 
policing and counterterrorism tactics developed in European contexts?  
Law Enforcement Agencies as Actors of Civic Engagement 
 
To answer these questions requires a closer look at some of the dynamics that have 
influenced Muslim publics in my research sites. Although some of these dynamics are 
multifaceted and require specific reports, it will be helpful to examine them in relation to 
alternative citizenship imaginaries and practices. Through three snapshots from my 
fieldwork, I examine the development of LASD’s Muslim American Homeland Congress 
and the Young Muslim American Leadership Council (YoungMALAC) programs – both 
conceived by the Muslim Community Affairs Unit (MCAU) at LASD – along with 
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LAPD’s Muslim Mapping Project,446 which was discarded in 2007 after strong backlash 
from Muslim community and civil rights organizations. I present debates around these 
programs with a specific focus on alternative citizenship discourses that illustrate the 
process of cooperation and conflict between American Muslims and their government at 
the local, state, and federal level. Next, I examine the White House’s CVE initiative and 
its impact on Muslim American communities with a focus on appropriation of diverse 
political and discursive stances on “othering” of Muslim Americans and their ownership 
of American citizenship discourses.   
On November 9, 2013, an event with a polished title was held at California State 
University in Long Beach: “Leading By Example: A Conference to Empower the Future 
Muslim Leaders of America.” The event included speeches by Jihad Turk, the President 
of Bayan Claremont and Ali Saleh, a second generation Lebanese American City 
Councilman from Bell, a 93% Hispanic city who had elected a Muslim over many 
Hispanic candidates. Jihad Turk was born in the United States to a mixed faith couple, 
and had decided to study Islam in Madina. Upon completion of his studies at the Islamic 
University of Madina, Turk had returned back to the United States, enrolled in a PhD 
program in Islamic Studies at UCLA, and had come to serve as an imam and religious 
director at the prominent Islamic Center of Southern California before he was approached 
by Claremont school of Theology to head a graduate program that would educate future 
Muslim American religious and civic leaders. Saleh, who was active in the Al Hussain 






Youth Center in Bell, had faced backslash during his first run for the city council in 2009 
from local groups because he was Muslim. In 2010 he had emerged as the face of popular 
civic mobilization against a corruption scandal in Bell
447
 and received overwhelming 
support from the Latino community over 60 other Latino candidates to become the first 
Muslim in the city council the next year. Other speakers included an executive who 
worked at the tech-giant Oracle who told the audience that corporate America did not 
care about a person’s faith. The female panelist was a Muslim volunteer chaplain at 
Southern California prisons who attends the prominent Islamic Institute of Orange 
County and urged the audience to not be caught in the struggles of “back-home”: “If I am 
here and I am thinking on what’s happening in the Middle East, I am losing a lot. In 
chapter 36, Verse 12 of the Qur’an Allah tells us we will be held accountable for what we 
did…You will make a change here, not there...Prophet emphasized this when he moved 
to Madina.” All speakers underlined the importance of interfaith alliances and urged the 
largely young audience to be civically engaged and invest in understanding other walks 
of life.  
The messages that were delivered in this event were not necessarily exceptional in the 
American Muslim landscape. The distinctive aspect of this event, however, was that its 
sponsors included local and federal law enforcement agencies. The program was 
sponsored by Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and the CIA at the federal level 
and by LASD and LAPD at the local level along with Bayan Claremont and Access 
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 But some Southern California Muslims were fiercely against the 
federal sponsors. CAIR-LA’s Executive Director Husam Ayloush wrote this on social 
media:  
“Why are the CIA & FBI part of a Muslim youth conf? I haven't seen 
them sponsor Jewish or Catholic youth events. At a time when the CIA is 
found guilty of committing torture, kidnapping, and murder on foreign soil 
and when the FBI is guilty of hiring criminals to act as agent provocateurs 
to entrap Muslim youth and new converts, I find it distasteful and 
objectionable that they will be given access to our youth. Am I the only 
one who sees a problem with that?”449 
Later, Aylosuh told me that he pushes against CIA and FBI sponsored Muslim youth 
events but strongly advocates for engagement with local law enforcement agencies. For 
him, such events will signal to the youth that “they are different than other youth with 
different faith backgrounds and it is ok for federal agencies to sponsor Muslim events.” 
According to him, CIA and FBI sponsorship of Muslim events carried the risk to hamper 
the future self perceptions of young American Muslims.
450
  
But the event was specifically catered to the very youth that Ayloush was concerned 
would feel less American than their Sikh, Catholic, Jewish and Protestant peers. The 
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main organizer was LASD’s Muslim Community Affairs Unit (MCAU), which had 
formed an organization, Young Muslim American Leadership Advisory Council 
(YoungMALAC), with the aim of fostering better relations with young Muslim 
Americans. Actually the then head of LASD, Sheriff Leeroy “Lee” Baca, and LAPD’s 
Deputy Chief Mike Downing headlined the event and gave brief opening speeches after 
the prayers offered by LASD and LAPD’s Chaplain Officer Qazi Asad. Overseeing the 
whole event was Sergeant Mike Abdeen, a 19-year veteran of LASD and the head of its 
MCAU.  Abdeen’s story is reflective of how law enforcement agencies have been 
struggling with America’s Muslim citizens and immigrants since 9/11.   
A Palestinian-born naturalized citizen, Abdeen joined the LASD in 1996. Following 9/11 
when all law enforcement agencies were scouting for Arabic-speaking agents, he joined 
the local counter-terrorism task force. In time, he would become the LASD’s main face in 
the Muslim community. He would travel across the world to give presentations on 
MCAU’s outreach model. Abdeen acknowledges that it took him and his team a while to 
win over the Muslim community – he vocally criticizes some of the leading Muslim 
leaders in Southern California for being uncooperative, for being too hostile towards law 
enforcement agencies, and blames some communities for “staying behind their closed 
doors and then complaining when their neighbors do not know them.”451 Self-identifying 
as a secular Muslim, Abdeen argues that “secular Muslims are more integrated to 
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America, those who are more religious are busy with events overseas and tend to become 
too political and isolationist.” Inside the LASD, Abdeen had it difficult too. He argues 
that before MCAU was formed, training materials about Islam for new recruits was “full 
of stereotypical material,” 452 and he helped develop a new curriculum that allowed for 
better cultural training. 
Abdeen credits Sheriff Baca for creating MCAU. Baca had seen the need to develop 
better relations with Muslim community and had realized early on that the culture of 
surveillance and spying was alienating the Muslim community. In the aftermath of 9/11 
federal and local law enforcement agencies relied on informants that could direct them to 
extremists in Muslim communities. As the use of these informants especially by the 
FBI
453
 had become more widespread and community outreach efforts were sometimes 
utilized toward intelligence gathering, the mistrust between Muslim communities and law 
enforcement agencies grew wider. In 2006, a year after July 7 London bombings that 
targeted the underground system, Baca created Muslim American Homeland Congress 
(MAHC) with the participation of leading Southern California Muslim organizations to 
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develop a forum of conversation between LASD and the Muslim community.
454
 Despite 
Muslim community’s tense relationship with the LASD because of its unwillingness to 
provide religious accommodation for Muslim inmates in correctional facilities under 
LASD’s jurisdiction, Baca – a nominal Catholic who would later come under fire for a 
series of scandals in the Department – had built a rapport with the Muslim community 
and actually had become a strong voice in support of American Muslim communities 
during the notorious radicalization hearings organized by Representative Peter King in 
March 2011. The hearings became a politicized platform for a number of anti-Muslim 
voices who argued that there was a primordial link between Islam and violence. Baca 
argued in front of the Committee, with examples from his Department’s outreach 
activities, that wholesale accusation against American Muslim community would 
exacerbate their feeling of being singled out and only further alienate an otherwise 
civically engaged, peaceful community.
455
  
The year after Sheriff Baca announced MAHC, LAPD announced a major program that, 
according to its chief architect Deputy Chief Mike Downing, would make sure LAPD 
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would be able to identify Muslim communities who were particularly at risk of being 
radicalized. Downing argued before a Senate Committee in 2007 that engagement with 
Muslim communities helped to elevate “moderate Muslim voices,” and “..In preserving 
good will and buy in by Muslim communities, law enforcement is, in fact, advancing its 
intelligence agenda by fostering an environment that maximizes tips and leads surfacing 
from those same communities. The long-term solution to this radicalization problem will 
come from Muslim communities themselves.”456 In the same Senate Hearing, Downing 
presented a solution: LAPD would collaborate with local academics and would “map the 
Muslim community” to identify its geographic distribution and those communities that 
“may be susceptible to violent ideologically-based extremism and then use a full-
spectrum approach guided by an intelligence-led strategy.” When Downing’s plan was 
picked up by the local media, Muslim and civil rights groups raised their voices against 
the plan. CAIR argued LAPD was conflating Los Angeles’ Muslim community with 
isolated Muslim enclaves in some European countries and was furthering the notion that 
Muslim Americans were treated through the prism of national security. Downing’s close 
ally MPAC’s founder Dr. Maher Hathout argued he had more in common with his 
Christian neighbors in the LA suburb Arcadia than with some of his Muslim neighbors.
457
 
The backlash from Muslim community and civil rights organizations against the initiative 
was so harsh that LAPD’s then Chief William Bratton quickly shelved the program that 
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 within a span of two weeks following a meeting with Muslim 
community leaders.
459
 In a press release Bratton emphasized that the project would only 
work if the Muslim community participated in it and that LAPD had heard their 
reservations clearly.
460
 When Bratton was tapped by New York Mayor Bill de Blasio for 
the position of Police Commissioner in 2013, some Muslim activists voiced their 
concerns because of Bratton’s initial defense of the Muslim mapping project. After all, 
Blasio was looking for someone who could undo the blistering damage of NYPD’s 
monitoring and surveillance of Muslim businesses and student organizations along the 
Eastern Coast.
461
 For Muslims NYPD’s program was a clear indication of law 
enforcement’s approach to Muslim Americans; guilt by association and religious 
discrimination. Government monitoring of religious and racial groups have left a 
considerable mark in American history, but it had been limited mostly to “cultish” 
religious groups and while it was controversial, it was also widely perceived to be 
acceptable
462
 by the public. In testament to mainstreaming of Islam in America when it 
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was revealed that a number of prominent figures in the national Muslim community were 
subject to surveillance by the federal government from 2002 to 2008, the news prompted 
calls by interfaith and civil rights leaders to call on Obama administration to put an end to 
discriminatory surveillance of American Muslims.
463
 
Coalition Building and Civil Rights Discourse 
 
These processes also point out to new sites of cooperation that connects a wider spectrum 
of faith and non-faith communities. The post 9/11 anti-Muslim bias against American 
Muslims and their opposition to law enforcement discrimination have allowed Muslim 
communities to establish new partnerships on the ground not only with interfaith 
coalitions
464
 but also with communities of color, ethnic minorities and at times sexual 
minorities. In Los Angeles and New York Muslim activist formed bonds with community 
organizations that sought to dispel stop and frisk policies, racial discrimination, and 
targeting of minorities. In Boston, interfaith leaders came to the aid of Black Lives Matter 
activists who were charged with jail time following a protest they organized,
465
 in Los 
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Angeles Muslim organizations and leaders found one-another on different sides of the 
movement to “stop LAPD Spying,”466 and in Oakland Muslim scholars and activists 
partnered with marginalized communities to protest a new surveillance center arguing 




These confrontations with law enforcement agencies also generate a new discourse that 
emerges frequently in American Muslim leaders’ discourses. Civil rights activists and 
political advocacy groups argue that the dual process of cooperation and confrontation 
with law enforcement agencies serve to enculturate the largely immigrant American 
Muslims into American citizenship discourse. These public voices argue that immigrant 
Muslims come from contexts where law enforcement is widely perceived as an 
authoritarian force that largely enjoys impunity even when they are acting against 
established laws. By asserting their rights and seeking venues of cooperation with law 
enforcement agencies, American Muslims – both U.S. born and immigrants – would 
come to appreciate their constitutional rights. “The patriotic thing to do when FBI knocks 
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on your door” argues CAIR-Bay Area’s Zahra Billoo, “is to tell them you will get back to 
them with your lawyer present. You do not invite them in for chai.” This is why civil 
rights and policy advocacy groups, despite their partnership with federal and local police 
forces on the ground, continue to express their anxiety with the post 9/11 pattern of 
engagement whereby Muslim outreach was placed under the authority of special 
operation bureaus in local and federal law enforcement agencies – which continue to be 
the model followed in my three research sites. LAPD’s chief officer responsible for 
relations with Muslim community, Deputy Chief Mike Downing, is based not at 
Community Relations Bureau but runs the Department’s Counter-Terrorism and Special 
Operations Bureau
468
 and although law enforcement agencies are aware of the barriers 
this builds, a number of national and transnational developments exacerbated problems 
with both federal and local mechanisms of engagement with Muslim community. White 
House’s response to potential appeal of ISIS in American Muslim community, the CVE 
initiative, seems poised to entrench this practice. And lately, as I will show below, the 
American state’s involvement in the management of multiple interpretations of Islam in 
light of perceived and real security threats has become increasingly more controversial. 
Under the rubric of a loosely defined Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) campaign, 
the White House seeks to address militant manifestations of Islam and prevent its spread 
among American Muslims. With varying degrees, most American Muslims see a problem 
in this approach, some choose to work with the White House and pursue formal 
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engagement with law enforcement, others emphasize faulty presumptions that guide the 
initiative and draw attention to securitization of Muslim identity as a result of CVE 
programs. 
While organizations such as MPAC and CAIR’s leaders are careful to keep their 
disagreements on policy preferences and tactics civil and frequently cooperate on the 
field or share platforms in each other’s initiatives, their differences are important to 
highlight. These organizations’ alternative historical trajectories and competing outlooks 
cannot be captured in a simple dichotomy, where one is labeled more American than 
another, or one as preferring civic engagement whereas the other promoting 
disengagement. Neither are their disagreements rooted in their competing readings of 
Islam. Indeed, they both draw on similar interpretive frameworks when they invoke 
Qur’an and Islamic history – the amount of overlap in their employment of notions of 
maslaha, maqasid, and jihad is striking. In an interesting fashion, if CAIR represents an 
American Muslim “encounter with American civil liberties discourse,”469 MPAC 
represents an American Muslim encounter with American tradition of political advocacy. 
Despite these parallels, the divergent preferences and vocabularies employed by CAIR 
and MPAC became clearly portrayed in their alternative views on law enforcement 
engagement both at the local level, and especially when White House’s CVE program 
was launched. Below, I focus on this debate to showcase how citizenship imaginations 
can be influenced by divergent understandings of citizenship. In addition I highlight how 
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divergent discourses can be utilized in search of full citizenship, beyond formal 
citizenship, especially when the fall-out from international developments influence local 
contexts. 
Heightened Tensions: CVE and State Involvement in Management of Religion 
 
The CVE initiative seems to verify one scholar’s observation that post 9/11 era and 
transnational developments create a particular reality for American Muslims’ 
performative place in America’s pluralistic society; that they inherit “pluralism under 
special circumstances.”470 Muslims in my research sites increasingly recognize that while 
part of the country and the political elite grant them a public role and legitimacy, there 
are others who have found ample public space to delegitimize and securitize Muslim 
Americans and although the  Federal government has invested a lot in optics when it 
comes to engaging with American Muslims, they point out to FBI’s continuous 
surveillance of mosques and use of informants to argue that meaningful engagement with 
Muslim Americans has not found adequate attention on the part of the Federal 
government. Ever since the US Attorney’s office designated Los Angeles471 as one of the 
three pilot cities
472
 – along with Boston473 and Minneapolis474 – where authorities are 
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starting to engage Muslim communities to counter violent extremism (CVE) in light of 
ISIS’s perceived reach among Western Muslims, these perceptions and dynamics have 
become  all the more crucial. On the one hand the rationale for the selection of these three 
cities was the already advanced relationship law enforcement agencies have with Muslim 
community.  The CVE Summit in Washington
475





 commentary, public posturing, and a heated debate on the potential 
implications of a CVE-specific engagement with Muslim communities. Even though the 
White House has refused charges of singling out and securitizing Muslim communities
478
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and President Obama gave a reassuring speech
479
 at the Summit, many observers
480
, 
including some who were part of the meetings
481
, point out that the political scene may 
soon change, rendering these programs potentially problematic in the long-run especially 
if elected officials leave engagement with Muslim community to the hands of law-
enforcement agencies. What is potentially harmful in the long run is that although Los 
Angeles, Minneapolis and Boston’s District Attorneys were careful to not present their 
CVE approach as specifically targeting Muslim populations and referenced concerns 
about the program in their reports
482
, the division among the Muslim community between 
those who are supporters of these initiatives and dissenters have become toxic and 
harmful. The dissenters have correctly pointed out that the White House approach was 
modeled after failed initiatives that were applied in Britain, which suffered from a 
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number of faulty assumptions about Muslim identity formation.
483
 Also, these programs 
carried the risk to make state-led promotion of theological interpretations, thereby 
violating the First Amendment.
484
 Significantly, in Los Angeles, the involvement of key 
actors of the city’s Muslim institutions in the CVE debate created a deep schism in the 
community. When MPAC presented its Safe Spaces Initiative,
485
 a program that seeks to 
empower mosque communities to prevent radicalization, for a vote of endorsement to the 
Council, all members of the Council voted against the Program.
486
 MPAC, one of the key 
members of the Council despite their disagreements, did not take part in the vote. When 
key MPAC officers were accused by other Southern California Muslims associated with 
CAIR for their complicity in government programs and for seeking professional 
opportunism, MPAC leadership accused these individuals for creating divisions, being 
uncivil in their disagreement, and, while dismissing their own government’s initiative, for 
attending a similar summit organized in Saudi Arabia.
487
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Furthermore, alternative visions within the African American Muslim communities also 
created potential fault-lines in the already sensitive relationship between the larger 
Muslim community and the Black Muslims who have been wary of law enforcement 
tactics in the post-Ferguson moment in the United States. While some African American 
leaders and programs are highlighted in the Los Angeles presentation to the CVE 
Summit
488
, other leaders pointed out that the CVE programs carried the potential to turn 
into the problematic law enforcement programs that targeted civil rights movement.
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The implications of the CVE debate and local disputes with law enforcement engagement 
for pluralist citizenship are critical exactly because many American Muslims see yet 
another post 9/11 moment in this debate: What brings together competing visions and 
tactics employed by Muslim activists and organizations and sensitivity to stand against 
breach of civil rights on the one hand and ensure building relationships with the 
government agencies is that actors who stand at opposing ends of these options 
emphasize a sensibility toward the future of Muslim American citizenship. Although 
some actors see more harm in allowing the federal and local government to single out 
Muslim communities because that would mean that Muslim Americans are not treated on 
equal footing with other minorities
490
, others, while admitting to potential problems, 
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argue that Muslim Americans should not feel apologetic to collaborate with government 
agencies and that a combative stance against CVE programs would only create a void that 
will be filled with anti-Muslim security experts.  These alternative sentiments not only 
about CVE but a number of related debates in the larger American Muslim ecology such 
as White House iftar boycotts and Muslim Leadership Institute (MLI) trips to Israel have 
been debated in several local and national community forums over the last two years with 
a focus on the question of how to manage different views, strategies, and preferences. 
And whether they build their arguments about complex issues such as the benefits of 
boycott or engagement – and more appropriately when to employ these strategies that are 
not mutually exclusive – with reference to Martin Luther King, Cesar Chavez, or Prophet 
Muhammad
491
, despite their heated and public disagreements multiple stakeholders at 
different ends of these debates continue to collaborate on a number of platforms and 
issues. In other words, intra-faith differences are illustrated in political, economic, and 
social issues as a testament of the complex questions that face faith communities along 
the unity vs. uniformity axis. 
For some of my subjects, the ideal of umma required being attuned to local differences, 
and not merely to civic-political strategies examined above. Yusuf, who was born and 
raised in the MCA community, served as a teacher at the Granada Islamic School where 
he was once a student. He later took on the job of youth director and an imam in a 
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community in the South Bay. “When I say umma I refer to all Muslims in the world. I 
emphasize however that being American and Muslim is not a problem. The most 
important thing for me here is to be able to deal with a multicultural umma.” His 
pedagogical approach in the classroom was shaped by this concern to represent a 
multicultural community. To exemplify this diversity he wears different dresses, suits, 
hoodies, and thobes to the classroom, “I want them to see that there is no one Muslim 
dress. Today I was wearing a thobe for example. I think the parents are also appreciating 
what I am trying to do.”   
Like Rabia at Ta’leef, several of my respondents found themselves torn between the 
religious ideal of unity and the realities that surround their communities. Rachel 
converted to Islam from Judaism. She had to endure a problematic marriage to a Middle 
Eastern student she had met in college for several years, before she was encouraged by 
Imam Suhaib Webb to step out of the marriage. Today, she has close insight into internal 
dynamics at the ISBCC as she continues to volunteer with their converts and youth 
programming. She argues that “Umma is a religious idea; you need to be closer to other 
Muslims then your blood relatives. But also there are these divisions in the community. 
Arabs hang out with one-another; Somalis with other Somalis…” At Zaytuna where a 
conversation about the relationship between immigrant and indigenous American 
Muslims receive additional attention not least because the actual presence of African 
American teachers such as Imam Zaid and Ustadh Abdullah bin Hamid Ali accentuate 
conversations about inner-city Muslims and suburban immigrant communities. 
Additionally, the intellectual impact of scholars such as Sherman Jackson can be felt in 
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the example of the student club ThirdRes, which focuses on Islam and African 
Americans. ThirdRes was named after the title of Jackson’s book Islam and The 
BlackAmerican: Looking Toward the Third Resurrection. Hasan would tell me one of his 
uncles made fun of Imam Zaid’s qiraa (recitation of Qur’an). “Can you believe it, he 
made fun of Imam Zaid. Someone with a strong desi culture will have a problem even in 
inclusive spaces like Ta’leef.” Reflecting on another division in the Muslim community, 
Zaytuna student Omar said “the relationship between ansar (community in Madina who 
received Prophet Muhammad and his community who immigrated from persecution in 
Makkah) and muhajirun (the early Meccan Muslim community who fled to Madina) 
should be the model for the relationship between the inner-city Muslims and suburban 
Muslims; but they remain so divided.” ISBCC’s Executive Director Yusufi Vali is aware 
of these issues that frequently emerge in large mosque such as the one he manages. In a 
community forum that debated problems in the mosque communities, he tried to strike a 
conciliatory tone when many participants voiced negative experiences they have had in 
the mosques. Once again, the ansar-muhajirun comparison was employed “Knowing one 
another is a Qur’anic responsibility and our differences and different stories are a 
blessing to this umma. We embrace diversity; that deep diversity in ISBCC is 
valuable…we strive to be really one umma, really like the ansar and the muhajirun.” But 
is this vision possible in the increasingly diverse American Muslim landscape? 
American Muslim leaders realize they need to engage an increasingly secular and urban 
crowd to mitigate the crises of authority that renders Islam an ideological, landlocked 
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reality for its Western contenders and Muslim militant distorters alike.
492
 On the other 
hand, because these extremist groups also compete in the religious marketplace of ideas, 
and because reputation and fame plays an important role in the appeals to counter these 
groups
493
 leading American Muslim scholars need to speak simultaneously to multiple 
groups. In their discourses, these local and transnational religious authorities as well non-
clerical community leaders frequently navigate religious concepts such as fiqh al qalliyat, 
maqasid al Shariʻah, and ‘urf. In the next two chapters chapter I first turn my attention to 
the examination discourses on (the possibility of) American Muslim identity. Bringing in 
data from my fieldwork, I present how respondents in my research sites negotiate culture 
and belonging on the one hand, and intra-Muslim debates about immigrant-indigenous 
divide as well as intra-Muslim racism on the other. Second, in Chapter 7, I highlight a 
number of discursive repertoires ranging from women’s role in mosques and religious 
communities to questions of dress, and intra-Muslim racism to highlight multiple 
contexts through which American Muslim publics negotiate unity and diversity not only 
in the context of the ideals of an umma but also in highly localized, contentious contexts 
with reference to the role of Shariʻah, maqasid, and the function of customs. 
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CHAPTER 6- DEBATING AMERICANNESS: BELONGING, IDENTITY 
AND THE IMMIGRANT-INDIGENOUS DIVIDE 
Introduction 
This chapter departs from the previous one in two important ways: First, by contrast to 
the previous chapter where I introduced American Muslim narratives and debates about 
political aspects of belonging and presence, I now turn to a number of cultural and 
symbolic referents to explain the evolution of discourses about American Muslim 
identity. This aspect of the chapter also highlights one of my main findings: questions of 
belonging and identity are negotiated much more pronouncedly through cultural, rather 
than political, categories among my respondents. In the self-narratives and discourses of 
my respondents, including those who place an emphasis on political notions, umma 
narratives are juxtaposed against contentious and divisive themes such as women’s place 
in mosques, intra-Muslim racism, and generational divisions that are contextualized in 
the next chapter. I examine the processes through which many of my interlocutors, 
including those who portray a politically active and transnational outlook, strongly 
emphasize and prioritize cultural and identity-specific categories, especially along the 
convert- born Muslim and immigrant-indigenous divide, while interpreting their 
situatedness as American Muslims.  
Second, I turn my attention to the notions of immigrant-indigenous divide and racial 
tensions through examining how prominent indigenous figures, including Malcolm X and 
Imam Warith Deen Muhammed, are debated and utilized in my research sites. This 
section helps contextualize debates about authority and authenticity in the larger 
333 
 
narratives about belonging and forging a particular American Muslim umma.  
Therefore my objective in this chapter is to i) identify one of my main findings – that 
cultural referents prevail over political referents in self-imaginations of American Muslim 
communal conversations – and ii) locate the interconnectedness between popular and 
academic engagements with modern and pre-modern notions of tradition, authority and 
ethical reasoning in the context of alternative institutional frameworks that straddle 
ethno-racial, generational, and interpretive frameworks in the wider American Muslim 
ecology.  
Hence, this chapter proceeds in four steps: First, I introduce how my respondents across 
the research sites operationalize culture as a prevailing category to negotiate and give 
meaning to their multiple identities (i.e., gendered, racial, born vs. convert Muslim) and 
how they negotiate these identities in relation to the question about what it means to be an 
American Muslim. Second, I map a number of contentious and widespread debates that 
have influenced my research sites and the religious leaders I examine onto the question of 
American Muslim identity and culture in order to contextualize intersectionality between 
generational, gender-based, and interpretative positions influencing my respondents and 




Negotiating America: Belonging and Identity 
 
“Here in America you will always feel like mice, like living in someone else’s house. It is 
like living in the hands of kuffar
494
, like paying cizya.”495 
Bilal, Dorchester 
“Being American and being Muslim was mutually exclusive for me. At home being 
American was difficult so outside I was completely ‘American’.” 
Amina, Fremont 
“Being American and being Muslim never became a problem for me, it was always the 
same. But culture was more problematic. [I asked myself,] Am I Indo/Pakistani or 
American?” 
Talal, Fremont 
“I would not exchange the rights, access to education, bookstores and all of that in 
America to anything. But I am not sure if I would like to raise my kids here. I would do it 
in Tarim, in Hadramawt...With all this culture around, especially raising daughters here?” 
Hasan, Berkeley 
When Bilal told me living as Muslims in America was essentially similar to living in 
someone else’s house, like mice, I was a bit surprised. After all, he was born in Roxbury 
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to African American parents, he had traveled to and lived in Saudi Arabia before 
returning to Boston, and it seemed like he was thriving here. He had finished school, 
fixed his credit history and he was studying toward his memorization of the Qur’an. So I 
asked a follow up question: where would he prefer to live if he had the means to move 
anywhere in the world? “This has been the topic of my conversations for the past three 
years,” responded Bilal. “I left America, I went to Saudi because I no longer wanted to 
live here…thinking, Saudi Arabia is this holy land, but Saudi Arabia was not what I 
thought it was…not at all… I was in Saudi, this country that I thought was the safe 
haven, which it was not. They were a bunch of liars, fornicators, and drug dealers, 
cheaters…kuffar, kuffar, seriously…al munafiqeen [hypocrites]; sick…So I realized that 
it is not just America that is corrupt…America or the government here is not the only 
corrupt government in the world, the whole world is corrupt…” He was truly 
disillusioned with life in Saudi Arabia and his experiences with the rich elite of the 
country. And America, despite his misgivings, was preferable, perhaps in support of one 
scholar’s observation that American Muslim youth often internalize a state of “double 
consciousness”496: “So when I came back to America, I was like, man…At least I am in a 
place, I know they are kuffar, they clearly state that; it is not like in Saudi, at least they 
don’t lie with their tongues here.”  
As we talk in his mid-sized room near Masjid Alhamdulillah, Bilal continued to explain 
why he thought America was simultaneously good and bad. In his increasingly 
conservative life, he had come to find the solution in purifying himself, it was not 
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location-bound. “Other places are also not alternatives, Saudi is not. Syria, other places 
are not. The reality is you will go to the grave…So my reality is Qur’an and…” Bilal 
pauses and walks to the other side of his room, opens the sliding doors of his closet and 
turns on the light. I see a prayer rug inside the small closet space. “This is my cave; this is 
the safest place, outside of this is not safe. I will not find peace in wealth, or 
anything…Allah said, ‘your hearts find peace only through the remembrance of Allah.’497 
So the reality I came to is...you can uproot all your world and move but until you make 
your heart clean, inside, your soul clean and at peace...there is no where you can go that 
you will feel ok, there is no woman you will marry that will make you happy.” Bilal’s 
world had been chaotic, full of ups and downs but he now admits that “there is no society 
or law that will be passed that will make things ok...” In Bilal’s world, which is relatively 
influenced by a conservative form of isolation, the answer lies in purifying one’s heart. 
And he argues that American culture and life, much more so than any political aspect, is 
detrimental for the Muslims in America. “So for the modern Muslim in America, some 
serious purification of the heart that needs to take place. All these things, pride, ego, 
greed…All these things that America lives for…lust, that is in every advertisement, 
pride…that is the American way. Ego and greed, oh my god, the capitalism that is 
everywhere. If we have all these things that America is shaping us to be then we won’t be 
Muslims…We will have this extreme cognitive dissonance, we will have this conflict 
with ourselves.…You can’t fit Islamic theology and these things in the same heart, they 
are the opposites.” For Bilal, American stood in diametrical opposition to cultivating a 
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Muslim identity. In testament to intersectionality between traditionalist and salafi 
ideological spectrums, he circled back to an earlier conversation we had about dawah, 
propagation of Islam. “So yeah, go and engage the people out there,” he says and walks 
to his bookshelf, picks up Hamza Yusuf’s Purification of the Heart498, a translation and 
commentary on mid-19
th
 century Mauritanian Maliqi scholar Imam Mawlud’s poems, 
Matharat al-Qulub. “Engage people out there, but after what, purification of the heart… 
then you will be at peace, you won’t worry about losing your identity. You can go 
anywhere.”  
Bilal’s invocation of Hamza Yusuf to support his negative views of America and 
American culture reminds me of Zaytuna founder’s ISNA keynote speech a few months 
ago in Washington, D.C. Before the convention traveled to Detroit in 2014, it was held in 
Washington, D.C. in 2012 and 2013. Yusuf had addressed thousands of Muslims during 
the main session of ISNA’s 49th Annual Convention in 2012, themed, “One Nation Under 
God: Striving for the Common Good.” He came to the platform after a long session 
headlined by Imam Mohammed Magid and the current Secretary of Labor Tom Perez 
who was then the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division at Department 
of Justice. The convention took place in the wake of anti-Shariah bills that were passed in 
six states and the notorious congressional radicalization hearings held by Representative 
Peter King in March 2011, which had become a politicized platform for a number of anti-
Muslim voices who argued that there was a primordial link between Islam and violence. 
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Perez told the massive audience that the Justice Department would not allow hate crimes 
against Muslims go unprosecuted. Perez also addressed the recent anti-Muslim waves and 
noted that as a Catholic American he remembers the anti-Catholic sentiments that 
prevailed in the United States: “there was a time when people argued Catholics cannot be 
loyal to America. I am sure anti-Muslim sentiments will be seen as ludicrous as that 
assessment was- because it is ludicrous,” he noted to a huge applaud.  
Hamza Yusuf was equally adamant in his belief in America, “America has temporary 
delusions but it always comes back,” he told the audience. His speech was eclectic as 
usual, full of references to Federalist papers, Alex Haley and Plato. Islam had a long 
presence in America, and no Muslim here, whether immigrant or not, “should see 
themselves as aliens,” he noted. Federalist Papers had traces from the Shari’ah, the dome 
of the Library of Congress was citing Islam as an influence in the advancement of 
humanity
499
, and Muslims had fought in the civil war. Unlike Bilal, Yusuf was a believer 
in America and urged the audience to fight for the soul of the nation. But his criticisms 
were as sharp as his praise. “Have we become a Godless Nation, under lust?” he asked. 
America was overtaken by pornography, by the greed of politicians and the banks. He 
urged the audience to pull their money from Wall Street and put in local credit unions, to 
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uphold fair trade criteria when buying their clothes and their food. The moral claims to 
American soul and American identity therefore was part of Yusuf’s vision for American 
Muslims.  
For Bilal the problem with America was not necessarily the laws or that the rulers were 
non-Muslims. But the dominant American ideals and American ethos he perceived were 
problematic. His solution was to “unAmericanize American Muslims:” 
“So the problem with American Muslims is that American ideals are 
hundred percent aimed at the heart. So that everybody has a sick heart.  So 
when you wake up in the morning, to feel American is to feel absolutely, 
morbidly ill, spiritually. And that is the essence of America. So to be 
proud and rich and have all these things…All your lusts are fulfilled, and 
your desires, the freedom to do all…The success for the Muslim in 
America is to purify the heart…Which is the exact opposite of all those 
things that America is trying to instill in your heart. We need to 
unAmericanize American Muslims. Otherwise they will be not humble, 
not pure people.” 
Bilal’s critique of America’s moral vices led him to a reclusive solution. His life 
experiences in the Muslim majority context of Saudi Arabia had made him to come 
home, even if it was the land of the kuffar.  For some converts the process of engaging 
with Muslims abroad can be equally difficult but lead them to different conclusions. Ryan 
converted to Islam when he was a freshman at an Ivy League school. Influenced by 9/11 
he had settled on studying international affairs and he was hoping to get a job in 
Washington, perhaps with the CIA. When prompted by a family friend who worked in 
the national security circuit to learn Middle Eastern languages, he started to take classes 
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on Arabic and Arab culture. He had grown up Christian and developed a keen interest in 
Church music much more so than theology. In one of the classes, he watched a video that 
included the Muslim call to prayer, the azan; “I thought I could make it part of my 
Christianity,” says Ryan. After a few visits with the Muslim Student Association on 
campus he became Muslim and within a month of his conversion, he flew to Jordan for 
the summer to enroll in a reputable Arabic intensive program. Ryan would become the 
president of the Muslim club next fall and upon graduation would go on to advance his 
Arabic in Damascus. He later joined Zaytuna as an Arabic instructor and student life 
coordinator.  
He used to follow Shaykh Hamza and Imam Zaid through their videos and podcast, 
which helped him as he struggled with certain aspects of Islam, among which were 
violence and treatment of women. At the time another source of inspiration for Ryan was 
Muslim hip-hop music. “Studying with scholars was not something I knew about during 
my time in Damascus, it only started after I moved to California.” At the time of our 
conversation he had joined Ta’leef to help out with their converts programming but 
would soon leave to become the Muslim chaplain at another Ivy League school. In both 
Zaytuna and Ta’leef part of his job was to help his advisees navigate life as American 
Muslims; especially with converts and “seekers” he was explaining them Islam was part 
of the American fabric and their Americanness was not an anomaly. As he explains to me 
his own journey, he reflects back to his time in Jordan. “In Jordan I said to myself, 
‘Alhamdulillah [praise be to God] I came to know Islam before I knew Muslims.’ If this 
was not the case it would have made me think twice.” Ryan’s experiences overseas were 
341 
 
not necessarily negative; he was welcomed warmly and he appreciated the diversity in 
Muslim environments, even when he was conscious of his mid-West “WASP”ness.  
Zach, the Seattle native, also had experiences with Islam and other cultures; through a 
painful one indeed. He was intending to marry a Bengali girl she had met during a study 
abroad semester in Sydney. Her parents dismissed the idea. “I experienced racial 
discrimination early on,” he reflected. For Zach, many Muslims remained too insular. He 
knew that he possibly had put his law career at risk when he interned with a Bay Area 
Muslim civil rights organization; “it will probably come up if I apply to positions with 
the attorney general’s office.”500 Although wary of Islamophobia and disturbing trends, 
Zach was convinced that America provided the best ground for the development of Islam.  
“At its foundation, America is the most Islamic country in the world. It is the most 
voluntary place. It is the most voluntary, diverse place…America is a melting pot; you 
blend in but also you share. If you segregate yourself, you just self-isolate and allow the 
larger community to develop stereotypes about you.” 
Zach’s experiences in the different Bay Area communities influenced how he viewed 
Muslim life. Per his position as an intern with a local organization he was straddling 
many communities. “In general,” he says, “the younger generation is different than the 
older generations.” For him, the balance between assimilation and integration was taking 
its natural course in the younger generations and some mosques seemed to adapt better 
than others. Although he was a frequent attendee at MCA, he had become more engaged 
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with Imam Tahir Anwar’s South Bay Islamic Center and took a part-time teaching job at 
Averroes Institute. And as a convert he had found a good community at Ta’leef 
Collective where he was a frequent volunteer, often serving the Moroccan tea during 
weekly mawlid and helping circulate the oud burner for the attendees to apply the incense 
on themselves. He is hopeful about the future: “In 10-20 years it will be natural to see ten 
hijabi women to serve in prominent positions.” 
Monica observes the discourses about American Muslim identity she encounters at MCA 
and Ta’leef, especially in the case of immigrant generation, are “influenced by the 
American dream; but it seems to me that they do not realize it only takes one event to 
wake up from this dream. A lot of immigrant Muslims hold this ideal of American dream, 
but it does not really hold. See, for some of them it is about acting white, for others it is 
about looking white. I see people who have blend in and they became nominally white, 
just that they are not aware of it now.” Monica is easily recognizable as a white convert 
in her bohemian outfits at MCA and Ta’leef and she is sometimes put off by the Muslims 
who, in her words, “ask persistently about conversion stories and think I should know 
some things better than them because I am a convert, as if they want to advance a 
political interest, this idea of wanting to be the ‘white Muslim.’” 
Her experiences in a Louisiana Catholic family were not too positive and she had a 
rebellious phase growing up. The charismatic Catholicism her mother followed was 
interesting for her but she reports that she was attentive to racial dynamics in the South. 
Her cynicism toward politics and societal norms led her to look into Buddhism but she 
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did not find the fulfillment in it. She would eventually move to California and put her 
critical outlook into work with political activist groups, including with American 
Muslims for Palestine, an advocacy group led by Zaytuna’s Hatem Bazian. Monica also 
frequents Ta’leef Collective mostly preferring to work with the kids for childcare. She 
finds the mawlid too reminiscent of the glorification of Jesus in Christianity and she says 
she prefers to be in the community than to listen Usama Canon’s lectures. How Monica 
perceives America and the Muslim community she became part of is influenced by her 
academic interests in critical women’s studies and experiences abroad, during a volunteer 
semester in the Ghana. She was initially much more so attracted to the cultural and 
linguistic diversity she had come across at MCA; in Ghana she saw some of the 
proselytizing that was happening as well as problematic gender discrimination. “That 
initial perception of utopia has rather changed,” she says, “but now that I am Muslim, I 
still have more faith in humanity than before.” For her a challenge for all humanity is 
nationalism; she argues that both the “American type of nationalism and also all these 
other nationalisms within the Muslim community,” pose challenges. “Our government 
always created notions of nationalism; they pushed it with Native Americans before. A 
Judeo-Christian meritocracy that is individualistic, that does not contest the status-quo. 
Any Muslim who does not fit into this is also a bad Muslim,” she argues, invoking 
Mahmoud Mamdani’s argument that in the post 9/11 era American government increased 
their stakes in representing certain strands of Muslim identity and thought as preferable to 
others.
501
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America in different ways compared to their parents.  
Indeed, several of my respondents reflect on how their parents’ engagement with and 
perceptions of America are different than their own experiences. Aliyah, who was born 
into MCA community would tell me, for example: “My parents are from Pakistan, and I 
can see they still cling back to that. For them there is no sense of belonging here, home is 
back there. I tell my father, stop watching Geo TV (Pakistani news channel) all the time 
and watch some CNN. He does not know what is going on around him.” Aliyah grew up 
at MCA and attended Granada Islamic school. She had recently finished college and got 
married. Reflecting on her background and her time interning with CAIR, she says: “Me 
and my sisters, we are more American than anything else. I interned with CAIR here and 
despite all FBI tactics, problems, it was empowering. I cannot see myself living 
elsewhere, Alhamdulillah. Fighting for justice here means we are more American than 
many others.” Aliyah and Monica both have criticisms of America, but they are speaking 
from inside, with a sense of ownership that comes naturally but also is in need of further 
nourishment at the communal level. They invoke problems within the Muslim 
community, from racism to gender relations to reflect on their internal struggles. Their 
negotiations however, are different than the older generations’ engagements with 
America as an “anomic site,”502 a space that is defined by anxiety and confusion and 
remains “an unbounded and unnavigable environment.”  
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“My parents settled here geographically and economically; we need to settle socially, 
psychologically and spiritually” says Omar, the Afghani-American Zaytuna junior, with 
reference to Dr. Umar-Faruq Abd-Allah’s articles; “Living Islam with Purpose,” and 
“Islam and the Cultural Imperative.”503 Omar had to navigate his own Afghan, Muslim 
and American identities in his early adulthood; he was practicing partly but, he says, “I 
was disappointing my religion.” He joined a summer camp that was run by a Salafi group 
in high school; “I am at a different place now, but I credit them for pulling me back in.” 
When he speaks at community forums, he invokes his belief in America through Martin 
Luther King and Malcolm X, through the idea of developing a stake in the future of 
America. He hopes to settle in Virginia as an imam and youth councilor after his studies 
at Zaytuna and perhaps advanced seminary work overseas.
504
  
His classmate Hasan, who is not sure whether he can raise his kids in America, is rather 
ambivalent about his relationship to America. “I feel like my cultural and ethnic 
background is a baggage. I don’t want to be a Desi. I want to be a Muslim American…or 
a Muslim in America; but realistically it is difficult. It seems like the majority of Muslims 
will be just nominal Muslims. And they will hang on to Muslim identity because of their 
cultural identity. Only a minority will stay on the deen.” Hasan’s remarks remind me of 
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an earlier conversation I had in Boston with four young Muslim Americans, from 
Pakistani and Bengali backgrounds. They were all recent graduates from colleges in and 
around Boston and were slowly becoming mentors to college students who attended 
Muslim American Society’s annual youth retreat. One of them, Burhan reflected how the 
ABCD trauma defined most of his Desi peers’ experiences. I did not know what ABCD 
stood for; I did know, however, that the word desi had evolved from desha, a Sanskrit 
word that meant homeland or country. “It’s American Born Confused Desi, ABCD, 
man!” explained Burhan, who was taken aback at some of the ongoing conversations in 
the Muslim landscape about the validity of placing American flags at mosques and about 
the discussions on American Muslim identity. “I understand that we were talking about 
these after 9/11 but common, I was born in Long Island and I never knew any flag but 
this one and I am not Bengali, even not when I travel there. I am the American cousin 
there. So what are we really debating here?” Burhan was more interested in the religious 
discourses coming from indigenous American Muslim seminaries, such Darul Qasim 
near Chicago where he had spent a year working as a community organizer. For him, 
scholars such as Shaykh Mohammed Amin Kholwadia and Mawlana Bilal Ali Ansari 
were developing real answers to realities of Western Muslims, not merely debating 
American Muslim identity which could be difficult to delineate. 
Hasan and Burhan’s engagements with their identities and their belief in the promise of 
traditional scholarship to address the challenges facing Muslim Americans is reflective of 
the contested notions of America that is prevalent in the American Muslim imaginary. As 
I covered in Chapter 4, from anti-Muslim rhetoric to foreign policy, from fears of 
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assimilation to interpretive differences about living in a non-Muslim context, multiple 
considerations shape and influence Muslim Americans’ perceptions of their natural or 
adopted homeland. But the salient feature of their engagement with Muslim life in 
America takes places through narratives about internal divisions that are illustrated 
through cultural negotiations. Often informed by inter-generational tensions, these 
negotiations are not lost on the scholarly circles. The scholarly discourses about 
normalizing being simultaneously Muslim and American and doing away with the 
perceived duality between the two are informed on the one hand by the pronounced need 
to make Muslim presence and citizenship in the United States a viable, long-term reality 
and placing Islam as an integral part of American religious landscape. On the other hand, 
intra-communal conversations and questions lead the scholarly networks I examined to 
develop new approaches to questions of belonging and culture as well as contentious 
disputes that factor importantly into these internal conversations. The institutional 
histories and pedagogical networks I have outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 shape how lay 
members and scholarly leaders debate crucial frameworks that give depth and meaning to 
the effort of unpacking the conversations about American Muslim identity(ies). In this 
context, as Berger and Luckmann argues, the re/production of a set of collective social 
practices in the Muslim communities, rather than mere socialization or inherited 
identities
505
, shape the direction of these conversations. From textual discourses to 
thematic emphasis in community forums, cultural sources of contemporary American 
Muslim imaginary serve as a practical medium to re/define and conceptualize American 
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Muslims’ place in the global Muslim landscape. In other words, cultural negotiations and 
their relationship to identity establish what Charles Taylor calls a “constitutive goods”506 
for the collective American Muslim imagination in their everyday manifestations about 
moral agency of the American Muslim. 
These conversations are often multi-layered and do not follow a one-dimensional and 
coherent trajectory. The ethno-culturally, socio-economically and racially diverse terrain 
that defines my institutions as well as the wider American Muslim landscape, in turn, 
generates a number of contentious and complex themes and questions through which my 
respondents and institutional leaders strive to give meaning to their futures in America: 
what is authentic and what is cultural in Islam, what does an American Muslim culture 
entail and how can this culture play a role in the future of Islam in America? How should 
mosque spaces be organized and where do the needs of sub-communal populations such 
as converts, women, and youth lie in the American mosques? Is it possible to resolve the 
tension between immigrant and indigenous Muslims and corresponding categories of 
immigrant and indigenous Islam? What is the role of Islamic law and jurisprudence in 
answering these questions and does their answer lie in historical practices or in new 
forms of ijtihad? And importantly, what are the implications of American Muslims’ 
ability to find meaningful, if not monolithic, answers to these questions for the future of 
Islam in America and for the global Muslim populations?  
In the next section, I highlight how lay members and leaders in my research sites 
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negotiate questions around culture, authenticity and American Muslim identity. Second, I 
turn to the dynamics around immigrant-indigenous divide in relation to this question. 
Culture and Authenticity: Intra-Muslim Debates and Indigenization 
 
One of my respondents, Rachel, reflects how she encountered cultural impositions from 
other women and men since her conversion: “Nothing in Islam says women need to be at 
the back, respect for women’s right is important. A lot of men try to impose their own 
culture to Islam, and I am like, ‘I’m sorry but it is not your country, you cannot impose 
your culture.’’ At the same time, Rachel quickly notes that this does not mean she 
perceives non-immigrant manifestations of Islam as more pure. She actually criticizes 
herself for previously subscribing to such a notion, and notes that some of his convert 
friends have become too Salafi because they think their Islam is void of “cultural 
influences.” “I used to have this arrogant idea that American Islam is more pure. It is 
prevalent among converts,” she notes telling me how in a recent Conversations session at 
ISBCC a recent convert dominated the discussion about Jesus and accused everyone else 
of not engaging primarily Qur’anic discourses about Jesus and rather relying on historical 
accounts. “Sometimes it leads them to be too conservative and pushy though…and it 
hurts more, when this comes from your own people.”  
Rachel’s closest friends are mostly second generation Muslims and she can see how some 
of her peers, without much thought take their cultures as the normative baseline for being 





 I am sorry, I am American; I am not wearing an abaya.” For Rachel, her 
Americanness did not run counter to her Islam, she carefully created a fashion sense since 
becoming Muslim and wearing a headscarf. She did not need an abaya to feel Muslim 
and she thought that most Muslims were taking the principle of “enjoining good and 
forbidding bad” as a card blanche to get involved in other people’s lives. “It creates this 
haram police.”  
Yusuf, who sampled different outfits as a teacher at Granada Islamic school to show his 
students Islam can contain different cultural representations, is equally adamant about the 
need for mosque communities to be more inclusive. He remembers how he was scolded 
by an “uncle” when he was younger for wearing shorts in the basketball court next to the 
MCA. “I could have been somewhere else” he says, “but I was at the mosque. Things 
have gotten better but there are still problems. So in my khutbas and in the classroom I 
emphasize why we should welcome people; even if they are wearing skinny jeans, even if 
they are not wearing headscarf…we cannot have this haram police thing. So in my 
khutbas I try to drive my messages to home for a diverse community. We need to do 
dawah in a sweet way, we do not need more haram police.”  
Zainab, a Tunisian-Palestinian college student tells me that she has become more 
confident in her identity after she picked up soccer early on in high school. At the time of 
our interview she was in her college’s soccer team, despite having a “racist” coach. “It 
was sad because I was the first Muslim player of the team,” she remembers. “But still in 
just six months I did more dawah in the team than anywhere before.” She finds most 
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MSAs and mosques too far on the conservative side, because most have immigrant 
congregations. “MCA continues to be very conservative, because most people are 
immigrants they choose the most conservative options out of many positions that are 
based on Shariah…All these haram police continues here; if they see you in nail 
polish
508, they say things.” These factors have pushed Zainab toward Ta’leef, even 
though she still prays at MCA. She finds the environment at Ta’leef more welcoming and 
catered toward the youth.  
Indeed, Usama Canon frequently urges the audience in his talks on Sunday nights at 
Ta’leef to  remain within the normative Islamic traditions, but to refrain from defining it 
too restrictively. Seamlessly navigating between classical texts, Prophetic narrations, 
modern American urban vernacular and the stories of spiritual masters of Islamic 
mysticism, he urges the audience to be in peace with their American Muslim identity. 
And his own life story weaves into his talks significantly, with references to the 
Ba’Alawi leaders, Zaytuna’s founders and the wider American Muslim scholarly 
networks. Week after week, he puts on different hats, in his discourse and outwardly 
appearance. During a Ta’leef Live session in February 2015 when he was engaged in a 
reading and exegesis of 18
th
 century Ba’Alawi leader Imam Abdullah Al Haddad’s famed 
work, Counsels on Religion, he urged the audience to not confuse spirituality with beaten 
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outlooks. His story quickly referenced Imam Al Shadhili, who always dressed in stellar 
fashion, as well as Habib Ahmed Mashur al Haddad, one of the foremost mid- 20
th
 
century Ba’Alawi leaders credited by Ba’Alawi sources for spreading Islam in Uganda, 
Kenya, and other African contexts.
509
 “He is one of the people who is the teacher of many 
of our teachers, 300 thousand people became Muslim at his hand and he was Dr. Umar's 
teacher [Umar Faruq Abd-Allah], and Shaykh Hamza's teacher, and Dr. Murad's 
[Timothy Winter/ Abdulhakim Murad] teacher, Habib Umar's [Habib Umar bin Hafidh] 
teacher, Habib Ali's [Habib Ali Al-Jifri] teacher. His grandson told me a story between 
him and his grandfather. Habib wore a good dress and a very nice cloak, he would 
perfume himself and burn aloeswood (sandalwood) ---he wore a good dress but 
underneath it was his teacher’s old shirt.” Usama Canon’s invocation of these stories not 
only help authenticate and connect practices at Ta’leef, such as the burning of aloeswood 
during the lectures and the mawlid, to a timeless tradition but also instill a traditional 
sensibility in the mostly young audience he preaches. And rather than remain there, he 
quickly taps into his own life-story where he navigated alternative identities and 
sensibilities as a Muslim. Moments after invoking Habib ahmed Mashur al Haddad, he 
was talking about late 1990s, his own experiences with culture and fashion as a relatively 
new Muslim: 
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Figure 41: Mustafa Davis, co-founder, Ta’leef Collective; “Theory of Evolution”510 
 
“When we first converted to Islam, actually Mustafa [Davis] can tell you a thing or two 
about it…we had some very interesting explorations of fashion...Actually Mustafa and 
Yahya had more interesting experiences…When they first came back from Mauritania, I 
went with Yahya's parents to the airport...Mustafa mashallah looked like something like 
Lawrence of Arabia, he had a full black Tuareg style turban wrapped around his head, a 
Mauritanian black thobe, and sandals. And Yahya like…had really baggy parachute 
pants, with jeans and boots on and a kufi…it was weird but it was a time when we felt we 
always felt the need to emphasize that we dressed "supposedly" Islamic.” 
“And Dr. Jackson, may Allah preserve him came to Shaykh Khatri511, one of our 
teachers,” noted Usama Canon, mentioning that Dr. Jackson himself was dressed well; 
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“how he dresses now…as one of my teachers say, he was a Brooks Brothers from day 
one” to the laughter of the audience. He continued the story that included one of the 
foremost authorities on Islamic law and contemporary Muslim thought as well as a 
source of traditional authority. “So Dr. Jackson came to Shaykh Khatri's house and said, 
‘O shaykh is it permissible for Muslims to wear Western clothes?’ And Shaykh Khatri 
was wearing like a Moroccan robe and he pulled up his robe and he had Adidas 
sweatpants underneath…He said, misal haza, like this? Later Dr. Omar Mahmood512 
reminded the incident and when we told Dr. Jackson, he said, ‘I was not asking for a 
fatwa, I was asking for you guys.’ Because he noticed that we were doing a little bit too 
much.”  
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512
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Figure 42: Mustafa Davis shortly after his return from Mauritania.
513
 
Mustafa Davis later posted the picture above on his Facebook page and reflected on how 
he had met his father in the same Touareg dress Usama Canon described above: 
When I returned home from Mauritania (after several months living in the desert in a tent 
with no running water or electricity) I thought I was a Bedouin from West Africa. My 
father wanted to take me out for dinner. He was waiting for me at the front door with his 
car keys in hand ready to go. I walked down the hall wearing this outfit (plus a Touareg 
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style turban wrapped around my head and chin). He looked me up and down and said 
‘Um, you're going to go out like that?’ To which I replied ‘Yes, I'm Muslim now.. this is 
what I wear.’ He shrugged his shoulders and said ‘Hmmm... ok, suit yourself’ and we 
left. I laugh every time I think of this story and how I said ‘I'm Muslim now, this is what 
I wear.’ What I should have said was ‘I'm Muslim now, and for some reason I feel like I 
need to adopt another culture in order to make me feel more Muslim.’ It took me more 
than a decade to realize that I was a better Muslim when I learned to just be myself, 
recognize my flaws, and work on being a better human being at a pace I could maintain. 
My father saw my overzealousness and extreme way I began to view the world and one 
day told me something that ended up being the most important lesson I've learned as a 
Muslim. He said ‘Son, be careful on your path to being a good Muslim that you don't 
allow yourself to become a crappy human being.’ 
Mustafa Davis and Usama Canon’s reflections above ties in with their reflections about 
how American Muslims are perceived in the global umma. Like these two convert-
Muslim American leaders, many others, including Imam Suhaib Webb recount stories of 
zeal from their early years as new converts when they renegotiated their own identities 
and tried to authenticate their selves in the cultural milieu of their newly found, mostly 
immigrant, communities. During his tenure at ISBCC, Webb continuously emphasized 
the need to cultivate an authentic American Muslim identity. As I have highlighted in 
Chapter 2, Imam Suhaib Webb started to appear in the American Muslim national scene 
in the early 2000s. He was active at the MSA in University of Oklahoma, all the while 
studying privately with a Senegalese Sheikh.  In 2008, while studying at Azhar through 
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the financing of Muslim Community Association in Santa Clara, California, he spoke at 
the annual ISNA Convention that took place in Columbus, Ohio.
514
  In this talk, Webb 
referred to Dr. Sherman Jackson as his Shaykh, and recounted how the beauty of Islam 
had brought him to Islam “from the bowls of the system.” As we have seen before Webb 
refers to his past in hip hop music scene full of drugs and some violence. He ties this 
point with an earlier point on how the Prophet’s message helped bring up not only his 
community but the whole Arab community. Then he proceeds: 
“We have to be very cautious in America that we do not import a theology of complexes. 
And then try to inject those complexes into the veins of our community as well as to 
other people who live with us. One brother came to me…And I have been guilty of this, 
due to my youth, due to being a little cynical as my mother tells me and sometimes a little 
arrogant as one of my teachers tells me…this brother tells me… ‘I don’t need a theology 
that tells me about God’s hand…My secretary looks like Beyoncé, I need a theology 
that’s gonna protect me from that. I need a theology that’s gonna help me raise my kids. I 
need a theology that’s gonna help me contribute something positive to society. And what 
you [Imam Suhaib] presented me is a theology of complexes.’ We presented a 
debilitating theology…So we have to be careful that we do not import from the East, 
theological issues and practices which have only created greater complexes in the East 
itself and try to inject them into the West.” 
“We saw today the narrative of the immigrant community,” Imam Suhaib continues after 
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mentioning how the mosques have become scenes of “Judge Judy and not Dr. Phil,” to 
underline the community needs a theology that is more attuned to the Prophetic message 
of mercy rather than pushing people away; in the same spirit as Yusuf and Zainab’s 
misgiving about the haram police phenomenon. According to Webb, the “unrealistic 
theological constructs that fail to deal with reality, which is what theology means, that its 
job is to deal with reality, have created an insecure inclination among American Muslims. 
Webb urges the audience to not “cripple the believers before they even come to the 
community.” In the coming years Suhaib Webb would continue to circulate these ideas 
and argue that “theology is not a good starting point for people to come into Islam. I 
came into Islam through marijuana and hip-hop.” As I mention in the Unmosqued debate, 
he would continuously urge for a welcoming mosque environment. His tenure at the 
ISBCC would be based on building a welcoming environment for the marginalized, 
including the youth, the women and the converts, and he would challenge himself on 
occasion for having been unwelcoming to gay Muslims in the past. I will turn back to this 
question below when I raise the issue of sexual identities and how contemporary 
American Muslims face a tremendous challenge in answering their critiques both from 
within and from outside. Before that, however, it is worth going back to Webb’s speech 
at ISNA’s 2008 convention. In closing, Imam Suhaib turns his attention to issues that 
relate to the youth. In doing this, his concern is with how America is understood by the 
American Muslims. “Before 9/11 we had a leftist discourse,” he says. “I consider 9/11 a 
social aneurysm in our community. Let’s be honest…Before 9/11 the rhetoric was almost 
borderline leftist in our community. It was an anti-American, at times, rhetoric. After 
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9/11 next to the dish we found the American flag. Because we were forced to reconcile 
with our own demons, deal with our demons and perhaps we had become in attempt for 
our love of the Prophet we had become more extreme than what Islam asked of us. And 
that had created a great, great gap with us and the people…” What follows is not a deep 
analysis of American foreign policy or why American Muslims were “so far on the left.” 
Neither does Imam Suhaib answers what Islam would really asks of American Muslims 
in regards to their relationship with the American government. Rather, he circles back to 
the idea of relevancy, the necessity to be able to speak to non-Muslims, and Muslims on 
the fringes of the American Muslim community. His message is once again about 
relevancy. He urges the audience to identify an issue they can address in their 
communities and strive to solve that. “The message is Iqra!” he says, “Be relevant! Don’t 
ask what ISNA can do for you but ask what you can do for ISNA. Don’t ask what Islam 
is going to do for you but what ask what you can do for this deen.” In his closing 
sentence, Webb addresses that contention with the immigrant community. Over the years 
that I have followed him, it never surprises me that he furthers some of the harshest 
criticisms of immigrants and “immigrant Islam” and yet is always careful to take a step 
back and refers to the legacy of immigrant Muslims and their contribution to Islam in 
America. This tension and the way Webb charts through it not surprising, not least 
because it reverberates with multiple identities and institutional frameworks he navigates. 
“I am a proof of the excellent legacy of ISNA, of those who came before us…the legacy 
of my American brothers and sisters like Shaykh Hamza, Shaykh Zaid Shakir, and others 
who inspired us Americans…Dr. Sherman Jackson…to not only succeed in the academic 
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world but to go overseas and study and come back and translate this religion to our 
society.” Despite these references to the academic scholars, in our conversations Webb 
also situates himself as someone who chooses to be close to the street rather than in 
academia. “We are doing the work in the trenches,” he told me during a late night dinner 
at Ashur, the Somali restaurant next to the ISBCC. He was adamant that the Imam 
training institute he envisioned would have to have a pastoral component in order to 
attend to social problems in the Muslim community and mosque environments. Actually, 
on December 12, 2014, during the farewell halaqa ISBCC organized to bid farewell to 
Webb, who was leaving for Washington, D.C. on what would become a short-lived 
tenure at MakeSpace, a new third space institutions that sought to emulate Ta’leef 
Collective, Webb told the audience that he was deeply discontent with the dynamics in 
the mosques and he understood why people were becoming unmosqued: “If I was not 
imam, as a white convert I would not go to many masjids; except to pray.” Listening to 
Imam Webb, I reflect on some of the discourses I have come across from prominent 
Imams who have voiced similar views on occasion. They would be on guard when 
someone who was not Muslim wanted them to suggest a mosque to visit. Many would 
even be unsure about the congregations they lead, fearful that someone could offend a 
new visitor based on their dresses or could respond to a question in a negative fashion. 
For many, new converts would also constitute a risk-group.  
Jordan Richter Story: Converts and Immigrant Muslims 
These experiences and the heated debate about making American mosques more 
welcoming were on my mind when I first met Jordan Richter in person at Suju’s Café in 
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Fremont, the only coffee house that was open late into the night, which I had made a 
second home in the suburban life of California. He was with his son so I did not prolong 
the conversation. I just introduced myself and told him that I had watched Mustafa Davis’ 
2012 documentary film, Wayward Son: the Jordan Richter Story
515
 that chronicled the 
former skateboarding champion’s life and journey into Islam with a focus on how Richter 
was told that he had to give up skateboarding now that he was Muslim. He was told 
earning an income from skateboarding was haram. At the time of our meeting in 2013 
Richter had settled in Fremont and launched Jordan Richter skateboarding school in a 
public park here. He was kind and engaging, “I know the movie created too much 
discussion, and really it was not my intention that it would. Some people thought I was 
bad-mouthing immigrant brothers,” he said. It was not his intention, he appreciated all 
those who played a role in his early years in Islam in the early 1990s. Actually he was 
planning to turn his story into a book and he was in search of a ghostwriter who could 
help him with the project. I suggested a friend and we exchanged emails before parting 
ways. We had agreed to meet before I moved back but the plans fell down because he had 
fallen badly and injured his leg. In the Ta’leef documentary that made Richter a famous 
figure in the Muslim community, when the documentary was screened at mosques and 
university campuses, Richter recounts how he had foregone a promising fame and 
financial earnings in search of an authentic Muslim life. Richter was living an early fame 
as a rising star in the skateboarding world but coming from a broken home, he was going 
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through a psychosis and life full of “destructive habits.”516 Having moved to San Diego at 
the time, he meets African American Muslims, “they were so peaceful, amid all the 
havoc going on in my life, they stood so peaceful.” Richter mistakes them for followers 
of Louis Farrakhan, the leader of post-1978 Nation of Islam. “No bro, that is not real 
Islam,” he was told. “I was surprised, this is what Erik B is saying, this is what all the 
rappers were saying, this is Black Islam,” remembers Richter. That day the Black 
Muslims he met tell him about Orthodox Islam and invite him to Islamic Center of San 
Diego for Friday prayers. Jordan narrates his experience: “It was Jum’a; I went to the 
first raw, they were like, ‘common ack!’ I did not take shahdah that day. I took a Qur’an 
home and started reading. A lot of crying, a lot…” Two days later, on a Sunday Richter 
accepts Islam.  
The documentary shows pictures of Richter in long thobes and a full-grown beard. “I was 
like, those are kafir clothes, I was like in this pious state, felt really clean, that arrogance 
that comes with people who think they are super-religious,” says Richter, “all those 
diseases came to me” he adds, before finishing with “Alhamdulillah,” after a short pause. 
In his narrative Richter remembers how he was skating once in a while, in contests and 
his pictures being taken. “I asked a religious scholar and he told me ‘pictures are 
haram.’” Thinking Allah would be angry with him because his profession involved 
haram, Richter quit his skateboarding career in 1995. Looking back Richter is angry with 
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the Muslim community for the disregard for his situation, for not having any support 
system. He did not know how to make money or how to survive. Imitating a thick South 
Asian accent, he recalls how he was told, “’brother, this is mashallah, just drive a taxi.’ 
There was really no one who understood or stood y my side really, you know…” He says 
it is hard to explain how sacred and confused he was. “They pushed their version of Islam 
on me bro, that s what it comes down to…I am not a Pakistani, I am not an Indian, I am 
not Arab…I am an American, born in America, raised in a Jewish family, in Miami 
Beach. I had moved to California, I had some notoriety in the professional skateboarding 
world, whatever you wanna call it.” In the documentary Richter admits that he is angry 
because he feels he was “almost strategically held back, that he was hated on,” perhaps in 
part explaining why he told me he was misunderstood during our short conversation at 
Suju’s.  
In giving a voice to Jordan Richter, Ta’leef too was highlighting one of its own strengths: 
creating a healthy environment for “seekers” to grow in a traditional, authentic Islamic 
environment without giving up their identities. Richter’s anger at the neglect of the 
problems and sacrifices “reverts/converts” go through and being pushed to “embrace a 
new system overnight” are frequent complaints that my convert respondents reported to 
me in the context of their personal stories and discussion of culture and identity. Jordan 
Richter’s words are paralleled by Imam Suhaib Webb. He would urge the Bostonian 
Muslims about convert experience frequently: “The biggest problem for converts is 
loneliness. People push them too quickly but leave them alone. How can one go from the 
bar to the minbar, from liquor store to zikr store just so suddenly and without support?” 
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“Reverts become pet Muslims,” notes Jordan Richter, “you are putting clothes on us, you 
are putting a mentality on us that we are not ready for. And if you do that, a person will 
end up angry.” Richter argues that the pet treatment ends up as a disaster for the “revert” 
but those who have pushed him or her take ownership of their evolution. “This is the ex-
Jew, this is the ex-Christian, I am the one who is responsible for making him. That is 
what I experienced. People wanted to lay claim to someone’s spiritual evolution. I was 
this naïve, young revert who did not know anything, who just wanted to know Allah. 
They are like, ‘I am gonna capitalize on that. I am going to mold him, shape him for my 
own selfish reasons, for my own justification.’” Richter returns to skateboarding in 2011 
and Mustafa Davis skillfully captures Richter’s struggles with picking up where he left 
off after a 15 years hiatus through juxtaposing footage of Richter’s moves on the board 
from his early adulthood and his current, rather unsuccessful, efforts to repeat the same 
moves. “It is not about halal or haram now. It is about how do I get back to where I was 
when I was 14, how do I do that?” the documentary ends with scenes from Richter’s first 
boarding competition and a message from him that his intention was not to attack anyone, 
“if Prophet was able to come back to Mecca after all those years of oppression, all those 
years of turmoil, boycott…and come back and forgive, all of his enemies, then our issues 
are pretty small, in comparison.” In June 2015, Jordan Richter was featured on the second 
episode of Oprah TV’s “Belief’ series. He was ambivalent about whether or not to take 
part in the show where he would be going on hajj and the television crew would follow 
him. He reports that he asked a religious scholar, a close friend of his, if he should do it. 
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He was encouraged to take part.
517
 I wonder if the religious leader Richter referenced on 
Oprah was Usama Canon. 
As I mentioned in Chapter 4, Usama Canon and Mustafa Davis keep their own 
conversion narratives central to the mission of Ta’leef Collective. Usama Canon 
remembers how he had started to move away from his studies when Mustafa Davis and 
Yahya Rhodus left for Mauritania. He was left in the Bay Area with a couple Irish 
American converts and a few Arab uncles who were studying with Hamza Yusuf. When 
he slowly drifted away from attending the classes at Shaykh Hamza’s house, one day he 
received a phone call at this house line. “It’s Hamza; where have you been?” Usama 
Canon does not remember his response verbatim, “I probably said something like, ‘well, I 
have been around.’” In response, Hamza Yusuf tells him, “Usama, listen…It’s all 
dunya.”518  
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This was his wake-up call; Shaykh Hamza was calling to check on him. He recalls how 
important this was for him. He lacked a community, a common complaint for converts to 
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Islam. Among my respondents, most converts had come to Islam not merely in search of 
a transcendental truth or clear theological answers but also, and importantly, in search of 
a community. As the story of Jordan Richter and Ta’leef’s decision to produce a 
documentary based on his story manifests, the emphasis on building an intentional 
community with a particular culture is central to Ta’leef’s work with converts. Telling 
about this incident on a Sunday night, Usama Canon urges everyone to be attentive to 
keep their focus. In a Ta’leef Reflections episode entitled, “Spiritual Bypassing,”520 
Usama Canon argues that at Ta’leef, they are creating a safe space where “American 
Muslims can feel safe as American Muslims and be themselves.” He cites Dr. Sulayman 
Nyang, another African American Muslim scholar, who argued that “inter-generational 
survivability of Islam in America,” depends on cultural relevancy. As I discuss in the 
context of Unmosqued documentary below, Ta’leef’s model of “intentional community” 
building have been an attractive new model for many lay members and especially the 
young, American born Imams. 
 
The Immigrant-Indigenous Divide, Race and Search for Religio-Cultural 
Authenticity 
 
During Ta’leef’s December 2013 fundraiser, “The Hard Work of Heart Work: Building 
Sustainable Communities,” the keynote speaker, Dr. Sherman Jackson, started his 
remarks by noting what Ta’leef is doing “is magnificent and important work.” Dr. 
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Jackson, as he is invoked frequently at Ta’leef, Zaytuna and ISBCC, often calls on 
American Muslims to embrace their “modern” situatedness and develop a healthy 
relationship with the West. In his talks across the American Muslim terrain, on the other 
hand, Dr. Jackson also presents blistering critiques of modernity, modern education 
system and self-doubt which he identifies as a prevalent problem for American Muslims. 
In his speech to more than 200 supporters that came together at Paradise Palace Banquet 
Hall, Fremont’s fundraiser headquarters, Dr. Jackson cautioned the audience that 
Muslims should understand themselves first as human beings, not Muslims. “As human 
beings we have certain needs and certain vulnerabilities. We need to be recognized, we 
need humility. Loneliness is a very difficult thing to deal with…in PG 13 terms, 
loneliness is whack.” As an African-American convert-scholar of Islamic law, Jackson 
has influenced the conversations in the American Muslim landscape in significant ways. 
Jackson’s own personal story which took him from an inner-city Philadelphia vocational 
technical high school to Temple University and then University of Pennsylvania is one of 
personal struggle and an effort to authenticate Islam for himself. His early engagement at 
Temple University with Ismail Raji Al Faruqi, the prominent American-Palestinian 
academic and one of the leading proponents of Islamization of knowledge, had pushed 
him to take advantage of an arrangement Dr. Faruqi struck with the University of 
Pennsylvania that allowed Temple students to take Arabic classes in the Ivy League 
school. At the time Jackson had converted to Islam on his own and he was encouraged by 
another prominent expert on Islamic law and history, George Makdisi to transfer to 
UPenn. “It was such that at the time, people were trying to dictate my life, so it gave me 
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an incentive to learn Islam on my own. How could these born Muslims feel entitled to 
dictate to me how to live?” remembers Dr. Jackson.521  
Jackson’s personal authentication of Islam for himself is influential in his influence on 
the American Muslim landscape. Jackson conceives of a third resurrection, a cultural and 
religious authentication for ‘blackamerican Muslims,” as a counter project to “immigrant 
Islam.” Immigrant Islam for Jackson is the embodiment of religious hierarchy that 
constantly discredits black Muslims’ claims to authentic Islam: “Immigrant Islam 
embodies the habit of universalizing the particular. It enshrines the historically informed 
expressions of Islam in the modern Muslim world as the standard of normativeness for 
Muslims everywhere. In fact, it equates its understanding of Islam itself with a simple, 
unmediated perception of an undifferentiated ontological reality. On this approach, ‘true 
Islam’ can only assume one form anywhere it goes.”522 Jackson’s idea is commonly 
mistaken as an antagonism toward immigrant Muslims. While he notes that immigrant 
Muslims at large remain provisional supporters of immigrant Islam, Jackson 
differentiates them from “immigrant Islam.”523 Despite Jackson’s differentiation between 
immigrant Muslims and immigrant Islam, however, as I highlighted while describing the 
dynamic between ISBCC, Masjid Al Qur’an and Masjid Alhamdulillah in the Boston 
landscape, the two categories are often conflated and confused as they are popularized in 
everyday narratives of American Muslim scholars and lay community members. 
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Importantly, Jackson notes that Blackamerican Muslims’ encounter with immigrant Islam 
carried a dual interaction. Blackamerican Muslims were in a process of self-negotiation 
that was centered on their own experiences with domination and discrimination in 
America and they equated colonial experiences of immigrant Muslims with their own 
distance from the centers of power in the American polity. The second interaction 
Jackson highlights is centered on the question of authenticity and authority. Jackson 
argues that immigrant Muslims continued to monopolize religious authority and in turn 
reaffirmed Blackamerican culture’s hostile predisposition toward the West.524  
Jackson’s ideas are influences African American scholars such as Abdullah bin Hamid 
Ali of Zaytuna. Ali, whose Lamppost Initiative seeks to further indigenous religious 
discourses, notes that questions of identity are civilizational in nature and “most 
fundamental questions around theology is also mediated through identity questions…As 
an African American when I talk about ‘American,’ I am not trying to convince the 
mainstream. For people like myself, indigenizing means claiming our voices through the 
religious discourse, it is not a patronizing discourse against others.” He cites how a direct 
engagement of American Muslim scholars like himself, Dr. Jackson, and HamzaYusuf 
with their counterparts in the Muslim world, in platforms such as a recent colloquium 
organized by Abdullah bin Bayyah’s Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim 
Communities in Abu Dhabi, through the direct medium of Arabic language is an 
important step toward authenticating American Muslim voices. 
                                                          
524
 Ibid., pp. 91- 92.  
371 
 
As Edward Curtis’ critique of Orientalist/Islamicist discussions of Islamic civilization 
and local cultures implied, this tension has been a dominant feature in academic circles as 
well: “The central plot of Islamic studies thus became the clash between ‘Muslim 
civilization’ and local cultures, between the universal and the provincial. While this type 
of Orientalism raised a number of problematic empirical issues, it also crossed an ethical 
line, since it placed scholars in the position of determining the essential, and by 
implication, the true Islam.”525   
Ani Zonneveld, the co-founder of Los Angeles based Muslims for Progressive Values 
(MPV) argues that in MPV’s prayers spaces, “…families may pray together (like we do 
in Mecca), women may lead co-ed congregations, and mixed faith and LGBTQ Muslims 
are welcomed.”526 Zonneveld’s references to the ‘authentic’ Meccan practice of mixed 
gender prayer spaces as well orthodox Sunni women activists’ invocation of “Prophet’s 
mosque” in their calls for an end to gender discrimination, if not mixed-gender prayer, at 
American mosques both rely on early Islam as the authentic, unadulterated, Islam. At the 
same time, as the old and cultured Islam is invoked to support certain positions, it is also 
simultaneously refuted and excluded. The “back home” category and what is meant by 
“home” is a prominent debate and one of the most salient symbolic references that 
dominate identity claims among American Muslims. In these instances the category of 
back home frequently refers to a “regressive” type.  
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Figure 44: “Back-home Bro,” Superhanallah, An American Muslim Webcomic527 
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As Figure 44 portrays, “the back-home bro,” and the frequent references to “uncles and 
aunties” in the American Muslim parlance is associated with those viewpoints that have 
failed to successfully integrate in the American landscape, such as gender inequality and 
polygamy. In a 2005 “Muslim Declaration of Independence,” Muslim Public Affairs 
Council (MPAC) President Salam Al-Marayati argues that, “It is time to establish and 
strengthen the Western roots of Muslim communities, as opposed to living off the 
respiration of transplanted roots from “back home.””528 A prominent Southern California 
Imam, Yassir Fazaga, argues that back home mentality is among the reasons that ail 
American Mosques and push the youth away from religious congregations: “A good 
number of immigrants have not made peace with the fact that America is home. This has 
resulted in the creation of the ‘back home mentality.’ In this stage, immigrants try to 
bring what was happening back home to the US.”529 According to Sherman Jackson, even 
when it tries to speak to American issues, immigrant Islam, that is associated with back-
home mentality of the immigrant Muslims in the United States, targets scholarly and lay 
audiences in the Middle East and Asia.
530
  Jackson argues that “Muslims who came to 
America post-1965, still smarting from the dislocations of the colonial experience, tended 
to equate the preservation of a “back-home” vision and ethos with the preservation of a 
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normative Muslim identity, especially as their numbers reached critical mass and they felt 
themselves able to recreate the ways of their fathers on American soil.”531  
While it is possible to trace these approaches in the discourses that call for a “divorce 
from ‘back-home mentality,’’ the very same circles also seek a parallel process of 
authentication and perceive themselves as true representatives of Islam. These arguments 
and discourses around immigrant vs. indigenous Muslims are reminiscent of debates that 
dominated Catholic Church at the turn of twentieth century. Laurence Moore argues that 
“Americanization” was the dominant ethos that defined Catholic American mainstream:” 
…most histories of the Catholic church have made heroes of the so-called Americanizers, 
also referred to as “liberals,” who wanted to strip away as quickly as possible every 
feature of the church that suggested foreignness or an ideological antipathy to American 
institutions. This point of view….required the scapegoating of nineteenth-century 
“conservative clerics, who, it was alleged, viewed American democracy and it active, 
melioristic spirit with grave suspicion. They unwisely insisted on treating certain 
“foreign” elements in the church as integral parts of the universal faith rather than as 
anachronistic survivals from a past better forgotten. The criticism of the “conservatives” 
has gone rather far, even so far as to suggest that the anti-modernism of Catholic priests 
was more responsible for the delayed upward mobility of American Catholic immigrants 
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than the anti-Catholic campaigns waged by American nativists.
532
  
And yet, when alternative interpretative frameworks are at play, authenticity and claims 
to orthodoxy, i.e. to “true Islam,” can take divergent forms of expression in normative 
and lived manifestations of Muslimness, from how people dress and ask to be dressed to 
the nomenclature they adopt in their daily lives. Below, I focus on some of the vignettes 
from my fieldwork about these expressions. These vignettes highlight that beyond being 
confined to dualities between immigrant and indigenous or born Muslim and convert 
Americans, inter-subjective discussions about culture span multiple contexts and meaning 
frameworks. 
At Ta’leef however, the category of back-home attains a dual meaning. The first order of 
meaning associated with immigrant mentality is often criticized and yet those aspects of 
back home are glorified. The character traits of the Saints, and travel stories Usama 
Canon seamlessly incorporates in his lectures are loaded with references to “Islamic” 
ways of being. On the other hand, Usama Canon refers not only to Islamic lands such as 
Yemen, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Japan, with its utmost attention to detail and 
precision, takes on importance in his lectures, as an embodiment of noble character.  
On June 2, 2013 he was back in Fremont. He had just landed off of his plane that brought 
him back from umra – the non-obligatory, lesser pilgrimage to Mecca. Joined by two of 
his companions, Robert and Usman from Houston, Texas, who would share their 
experiences later that night with references to gatherings at Habib Umar’s house in 
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Madina, Usama Canon gave a passionate lecture about what Ta’leef embodies. In his 
own account of the gatherings at Habib Umar’s house, which followed a critical lecture 
on how to overcome “self-entitlement,” Canon argued that “visiting the Muslim-majority 
countries and seeing the centuries-old traditions is beautiful.” Generosity, respect for 
elders, and proper generational positioning for him were ways that would help fight 
entitlement that poisons contemporary youth.  
Founders of Ta’leef develop a similar emphasis on process over event when they discuss 
“American Islam.” According to Usama Canon American Islam is traditional and modern 
at the same time and at its core needs to simultaneously draw on sacred and secular 
perspectives and texts. It is only when American Muslims can relate to the civil rights 
struggle of African Americans they can overcome the vices of racism that poisons inner-
city and suburban communities alike. In this vein, the historical self understanding at 
Ta’leef is one that seeks to transcend what Sherman Jackson describes as a “seemingly 
unbridgeable chasm”533 that sets apart historical perspectives of African American and 
immigrant Muslims. Founders of Ta’leef, along with many contemporary convert-
scholars, call out immigrant Muslims for their seeming disregard for the problem of 
racism. 
On the other hand, these approaches to American Islam address what Sherman Jackson 
identifies as a central problem: Both immigrant and African American communities are 
unable to think of themselves as “objects of the West” and are “locked in a racial and 
ethnic essentialism.” While this is not entirely their fault and has a lot to do with “white 
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dehumanization of not only immigrants but also non-White Westerners, both groups have 
been unable to think of themselves as authentic members of the Western civilization and 
embrace their Western heritages.” In turn, both groups, have a developed a paradoxical 
relationship with authenticity. They tried to locate authenticity in “some absolute 
otherness which is grounded in a fixed and permanent essence that was fully instantiated 
long before any contact with the Modern West.”534 On the other hand, because of its post-
colonial roots, Immigrant Islam sought to dominate the American Muslim landscape 
whereas their Blackamerican brethren sought to liberate themselves from impositions of 
white supremacy. In the same vein as what Ta’leef envisions for American Islam, 
Sherman Jackson argues that if immigrant Muslims can prioritize process over event, 
routes over roots and see themselves as products of the process of modernity, their Post-
colonial tendencies can be weakened. This would produce the conditions for immigrant 
Muslims and the Blackamericans to envision themselves as the products of the same 
historical process; and “join forces as part of the corrective conscience of the West, a new 
Western consciousness committed to liberating both itself and humanity  from the 
debilitating self-alienation and idolatry imposed by the false universals of white 
supremacy.”535 
These discourses on conversion and discursive practices on American Islam ties back to 
Edward Curtis’s discussion of the tension between particularism and universalism in 
ancient and contemporary Muslim communities. Curtis pays particular attention to how 
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African American Muslims’ self understanding across these spectrums evolved over 
time. Curtis emphasizes however, that this tension is not exclusive to African American 
Muslim, nor it is a contemporary phenomenon. He uses examples from early Islamic 
history to portray how the Kharijites used notions of egalitarianism and exclusivity in 
simultaneously, paradoxical ways and why its egalitarian discourse appealed to African 
Muslims of the time. Today, the debate on the appeal of Salafism among African 
American Muslims, especially in prisons, fails to properly cite these early Islamic 
experiences.  
If the history of Islam is in part that of “one discursive tradition” that Muslims have 
constantly redefined and contested over time and in space, Curtis argues, we are enabled 
to take into consideration the competing and contrasting historical experiences and 




Nation of Islam, Imam W.D. Muhammad and Mainstreaming of African American 
Muslim 
 
“…we are not a gang of hoodlums, we are a group of men rooted in Africa and living in 
America. We are strong, proud. We are an entity, a presence. We are a force, and we 
must be dealt with.…We are voices, and we must be heard.” 
Kareem Said, Episode 1, HBO’s The OZ 
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Kareem Said appears in the pilot episode, The Routine, of noted HBO Series, The OZ. He 
claims to be a political prisoner, for he sets up an explosion in a white store. When told in 
the Emerald City section of the Oz, he does not get any special treatment for his 
“celebrity status”, he responds: “…how ironic; to finally be an equal in a place where I 
do not have the freedom to enjoy it.” Kareem is the author of several books; and the 
scene continues with five Muslim prisoners waiting for him on the lower level from the 
Warden’s office, repeating, Alhamdulillah…They wear throughout the series the kufis 
and the rosaries that signifies African American Muslimness in the OZ. 
In this section I discuss discourses and debates in my institutions about African American 
Islam and the African American Muslims’ historical experiences. I employ Curtis’s 
framework to discuss three seminal figures of African American Islam, Elijah 
Muhammed, Malcolm X, and Imam W.D. Muhammed and examine where they stood in 
relation to questions of particularism and universalism to contextualize these discourses 
and debates in historical perspective. Often invoked by both African American, 
immigrant and white convert scholars and leaders, both in mosque and non-mosque 
settings, these views figure importantly into the umma discourses.  
The general debate on American Islam has increasingly taken a historicized nature. Islam 
in America is largely immigrant and yet there is a story of genesis. And this story ties 
strongly with the racialized, indigenized version that is dominant today. It starts with 
African Muslim slaves who were brought to America. Settlement did not start in the 
1960s, it started in Antebellum America. As I have previously highlighted, the African 
slave trade and the long forgotten, largely ignored story of these slaves serve to 
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emphasize Islam in America is indigenous, not extrinsic, not alien and foreign. The 
tension between immigrant Islam and indigenous Islam, between the categories of 
Muslim-American and American-Muslim is exhibited in these narratives. On the other 
hand, these narratives rarely do justice to the painful histories of African American 
slaves. As Curtis points out, these men and women suffered a lot and yet failed to 
overcome the proselytizing and forceful conversion that was dominant in Antebellum 
America. While they were not able to embody the elements of an American faith 
community or transfer its generations down to the next generations
537
 it is noteworthy 
that contemporary American Muslim imaginations have given the African Muslim slaves 
a new life, a new reality, and a new historical mission that is central to the self-
consciousness of their religious brethren a century after their first arrival in the New 
Continent.  
The African American’s engagement and interaction with Islam and immigrant Muslims 
finds its place at the center of contemporary identity debates. Paradoxically, the primary 
agents of this debate are the second and third generation immigrant Muslims, much more 
so than the African American Muslims themselves. While “blackAmerican” Muslims are 
engaged in this conversation and struggle to not allow their experiences be trivialized, the 
identity debate is of paramount importance for the immigrants and their offspring. Imam 
Jihad Saafir, the son of an African American imam in south Los Angeles who now leads 
and transforms his father’s old community, signaled how his approach to the identity 
debate is different than the immigrant Muslims. “They can continue to emphasize we are 
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American…I don’t have to do that. I am American and it comes naturally to me…My 
immediate concern [in educational settings] is to fight off drugs, foul language…My 
reality here is different.”538  
Imam W.D.’s influence in bringing mass conversion of proto-Islamic Nation of Islam 
(NOI) into the fold mainstream Sunni Islam finds a strong reception in immigrant 
institutions. At Ta’leef, this is particularly noted. Imam Suhaib Webb similarly 
emphasizes this phenomenon frequently; if it was not for pioneers in NOI and Imam 
W.D., Islam’s continuity in America would not be a sure thing. This point missed 
important interactions that the immigrant Muslims had not only with Imam W.D. but also 
with his father, and with Malcolm X. According to Curtis, when immigrants and other 
African American Muslims of the 1950s challenged Elijah Muhammed on his 
unorthodox teachings, he choose to further entrench his movement in those elements that 
seemed off to outsiders along with his black particularism. The primary voice of this 
response was no one other than Malcolm X, who “confronted Muhammad’s critics on 
their own terms – that is by trying to use Old World Islamic traditions to justify 
Muhammad’s beliefs” upon which he “came to care far more about Muslims outside of 
the movement and about the traditions of Old World Islam.” 539 Curtis argues that this 
process shaped Malcolm X’s interactions not only with non-NOI Muslims but his later 
perceptions and eventual adaptation of orthodox Islam.
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Imam W.D. Community continues to respect and honor Elijah Muhammad. According to 
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the accepted belief in the current W.D. community, Elijah Muhammad saw a dream when 
he was 40, and was told in his dream by W.D. Fard – his mentor – that his eldest son 
would come to be a great leader. This is why, according to the version which was told by 
Imam Benjamin Bilal at the ISBCC on September 28 2012 during the Friday halaqah 
entitled “From the Nation to the Umma,” Imam W.D. came to be one of the greatest 
leaders in American Islam. Imam Bilal is an African American convert into Islam from 
Judaism and a student of Imam W.D. Muhammad on Qur’anic English who also led a 
workshop on his expertise at Masjid Al Qur’an the same weekend he was at the ISBCC. 
In his account, Elijah Mohammed first tolerated his son Wallace’s criticisms, and while 
ejecting him from the movement at certain lengths, accepted him back in to the 
movement closer to his death. It was this “wisdom” of Elijah, the version goes, that 
allowed Imam W.D. to claim the leadership of NOI upon his father’s death in 1975 and 
eventually bring thousands of Muslims, among them Imam Bilal himself, over a 
conference call into the fold of mainstream Islam, therefore initiating the Third 
Resurrection.  
As mentioned before, the Ahmadiyya movement was influential in its missionary 
activities and the Detroit – Chicago axis was no exception to this. Elijah Muhammed who 
had a troubled experience in Detroit’s booming industrial sector after joining the Great 
Migration to the West is believed to have met W.D. Fard at this stage, in 1930. While 
Curtis and other scholars complain from lack of sources to authenticate W.D. Fard’s 
identity, NOI’s self-histories argue that Elijah adopts this mythical man of some Middle 
Eastern descent as the Messiah and designates himself as his main messenger. While 
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Elijah Muhammed would continue to use Gulam Ahmad’s translation of the Qur’an in his 
teachings, his inspiration was in the image of W.D. Fard who mysteriously disappears in 
Chicago in 1934.
541
 The issue of Ghulam Ahmed prophethood and his close follower and 
later leader of the Lahori branch of Ahmadiyya Movement Maulana Muhammed Ali’s 
translation and its centrality has also spurred a flurry of debates between the North 
American Ahmediyya movement and Zaytuna’s Hamza Yusuf. When Yusuf 
acknowledged Muhammed Ali’s service in a talk but then retracted his positive portrayal 
following criticisms from scholars and experts he trusts
542
, the representatives of the 
movement pushed back against Yusuf, accusing him of opening the way for further 
persecution and excommunication of Ahmadiyya Muslims.
543
 I will further examine this 
debate and its implications for the identity debates in Chapters 4 and 5. But it is important 
to note here that Imam W.D. Muhammed worked hard to refute the teachings not only of 
his father’s master, W.D. Fard, but also Ahmadi Muslims.544  
While W.D. Fard is still veneered among Imam W.D. Muhammed’s followers with the 
title Master Fard Muhammed, Imam W.D. held that his father’s depiction of W.D. Fard 
as a deity, God in person, and himself as his Prophet was flawed and emphasizes that his 
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father had privately wrestled with his teacher’s doctrine and privately rejected it. Going 
back to Detroit in the 1930s, one of the most detailed and earliest accounts on W.D. Fard 
is noteworthy in its depiction of W.D. Fard. Erdman D.  Beynon’s 1938 article in the 
American Journal of Sociology provides an interesting insight into how W.D. Fard, a 
peddler reportedly from Saudi Arabia, captured the imaginations of black Americans. 
The back home concept, which refers to Mecca in W.D. Fard’s teachings, also figures in 
Fard’s speeches which initially took place in homes and gradually moved to rented halls 
proportionate with the expansion of his followers.
545
 While Beynon’s account is detailed 
in its ethnographic description of W.D. Fard’s early community in Detroit, he does not 
provide much insight into Elijah Muhammed’s encounter with Fard. One explanation for 
this is that Elijah Muhammed moves to Chicago upon death of W.D. Fard and according 
to Beynon his assumption of the leadership is not a smooth process. Beynon notes that 
upon Fard’s disappearance the movement becomes more amorphous. He notes that Fard’s 
followers whom he interviewed claim that Fard had given the name Elijah Karriem, not 
Elijah Muhammed, instead of his born name Elijah Poole to his leading student who had 
moved to Chicago and established a movement called the Temple People. In an interview 
he gave Elijah Muhammed actually accepts this but claims that one year before his 
disappearance W.D. Fard gave him the surname Muhammad, saying “I will give you a 
better name than Karriem, you take Muhammed, my name.”546  
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The question of authority emerges also in this proto-Islamic movement. Beynon notes 
that one of Elijah Muhammed’s deputies, Theodore Rozier, was especially opposed by 
those who rejected Muhammed’s movement because he received revelation second – due 
to the fact that he never saw W.D. Fard but only learnt about his teachings through Elijah 
Muhammed.
547
 As Imam Muhammed assumed the leadership of NOI in February 25, 
1975, at the annual Saviors Day convention one day after the passing of Elijah 
Muhammed, he commenced a long and well thought transformation of the community. 
According to Benjamin Bilal those outside the NOI community would have difficulty 
contemplating the sheer extent of this transformation and of the psyche of Elijah 
Muhammed’s followers: “We faced a reality where the person we took as the supreme 
guide, as the Prophet who thought us what he know based on his learning from God in 
Person, W.D. Fard, was dead. It was too difficult to even accept that he had died.” Amin 
Nathari recounts that day as a 10 year-old member of the NOI. His father was a Nation of 
Islam Minister in Newark, and he grew up aspiring to join the Fruit of Islam (FOI), the 
Nation’s paramilitary youth wing. As a student of the University of Islam, Nathari 
recounts how the day before he was supposed to join another 3000 members of NOI in 
Jersey City to watch the Saviors Day gathering via closed circuit television, his world 
was shattered by famed journalist Walter Cronkite’s announcement of a breaking news 
story on CBS: “Elijah Muhammed, the leader of the Nation of Islam and Black Muslims 
has died of congestive heart failure in Chicago. He was 77 years old.”  
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Figure 45: Saviors Day Announcement, Muhammad Speaks, February 7, 1975; Vol.14, 
No: 23. 
 
Nathari, in complete denial of the news awaits an assurance from his father, who had 
travelled to Chicago to attend Saviors’ Day. The call comes later that night confirming 
the news but assuring the young Nathari that the Nation would have a new leader the next 
day. Nathari reports that his future conversation with his father revealed that the upper 
echelons of NOI always knew that Imam Warith Deen Muhammed would assume the 
leadership. While Nathari’s account does not mention Benjamin Bilal’s version on the 
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prophecy of W.D. Fard, events next day confirm, to the surprise of many, a new chapter 
in the history of NOI. Imam W.D. Muhammad, in his first interview as the Chief Minister 
of the Nation of Islam that was announced on the cover of March 21, 1975 issue of 
Muhammad Speaks, “I was Born for the Mission,” recounts another version of this 
prophecy. Imam W.D tells that his mother told him that “...before I was born, while I was 
growing in her, my name was put on the door, on the back of the door in chalk by Master 
W.F. Muhammad. He told her and my father that the baby would be a boy and a helper to 
his father. I recall also my father telling me many times that he asked for a boy and was 
told that he would get a boy. He wanted a boy to help him in his work. He was asked to 
give the promise that if he received a boy he would let the boy help him in his work.” 548  
 According to Nathari, many NOI members thought the runner-uppers for the post would 
include the then Minister Louis Farrakhan, who was leading Temple No. 7 in Harlem and 
had been the National Representative and most visible face of the NOI since Malcolm 
X’s departure from Elijah Muhammed’s movement. Other contenders included Minister 
Yusuf Shah of Temple No.2 in Chicago.
549
 It should be remembered that the prominent 
scholar of Black Muslims – a term that was coined by him and later adopted by Elijah 
Muhammad in reference to NOI– , Eric Lincoln predicts a power struggle upon Elijah 
Muhammed’s death as early as 1961.550 His detailed account of the movement and 
critical writing based on interviews with Elijah Muhammed, Malcolm X, and the then 
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Minister Louis X along with other figures in the NOI hierarchy shed important light on 
what would happen in the short time period following Elijah Muhammed’s death in 
February 25, 1975. Lincoln notes that while the NOI presented a monolithic face to those 
outside the movement, it was inevitable that tensions within the movement would 
emerge. Lincoln reports that Elijah Muhammad seemed untroubled with the future 
direction of the movement, noting “Allah will see that the work is carried on.” On the 
other hand, Lincoln notes the schism that emerged upon disappearance of W.D. Fard in 
1934, and cautions that “[H]e must sense, as any observers do, that the struggle for 
succession is already on and that the image of the united front that the Black Nation has 
labored so hard to build will once again be fractured when the Messenger’s voice is heard 
no more. It will be interesting to see who, if anyone, will be able to pick up the pieces and 
fit them together again.”551 Malcolm X occupies the lion’s share in Lincoln’s power 
analysis of Nation of Islam. Because of his organizing and oratory skills, and his 
unceasing devotion to the leader, no one seems better placed and more adept for the helm 
after Elijah Muhammad. Only three years after Lincoln finished his book however, 
Malcolm would leave the organization he was so dedicated to between 1952 and 1964. I 
will examine Malcolm, and how he is imagined by Ta’leef and other leading voices, 
including Imam Suhaib Webb for whom Malcolm was a major influence in naming both 
his son and his educational institute, in the following pages. Returning to the events of 
February 26, 1975 and Lincoln’s analysis, it is evident that Lincoln’s foresight was on 
point. Minister Louis X, at the time from Boston’s Temple No.#11, and Raymond 
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Sharrieff, Elijah Muhammed’s son-in-law and the Supreme Captain of the mighty, 
secretive FOI, along with Lucius X of Washington, D.C., and Isaiah Karriem of 
Baltimore are others whom Lincoln considers to be near the center. Lincoln also talks 
about Wallace D. Muhammad, the future W.D. Muhammad, who would end up finishing 
the race for leadership ahead of others. In 1960, Wallace D. was the minister of Temple. 
No.#12 in Philadelphia and in Lincoln’s account had been travelling extensively to 
spread his Father’s message. Nathari’s narration would include these names and March 
14, 1975 issue of Muhammad Speaks would include a news article titled “‘Undying 
Support’ for Undying Leadership,” where some of these names would be pictured from 
the Savior’s Day “pledging support” for the Spiritual and Administrative leader Wallace 
D. Muhammad, with a line referring to prophecy: “In his opening remarks, the Nation of 
Islam’s National Secretary, Abass Rassoull announced that the mantle of leadership of 
the Nation has fallen to Minister Wallace D. Muhammad, 41, the Messenger’s seventh 
child, and second youngest son. It was pointed out that the young minister had been 
selected, even prior to his birth, to aid the Honorable Elijah Muhammad upon his 
maturity.”552  As I will explain in the following pages, in the 10 year period from 1965 to 
1975, Wallace D. would leave the movement or be excommunicated by his Father just 
like Minister James of Atlanta’s Temple No.# 15. Unlike Minister James however, 
Wallace would be allowed to come back and serve, in part thanks to W.D. Fard’s 
prophecy.   
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Figure 46: “Undying Support for Undying Leadership” Muhammed Speaks, March 14, 
1975 
 
Scholars of Nation of Islam spent considerable amount of energy to figure out the 
emotions and motives of Louis Farrakhan on that day. Farrakhan, a former disciple of 
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Malcolm X, would replace him and side squarely with Elijah Muhammed when Malcolm 
starts to incriminate Elijah Muhammad of indecency and fooling his followers. It is 
crucial to note that weeks before the 1975 Savior’s Day Farrakhan becomes a relative to 
the “Prophet.” On January 28, 1975 Farrakhan’s two daughters, Maria and Donna, marry 
a grandson, Alif, and nephew, Minister Wali, of the Honorable Elijah Muhammad. 
Muhammad Speaks publishes a news story including many pictures from the wedding in 
its February 14 issue and introduces the marriage from its cover with the title, “Two 
Great Families United: Muhammad’s, Farrakhan’s.” The paper’s editor of the time, 
Charles 67X, pens his column that week on the marriage of two families. After a long 
section on how Elijah Muhammad’s family stood by him for long years, he argues that 
Farrakhan from his early days in Boston onward stood by Elijah Muhammad. Reading in 
retrospect the column seems to carry not only signs of Elijah Muhammad’s ailing health 
who is introduced as “the eternal head of all Black families in North America,” but also 
of the power struggle in the upper echelons of NOI.  It is crucial to note that the same 
issue’s cover would also carry Wallace Muhammad. Chicago’s mayor of the time, 
Richard J. Daley had announced that the soon-to-turn-historic day, February 26, 1975 
would be proclaimed to be “The Nation of Islam Day in Chicago,” and the announcement 
ceremony was attended by Wallace Muhammed, “on behalf of his father the Honorable 
Elijah Muhammad.”553 It was also announced the same week that mayors of Oakland and 
Berkeley in California and Atlanta, Georgia had also proclaimed a day in honor of Elijah 
Muhammad and Gary, Indiana’s mayor had proclaimed a week for the ailing leader. 
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Massachusetts Governor had words of encouragement for the Nation’s work in 
Springfield where Malcolm X had founded Temple No.13. Among those that were 
thanked were the mayors of Newark, New Jersey and Los Angeles, California for their 
proclamations that honored the work of Elijah Muhammad. In other words, towards the 
end of his life Elijah Muhammad had managed to garner respect and recognition from the 
political establishment of America’s major cities and its strength in the inner-cities were 
considerably felt. This would not change soon but the dynamics of the relationship would 
witness a paramount shift under the leadership of Wallace Muhammad.  
 
Malcolm X: Bridging The Immigrant-Indigenous Divide? 
 
The question of Malcolm X’s authority and relationship to American Muslim identity, as 
well as his “tokenization” by immigrant Muslims through a “parochial” understanding of 
his transnationalist legacy has been the subject of several critically acclaimed studies.
554
 
In the section below, I highlight several vignettes from my own fieldwork and explore 
some of these criticisms. Once again, my immediate attention is on how questions of 
authority and inter-communal dynamics are negotiated in my research sites. 
Ta’leef organized an event entitled “Passing the Baton: The Life and Legacy of Malcolm 
X” at its Fremont headquarters on May 19, 2013. The date signified the birthday of 
Malcolm, who was born Malcolm Little in Omaha, Nebraska in 1925. Only two days ago 
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Malcolm’s grandson, named after him, was buried in Oakland, about 30 miles north of 
Fremont.
555
 The young Malcolm Shabazz had settled in the Bay Area and was trying to 
get over his problems. Imam Zaid would mention in his talk that it was the Bay Area’s 
Muslim community who had raised forty thousand dollars in a short time to appraise the 
body and transport it from Mexico City where Shabazz was killed after an altercation at a 
bar. 
 The two speakers of the event were bright stars of the American Muslim convert scene. 
Imam Zaid Shakir, the Chairman of the Board of Ta’leef, an African American scholar 
activist as we have seen before in the chapter on Zaytuna and Dr. Umar Faruq Abd-Allah. 
Travelling from Chicago, Dr. Umar, as he is commonly referred to, also leads Ta’leef’s 
Chicago weekly lectures when he is not travelling to Ghana-Zambia to visit his Shaykh. 
Both Dr. Umar and Imam Zaid are widely recognized names that can draw upwards of 
hundreds of Muslims to any event. Dr. Umar would stay in the Bay Area the next five 
days, teaching a workshop on his “Living Islam with Purpose” article at Ta’leef. The 
arguments in this paper, and a preceding one, Islam and the Cultural Imperative, as we 
will see below, have been influential in the debates around indigenization and 
development of American Muslim identity and cultural tradition. Ta’leef’s main hall was 
full, as usual the dividers between the men and the women were pushed to the limits. The 
night had started earlier with the usual mawlid. It was perhaps the aura of Imam Zaid and 
Dr. Umar that the audience, significantly packed than usual, seemed more ascetic, more 
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focused, singing along more strongly. Usama Canon preceded the mawlid as usual, he 
interrupted his singing though when he realized his assistant was walking in someone, 
with the traditional scarf that is worn over the shoulders by the Habaib. He walks up and 
greet him warmly, the individual who was not recognized by name but as a visitor from 
overseas, walks up the platform and greets those who are sitting up front. This seems 
strange to me not least because the rhythm of the mawlid is interrupted but also because 
the guest indeed takes his time to walk up to those who are concentrated on the hymns 
and greet them. When the mawlid is over the room is quickly reorganized for the 
program. Mustafa Davis and his assistant Jeremy Abdul Malik Stern set up their cameras. 
Almost all events at Ta’leef are meticulously recorded. Like many others this event 
would later be uploaded online as part of Ta’leef Media series.556  
What does Malcolm mean for the American Muslim experience? Was Malcolm a 
Garveyite revolutionary, a black nationalist, a civil rights activist, a Pan-Africanist, or a 
Muslim internationalist? What was Malcolm’s legacy for the African American 
Muslims? Imam Zaid and Dr. Umar engaged many of these questions in their talks. It 
was an emotional topic for both. Dr. Umar’s conversion to Islam, while a graduate 
student at Cornell University in 1970, was closely tied to Malcolm’s autobiography. He 
had not believed in anything for 6 years before he had to read Malcolm’s autobiography 
for a paper assignment. He goes on to note that it was a required reading in the 60s and 
70s, which has changed. He argues that the book co-authored by Malcolm and Alex 
Haley needs to be brought back into the curricula. He had known Malcolm as a socialist, 
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and reading the book was a life-changer for him. He was especially shaken when he read, 
“Islam takes away fear.” Dr. Umar notes that he had been dealing with his own fears 
about the meaning of life and reading that quote from Malcolm was earth-shattering for 
him and he thought to himself, “if this is good for you, it is good for me.” What is rather 
strange about the impact of Malcolm’s book, Dr. Umar notes, was that even though he 
had studied the history of Andalus, Ottoman Empire and the West African Islam in the 
past, it was Malcolm who “changed” him.  
Dr. Umar’s narrative of Malcolm’s impact on his own story crosses paths with his 
influence on the life-story of American Muslim communities. “He is the father of rebirth 
of Islam in this part of the world,” he proclaims. Dr. Umar is a serious historian. While 
Malcolm is an emotionally charged topic for him, his analysis is noteworthy. He argues 
that as someone who paid much attention to institution building Malcolm was more than 
instrumental in making NOI the vastly successful network of institutions that it was. 
From Lincoln to Curtis that is an observation that was shared by historians of the 
movement. Lincoln notes: “In directing the complex affairs of the rapidly growing Black 
Nation – coordinating its program, managing its economic enterprises, founding new 
temples, and so on – he [Elijah Muhammad] relies on the closely knit inner circle of 
Muslim leaders. Foremost of these is his chief aide, Minister Malcolm X 
Shabazz…Malcolm is an indefatigable organizer and speaker…He organizes new 
temples, pumps spirit and encouragement into the missions or newly founded cell groups, 
conducts rallies and fundraising campaigns and serves as Muhammad’s general trouble-
396 
 
shooter and spokesman.”557 Imam Zaid only takes Dr. Umar’s emphasis on institution-
building further. “When Malcolm joined the NOI, the Nation had a handful of temples 
and no press outlet, he started Muhammad Speaks, he connected NOI to larger African 
American intellectuals,” he urges the mostly young audience at Ta’leef. This event is not 
a mere commemoration; it is also an educational moment where the audience is told 
about a particular narrative on the historical trajectory of the African American Muslim 
experience in the United States. Both speakers are cognizant that the audience may not 
know Malcolm and the history of NOI deeply. Imam Zaid, in his particularly emotional 
speech notes the historical importance of Malcolm’s journey into Sunni Islam.  “NOI,” he 
notes, “for all its faults, transformed the history of this country and the civil rights 
movement. Malcolm, despite some of the good teachings of NOI, had the courage to 
leave when he found out about real Islam.” Imam Zaid starts to get emotional after 
reporting what Betty Shabazz, Malcolm’s wife, told an audience in the 96th Street 
Mosque [Islamic Cultural Center of New York] in New York City: “Nationalists claimed 
Malcolm, socialists claimed Malcolm, it is time Muslims claim Malcolm!” According to 
Imam Zaid Muslims had not paid enough attention to Malcolm’s legacy after his 
martyrdom in 1965. He then brings the discussion to the theme of the night: “Malcolm 
was saddened, he was disheartened but he believed and continued to commit…It was 
difficult,” says Imam Zaid, at this point his voice is shaking and he has tears in his eyes. 
“But Malcolm never stopped, are we going to drop the baton? Or carry it forward? True 
martyr is one that stands for truth and does not give an inch…Martyr is not those that 
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blow themselves at masjids and in marketplaces.” At the end of the event, during the 
question and answer session, Imam Zaid would return to this theme of Malcolm’s 
martyrdom and his activism. Responding to a question on what lessons could be drawn 
from Malcolm’s relationship with non-Muslim communities, he urges the audience to 
connect with regular people, the way Malcolm did. “It only takes knocking on the door, 
joining the next march in support of undocumented immigrants, stopping human 
trafficking.” The activist Imam gets fired up, “I met an angry young man recently, he 
wanted to join the Jihad he told me…You have the courage to get shot half-way around 
the world, but not knock on your neighbor’s door!?”  
The Dr. Umar tells the audience that 1965, Malcolm’s assassination, was a major setback, 
a loss, a tragedy for American Muslims. But simultaneously, notes Dr. Umar, the same 
tragedy brought lots of people into Islam in America – a country that was a white 
supremacist country that was not receptive to non Europeans before immigration quotas 
changed the very same year.  
 
The Leadership of Imam W.D. Muhammad and his Aftermath 
 
American Muslims frequently ponder and speculate on hypothetical scenarios. What 
would American Muslim trajectories look like if 9/11 had not happened? Would the 
community continue on the path of semi-isolated, successful minority community 
footing? What would it look like not having had to deal with the implications of 
invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq? Among these conjectural scenarios is one that takes 
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the calendars back to 1965. Had Malcolm not have stepped onto that platform at the 
Audubon Ballroom on February 21, 1965 – and there are reports that he was unwilling to 
take the stage that night, that he had sensed something would go wrong and had even told 
a professor who had invited him for a talk to his campus that he would be dead by the 
time of the invitation which was a week after the scheduled Organization of African 
American Unity event – where would his Mosque Incorporated evolve into? Would it 
still be possible for Wallace Muhammad to take the leadership at the death of his father 
or would he rather join Malcolm’s organization? Would mosques such as Masjid 
Alhamdulillah actually be the flagship mosques rather than staying on the margins of the 
wider American Muslim scene? Would NOI ever be resurrected by Farrakhan? Could 
African American Muslims establish their dignity, their culture, and identity – an African 
American Imam identifies the lack of a cultural footing that goes back centuries as the 
main source of problems African Americans in general, and black Muslims in particular, 
have
558
 – without the “judgmental” oversight of immigrant Muslims?  
There is no way we could develop intelligible answers to these questions. And yet, 
looking at what happened and why these questions haunt African American Muslims 
provide meaningful pathways to understand African American Muslim community. In 
indexing the history and contemporary implications of the evolution of NOI under 
Wallace – later Wareeth Deen – Muhammad from a proto Islamic movement into a Sunni 
Muslim movement, I also touch on discussions around Islamic jurisprudence and 
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Orthodoxy. Imam W.D. Muhammad’s 33 years of tenure saw debates on whether he had 
truly relinquished a particularistic vision, whether his claim to be a mujaddid and that he 
has established a madhab are indications of non-orthodoxy. When Imam W.D. died in 
2008, he had largely de-centralized and even dissolved the once all-powerful, highly 
hierarchical structure of NOI.   
There are alternative explanations on how IWD came to assume the leadership of NOI on 
February 26, 1975. As I have mentioned before the prophecy of Fard Muhammad is one 
explanation. Dawn-Marie Gibson quotes IWD on the influence of this prophecy on his 
father after senior minister of the Nation recorded his preachings and presented them to 
The Messenger on his sick-bed:  
“They took him a tape. They thought they were going to get me 
excommunicated again. When he heard the tape his face lit up. And I’m 
telling you he was sick in those times. This wasn’t long before he 
died….His face lit up and he smiled….They were waiting at the head of 
the table to help him when he got ready to get up….He jumped up. ‘My 
son’s got it.’ He said, ‘My son’s got it. That boy can go anywhere on this 
earth and preach that gospel.”559  
 
According to Gibson the decision to choose the leadership lied with Elijah Muhammad’s 
family and the family had settled on the young Minister Wallace Muhammad and had it 
not been for this fact alone, W.D. Fard’s prophecy would not have affected the senior 
Ministers of NOI.  
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Imam Muhammad would make sure to speak of his father in respectful ways. This would 
also include Fard Muhammad. As he says in a series of articles entitled “The Second 
Resurrection,” published in the Muhammad Speaks only two months after becoming the 
Supreme Leader, Imam Muhammad sought to inject a new understanding of his Father 
who thought of himself as the messenger of God, who had appeared to him in the person 
of Fard Muhammad. “In the Nation of Islam, divine knowledge is of greatest importance. 
We, as Bilalian people, have always had hearts that were filled with compassion....but 
love without knowledge is not good enough to sustain us in this day and time,”560 wrote 
the then young leader. As I highlight in Chapter 2, although Imam Muhammad situated 
himself as a mujaddid (reviver) early on, the development of what some followers of 
Imam Muhammad call, a specific madhab (jurisprudential school), has taken on a long 
and unsystematic fashion. Imam W.D. Muhammad’s efforts to establish ties with 
immigrant Muslims and the Muslim majority countries were complemented by more 
practical steps at the community level. For example, some of his followers hold, he 
switched to the use of Yusuf Ali’s translation of Qur’an in order to move away from 
Ahmadi scholar Muhammad Ali’s translation that was preferred by his father.561 In later 
stages he embarked on developing his own interpretation of the Qur’an and putting down 
juristic positions and exegesis that took into account his followers’ sensibilities. Timur 
Yuskaev highlights that Muhammad’s tafsir (commentary) and translation of the Qur’an 
has been mostly an oral effort whereby the difference between the two categories was 
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often conflated by his followers. The largely vernacular interpretations
562
 and perceptions 
of Imam Muhammad’s life and transitions and transformations in his community was a 
work-in-progress at the time of his death on September 9, 2008. The popular media 
representations highlighted how Imam Muhammad had shifted away from a black 
theology into the fold of mainstream Sunni Islam and American civil religion at once, 
pointing out that he had become the first Muslim to deliver the invocation prayer of US 
Senate in 1992, and that he had met Pope John Paul II in 1996 and 1999.
563
 Within the 
Muslim American landscape, several African American intellectuals and popular voices 
weighed in on the post-W.D. Muhammad period. Imam Zaid Shakir argued that although 
W.D. Muhammed did not have the popularity of other African American and indigenous 
figures such as Siraj Wahhaj and Hamza Yusuf, his impact on American Muslim 
landscape was of paramount importance: 
“Perhaps the greatest work Imam Muhammad engaged in was his effort at 
“indigenizing” Islam in America. At a time when many converts to Islam 
were being led to believe that being Muslim involved dressing like an 
Arab or a Pakistani, and cultivating a bitter anti-Americanism, Imam 
Muhammad was encouraging his followers to wear business suits, make a 
strong commitment to their families, and to embrace America as full 
participants in her ongoing saga. His approach in the latter regard was not 
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in the spirit of an uncritical “Uncle Tomism.” Rather it was a realistic 
acknowledgment of the fact that whether we like it or not this is our 
country, and true Islamic teachings urge us to acknowledge that fact and to 
do all we can do to advance the common good. For Imam Muhammad, 
pursuit of the common good did not mean an abandonment of the right to 
criticize and dissent, for often the common good can only be attained 
through dissent in the defense of truth and principle. We should never 
abandon this position.”564 
Sherman Jackson wrote an essay whereby he highlighted yet again that prominent 
African American Muslim intellectuals, including himself and Imam Zaid, were 
examples of a particular type of brain-drain:  
“When we think across the spectrum of the most noted Blackamerican 
Muslim scholars – from myself to Zaid Shakir, from Aminah Wadud to 
Aminah McCloud – what we see is a veritable brain-drain out of the 
Blackamerican community into discourses and activities whose primary 
beneficiaries are not Blackamerican Muslims and or whose primary focus 
is not Blackamerican Muslim problems or concerns….Blackamerican 
Muslim scholars have a closer relationship with the immigrant community 
than they have with the community of Imam W.D. Mohammad.”565  
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Jackson suggested that there were understandable reasons for this, from the role of 
media’s attention on immigrant agendas to the financial ability of the immigrant 
community and the ability of the immigrant communities to validate scholars as scholars. 
He reflected on how Sunni African American Muslims in Philadelphia in the late 1970s 
looked down on Imam W.D. community. The noted scholar urged followers of Imam 
W.D. Muhammad to work harder to spread Islamic literacy among Blackamerican 
Muslims and encourage them to engage religion on their own. In response, several 
leading students of Imam W.D. Muhammad wrote their own responses to Jackson, urging 
for a period of introspective soul-searching. Imam Dawud Walid, a student of Imam 
W.D. Muhammad who has been serving as the Executive Director of CAIR’s Michigan 
Chapter since its inception, argued that Imam W.D. Muhammad himself was wary of the 
Islamic literacy among his followers, including some of the Imams but that Imam 
Muhammed’s language would be preserved by his followers: “Those who were deeply 
affected by Imam’s language won’t be overtaken by some foreign ideology. I have no 
worries about that.”566 As Chapters 2 and 3 highlights, some of these problems, across 
immigrant-indigenous axis as well as among different strands of African American 
Muslim communities, are highlighted in Boston as well as in the Bay Area. Moreover, as 
the discussion of White House and ISNA boycott debates in Chapter 4 underlines, at the 
national level African American community and its concerns are utilized to point out that 
American Muslims cannot afford to be “preoccupied with problems overseas.” And yet, 
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at the national and local level, despite cordial relationships and new forums whereby 
these communities come together, the divisions are influenced by cultural differences as 
well as how segments of both communities relate to religious knowledge and authority. 
Today, members of the Imam Warith Deen Muhammad community are struggling with 
the question of inter-generational survivability. Since Imam Muhammad’s death in 2008 
his blackAmerican Muslim community has been divided, with no clear leader in sight and 
in search of individual survival. Imam Taalib Mahdee at Masjid Al-Qur’an in Dorchester 
feels the pain. With part of Imam W.D.’s community siding with his son who runs 
Mosque Cares out of Chicago and others, including Imam Taalib, organizing under the 
banner of The Community of Imam W.D. Muhammad, negotiations along authority have 
turn inwards. At the same time, Imam Taalib seeks to emphasize that cultural 
particularities of Masjid Al Qur’an would continue. He is hopeful that a new generation 
of young leaders will carry the legacy of their particular historical experiences forward. 
These include not only their reliance on Imam Muhammad’s teachings and minhaj 
(path/methodology) but also cultural elements that have been embedded in the ethos of 
Masjid al Qur’an. “We have our culture” says Imam Taalib. “Jazz and bean pie is 
important for us. Some say there is no music in Islam, ok, but this is our culture. These 
brothers were here from early on man...Like I told them [other Muslims, both of 
immigrant and African American origin] about moon sighting...Your community needs to 
respect your decision, and you need to respect our decision.” These particularities also 
include the integral role of women at Masjid al Qur’an. “You cannot push the women to 
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the back here, it just won’t fly; whatever you bring form the Qur’an, it won’t convince 
them…they will say this is America.”  
In the next chapter, I highlight the widespread questions of inclusion and exclusion in the 
mosque spaces and how not only the women of Masjid al Qur’an, but an increasing 
number of American Muslim women, as well as leading religious authorities seek to 
make American mosques and community centers adhere to gender inclusiveness. The 
next chapter will also contextualize the expressions around maqasid and fiqh aqalliyat in 




CHAPTER 7- FIQH OF MINORITIES AND HIGHER OBJECTIVES 
OF DIVINE LAW: CULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS AND 




“Central challenge for Muslims in the U.S. and Canada  
is a cultural challenge, not a legal challenge.” 
Dr. Umar Faruq Abd-Allah, Ta’leef Collective, May 20, 2013 
 
In the self-narratives and discourses of my respondents, including those who place an 
emphasis on political notions, umma narratives are juxtaposed against contentious and 
divisive themes such as women’s place in mosques, intra-Muslim racism, and 
generational divisions. I examine the processes through which many of my interlocutors, 
including those who portray a politically active and transnational outlook, strongly 
emphasize and prioritize cultural categories while interpreting their situatedness as 
American Muslims.  
Second, I provide examples from my fieldwork about negotiations of negotiations of 
juristic categories such as maqasid (higher objectives of Islamic law), fiqh al-aqalliyat ( 
jurisprudence of minorities) and ‘urf (custom/tradition) at the popular and religious 
leader/academic level and follow alternative frameworks through which a diverse set of 
actors employ these categories in cultivating imaginations of American Muslims as a 
particular micro-community with specific needs, priorities, and cultural outlook that is 
different than other Muslim populations, in both Muslim-majority and minority contexts. 
For some of my respondents, the very viability of the future of Islam in America depends 
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on the success of this process, which, in turn, carries key implications for the future of 
Islam globally, as, at least for some of my respondents, American Muslims are imagined 
as key agents in the global process of renewal and reform in Islam. 
In his extensive examination of the development of fiqh al-aqalliyat, Said Fares Hassan 
points out to the prominent role a number of Arab, not indigenous, Muslim jurists and 
intellectuals played in developing key notions of the discourse of jurisprudence of 
Muslim minorities.
567
 Hassan highlights that especially the early activist immigrants with 
ties to political Islamist movements in Western European and North American context 
were instrumental in seeking to normalize and legitimize their new environments in non-
Muslim majority, secular-democratic legal-institutional contexts. These activists sought 
juristic rulings and insights from a number of scholars including figures such as one of 
the early pioneers of the fiqh al aqalliyat paradigm, Yusuf al-Qaradawi. As Hassan 
mentions, indigenous voices, although another key figure he examines in detail, Taha 
Jabir al-Alwani of Virginia can be considered within the fold of American scholarly 
networks per his position as a Chairman of ISNA’s Fiqh Council of North America, have 
been left outside the scope of his inquiry. In the following pages, I benefit from Hassan’s 
extensive survey of the development of the concept and through locating several features 
of the aqalliyat approach in the discursive landscape of indigenous communities and 
networks of scholars, I contribute to the literature through bringing indigenous voices, 
both scholarly and popular, into the picture.  
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Before proceeding in this manner, I will, however, first examine the maqasid approach 
and how a number of developments around Shari’ah discourses in the West has 
contributed to the popularization of various aspects of maqasid discourse, including the 
increasingly important role and place of the discussions around the concept of ‘urf as it 
relates to the dominant discursive debates around American Muslim identity and cultural 
imaginations of American Muslims as a particular Muslim community. Without doubt, I 
do not claim that my respondents developed a coherent discourse about fiqh al-aqalliyat. 
On the other hand, their interpretative engagements in navigating through their lives as 
religious minorities, certain tensions between their religious beliefs and legal context in 
which they live in and the ways in which they imagined themselves and their obligations 
in this context amount to an increased sensibility towards internalizing key components 
of the dominant discourses about jurisprudence of Muslim minorities. Importantly, in the 
mosque communities, weekend seminars, annual conventions and small study circles I 
have surveyed a number of religious leaders and public popular figures who frequently, if 
not systematically, invoked both maqasid and aqalliyat discourses. The tripartite 
categorization Hassan offers in relation to the study of jurisprudence of minorities also 
reveals that juristic interpretative engagement with the question of minorities is not only a 
phenomenon that is not merely modern and rather owes a lot to early Muslim jurists and 
experiences, but also that it is an eclectic discursive framework. He identifies three 
distinct approaches that have been developed within the Muslim scholarly networks in 
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Shari‘ah, Maqasid and One Nation Under God: The Middle/Balanced Umma 
 
In early July in 2015, a day after segments of Imam W.D. Muhammad Community 
celebrated New World Patriotism Day I visited Masjid Al-Qur’an. It was Ramadan and 
iftar was quite a spread provided by community members. Unlike at ISBCC, which 
attracted on average near a two hundred people during Ramadan, and Masjid 
Alhamdulillah, with upwards of 50 men on a nightly basis, there were about 12 people, 4 
women and eight men enjoying the menu. After prayers and the food, Imam Taaleb urged 
me to taste the bean-pie. “This is special, you will not find it anywhere else,” he noted. I 
was familiar with bean-pie, mostly from Brother Jamaal’s bean-pie sells at Ta’leef on 
Sunday nights. 
As we went on sharing the small piece of bean-pie, one of the community members 
around the table brought up the recent Supreme Court ruling legalizing gay-marriage. 
“Brother Imam,” he said, “I know we need to follow the law of the land, but what do we 
do?” “Nothing,” noted Imam Taalib. “You know they ask me this, and I know what they 
are trying to get me to say. You don’t do anything. They will do their thing. Nothing 
changes for us.” Imam Taaleb’s position carried signs of Imam W.D. Muhammad’s 
interpretations about indigenous Muslims’ relationship to America: An increasingly 
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American voice that sought to normalize black Muslim’s role and space in the American 
religious landscape which remained critical of moral and sociological vices. 
New World Patriotism day was a tradition initiated by Imam W.D. Muhammad in 1977, 
when he noted that he had a historical responsibility to recognize the changes in race 
relations across America. On July 4
th
, 1977 Imam W.D. Muhammad said: 
“I would betray every slave, from the first to the last, and those former 
slaves who came under the Jim Crow system. I would betray all of them if 
I didn't stand up today and appreciate the life we have here in 
America…That's the life they cried for, that's what they begged for, that's 
what they struggled for - a New Day! A day when former slaves would be 
recognized and respected for what they are, and treated equally…We have 
come to that day, and I would betray all of my slave parents if I didn't 
appreciate this America and this change that has taken place here in this 
America.”569 
This was part of Imam W.D. Muhammad’s agenda dual agenda to simultaneously 
transition his community into mainstream America where black Muslim would re-
imagine themselves as part of the civic fabric rather than its marginal counter-public and 
on the other hand, into mainstream Sunni Islam. Zareena Grewal argues that although 
Imam Muhammed intensified his ties to Muslim world through partnerships with Muslim 
World League and local immigrant Muslims, especially in the mid-1980s he “moved 
away from a transnational moral geography to a national moral geography,” through 
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asserting his independent authority to interpret the Qur’an and encouraging his 
community to mend their relations with America as Americans.
570
 In a 1987 speech, 
Imam Muhammad would argue that the American mantra, “One Nation Under God,” was 
not new, rather it was essentially another interpretation of “ummatan wahidatun, one 
united people….responsible to God,” which was introduced in the Qur’an 1400 years 
ago.
571
 His followers would mention that Imam W.D. urged his followers to embrace US 
constitution and Declaration of Independence, saying, “we should be most American.”572 
Twenty-five years after Imam W.D. Muhammad made these remarks a similar language 
was repeated in ISNA’s 2012 Annual Convention in Washington, D.C. by Imam Faisal 
Abdel Rauf. Rauf had earned nation-wide fame when his Cordoba Initiative unveiled 
plans to open a community center, named Park51, near the World Trade Center, which 
would include a Muslim prayer space in addition to promoting interfaith engagement. 
Dubbed the “Ground-Zero Mosque,” by anti-Muslim activists Pamela Geller and Robert 
Spencer,
573
 the initiative quickly became the subject of anti-Muslim rhetoric circulated by 
                                                          
570
 Grewal, Islam is a Foreign Country, pp.147-149. Imam Muhammad’s relationship with 
Muslim World League would continue into the later decade. In 1990 for example, he cites being a 
board member of the League’s Council of Masajid. See, GhaneaBassiri, A History of Islam in 
America, op. cit., p.334. 
571
 Ibid., p.149. Also see, Timur Yuskaev, The Qur’an Comes to America: Pedagogies of Muslim 
Collective Memory, unpublished PhD thesis, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill, 2010), pp.95-101 for a detailed examination of Imam Muhammed’s oral translation during 
the 1987 speech. The verse comes from Qur’an, 21:92. Ummatun wahidatun is translated as “this 
brotherhood of yours  is a single brotherhood,” as well as “this religion of yours is a one 
religion.” 
572
 Matthai Kuruvila, “Muslim leader urges shift from black theology,” SFGate, April 21, 2008. 
Available at http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Muslim-leader-urges-shift-from-black-
theology-3216978.php [last accessed November 12, 2015.]  
573
 Justin Elliott, “How the ‘ground zero mosque’ fear-mongering began,” Salon, August 16, 
2010. Available at http://www.salon.com/2010/08/16/ground_zero_mosque_origins/ [last 
412 
 
Islamophobic voices as well key political figures such as the former New York Mayor 




Sharing the panel stage with prominent Muslim philosopher Seyyed Hussein Nasr of 
George Washington University, Georgetown’s John Esposito and Imam Zaid Shakir from 
Zaytuna, Faisal Abdel-Rauf chose to address the Annual’s Convention’s theme, “One 
Nation Under God: Striving for the Common Good.” In parallel to Imam W.D. 
Muhammad’s remarks from 1987, Rauf argued that “One Nation under God is a Qur’anic 
concept. Allah says ‘this umma of yours, all of you are one umma, so worship me.”575 His 
remarks included an exegesis of a number of umma verses in the Qur’an, including the 
“middle/ moderate/just/balanced umma” verse, 2:143576 to argue that there was a battle 
across many spectrums, including the Democrats and Republicans, between the moderate 
and extremist wings. “If we are indeed an ummatan wasata we can overcome and combat 
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extremists of all traditions, including our own.” Rauf would come back repeatedly to the 
“best umma” verse, 3:110, to emphasize the notion of hisba, or, “enjoining the good and 
forbidding what is wrong”577 establishes the basis for the “common good.” Following his 
interpretation of these verses, Rauf argued that “As American Muslims our challenge is 
‘how to be an American Muslim,’ may be some of us came here as immigrants, but our 
challenge is to define ourselves as American.” According to Rauf, in the evolving 
understanding of jurisprudence American Muslims needed to take their context into 
account: “We can own ‘the common good,’” he said, “these are not terms that are alien to 
us; they are deeply Qur’anic terms.”  
 
Maqasid beyond Resolving the Crises of Authority: Responses to post-9/11 Anti-
Shari’ah Movement 
 
Next day, the then ISNA President Imam Mohammed Magid offered opening remarks at 
a panel that sought to underline the question of contextualization: “The whole 
Convention is based on Maqasid. We need a holistic approach to understand inner 
objectives and inner-dimensions of Islam. Maqasid is the embodiment of an 
integrative/holistic approach; it connects all the verses in the Qur’an.” The panel, entitled, 
“Knowledge Intensive on Maqasid,” was rather sparsely attended, perhaps because it was 
held on the last of the convention, on the Labor Day morning. A few months ago, at the 
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ICNA-MAS Annual convention in Hartford, Connecticut during the Memorial Day 
weekend similar themes were on the agenda and the convention was themed, “Defending 
Religious Freedom, Understanding Shariah.”578 At the opening panel of the Convention, 
a long-time ICNA President Dr. Mohammad Yunus gave a detailed presentation on 
Shari‘ah and maqasid to thousands of attendees. Before examining these presentations, it 
is important to note that debates around Shari‘ah, maqasid, and fiqh al-aqalliyat are not 
recent introductions the Muslim specialists’ vernacular, including American Muslim 
juristic circles. 
For example, while detailing the challenges that face American Muslim practitioners of 
fiqh in a 2000 article, Yusuf Talal Delorenzo, the then secretary of ISNA’s Fiqh Council 
of North America, explains that Fiqh Council of North America considers maqasid in its 
rulings: “Among the most important approaches of the council in its treatment of new 
problems and questions that apply particularly to the Muslim communities of North 
America is its policy of giving additional consideration, in the light of the higher 
purposes of or maqasid of the Shari‘a, to the circumstances imposed upon Muslims by 
the non-Islamic environment that surrounds them.”579 In addition, Delorenzo argues that 
because traditional Islamic law primarily deals with Muslim majority contexts, “it pays 
little or no heed to the fiqh of Muslim minorities….It is therefore essential that the 
councilor strive to interpret the teachings of Islam in a way that is consistent both with 
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the higher principles of the Shari‘a and with the circumstances of Muslims living in 
predominantly non-Muslim societies. Such fiqh might be known as the fiqh of the 
Muslims in non-Muslim environments, and its applications in today’s world are probably 
without limit.”580 Nonetheless, the fundamental transformations in the popularization of 
the maqasid approach and fiqh al-aqalliyat across the American Muslim landscape owes 
a lot to the populist post- 9/11 anti-Muslim movements that not only helped circulate a 
number of stereotypes about Islam’s relationship to modern gender relations and warfare 
but also brought such central aspects of Muslim vernacular as the shari‘ah a new 
notoriety.  
In 2012, anti- Shari‘ah movement was at its height in the United States and throughout 
the ISNA and ICNA/MAS conventions speaker after speaker had underlined that 
Shari‘ah was not the embodiment of a series of rigid laws that flew through contexts in an 
immutable fashion. By 2013, seven states – Oklahoma, Louisiana, Arizona, Kansas, 
South Dakota, Tennessee and North Carolina – had signed anti-Islam bills into law.581 
Most of these bills included language from anti-Islam activist David Yerushalmi’s 
American Laws for American Courts (ALAC) initiative, which was “crafted to protect 
American citizens’ constitutional rights against the infiltration and incursion of foreign 
laws and foreign legal doctrines, especially Islamic Shariah law.”582 Different iterations 
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of ALAC initiative emerged across states where ALAC laws were introduced. One of 
these sites argued that the problem was transnational in nature: 
The ALAC Act is not simply about shariah and other foreign laws, but 
also transnationalism—or the documented creep of foreign and anti-public 
policy laws being recognized by state and federal courts. More, shariah 
has already entered into the legal systems of Western Europe, including 85 
shariah courts operating openly with the full authority of law in the United 
Kingdom. There are numerous cases in which shariah doctrines have been 
invoked in the US.   The Center for Security Policy’s recent study found 
50 legal cases across 23 states, all published appellate cases, where shariah 




Although several of the laws, such as the one passed in Oklahoma, was ruled 
unconstitutional in a Circuit court because it singled out Shari‘ah,584 continuous waves 
from American anti-Muslim right carried the urgency forward. Center for Security 
Policy, a right-wing think tank where Yerushalmi serves as legal counsel, argued that 
“the Islamic doctrine known as Shariah,” “is a real, present, and growing danger to 
America’s constitutional, democratic system.”585 The representations of Shari‘ah as a 
static, regressive, “creeping” threat and its categorization under “foreign law,” not only 
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brought to the fore questions about legal pluralism which has been part integral to the 
American legal doctrine but also created alliances across the liberal left, religious 
advocacy organizations from various traditions who were vary about the implications of 




The implications of “foreign law” bans have been debated across the religious-political 
spectrum and legal experts in Britain, United States and Canada among other Western 
democratic settings for quite some time. In what amounted to a controversial position, in 
a speech at the Royal Courts of Justice in 2008, the then archbishop of Canterbury Dr. 
Rowan Williams had made a call for legal recognition of Shari‘a law in UK, arguing that 
religious communities had to be free in their choice of legal systems, as long as the 
rulings of these systems did not violate the state-given rights of voluntary parties who 
agreed to their jurisdiction.
587
 In September of that year British government announced 
that it would allow the decisions of some Shari‘a councils in Britain to be “legally 
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enforced through county courts or High Court.”588 In the United States, not only Catholic 
and Jewish traditions, but a number of other religious communities had followed their 
own ecclesiastical laws in matters of marriage, divorce, commercial disputes and other 
spheres of life as long as the disputants voluntarily accepted their authority and when 
these tribunals/councils/courts/arbitration mechanisms did not contradict U.S. laws. In a 
resolution American Bar Association argued that federal and state level safeguards 
against religious codes replacing U.S. laws were enshrined and ALAC type efforts were 
duplicative and more importantly discriminatory.
589
  
The thinly-veiled anti- Shari‘ah agenda on the other hand, not only precipitated an 
ongoing debate among academics and specialists about Islamic law, the differences 
between jurisprudence and legal ethics, and importantly the definitions and goals of 
Shari‘ah but also shaped how multiple Muslim actors claim, re/present, and re/produce 
Shari‘ah in both Muslim-majority and minority contexts.590 For example, a growing body 
of scholarship has questioned patriarchal biases in the pre-modern body of Muslim 
jurisprudence as well as discriminatory perspectives influential in popular exegesis of the 
Qur’an,591 highlighting in the process the difference between terms such as Shari‘ah and 
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fiqh as well as between their contextual and historical iterations. These approaches have 
also informed how some American Muslim NGOs approach questions around gender 
relations in Islam and its legal implications with regard to the American legal-
institutional context.
592
 It is crucial to recognize that beyond their implications in the 
legal field, the anti-Shari‘ah discourses in the United States have fundamentally become a 
source of otherizing Islam with populist discourses drawing widely and wildly 
uninformed parallels between complex theoretical fields of jurisprudence from ibadat 
(acts of worship) and mu‘amalat (worldly dealings) to family law, gender relations, 
historical evolution of legal doctrines of war and their applications in pre-modern and 
modern eras in, again, widely diverse legal-contextual settings.  
As it has been well-established, not least because Shari‘ah is a porous term that extends 
beyond its immediate translation as Islamic law and its moral authority is multifaceted
593
 
that its meanings are plural and its authority extends to non-law making communities and 
individuals as well. Nonetheless, especially in the face of anti-Shari‘ah discourses, the 
wider American Muslim landscape’s discursive engagements with Shari‘ah, its higher 
objectives, and its practical implications have also become increasingly more multi-
                                                                                                                                                                             
and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective (New York: Oxford 
university Press, 1999). 
592
 For an example of such an effort that received endorsements from leading American Muslim 
jurists see, Maha Alkhateeb, “Islamic Marriage Contracts: A Resource Guide for Legal 
Professionals, Advocates, Imams, and Communities,” Peaceful Communities Project, Asian & 
Pacific Islander Institute on Domestic Violence, and Battered Women’s Justice Project, 2012. 
Available at http://www.peacefulfamilies.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/Islamic.Marriage.Contracts.Resource.Guide_Produced.By_.PFP-
API.Institute-BWJP_2012.pdf [last accessed November 13, 2015.]  
593




faceted and context-specific. Rejecting the idea of Shari‘ah as a fixed, immutable set of 
codified doctrines and written rules, its alternative meanings from Islamic ethics to moral 
path, from a holistic theory of common good
594
 to an inner-guidance aid have been 
influential in the re/representation of Shari‘ah in the popular vernacular of American 
Muslim leaders, especially through an emphasis on the maqasid approach. As a dynamic, 
evolving approach from the early Islamic centuries onwards, maqasid approach has seen 
crucial transformations. Not only the theory and classification of maqasid were 
developed in the fifth to eight centuries of Islam,
595
 but also the terminology with which 
higher objectives of Shari‘ah has been employed by both pre-modern and modern 
scholars of Islam reflected the jurists’ contemporary sensibilities, contextual reasoning in 
light of changing considerations around socio-political exigencies and public interest, or 
maslahah.
596
 Drawing on this background, in the remainder of this chapter I will first 
review some of the maqasid discourses and then move on to a number of debates that 
have stirred the American Muslim landscape to highlight how the question of context and 
culture has been juxtaposed in the Shari‘ah referencing597 processes and the application 
of a fiqh al-aqalliyat to the American landscape. 
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Re/presentations of Maqasid in the American Muslim Landscape: Terminology, 
Expertise and Jurisprudence 
 
At the ICNA Convention, Dr. Muhammad Yunus started his talk with quoting the 18
th
 
verse of Qur’an’s 45th chapter: “Then We put you, [O Muhammad], on an ordained way 
concerning the matter of [religion]; so follow it and do not follow the inclinations of 
those who do not know.” For him, the word shari‘ah in the verse was that divine 
guidance decreed to Muslims, similar to Jewish Halakhah and Catholic Canon Laws, and 
it included “the entire sweep of life.” For Yunus, while Shari‘ah was the divine law of 
God, fiqh was its humanly acquired interpretations.
598
 Like I would hear in many talks by 
religious leaders during my fieldwork, Dr. Yunus highlighted that Shari‘ah was not 
essentially about penal codes: “70 percent of it deals with rituals of worship, 20 percent 
with personal, economic, and family matters, and only 5 percent deals with penal codes.” 
Using Imam al-Juwayni (d.1085)’s tripartite categorization of maqasid along essentials 
(daruriyyat), needs (hajiyyat), and embellishments (tahsiniyyat) he covered the five 
commonly accepted maqasid: the protection of religion, protection of life, protection of 
dignity, protection of intellect, and protection of property. At the end of his talk, Yunus 
urged the audience to study and understand these higher objectives and utilize them in 
guiding their dialogue efforts with non-Muslims.  
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At the ISNA Convention’s maqasid intensive, two leading authorities on the subject took 
stage after Imam Magid’s introduction. As I mentioned above the Sudanese-American 
President of ISNA mentioned that the three-day convention was organized around the 
question of maqasid. The first speaker of the panel, Jasser Auda, was one of the foremost 
experts on maqasid and his presentation largely followed his arguments in his book, 
Maqasid al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A Systems Approach.
599
 Auda argued 
in his talk that Shari‘a should be translated as Islamic ethics, not Islamic law, and that its 
core included three intersecting circles: spirituality, ethics and law. For him, the 
jurisprudence of minorities, the differences between sin and crime, and understanding 
between the concept of umma and the state all evolved in the intricate circles of these 
three concepts. Not delving directly into categories of maqasid Auda gave examples from 
his interactions with Western Muslims, who subscribed to utopian understandings of 
caliphate, insisted on wearing the thobe as an “Islamic” dress and thought democracy was 
a form of kufr. For Auda, these approaches pointed out to not only a reductionist 
understanding of Shari‘ah but also underrepresented the jurisprudential plurality and 
creativity in pre-modern Islamic law.
600
 Likewise, as Muslim reformist thinkers such as 
Tariq Ramadan or traditionalist voices such as Hamza Yusuf also frequently invokes, 
uninformed perceptions of the evolution of modern politics and the dilemmas posed by 
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stagnated efforts in engaging Muslim tradition through a renewalist outlook in the context 
of contemporary realities caused a sort of hyperbolic antagonism among some Muslims. 
Nonetheless, it became clear during the question and answer segment that Auda’s 
challenge to the audience to broaden their focus toward a comprehensive understanding 
of their lives as Muslims in the West in light of a comprehensive understanding of 
Shari‘a did not mean questions of jurisprudence were any less critical and often 
confusing. The largely older-generation audience was curious about whether same-sex 
marriage laws in certain states nullified moral justification for living in a polity where 
their religious observance was not restricted? Could mosques distribute zakat funds to 
non-Muslims as a form of dawah? Auda, like many of classically trained scholars in his 
position answered these questions based on his understanding of maqasid as well as 
established procedures of jurisprudential reasoning. It was clear, however, that he did 
expect the questions to be more “novel,” and the types of questions that spoke to 
established concerns of Western Muslims that have been circulating in Muslim circles did 
not seem to underline that a maqasid approach would provide immediate resolution to 
moral dilemmas, concerns about assimilation, and anxieties about “innovation.” 
Following Auda, Dr. Jamal Badawi, a long-time member of Fiqh Council of North 
America, gave a detailed, power-point based presentation on maqasid. A senior academic 
in the Canadian landscape, Badawi’s main focus was to underline the differences 
between jurisprudence or fiqh and Shari‘a, which “focuses on ethical orientation, values, 
and broad principles; it offers few detailed rulings.” Badawi underlined that Shari‘a’s 
divine law was ‘infallible and stable,” unlike the fiqh that was “fallible, changeable, 
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subject to development and rejuvenation.”601 Badawi would explain later in his 
presentation that the maqasid approach entailed a built-in mechanism and rules to 
respond to changing circumstances; that misconceptions about Shari‘a and its equation 
with penal law was faulty especially given that first priority of Shari’i approach was to 
remove causes of crime first. For him other misconceptions about the concept, that it was 
old and obsolete, it was against human rights, and it did not involve clemency were all 
misplaced conceptions. Badawi’s categorization and conceptualization of maqasid 
included “the protection” language; and he included “protection of human dignity” as a 
sixth category in addition to protection of faith which for him entailed interfaith dialogue, 
protection of life that entailed among other provisions outlaws’ rehabilitation, protection 
of the mind that made seeking knowledge a religious duty, protection of family which 
was the basis of gender equality and equity, and finally protection of property rights.  
These re/presentations and interpretive engagements with maqasid in the public forums 
in claiming the Shari‘a as an ethical guide for all walks of life, including the complex 
jurisprudential questions carry important consequences for American Muslim 
imaginations covered in this study. While it is telling that the top three largest American 
Muslim umbrella organizations engage with maqasid at the level described above, the 
extent with which scholarly discourses, and public ethical imaginaries around Shari‘a 
trickles down and travels to individual level is difficult to measure. Additionally, as 
Sherman Jackson observes, maqasid discourses are often represented as an alternative to 
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literalist interpretations of Islam and acquires “almost panacean expectations among 
modern Muslims.”602 Nonetheless, a number of institutions and leaders I have covered 
during the course of my research choose to adapt maqasid in their vocabularies and 
outlook. For example, the Los-Angeles based Muslim Public Affairs utilizes the maqasid 
approach in their “Human Rights Report Card for Muslim Countries” project that 
examines the constitutions nine Muslim-majority countries based on the extent with 
which their policies comply with “Sharia human rights requirements.”603 Noting that “the 
overarching designation of ‘Sharia’ and ‘Islamic’ are being used to give authenticity and 
authority to authoritarian and violent worldviews, which would generally not be accepted 
by the masses. As has become blatantly apparent, both nation states and non state actors 
are using broad terms such as Sharia and Islam to justify outlooks, ideologies, behaviors, 
acts and laws” MPAC resorts to maqasid as a yardstick for taking these countries to 
account: “…Notwithstanding, there are aspects of Sharia human rights requirements with 
which the majority of Muslim scholars, past and present, agree. These are foundational 
tenets of Sharia, generally referred to as maqasid (higher objectives and intents]), upon 
which we have based our scoring system.”604 A second aspect of the operationalization of 
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maqasid involves using the guiding principles in jurisprudence, and more particularly in 
its utilization toward a particular jurisprudence for minorities, fiqh al-aqalliyat. Below, I 
will detail two examples that involve two leaders of my institutional settings in their 
dealings with questions of jurisprudence, their engagements with jurisprudential schools, 
as well as maqasid theories, and finally how cultural negotiations described in Chapters 4 
and 6 factor into these debates. 
 
Culture, ‘Urf (Custom), and Qawaid (Legal Maxims): Maqasid Based Fatwas and 
Popularization of Dr. Umar Faruq Abd-Allah’s Articles 
 
As Chapters 4 and 6 have portrayed, questions of citizenship, belonging and identity 
among my respondents are negotiated through cultural frameworks, rather than through 
politico-legal considerations. As I have repeatedly underlined the lay Muslim 
perspectives on the cultural negotiations are informed by a number of factors and 
considerations of technical/expertly perspectives on jurisprudence, higher objectives of 
Divine law, the role of custom and culture in these nuanced fields factor into these 
discourses at varying levels and with varying opaqueness. Those of my respondents who 
had studied with scholars sometimes referred to their teachers in their responses, in other 
cases, I was able to observe the influence of established institutional scholars such as 
Imam Suhaib Webb and Usama Canon’s discourses in my respondents’ articulations. In 
what follows I highlight some of these scholarly discourses and examine one particular 
case – Dr. Umar Faruq Abd-Allah’s articles – as travelling influential texts across three 
of my institutions. The examination then established the background for the Unmosqued 
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and gender-segregation debates; the main sites of cultural negotiations of unity and 
diversity for many of my respondents. In some cases I choose to highlight how the 
Internet discussions and the cyber economy of knowledge about Islam
605
, authority and 
religious rulings (fatwas)
606
 influence the nature of debates and the contestations about 
categories such as maqasid and qawaid,
607
 universal legal maxims in jurisprudence.
608
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Figure 47: Dr. Umar Faruq Abd-Allah (left, in white dress) with Imam Zaid Shakir at 
Ta’leef Collective, May 19, 2013. 
Dr. Umar Faruq Abd-Allah (Wyman-Landgarf) emerged as one of the leading voices of 
traditionalist American Muslim landscape over the last two decades. He has been a 
regular participant at Zaytuna’s rihla programs and the RIS convention, in addition to his 
close ties to Ta’leef Collective. Abd-Allah converted to Islam in 1970 while he was a 
doctoral student at Cornell University after reading the autobiography of Malcolm X and 
transferred to University of Chicago’s doctoral program where he completed his 
dissertation on Imam Malik, the founder of Maliki jurisprudential school and the 
development of his legal theory in the context of Medina. After spending two decades at 
429 
 
the King Abdul-Aziz University in Jedda, Saudi Arabia Abd-Allah returned permanently 
to the United States in 2000 and took up the position of resident scholar at the now 
defunct Chicago-based Nawawi Foundation which was founded by local Muslims to 
support Abd-Allah’s scholarship and vision to “build a successful American Muslim 
cultural identity.”609 Since his return to the United States, Abd-Allah, known at the 
traditionalist institutions I examine as Dr. Umar, has produced a number of articles that 
continue to be influential texts in the wider American Muslim landscape. In addition to 
these articles he published an historical documentation of the life of Alexander Russell 
Webb
610
, the late 19
th
 century white American convert to Islam, as well as his doctoral 
dissertation.
611
 Abd-Allah thought at Darul Qasim, the suburban Chicago seminary for a 
while and joined in 2013 to the faculty of Chicago Theological Seminary. Below, I 
examine the treatment of the question of culture in Abd-Allah’s 2004 article, “Islam and 
the Cultural Imperative,” along with his 2007 paper, “Living Islam with Purpose.”612 
Throughout my fieldwork, I have observed that these two texts have become crucial 
reference points especially for indigenous religious leaders in Boston, Bay Area and Los 
Angeles. Imam Suhaib Webb frequently referenced Dr. Umar’s papers in his lectures at 
the ISBCC, at Ta’leef and Zaytuna Dr. Umar was already a foundational name with his 
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friendship to Hamza Yusuf and Imam Zaid Shakir as well as through his mentorship to 
Usama Canon. In Los Angeles the two texts have been followed by Muslim chaplains 
and Imams and again frequently referenced. Although both papers treat complex legal 
concepts in making a case for developing an American Muslim identity through cultural 
relevancy, the brevity and accessibility of both papers have become important in their 
popularity. My analysis is both textual and observational thanks to a three-day program I 
attended at Ta’leef Collective in May 2013 when Abd-Allah thought the 2007 paper. The 
Ta’leef program was attended by over 30 students, including some of the Zaytuna 
students I interviewed. While the focus of the program was the “Living Islam with 
Purpose” paper, Ta’leef had announced that “Islam and the Cultural Imperative” paper 
was a prerequisite for those who wanted to benefit from the lecture series and Dr. Umar 
referenced this paper frequently throughout his lectures.  
In “Islam and the Cultural Imperative” Abd-Allah argues that although Islamic 
civilization “harmonized indigenous forms of cultural expression with the universal 
norms of its sacred law,” and “religion became not only functional and familiar at the 
local but dynamically engaging, fostering stable indigenous Muslim identities and 
allowing Muslims to put down deep roots and make lasting contributions wherever they 
went,” the influence of modernity and dislodged sensibilities in the post-colonial period 
had resulted in a situation whereby modern Muslim discourses were  demanding “cultural 
apostasy” from indigenous Muslim cultures. Abd-Allah argued that immigrant Muslims 
in America to a large extent imparted these views from their homelands, and convert 
Americans, were “often alienated from their own deep indigenous roots and native 
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cultural sensibility through the destructive impact of culturally predatory Islamist 
ideologies from abroad.” According to Abd-Allah Prophet Muhammad had respected 
local cultures and did not demand from them assimilation in the Arab culture. Abd-Allah 
cites the story of Ethiopian Muslims who started to play their customary drums and dance 
with spears in celebration of a Muslim holiday at the Prophet’s mosque, which drew 
objections from some of his leading companions.
613
 For Abd-Allah, the fact that Prophet 
not only allowed the Ethiopian Muslims to join in the celebrations through their customs 
and culture but also helped his wife Aisha to watch them underscored that in the 
Prophetic tradition other cultures were not judged by local Arab customs. In a sub-section 
of the paper entitled “The Cultural Imperative in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence,” Abd-
Allah establishes the centrality of custom (al-‘urf) and usage (al-‘ada) in Islamic 
jurisprudence to support his assertion about the centrality of culture in the future of 
American Muslim community. Abd-Allah notes that all jurisprudential schools endorsed 
appropriation of local customs and its weight in jurisprudence to the extent that they 
conformed to “transcendent norms of Islamic law,” rather than a categorical endorsement 
of customs. Citing one of the five legal maxims (qawa’id) “custom has the weight of 
law,” (al-‘ada muhakkama) Abd-Allah underlines that Islamic jurisprudence, while 
cautious of problems such as imitation and innovation, was accommodating to local 
cultures as well as to the evolving nature of culture and customs throughout time.
614
 With 
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reference to pre-modern Muslim jurists Abd-Allah notes that Islamic jurisprudence 
sought to preserve the higher objectives of Divine law, or in Intisar Rabb’s 
conceptualization, “meta-values governing the law.”615 In his Ta’leef lecture Abd-Allah 
emphasized to the students that rather than being a “progressive notion,” the role of 
custom “lied at the very core of” Islamic tradition. A similar point would be made by 
Suhaib Webb in his lectures and his online writings. For example, in response to a 
question about whether or not the common idiom, jumu’a Mubarak ( have a blessed 
Friday) amounted to innovation in matters of religion, Webb highlights that speech acts 
were part of customs and that customs carried weight of law unless they contradicted 
openly with other legal injunctions. Webb argued that the centrality of custom in Islam 
was apparent in light of the fact that “first Ph.D. granted at al-Azhar in the 20’s was on 
Islam and Custom.”616 For him, just as Islam had spread through multiple cultural 
environments with success modern Muslims could re-vitalize the Muslim tradition if they 
were able to apply the legal maxims in their contemporary environments. In his 
conclusion, Abd-Allah notes the parallels between the “cultural imperative” and 
American Muslim futures: 
“Culture enables us to be comfortable with who, where, and what we are. 
Muslim Americans who are comfortable with being themselves have taken 
the first major step in becoming role models for their children and others 
and radiate a sense of direction and credibility. Identities that are rooted in 
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deep cultural contradiction are easily thrown into states of confusion and 
doubt. True religiosity and deep spirituality require inner consistency and 
stability, which are only possible within a sound cultural nexus…The 
work before us is a matter of true ijtihad, moral commitment, and dynamic 
creativity. In the spirit of the great jurists of the past, any failure on our 
part would constitute “iniquity and disobedience before God,” except that, 
in our case, the ‘gross error’ we commit pertains not to an isolated legal 
ruling and a few individual cases but the ruin of an entire community.”617 
 For Abd-Allah, the question of “cultural imperative,” alongside many of the other 
contemporary challenges facing American and Western Muslim communities could be 
resolved if Muslim Americans internalized five operational principles that were “age-old 
Islamic guidelines,” each of them “firmly based on the Qur’an and Sunna and supported 
by the general consensus of traditional Islamic scholarship.”618 During his Ta’leef lecture 
Abd-Allah explained each of these principles in detail with frequent references to 
contemporary American Muslim communities. Although a detailed summary of each 
principle would divert our focus away from the discussion around culture, custom and 
higher objectives of divine law, it would suffice to note that the paper as well as Abd-
Allah’s lecture dependent heavily on jurisprudential categories and maqasid based 
reasoning. For Abd-Allah the five operational principles (1. Trusting reason; 2. 
Respecting dissent; 3. Stressing societal obligations; 4. Setting priorities; 5. Embracing 
maxims.) were all sub-sets of maqasid, and they could not survive without maqasid. He 
argued that “any society, Muslim or non-Muslim, that does not follow and preserve any 
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one of the maqasid, is bound to fail.” 619  
In what follows I contextualize several recent controversies to highlight that questions of 
cultural appropriation continue to be problematic sites for the contemporary American 
Muslim community. Referring to the positions of some of Abd-Allah’s students and 
colleagues around these controversies, I want to make two related points: First, the 
discourses around maqasid and culture/custom remain meta-narratives that needs to be 
mediated in the daily context of Muslim life. Second, the relationship between texts and 
praxis face an additional challenge due to the contemporary digital age whereby Muslim 
scholars find themselves struggling to respond to arguments that seem to appropriate the 
thesis developed in texts such as “Islam and the Cultural Imperative.” The question and 
answer segments of Abd-Allah’s lectures at Ta’leef Collective carried signs of these 
questions: Who would be responsible for setting societal priorities and goals? Did the 
category of societal obligations include non-Muslims? Did not Muslims have greater 
responsibilities toward Muslims? How could Muslim Americans avoid treating their own 
culture as superior to other sub-cultures? The following section highlights how some of 
these questions as well as the contours of the “cultural imperative,” become increasingly 
divisive issues and more often than not do not have clear-cut answers. 
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Mipsterz and Happy Videos: Music, Culture and Dawa 
 
Living in a hashtag era, American Muslim landscape frequently experiences viral 
debates. While some of these, as portrayed in Chapter 4, are on political issues in nature, 
others are more squarely about the compatibility between religion and local cultures, 
including cultural notions of Muslim majority countries and Muslim minority contexts. 
Ubaydullah Evans, an African American graduate of Al-Azhar university who is a 
resident scholar at Sherman Jackson’s American Learning Institute for Muslims (ALIM) 
program, for example, speaks about a “controversy calendar”: “It begins in the earlier 
part of the year with the Eid Milad an-Nabi (the Celebration of the Prophet’s birthday), 
surges to mid-year with the commencement of Ramadan and Shawwal, and ends with the 
celebration of holidays.”620 Other scholars such as Suhaib Webb frequently complain 
about a “3-M Problem, moon-meat-music,” centered around moon-sighting debate, the 
question of what type of meat consumption follows Muslim dietary rules, and finally the 
permissibility of music in Islam. In December 2013, a music video created by Sheikh and 
Bake Productions, “Mipsterz-Somewhere in America, gained the hashtag #mipsterz and 
quickly went viral on social media, eventually drawing attention from mainstream 
American and global media.
621
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Figure 48: Mipsterz video screen-shot. 
The video was released by a group that called themselves Muslim Hipsters- Mipsterz on 
Facebook. The group’s Facebook page explains the neologism: 
A Mipster is someone at the forefront of the latest music, fashion, art, 
critical thought, food, imagination, creativity, and all forms of obscure 
everything. A Mipster is someone who seeks inspiration from the Islamic 
tradition of divine scriptures, volumes of knowledge, mystical poets, bold 
prophets, inspirational politicians, esoteric Imams, and our fellow human 
beings searching for transcendental states of consciousness. A Mipster is 
an ironic identity, one that serves more as a perpetual critique of oneself 
and of society. A Mipster has a social mind, and yearning for a more just 
order, a more inclusive community unbounded by stale categories, 
unwilling to plod blindly along in a world as obsessed with class as it is 
unmindful of its consequences. The Mipster is a bold, yet humble mind, 
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open to disparate ideas and firm enough in conviction to act, speak out and 
drop the hammer when the time is right.
622
 
The content of the video touched on sensitive and divisive issues among Muslim 
audiences. The video clip
623
 was based on the soundtrack of musician Jay-Z’s song, 
Somewhere in America, and portrayed American Muslim woman posing, dancing, and 
skateboarding to the tune of the music. Some of the women portrayed in the video said 
they did not know Jay-Z’s music would be used in the video and thought objections to the 
foul language of the song which included the N-word was understandable
624
 but those 
who argued the public display of female womanhood in the video was problematic 
especially since some women in the video, in the description of a New York Times 
article, were dressed in clothes that were “more evocative of hipster Williamsburg than a 
mosque”625 had to accept that “hijab was a personal choice and everyone interpreted it 
differently.”626 There were also those who found the conversations sparked by the video 
constructive but warned that the video’s portrayal of female femininity and the “cool” 
hijabis carried signs of an insecure willingness to be accepted as normal and could create 
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further divisions within American Muslim communities.
627
 Layla shaikley, the art 
director of the video, responded to criticisms by saying that she had produced the video, 
seeking to tell her own American Muslim story and admits that the reactions it received 
were somehow unsettling:  
In putting together the video, I thought that I was aiming at the American 
mainstream that does not understand Islam. But the aftermath served more 
to unveil many of the insecurities within my own Muslim-American 




Shaikley’s reflections about her own agency in creating a cultural product that was 
intended for the American mainstream helps contextualize some of the overarching 
debates about culture and religion. While much of the social media discussions were 
reflective of contested jurisprudential interpretations about music, female conduct in the 
public sphere and proper dress, the overarching theme about cultural production and 
culture’s role in identity-making was taken-up by a few voices. Citing the role of 
Egyptian pop songs and the portrayal of love in these songs in connecting lay Egyptians 
to a religiously informed notion of shared religious notions, Ubaydullah Evans observed 
that American Muslim communities were caught up in a vicious cycle while thinking 
about culture and religion (din/deen): 
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In order to remove confusion about the actual substance of the religion, 
community leaders have painstakingly labored to draw a clear distinction 
between various ‘Muslim cultures,’ and Islam. This is commendable; 
however, it has also given rise to an understanding of culture that pits it 
against Din as a natural rival of some sort. In actual fact, subsumed under 
both categories, culture and Din, are a fluid set of practices and behaviors 
of varying degrees of real religious value. However, while the latter is 
encouraged within the community, owing to its endorsement by the 
Qur’ān and traditions of the Prophet (upon him be peace), the former is 
either frowned upon or grossly undervalued.
629
 
Highlighted in several of my respondents’ misgivings about the cultural notions of 
religion that their parents, mosque communities and friends have subscribed, Evans’ 
observation raised a number of crucial questions for the conversation about cultural 
production and American Muslim futures. Several months after the Mipsterz video 
debacle, another music video re-ignited similar questions about Muslim representation, 
cultural production, and relevancy. When a group of young British Muslims produced a 
video titled “Happy British Muslims”630 to the tune of popular song by musician Pharrell 
in April 2014 that went viral, the endeavor was picked up by American Muslim groups at 
the national and local level. The Muslim advocacy organization Muslim Public Affairs 
Council (MPAC) produced a version shot in Washington, D.C.,
631
 arguing that “amidst 
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stereotypes and misinterpretations of Islam and Muslims in the media, this video is a 
proactive way of helping change the narrative about American Muslims.”632 In Boston 
Imam Suhaib Webb invited community members to take part in the shooting of a local 
version and himself appeared in the video.
633
 The videos showcased diverse groups of 
American Muslims dancing or posing to the tune of Pharrell’s captivating tunes, being 
“happy” in the symbolic sites of D.C. and Boston, in their labs, university campuses, and 
homes. The Happy videos sparked heated discussions in both Britain and United States, 
much alike the Mipsterz controversy. Some questioned the standards of modesty 
portrayed by individuals taking part in the videos, others questioned the validity of the 
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Figure 49: Timothy Winter (Abdal-Hakim Murad) in British Muslims Happy video.
635
 
Timothy Winter, the British convert-scholar and founder of Cambridge Muslim College 
also known as Shaykh Abdal- Hakim Murad, who was included in the British version 
wrote that while the video created deep divisions within the Muslim community, it also 
underscored how some of those who used a strong language against the videos were in 
the same wavelength as anti-Muslim voices. For Murad, several components of the video, 
including the modesty and music questions could have been debated in a more measured 
way and his leanings were influenced by his own traditionalist/Sufi take on both 
questions. And yet, Murad argued that the challenge of anti-Islam environment was a 
fundamental consideration for Western Muslims and the communal energies could have 
been used in a better way:  
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“…This means some semblance of unity, which in turn means respect for 
difference. The sectarian and fiqh disputes which weaken us seem to be 
growing in bitterness, and can we deny that this gives joy and hope to our 
adversaries? Muslim unity comes not from the triumph of a single view, 
but from courteous respect for difference. In our extreme times this must 
mean an insistence on husn al-zann – giving other Muslims the benefit of 
the doubt - and this should particularly apply in the judgements we make 
of non-scholarly Muslims.”636 
Murad argued that the question of reaching to younger generations of Muslims through 
new cultural forms, such as Muslim rap music, had to be involved as a consideration by 
the scholars who had to rethink some of the religious categories used in their 
deliberations about concerns around imitation and assimilation. Similarly, responding to 
people who criticized him on social media for his call on others to take part in the 
shooting of the Boston version of Happy Muslims video in his halaqa at the ISBCC, 
Imam Suhaib Webb said: “Why do people always assume the worst? That we will dance, 
do this or that…this negativity has to stop. The Qur’an says [(30:15)] ‘As for those who 
attained to faith and did righteous deeds, they shall be made happy in a garden of 
delight.’”637  
These reactions from scholars who, if not completely endorsing the content of the videos, 
had taken part in the Happy videos and their engagement with broad audiences about the 
                                                          
636
 Abdal-Hakim Murad, “Clarification: On the boundaries of da’wa,” May 2014. Available at 
http://www.masud.co.uk/ISLAM/ahm/clarification-happy-muslims-video.htm [last accessed 
November 16, 2015.] 
637
 The same verse was also used by MPAC in their press release cited above about their version 




controversy on new cultural expressions produced by mostly young generation Western 
Muslims follow the contours of a critical question about Islam’s viability in alternative 
cultural settings. These questions include whether or not a new cultural production or 
expression is innocuous or not and how to appropriate Islam’s universal values in diverse, 
culturally heterogeneous settings.  As sites of negotiation and contest among not only lay 
Muslims but also the scholarly elites, these questions do not have ready-made, easily 
identifiable, or religiously sanctioned answers. Rather, alternative engagements with 
Islam’s historical evolution, its jurisprudential and intellectual legacy, as well as the 
identity of the individuals as interpretive agents factor importantly in these debates. As 
the jurisprudence of minorities literature suggests, these cultural negotiations often co-
exist with grander debates about the legality of Muslim settlement in non-Muslim 
majority contexts as well the resulting questions about citizenship. At the same time, 
however, cultural negotiations, unlike the relatively more stable, if still contested,
638
 
citizenship considerations in the aqalliyat discourse, are highly context-dependent and 
scholarly positions on one question or another often defy easy categorization. It will be 
helpful to examine the case of Imam Zaid Shakir’s maqasid and ‘urf based position on 
validity of celebrating Halloween in explaining the complexity of cultural negotiations.   
 
Halal-o-Ween? Halal or Haram? 
 
As a powerful voice for the indigenization of Islam in America and the special treatment 
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of converts regarding their adaptation into Islam especially through his role as Chairman 
of Ta’leef Collective, Imam Zaid Shakir published a Facebook post in October 27, 2014. 
In his post, Imam Zaid addressed one of the major components of the Muslim 
“controversy calendar,” the question about whether or not American Muslims could 
partake in the Halloween celebrations. Had Halloween become an innocuous cultural 
practice, especially in the form of kids going treat-or-treating and dressing up as popular 
figures, stripped off of its once pagan origins? In some sectors of the American and 
Canadian Muslim landscape mosques, Muslim student centers and communities were 
organizing halal – religiously permissible – Halloween celebrations, using the hybrid 
“Halal-o-ween” term to present the events as religiously sanctioned.639 Some of these 
events were organized around the idea that there could be a halal alternative to 
Halloween, where only certain aspects of Halloween such as candies would be present 
and the kids would be provided with “an Islamic perspective on Halloween,”640 in others 
costumes and watching horror movies were involved.
641
 Shakir’s post argued that 
Halloween had origins in pagan and satanic practices and many of symbols continued to 
be appropriated by these groups. He said, “Like many aspects of demonology and the 
occult, Halloween has been sanitized and made to appear as something ‘cute.’ Along 
these lines, some Muslims actually have ‘Halaloween’ parties. It’s just ‘fun.’ This is one 
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of the ways children in our society, increasingly Muslim children are no exception, are 
introduced to occult and demonic symbols and rituals.”642 The post concluded by stating 
that, “Halloween as well as Halaloween are Haram!” Some respondents to the post 
expressed their disappointment that Shakir was using the term “haram” so freely, others 
disputed that dressing up as Spiderman or eating candies could not be labeled as demonic 
rituals and practices. One commentator, Safwan Badr argued that Muslim civilizations 
had always embraced local cultures:  
“Understanding Islamic history is critical. Muslims never banned any 
practice that does not explicitly contradict Islam. For example, spring 
festivals (Naurouz in Persia / Afghanistan and Sham-el-Naserm in Egypt) 
continued to be celebrated for 1400 years. In fact, embracing local culture 
contributed to the spread of Islam. I respect all our scholars but refuse to 
have them think for me. No scholar has the right to speak in God's name. 
You may reject Halloween but don't tell me that it is haram. We don't have 
a pope in Islam…”643 
On November 1, 2014 Imam Zaid published a follow-up article to his post, detailing his 
position and answering some of the points raised by his followers on Facebook.
644
 In his 
blog post Shakir defended his position that taking part in Halloween celebrations was 
harmful and that it was impermissible; noting that his extension of the category of haram 
to “Halaloween” was a result of his carelessness, and with that statement he was referring 
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to imitative practices some Muslims were undertaking through partaking in Halloween 
celebrations. Shakir’s post started with the support of his original proposition that 
Halloween had its roots in pagan practices and continued to be so in many ways through 
the symbolic uses of Jack O’Lantern, its ritualistic aspects such as glorifying the dark 
spirits and vampires, in addition to its materialistic aspects. For Imam Zaid, these aspects 
of Halloween, especially its glorification of Satan was incongruent with preservation of 
faith, one of the higher objectives of Shari‘ah:  
“The first objective of the Divine Law (Maqasid al-Shari’ah) is the 
preservation of monotheism and the worship of Allah. Pursuant to this 
objective, idolatry in all of its manifestations has been forbidden in Islam, 
as well as actions and practices described by our scholars as constituting 
disbelief or those that are seen as leading to disbelief. Belief in a God of 
Death, Samhain, who has the power to act independently in creation, is 
idolatry and disbelief with Muslims, and therefore Haram, or forbidden” 
Imam Zaid’s post addressed some of the other arguments put forth by defenders of 
lawfulness of Halloween celebrations. In response to those who argued that their 
intention in participating in Halloween celebrations was to mold in or simply take part in 
a cultural holiday and had nothing to do with glorification of paganism or its cultural 
references, he argued with reference to the legal maxim “matters will be judged by their 
purposes” which is based on the idea of intentionality,645 that Muslim scholars agreed on 
the principle that a good intention would not render an unlawful action, lawful. Referring 
to comments about Islam’s incorporation of local custom, Shakir argued that the weight 
                                                          
645
 The maxim is based on the Prophetic saying, “Acts are judged only by intention.” See, Abd-
Allah, “Living Islam with Purpose,” pp.23-25.  
447 
 
of custom as law should be approached with nuance and that its place depended on the 
context in regards to other “Western holidays,” as well: 
“Some claim that Halloween is an American custom and custom is a legal 
consideration (al-‘Ada Muhakkamah). This maxim has no relevance here. 
Custom is only a legal consideration when it does not contradict or 
conflict with established rulings or principles of Islam. This is clearly not 
the case with Halloween, which conflicts with many Islamic rulings and 
principles, as we have shown. Therefore, one cannot claim its 
permissibility based on custom…I also do not wish for anyone to take my 
position on the issue of Halloween as a blanket condemnation of all 
western holidays. Each one has to be considered on a case-by-case basis, 
as each is unique and distinct…”  
 
Whether the commentator cited above was convinced with Imam Zaid’s second post that 
was based on legal terms is a question that I continue to wonder. As it is often the case, 
the age of social media renders these conversations about contemporary jurisprudential 
questions crucial. As sites of negotiation and public reasoning these conversations online 
highlight a new form of interaction between lay Muslims and scholarly elites and the 
invocation  of maqasid and ‘urf  by multiple actors point out that the emergent American 
Muslim identity and culture will continue to be influenced by multiple considerations, 
including citizenship practices, public discourse on and perceptions about Islam, but also 
by specific understandings of Islamic law and its adaptability to local cultural landscapes. 
In the next section I examine two ongoing and inter-related debates about the question of 
culture and relevancy with regards to questions of inclusion and exclusion in the 
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American Muslim landscape. The first of these debates examines the phenomenon of 
young Muslims drifting away from mosques, the “unmosqued” generation, due to 
multiple reasons that include cultural unfit, the lack of relevant imams, and the inter-
generational clashes. The second debate, which I will call the “sideentrance” debate with 
reference to an influential blog with that title, involves the inter-related question of 
female participation and spaces in American mosques and public forums.  
 
Unmosqued/Sideentrance: Inclusion and Exclusion in the Muslim landscape 
 
In November 2012, Houston area Muslim Atif Mahmud, using the alias Abu Rocky, 
delivered a talk at RAD Talks, the American Muslim version of TED Talks. The talk was 
titled, “Unmosqued – Muslims Unwelcome at the Mosque.”646 Mahmud borrowed the 
term from his Christian friends who were talking about how they were drifting away from 
their churches, becoming unchurched.
647
 In his talk, Mahmud chronicles how his local 
mosque evolved from a strip mall rental space to a million-dollar stand-alone house of 
worship, in time also evolving in its politics, financial needs, and inclusiveness. In New 
York, Ahmed Eid was experiencing related problems.
648
 The mosque Eid and his family 
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attended had a curtain separating men and women, which was a concern for Eid. The 
ethno-racial cliques at the mosque were creating problems and he did not feel like he 
belonged to the mosque. Mahmud, Eid and Marwa Aly, Eid’s wife partnered to create a 
documentary about their experiences with being “unmosqued,” and the multi-faceted 
challenges that faced American mosques.  
Unmosqued aimed to answer a critical question: Why were some Muslims leaving the 
mosque, and what were their grievances? In early 2013 several teasers for the 
documentary film appeared online featuring some of the leading Imams and community 
leaders, including Imam Suhaib Webb, Nouman Ali Khan and Khalid Latif.
649
 The 
documentary sought to give voice to those Muslims in America who were alienated from 
mosques due to gender discrimination and ethno-cultural practices, highlighted 
problematic hiring and firing practices through featuring several Imams who talked about 
their problems with mosque administrators and showcased examples from Third Space 
organizations such as D.C. based Make Space, Long-Island based Lighthouse Initiative, 
Virginia-based Nur Center and Ta’leef Collective. Ta’leef would refuse to be featured for 
the documentary however. Usama Canon would refuse Unmosqued producers’ demand 
to feature Ta’leef in their documentary. Noting that the conversation around the 
documentary had evolved to include an “anti-mosque” sentiment, he would explain, “as 
students of sacred knowledge we did not want to contribute to that false understanding.” 
Still, during ISNA’s 2013 convention Ta’leef’s co-founders Usama Canon and Mustafa 
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Davis would take part in a session entitled “Sacred Space: Where is My Place,” alongside 
the Unmosqued producer Marwa Aly, Imam Suhaib Webb and Dr. Muzammil Siddiqi, 
the Chairman of the Fiqh Council of North America to talk about the positive and 





Figure 50: Unmosqued Screening flyer at the ISBCC.
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Notwithstanding all the controversy it has caused for its portrayal of the problems in 
mosque along the immigrant- indigenous axis, accusations of false representation from 
some mosques featured in the documentary, and the criticism that it sought to paint third 
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space organizations as the only positive examples,
652
 the documentary created a synergy 
around some of the key conversations in American mosques. Would it be possible to 
attract the millennial and post-millennial generation who appear to be appropriating much 
of the “moral ills” of mainstream American youth653 to the mosques if they do not 
develop a belonging to the mosque communities? Could converts retain their new faith if 
they could not build a relationship with the cultural norms at the mosques? These 
questions continue to be key conversation points for Muslim Americans not least because 
alternative paths of development that define American mosques, as portrayed in Chapters 
2 and 3, also mark their difference with the mosques in much of the Muslim world, 
making them closer to the American congregational/community center model rather than 
a uni-functional prayer space as found in most Muslim-majority contexts.
654
 Despite their 
internal diversity however, most mosques continue to be ethno-racially homogenous and 
a majority of imams are born outside the United States.  
In the Muslim community where priesthood is not an official vocation, the phenomenon 
of immigrant imams has attracted significant attention, especially in Western Europe.
655
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Although a number of Muslim-majority countries and movements originating in the 
Muslim world has been influential in dissemination of Islamic literature and sponsorship 
of clerical training, the influence of “embassy Islam” has been considerably limited not 
least because American state is not involved, unlike its most Western European 
counterparts, in the management of religious minorities. As mentioned before this fact 
has witnessed certain twists in the post-9/11 era and more recently with the rise of ISIS, 
but to a large extent the influence of the high wall of separation between church and state 
has kept American state away from attempting to manage Muslim clergy.  In the 
American Muslim context decentralization and lack of formal governance structures 
make it difficult to attain the exact number of religious seminaries, and Imams. The sole 
available comprehensive resource available on the subject is a series of surveys 
conducted by Dr. Ihsan Bagby’s in 1994, 2000 and 2011.656 Although these reports, as 
acknowledged by Dr. Bagby, fall short of representing the entire picture on the ground 
due to an inability to reach all the mosques and mosque leaders, they are still important as 
the sole comprehensive study on the subject.  According to the surveys, the number of 
registered mosques in the U.S. was 962 in 1994; with a 26 percent rise, the number 
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reached 1209 in the year 2000. An unparalleled rise of 74 percent brought the figure to 
2106 mosques in 2011. On the other hand, American mosques continued to be ethnically 
homogenous, with mixed congregations standing at a mere 16% in 2011. In American 
Muslim landscape, American-born imams are in the minority: 66 percent of the imams in 
the U.S. are born outside of the country. The majority of U.S.-born imams are African-
American imams, primarily serving Imam W.D. Community’s mosques. Of those who 
work on a full-time, paid basis – 44 percent of all imams in the country - the ratio of 
imams born outside America is 85 percent. Almost half of foreign-born imams surveyed 
in the 2011 report came to the United States after 2000. Although there is an increased 
demand for the few American-born imams who studied the classical Islamic sciences to 
the extent that a competition is underway, as it were, among mosques with the financial 
means, to hire them with annual salaries of 70-100 thousand dollars.
657
 However, the 
majority of imams in the U.S. are paid significantly less compared to Jewish or Christian 
religious officials. Another reason for many mosques to continue functioning without a 
full-time imam is that many individuals who have received enough religious instruction 
to qualify as imams do not consider being an imam a viable career option in the current 
economic and social atmosphere of the U.S. because of low salaries, intense workload 
and the attitudes of mosque administrations towards imams. Just over a span of a year 
and half, from 2013 to 2015, three young, American born Imams with classical 
educational backgrounds voluntarily left or had to leave their posts citing disagreements 
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with mosque administrations in the mega-mosques of Southern California.
658
 As 
mentioned before, at Muslim Community Association (MCA), mosque leaders cite 
difficulties in finding an Imam who is born in the United States, can be relevant for the 
flourishing second and third generation Muslims, and navigate the multiple theological, 
fiqh-based and political approaches followed by the mosques large congregation.  
In addition to the problems with mosque management and the problems with immigrant 
imams, the Unmosqued debate highlighted another question that became a convergence 
point about culture, jurisprudence and the emergent needs of American Muslim women. 
As mentioned before the question of gender inclusion in American Muslim communities 
had become a focal discussion point ever since the female-led mixed prayer controversy. 
Much like the beginnings of Unmosqued project, the “side entrance” debate owes its 
origins to Muslim American women questioning the evolution of their spaces and access 
in mosques. Hind Makki, a Sudanese American activist started a Tumblr blog with the 
title “Side Entrance”659 to highlight that many American mosques did not have proper 
accommodation for women and many of those who did created unnecessary barriers and 
multiple layers of segregation. Makki asserted that in most cases this had to do with 
cultural notions around women’s place in the mosques. Makki argues that Prophetic 
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example did not prevent or discourage women from attending mosques, it was rather the 
influence of local cultures through which Islamic jurisprudential schools evolved that 
female participation in mosques have come to be a marginal practice in much of the 
Muslim-majority contexts.
660
 Makki’s activism, coupled with increasingly dissenting 
voices from leading American Muslim female activists against “all-male Muslim 
panels,”661 much like its counterpart in the wider society and creation of female Muslim 
speaker databases
662
 have led to a new sensitivity about gender-discrimination and 
inclusion in the American Muslim landscape. On the other hand, the discourses around 
gender inclusion and exclusion often conflate questions of authentic practices, and often 
put women who prefer gender barriers in a difficult position. In response, some mosques 
choose to create women’s prayer sections that include both a section that has barriers or 
curtains and another that does not have these features, such as the South Bay Islamic 
Association (SBIA)’s new building in Santa Clara. Likewise, during a tour of the newly 
acquired building of Islah L.A. in Los Angeles in December 8, 2013, which was then 
being prepared for construction of a prayer space, one of the participants in the tour asked 
Imam Jihad Saafir of Islah LA why they were planning to have a barrier between the 
men’s and women’s section. “It is not required,” she noted, “Unfortunately our sisters do 
not know that this is not Islamic, it is cultural.” Imam Jihad’s response showcased his 
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disappointment with this tone; “Please do not say they do not know, it is sort of 
patronizing. My wife also prefers to pray behind a barrier, she feels more comfortable 
doing that way and she is educated. Women are integral to our mosque and they do mix 
with men but that is also their preference.” In a similar fashion, negative experiences in 
mosque communities are not limited to necessarily orthodox/conservative communities.  
For example, the precipitating event for the establishment of the Women’s Mosque of 
America in Southern California that provides Friday prayer services for women-only 
congregation
663
 took place in the Islamic Center of Southern California (ICSC), one of 
the historically most progressive mosque communities across the United States, which 
also gave birth to MPAC.
664
 Citing discomfort with gender dynamics at ICSC and other 
area mosques, Hasna Maznavi teamed up with other like-minded Muslim to establish 
Women’s Mosque of America, which convenes in the interfaith Pico-Union Project 
building converted from a synagogue located in Central Los Angeles. Women’s Mosque 
of America was welcomed by most local and national figures to the extent that it 
highlighted the problems with women’s prayer spaces and status in mosques and 
community organizations, but these names also argued that a Friday service led by 
women and only for women stood on questionable legal validity.
665
 In response, some 
                                                          
663
 Tamara Audi, “Feeling Unwelcome at Mosques, 2 Women their Own in L.A.,” The Wall 
Street Journal, January 30, 2015. Available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/muslim-women-to-
launch-their-own-mosque-1422639983 [last accessed November 23, 2015.] 
664
 For a history of the center and women’s role in its history see, Mary Jane O’Donnell, “E 
Pluribus Unum: The Islamic Center of Southern California and the Making of an American 
Muslim Identity,” in Fay Botham and Sara M. Patterson (eds.,) Race, Religion, Region: 
Landscapes of Encounter in the American West (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2006), 
pp.125-138. 
665
 Shaykha Muslema Prumul, “Guarding the Validity of the Prayer: Women’s Mosque of 
457 
 
proponents invoked the example of women-only mosques in China to defend the 
practice.
666
 Organizers of the initiative have accommodated those congregants who 
wanted to pray a separate mid-day prayer and the preachers who wanted to give a pre-
sermon talk, or bayan, rather than the sermon.
667
 These intra-Muslim debates point out to 
a vibrant landscape that is marked by a plurality of opinions and positions. 
Importantly, the collectivity of these questions not only highlighted crucial fault-lines in 
approaches to questions of cultural production, the role and function of customs in pre-
modern and modern Muslim majority and minority contexts, but also spearheaded new 
developments. For example, ISPU initiated a new research project titled, Reimagining 
Muslim Spaces Initiative, in order to provide a needs assessment for creating “inclusive 
and community friendly” American mosques.668 Additionally, during ISNA’s 2015 
convention the Fiqh Council of North America alongside a number of influential and 
interpretively diverse set scholars signed a statement calling on all Muslim community 
organizations, especially mosques, to work toward eliminating gender-discrimination in 
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their organizations. The statement argued that Prophetic example and jurisprudential 
schools did not provide any support for barriers in the prayer spaces and that providing 
access to and ensuring equal representation of women in Muslim organizations was a 
religious duty.
669
 In the American Muslim topography today one can find programs that 
feature female Muslim scholars such “Shaykha Fest,”670 and more women speakers 
joining their male peers in weekend seminars, knowledge retreats, and annual 
conventions.  
In the concluding chapter I highlight what these developments mean for the future of 
American Muslim community and provide an overall assessment of the cultural 
negotiations of community, identity and polity among American Muslims. 
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CHAPTER 8- CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation sought to delineate current dynamics that shape the development of an 
American Muslim outlook and identity among US-born devout Muslims. In one 
nationally recognized Imam’s words, however, is it possible to establish an American 
Muslim identity that is dictated by the very fact that one’s zip code in the U.S. makes the 
development of such an identity imperative? Or is the better response would be to take 
careful note of the zip codes we are given but develop a universal delivery system for the 
type of Islam that speaks to a contemporary global situation whereby religion and 
religious identities are constantly challenged and deeply tectonic changes simultaneously 
affect not only Muslims, but people of all religious and nonreligious backgrounds alike?  
For some, the answer can be readily found in Qur’anic exegesis and the Prophetic 
example. The Prophet, this view argues, sought to distinguish early Muslim community 
from Christians and Jews living in 6
th
 century Arabia but never sought to move them 
away from their Arab identity at large. Further, he allowed and facilitated the adaptation 
of local customs, and hence daily relevancy of Islam to its cultural context, as long as 
these traditions did not contradict the Islamic shariʻah laid out by Qur’anic injunctions. 
Others, including some of my respondents, yet, hold not only that the U.S. is an 
unfavorable ground for the development of an Islamic understanding and identity because 
it has lacked the authority of traditional centers of learning and scholars but also that 
“American” is a faulty identifier that seems to negate the Muslim identity to begin with. 
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There is then, another subset of ideas within this latter view that hold that one can 
identify as American as long as that signifies the given conditions; a person was born in 
the American society but that it should never precede the core of one’s meaning giving 
identity which should always be the Muslim identity. This view holds that there is too 
much cleaning to do to strip off the adjective “American” from its vices and a hyphenated 
American-Muslim label would be a circular practice at best. As the globalized world 
brings American Muslim discourses in closer contact with the experiential worlds of 
Muslim majority and Muslim minority contexts, and as many American Muslim leaders 
chronicled here frequently serve as community leaders, public intellectuals, and 
academics, they are often asked to speak about questions around the particular and the 
universal and navigate between local and global contexts. Much of these notions have 
become hot-button issues in the American Muslim public sphere especially during the 
White House iftar controversy in 2013 and 2014 (Chapter 4), and during the Countering 
Violent Extremism (CVE) discussions in early 2015 (Chapter 5). When these questions 
are centered on international politics, the need to speak through a religious authority 
framework is complicated due to the fast changing global political landscape, reductionist 
approaches to ummah discourses, and practical realities. While academic disciplines, 
including international relations and political science as well as religious studies, fail to 
properly engage with religion as a belief system with complex textual, societal, and 
political implications, dominant theoretical frameworks and public scrutiny on Muslim 
intellectuals have also marginalized boundaries of acceptable public talk. 
As American Muslim communities continue to experience a resurgent tide of anti-
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Muslim sentiment, the process of their indigenization and discussions about the contours 
of their belonging in America takes place in an increasingly dynamic landscape.  The 
research presented in this dissertation suggests that American Muslims negotiate 
transnational and national belonging through simultaneously overlapping considerations 
of inclusion in the wider American religious landscape, citizenship practices that respond 
to undercurrents that seek to marginalize them, and through cultural negotiations. The 
discourse analysis and ethnographic fieldwork utilized in this dissertation points out that 
simultaneous engagements with Islamic tradition and American context are the primary 
medium through which American Muslim communities examined in Boston, San 
Francisco Bay Area and Los Angeles negotiate questions of belonging and identity. 
These considerations lead to an increasing self-perception of belonging in a particular 
micro-community with a set of priorities and sensibilities that are different than other, 
non-American Muslim populations. Rather than restrictively political considerations, a 
hybrid, often tension-ridden, set of factors shape American Muslims’ engagement with 
transnational Muslim identity and in turn shapes their internal debates about questions of 
inclusion and exclusion, in the mosque communities, in national platforms, across the 
media, and across the civic life. The distinct dynamics that influence six particular 
institutions also reflect a number of ongoing processes that factor importantly in the 
national debates including the immigrant-indigenous divide, the questions of authenticity, 
tradition, and knowledge, racial and ethnic inclusion, and the wider debate about 
constructing and furthering an American Muslim outlook. 
The dissertation chronicled how the American Muslim discourses on the need to 
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cultivate, the possibility to have, and the jurisprudential consequences of an American 
Muslim identity on the one hand and how these alternative visions imagine American 
Muslims in relation to the wider Muslim world, and particularly in relation to the 
experiences of other Muslim minorities, on the other. Chapters 2 and 3 placed these 
questions in historical-institutional context through an examination of the institutional 
identities of the six institutions as well as through emphasizing the life-stories and 
discursive evolution of their leaders. Chapters 4 and 5 focused on questions of unity, 
uniformity and how alternative engagements and processes influence the particular sub-
sets of negotiations about the contours of Muslim minority citizenship takes place. 
Chapter 6 took a step back and juxtaposed initial contours of cultural negotiations and 
depictions of convert and indigenous Muslim experiences alongside the multiple 
imaginations of America as a homeland. In Chapter 7 I drew attention to the increased 
emphasis and engagements with Shariʻah, its higher objectives, and jurisprudence of 
minorities with a focus on elite-level and scholarly discourses in the American Muslim 
landscape and argued that these discourses shape, if not dictate, lay Muslims’ 
engagements with questions of cultural production and negotiations of belonging through 
cultural frameworks.  
In these processes elite leaders invoke Islamic precepts and transnational pedagogical 
interpretations but as the introductory chapter also highlights, these views are often 
challenged by others who use alternative interpretive frameworks. Moreover, the 
diffusion and appropriation of expertly religious discourses by lay members does not 
takes place automatically and my research suggests that for some lay members, rather 
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than the religious discourses, their racial identities or their interactions with their parents 
form the primary reference points in these discussions. In the case of converts as well 
born Muslims who adopted a religious life later in their lives, life stories and experiences 
with charismatic leaders as well as the particular dynamics in institutional settings often 
inform their outlook and positions. After conclusion of my interviews, I kept in touch 
with or came across some of my respondents and observed the transformations and 
changes in their lives and viewpoints. In those cases where these changes were important 
in the context of a respondent’s answers to my original interviews, the answers and my 
observations have been excluded from writing. In other words, as the literature on 
narrative and discourse analysis also underscores, life stories, and self-narratives do not 
remain constant or are not always coherent, even at the first instance of narrating.
671
 The 
rich repertoire of life stories my respondents graciously shared with me however, tell the 
story of particular segments of American Muslim experience in a bounded temporal 
frame. Moreover, each institutional setting has seen a number of changes after the 
completion of my primary research.  
Suhaib Webb moved to Washington, D.C. but soon after left Make Space citing its poor 
institutional preparedness. His relationship with MCA transformed into a more formal 
one, he now travels one weekend every month to the West coast to deliver sermons, and 
holds evening and weekend programs. In this regard, MCA continues with its loosely 
structured religious leadership model. After an 8 month-long search process ISBCC hired 
a new imam, Shaykh Yasir Fahmy, a New Jersey born, former software engineer who 
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later enrolled in formal Islamic education at Al-Azhar University. In addition, in an effort 
fulfill its promise to the City of Boston, ISBCC launched a new educational initiative, 
American Islamic Institute (AII). Initially construed as an Islamic seminary, the AII seeks 
to transform itself into a college by 2025 and into a university by 2035.
672
  The ISBCC 
and MAS Boston has initiated an ambitious fundraising effort for the project, arguing that 
American Muslim communities could no longer afford to import imams or send young 
members abroad to traditional pedagogical centers – the success rate of this model they 
argue is quite low.  
Importantly, Zaytuna College earned formal accreditation from the WASC in March 
2015 and became the only accredited Muslim college in America.
673
 The transition from 
zaytuna.org to zaytuna.edu is presented as a fundamental historic moment for Muslim 
American experience by the school. President Hamza Yusuf said in a statement “Five 
years ago, we introduced an undergraduate liberal arts program inspired by the idea of 
restoring the holistic education that had been offered in the great teaching centers of 
Islamic civilization...Today, Zaytuna’s accreditation roots this vision in a reality 
recognized within American higher education. It gives our community its first accredited 
academic address in the United States. And we hope, God willing, that there will be more 
such Muslim colleges and universities to come.”674   
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At Masjid Al-Qur’an, Imam Taalib Mahdee retired from prison chaplaincy and has 
transitioned to a full time imam position in the Dorchester Mosque. Masjid 
Alhamdulillah became center of attention when Usaamah Rahim, an attendant with ties to 
both Masjid Alhamdulillah and Masjid Al-Qur’an, was killed by law enforcement 
agencies during what was described as an antiterrorism operation In June 3, 2015. His 
family rejected the notion that he was radicalized and argued that he was killed extra-
judicially.
675
 Imam Abdullah Faaruuq argued that the police could have apprehended the 
young black man, without killing him. In a conversation after a civic engagement forum 
he attended, he told me, “he was killed because he was a black boy.” Ta’leef collective 
celebrated its 10 year anniversary, launched an ambitious new global media program 
broadcasting its programs live to global audiences and announced its plans to evolve 
Muallif Mentorship Program into Ta’leef Academy, which will seek to further expand 
Ta’leef’s global network. In parallel to these transformations, global and local 
developments also continue to shape negotiations of belonging, community and identity 
among American Muslims. Therefore, the cultural settlement of American Muslims and 
their cultural negotiations take place in a dynamic terrain, often unsettling newcomers 
and those who have settled culturally and physically long time ago. 
The multifaceted account I presented in this study points out that as American Muslims 
contribute to the “unfinished America,” in an increasingly more assertive fashion. In this 
process, their experiences and narratives increasingly vacillate towards a conspicuously 
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particular experience in relation to their imaginations of American Muslim futures vis-à-
vis other Muslim communities across the world. At the same time, however, their internal 
debates highlight the fact that internally, American Muslims subscribe to a diverse set of 
precepts and visions in regards to communal futures as well as the modality of “becoming 
and remaining” simultaneously American and Muslim. 
As highlighted in Chapters 4 and 5, the differences in the role of state management of 
religious minorities establish a stark difference between European Muslim minorities and 
American Muslim community. In contrast to European experiences with “embassy 
Islam,” as Jonathan Laurence reminds us, the history of the flourishing of Islam in 
America has been far freer, if not completely independent of, the impact of direct 
intervention by countries of origin. Although countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and 
Indonesia among others have, in different fashions, establish and fund mosques, invest in 
scholarship and communal ties, these efforts have been far limited in scope especially in 
the past decade and a half, and have also met with resistance from the widespread 
communal agreement about the need for American Muslim experience to be in 
independent from these influences. At the same time, the American state’s involvement 
in the management of religious landscape has been fundamentally informed by the 
historical processes that make questions of religious freedom and the state’s role a 
common denominator across majority and minority religions.  
As I highlight in Chapters 4 and 5, citizenship discourses and practices are intricately 
linked with the state’s role in foreign policy and securitization of Islam and developments 
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since the 9/11 have placed an increasingly controversial role for the American state about 
the global conversation on Islam and questions of religious freedom and extremist 
terrorism and its relationship to American Muslims. And yet, the American experience 
has been starkly different than the corporatist establishment of what Laurence calls 
“Muslim councils,” in the European experience that sought to manage politics of 
representation along with clerical training and recruitment processes. As a number of 
recent studies have reminded us, however, the state remains an important actor in the 
American case as well. And yet, forging cross-communal and political alliances, and 
experiencing a learning curve in public representation and political maturation, American 
Muslims have adopted the language and practice of civil rights activism and political 
lobbying on the one hand, and invested in developing closer ties with other ethnic and 
religious communities that shape their interactions with state institutions. In Chapters 2, 3 
and 6, the crucial discursive thread along the immigrant-indigenous axis is examined as a 
fundamental phenomenon in shaping these experiences. Throughout the dissertation I 
draw attention to socio-economic factors on the one hand, and pedagogical processes and 
normative engagements with religious orthodoxy on the other to highlight the importance 
of African American experience and its influences on a number of fundamental 
discussions that help shape the future contours of American Muslim experience. In 
examining the American born and convert religious and lay leadership and their 
engagements with trans-national networks of normative learning and socio-political 
movements I also highlight the prevalence cultural negotiations around the idea and 
discourse of umma, jurisprudential arguments for the particular development of an 
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American Muslim identity, and their implications for political, social and religious 
engagements across the global debate on Islam and modern politics.  
As the quote from Italo Calvino in the introduction reminds us, imaginations, and 
especially communal imaginations, flow through and are shaped by multiple experiences 
as well as by often-contentious aspects of praxis. The research about the six institutional 
frameworks and the wider American Muslim landscape presented here, I hope, serves to 
underline that along with power relations, politics of representation, and historical-
institutional influences, lived expressions of socio-political and ethical normative 
positions are shaped by multiple, often mind-boggling, manifestations of individual and 
communal imaginations. An analysis of the future trajectory of American Muslim 
experience, therefore, will require being simultaneously attuned to local and global 
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